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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores constitutional judicial review in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 
assessing the expansion of judicial power between 1990 and 1999. The core of this 
research project focusses on the Council of Grand Justices of the Judicial Yuan, and the 
ability of these fifteen Justices to impose their collective will upon other branches of 
government through judicial decisions that sometimes override executive actions and 
legislative acts. The power of constitutional judicial review has de jure rested 
exclusively with the Judicial Yuan under Article 78 of the 1947 Constitution of the 
Republic of China, and the constitutional text places no limitations on the use of such 
judicial power. On a de facto basis, however, the power of the Judicial Yuan has varied 
considerably since 1947, setting an interesting research puzzle and inspiring the 
research questions of this thesis: What are the shifting limitations of judicial power? 
When do Justices review with deference and what encourages judicial assertiveness? 
 
In engaging with these questions, this thesis reconceptualises and contextualises 
Taiwan’s institutional arrangements for constitutional review through strategic 
accounts of judicial decision-making and the examination of the role of judicial 
audiences. Building upon Ginsburg’s seminal study of Taiwanese courts and his 
diffusion-of-political-power model, the following chapters will extend the study of 
constitutional judicial review in a new direction. The diffusion of political power 
through competitive elections only accounts for the strengthening of the power of the 
Judicial Yuan in comparison to other competitive branches of government as a general 
trend. It leaves unexplained why the all-important 1990 case – Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No. 261 [1990] – precedes democratic transition, and why the practical 
exercise of judicial power then fluctuates between deference and assertion. In order to 
8 
 
understand Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 [1990] as the original constitutional 
moment of judicial power in Taiwan, and to assess the important subsequent variations 
within a more general trend of judicial power expansion, this thesis will expand 
strategic accounts of judicial decision-making into the realm of an alliance between 
judiciary and public opinion. The interplay between public support for the Judicial Yuan 
as an indirect enforcement mechanism and the Justices’ strategic alignment with public 
opinion as a basis for building institutional legitimacy is then further reinforced by the 
more traditional elements of Chinese legal culture, such as Mencius’ indirect democracy. 
Evidence for these arguments is offered using a combination of quantitative approaches 
and a series of interviews, as well as special attention to archival research. These 
combine to offer the researcher a wealth of new material in support of the key argument 
that the shift towards judicial supremacy in Taiwan during the 1990s is rooted in the 
Justices’ ability to decide strategically and align themselves with public opinion. 
 
This thesis is therefore original in its empirical impetus and unique as regards the novel 
pieces of evidence it unearths and analyses, in particular the discovery of a repository 
of official judicial interviews in the National Central Library of Taiwan. In addition, the 
theoretical ambition of this thesis combines strategic approaches and the study of 
judicial audiences to Taiwanese constitutional law for the first time. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
The expansion of constitutional judicial power in the Republic of China (Taiwan) 
reached new heights in the 1990s (Mendel, 1993: 157-189), as the (Grand1) Justices 
transformed the Judicial Yuan from a court that ‘served an authoritarian regime’ 
(Ginsburg, 2003: 106) into a genuine guardian of constitution. Taiwan’s decade of 
judicial power expansion began in earnest when the Justices dismissed the martial law-
structured National Assembly in 1990, opening the doors for democratisation via court 
warrant, 2  and ended even more dramatically when they embraced the idea of 
unconstitutional constitutional amendments3 (Jacobsohn, 2006: 460-487) in practice in 
2000.4 Jurists and academics from various disciplines have struggled to explain such a 
dramatic and rapid expansion of judicial power compressed into a single decade. 
 
Taiwan’s story is particularly puzzling because the Council of Grand Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan (hereafter the Judicial Yuan) that stood behind the period of judicial 
assertiveness in the 1990s was appointed by Taiwan’s authoritarian regime.5 How was 
                                                     
1 Nomenclature: the best literal translation is the ‘Grand Justice of the Judicial Yuan of the Republic of 
China’. Although the legal term ‘Justice’ is more commonly used in English and comparative literature, 
this thesis mostly employs that term when referring to the judicial decision makers which constitute the 
Judicial Yuan. In addition, this thesis may occasionally refer to the Judicial Yuan as the ‘constitutional 
court’ if necessary. 
2 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
3 Other constitutional courts asserted this power as a theoretical possibility but chose not to apply it in 
practice. Very few constitutional courts actually struck down specific amendments, and even fewer did 
so for amendments that truly mattered. This makes the Judicial Yuan particularly unique. See generally 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000]. See also Chapter 4.7. 
4 Id (promulgated on 24 March 2000, appealed on 28 October and 18 November 1999). 
5 The 15 Justices who dismissed the congress in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] were 
appointed by President (and dictator) Chiang Ching-Kuo in 1985, and the 15 Justices who struck down 
the unconstitutional constitutional amendment in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000] were 
appointed by President Lee Teng-Hui in 1994. 
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it possible – against the prediction of Dahl’s regime theory (Dahl, 1971: 1-257), 
Hilbink’s work on Chile (Hilbink, 2011: 1-316) and Ginsburg and Moustafa’s study of 
judicial reviews in authoritarian countries (Ginsburg and Moustafa, 2008: 1-378) – that 
the Justices would not only fail to support the regime that appointed them but would 
actively challenge other branches of government? What is more, why did judicial 
behaviour change from a Judicial Yuan that would be best described as deferential (Pre-
1990; Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157) to one that was extraordinarily assertive after 1990, 
playing pivotal roles in politics by imposing its preferences upon other policy areas 
(Wolfe, 1994: 3-16), overriding executive actions and legislative acts (Whittington, 
2007: 230-284). In analysing this puzzle, this thesis shall review not only the nature of 
judicial review (ibid: 1-27) but also the motives (Schubert, 1965: 22-43; Shapiro, 1981: 
28-32) behind the judicial decision-making. 
 
We know that institutional design has not changed since the implementation of the ROC 
Constitution of 1947. It is therefore worth arguing that one source of judicial power for 
the Judicial Yuan’s political influence is rooted in the original Constitution with its 
institutional design and highly abstract language. We also know that judicial behaviour 
changed dramatically despite the fact that the institutional design remained unaltered, 
hinting at the importance of context in understanding the shift from deference to 
assertion that characterised the judicial power expansion after 1990. The most 
prominent explanatory model has been presented by Ginsburg, but scholarship (and 
Ginsburg himself) has subsequently refined the models that informed Ginsburg’s 
seminal study. This has shifted attention beyond the political opportunism that the 
diffusion of power through competitive elections created to an examination of judicial 
preferences – why and how the Judicial Yuan often made the best use of opportunities 
to assert themselves, and why they remained deferential at other times. This new field 
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of research lies at the heart of this thesis, with a special focus on the alliance between 
the Judicial Yuan and public opinion (Baum, 2006: 25-49; Marshall, 1989: 14-26) 
which assumes that the Taiwanese Justices decided carefully and strategically (the 
strategic model) in order to maintain this alliance.6 
 
In the field of constitutional design, the implementation of the Constitution requires a 
great deal of additional interpretation because it is written in abstract terms. However, 
the institutional power to interpret this Constitution7 rests exclusively with the Justices 
(Chen, 2005b: 796-806), placing no limitations on the use of the resulting judicial 
power (Li, 2007: 206-208). This in turn provides an opportunity8 for the expansion of 
judicial power – just as long as the Justices make decisions that are strategically in line 
with the preferences of their crucial audience (Baum, 2006: 25), namely Taiwan’s 
public opinion (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009: 452-457). Based on concepts of strategic 
behaviourism (Baum, 1997: 89-124), this thesis sets out to observe interactions between 
the Justices and public opinion, and to assess the expansion of judicial power and its 
limitations from 1990 to 1999. 
 
This thesis begins by demonstrating that the strategic model (Epstein and Knight, 1998: 
1-21) provides important insights, going beyond Ginsburg’s diffusion model (Ginsburg, 
2003: 106-157) because public opinion in Taiwan was able to influence the Justices in 
                                                     
6 Eg., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] (regarding the constitutionality of capital punishment). 
See also Chapter 9.2. 
7  Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 171 (1947), and 
Constitution of R.O.C. § 173 (1947). 
8 The institutional design of Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan has not changed since the foundation of the ROC 
Constitution in 1947, but judicial behaviour changed after 1990. This could result in only one outcome 
– the foundation of a new key variable: an alliance between the Judicial Yuan and public-opinion, in 
order that the Justices could behave differently by exercising their constitutional powers to the 
maximum. It is therefore necessary to emphasise the Justices’ theoretical constitutional powers. 
36 
 
terms of judicial decision-making.9 This confined the expansion of Taiwan’s judicial 
power within effective political limits,10 despite the fact that such an expansion of 
power was not subject to normal institutional checks and balances. Secondly, this thesis 
transcends the classical framework of separation of powers games (Li, 2000: 37-63) 
and expands the strategic paradigm into the realm of public opinion inspired by Baum’s 
idea of judicial audiences, (Baum, 2006: 79-87). The evidence presented in this thesis 
– in the form of 38 official Judicial Yuan interviews with Taiwan’s Justices and elder 
judges, 12 personal interviews with Justices, judges, constitutional draftsmen, 
politicians and senior journalists and 37 crucial articles, books, biographies written by 
key people in the 1990s – leads us in an entirely new direction. This thesis concludes 
that the Justices of the Judicial Yuan pay more attention to public opinion than to any 
other element we have come to associate with judicial decision-making (Segal and 
Spaeth, 2002: 44-114; 424-428). As such, this thesis aims to verify that public opinion 
is the most important guide for the Judicial Yuan, and it has forced the Justices to 
accustom themselves to making strategic decisions in return for the support of public 
opinion, thereby providing indirect democratic legitimacy (Mencius11) or an indirect 
enforcement mechanism (Vanberg, 2005: 1-178). This means that whilist the Justices12 
may oppose other branches of government, alliances between them and public opinion 
                                                     
9 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.475 [1999]. 
10 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]. 
11 Mencius is one of the most important political theorists in Chinese history, and his political philosophy 
remains highly influential in Chinese civilisations, and hence for the cultural and intuitive dimensions 
of Taiwan’s Justices. Mencius is honoured as the China’s Second Sage, after Confucius. For detailed 
discussions of Mencius’ ideas, see generally the section on indirect democratic legitimacy on Chapter 
1.7 and Chapter 4.4. 
12 Apart from providing more accurate and sophisticated explanations of the Judicial Yuan’s decision-
making and judicial power variations in the 1990s, public opinion also matters as an indirect 
enforcement mechanism corresponding with important cultural dimensions of the Judicial Yuan’s 
legitimacy (Mencius’ indirect democratic legitimacy). Apart from empowering the court against other 
branches of government, this thesis will also present examples in which the Judicial Yuan did not dare 
to confront public opinion, despite the fact that the actual preference of the Justices was different from 
the final vote. This reflects strategic decision-making, rejecting the attitudinal model. 
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can also narrow down their decisions to a much narrower range of choices13 , and 
Taiwan’s Justices are fully aware of these political costs. 
 
To build better models of the highest court of decision-making in Taiwan, this thesis 
often employs a ‘but for’ causation analysis. As a first step, Taiwan’s Constitution is 
explored as a possible textual restriction of judicial power expansion: are there textual 
elements linked to jurisprudence and judicial doctrines of interpretation that have 
consistently stood in the way of judicial power expansion over time? If such textual 
constitutional restrictions cannot be found, then formal legal explanations of judicial 
decision-making can be set aside for Taiwan. It has already been argued that the 
formalist-realist divide is often overplayed 14  (Tamanaha, 2010: 181-199), but in 
Taiwan – with a highly abstract constitution and a judiciary that apparently values being 
assertive in terms of culture and the role of the judge – the textual models fail to explain 
what the judicial decision makers do. We must therefore use context and other models 
to understand the workings of the court. As a next step, the attitudinal model15 is tested 
and ruled out for Taiwan – there is no single case in the 1990s where the Justices played 
against public opinion, and the only thing we can conclude is that they actually changed 
the prosecutorial system in accordance with public opinion.16 
 
                                                     
13 Taking Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] as an example, Justices who clearly supported the 
abolition of capital punishment not to make themselves heard because they knew that the majority of 
Taiwanese citizens supported capital punishment. If the Justices had to refrain from provoking the 
public, their choice was de facto limited. 
14 Taiwan’s judicial decision-makers are constantly expected to be both legal realists and formalists 
because of the cultural role of the judge – which somehow makes the realist-formalist divide 
meaningless in this country. See also Chapter 1.8. 
15 In theory the Justices can decide in accordance with their political preferences (the attitudinal model) 
as long as there are no constitutional restrictions against them (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 44-114). 
However, if the Justices always decide strategically (strategic model) despite the fact that there are no 
constitutional restrictions against judicial power expansion, this implies that non-constitutional 
restrictions exist. 
16 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995]. See also Chapter 8.4. 
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The textual and attitudinal models both fail to yield convincing evidence for Taiwan’s 
apex court’s judicial decision. As a standard separation of power games between 
different branches of government, the game-playing strategies show how crucial public 
opinion was in the 1990; as long as the Justices decided in accordance with public 
opinion at the time, the executives and the legislature could only choose to comply, 
instead of making another Burmah Oil case.17 This thesis will therefore examine how 
important public opinion was in terms of judicial power expansion in Taiwan, shifting 
Taiwan’s judicial decision-making towards the strategic model. In other words, this 
thesis aims to demonstrate that Taiwan’s Justices decided strategically because of 
public opinion in the 1990s, even though there were absolutely no constitutional 
restrictions against the expansion of their power. 
 
Overall, this thesis will provide an empirical paradigm of judicial power expansion 
based upon the strategic model, and will also explore why the attitudinal model failed 
in Taiwan. The emerging hypothesis of this thesis is built around the following: 
 
1. Justices would maximise their political preferences only when they were not 
politically threatened. If Justices had to find a political ally, they maximised 
their judicial political preferences only when their political allies shared or 
refrained from offering an opinion of their own 18  (indirect enforcement 
mechanism). 
 
                                                     
17 Burmah Oil Company Ltd v. Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75. 
18 The term ‘does not care’ was used by Justice Herbert H.P. Ma when he explained the interaction 
between public opinion and the Judicial Yuan. He said clearly that public opinion simply ‘does not care’ 
what the Justices had decided in some cases (Interview with Ma on 19-JUL-2013). 
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2. Justices could obtain democratic legitimacy even though they were not 
elected. As long as public opinion was in favour of the Justices, neither 
congressmen/women nor elected officials would dare to challenge the 
Justices’ political authority (indirect democratic legitimacy). 
 
Given that Taiwanese legal and political studies are a rare phenomenon in the UK, there 
will be two chapters introducing the theories discussed in this thesis – Chapters 1 and 
4 – which are designed for different purposes. Chapter 1 introduces the way the Judicial 
Yuan and its inferior courts operate. The chapter introduces a court system that pays 
very little attention to the English-speaking world. The Taiwanese judiciary is mainly 
based upon German19 jurisprudence, but in terms of legal transplantation, there are 
always different understandings of the same doctrine. Chapter 1 is therefore designed 
to introduce the Taiwanese court system via the Taiwanese interpretation of legal-
constitutional theories and political-philosophical ideologies that are commonly applied 
worldwide, along with ancient Chinese political doctrines. Chapter 4 is constructed 
around theories that examine the newer decision-making model of the Judicial Yuan. 
The chapter addresses legal and political theories that are applicable in explaining why 
and how the Justices behaved in the 1990s. There is no denying that Chapters 1 and 4 
may cover the same ground, but both chapters are necessary as they examine the 
problem from different angles. 
 
As a next step, important key phrases and concepts are clarified. Based on this, Chapter 
1 explains the relationship between Taiwan’s Justices and public opinion through 
                                                     
19 For this reason, this thesis applies German legal terms if there is no similar concept in English. 
Taiwanese legal terms can be translated into German without gaps and for English academics, it is 
generally easier to understand German than Chinese. 
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specific examples, thereby moving from a standard legal doctrinal analysis of Taiwan’s 
judicial decision-making towards a judicial-political study that makes a fuller use of 
interdisciplinary analytical processes. 
 
1.2 TAIWAN, CHINA AND CHINESE 
 
There are de facto two China(s) in the world – the nationalist Republic of China – the 
ROC (Taiwan), founded in 1911 – and the communist People’s Republic of China, the 
PRC, established in 1949. The de jure relationship between the ROC and PRC has 
always been complex, and the related politics (domestic as well as international) even 
more so; this complexity becomes relevant on a practical level in Chapter 9.3, which 
discusses Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993]. To isolate this thesis from the 
very outset from the passionate politics that the use – or avoidance – of a single word 
can trigger both in the ROC and in the PRC, it seems worthwhile to stress the fact that 
the two China(s) do not presently belong to each other, and those who propagate a One 
China Policy implicitly acknowledge the presence of opposing views and the reality of 
two different systems of government.20 Meanwhile, those who demand a declaration 
of independence for Taiwan inherently acknowledge the fact that there is no such 
independent country named Taiwan. 
 
Some Taiwanese academics currently avoid using the term ‘China’ altogether because 
the word is taken to refer to the communist PRC in contemporary and especially global 
discourses. Similarly, some Western academics prefer the term ‘Taiwan’ instead of 
‘China’ because Taiwan is de facto not part of the PRC. However, it would be 
                                                     
20 To use Germany as an example, it would no longer make sense to talk about ‘One Germany’ or 
‘Dachtheorie’ after reunification; the discourse of unity required the reality of division. 
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impossible to engage with Taiwan’s legal system without using the terms ‘China and 
Chinese’ because the Constitution is unaware of, and thus does not recognise, the term 
‘Taiwan’, and the same applies to all relevant legislative acts, executive orders and 
judicial decisions. Within the entire Taiwanese legal realm, the official terminology of 
‘Republic of China’ is used exclusively. Hence, within this thesis on Taiwan’s Judicial 
Yuan and Constitution, the words China and Chinese refer to the ROC, the subjects of 
Imperial China, as well as people who are full-rights-citizens of the ROC; of course, 
these citizens today mainly refer to themselves as Taiwanese – even though their 
passports say ‘Republic of China’. 
 
1.3 LEGAL LANGUAGE IN TAIWAN 
 
The language of the Taiwanese legal system has three implications. Firstly, the use of 
classical Chinese implies the highest levels of abstraction (Cao, 2008: 123-125), so the 
word count21 of the ROC Constitution is similar to other short constitutions.22 What is 
more, the ROC Constitution does not even try to bind the Justices and judges through 
specific details. The high levels of linguistic (ibid) as well as contextual23 abstraction 
empower the Justices and judges constitutionally from the start, although they basically 
supported the authoritarian regime before the 1990s. In fact, the ROC Constitution has 
not changed so much as a word, remaining exactly the same constitutional text that says 
the Constitution ‘is what the judges say it is’ (Hughes, 1908: 139), despite the fact that 
                                                     
21 In terms of length, the ROC Constitution of 1947 is not amongst the shortest. This is because it 
embodies fundamental national policies. Apart from those articles, the Constitution’s word count is 
very low. For example, the most important chapter of the Constitution, the fundamental rights chapter, 
only consists of 18 articles and 600 Chinese characters. Considering that this chapter is applied in 
almost all litigations in the Judicial Yuan, 18 articles written in only 600 Chinese characters illustrates 
the highly abstract linguistic nature of the legal text. 
22 For example, the US Bill of Rights consists of 568 English words, whilst the fundamental rights 
chapter of the ROC Constitution (in its official English translation) consists of 591 words. 
23 Constitution of R.O.C. Chapter 7 (1947). 
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the Justices have changed their decisions dramatically since 1990, actively striking 
down the authoritarian regime. In order to understand this legal-historical complexity 
and address how and why the Justices changed their mind by re-interpreting the ROC 
Constitution,24 we have to look at the context and the institutional organisation of the 
Judicial Yuan. This thesis has no intention of claiming that legal formalism is 
completely incompatible in Taiwan, but it appears that this legal formalism – 
exemplified by judges finding the law and theories of judicial decision-making 
restrained25 by the legal context of the constitution – never made sense in Taiwan’s 
constitutional litigation because of the highly abstract nature of classical Chinese. 
 
Secondly, as well as high levels of abstraction, classical Chinese grammar is 
exceptionally complex (Li, 2016: 416-418) and adds a multitude of interpretative 
options when judicial decisions ascribe meaning to linguistic symbols (legal 
indeterminacy; Kress, 1989: 283-337). The wide use of pronouns and generalised nouns 
characterises classical Chinese as a profound but abstract language, and the massive use 
of abbreviation on verb tense as well as static morphological features opens the 
language to even more interpretation. In other words, classical Chinese requires 
grammatical interpretation by nature, making the language extraordinarily 
indeterminable (Cao, 2008: 123-125; Li, 2016: 416-518). The role of classical Chinese 
takes indeterminacy to a whole new level, 26  yet it makes up a fundamental 
                                                     
24 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
25 In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984] the Justices concluded that their decisions are deemed 
part of the Constitution (Li, 2000: 45-51); in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] they dismissed 
the then congress, and in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000] the 5th constitutional amendment 
(1999) was declared unconstitutional – evidence that shows it would be naïve to discuss legal formalism 
in Taiwan. 
26 The best example concerns Taiwan’s debate on whether or not the Constitution intends to prohibit 
precedent. Because Article 80 of the Constitution dictates that ‘[j]udges shall be above partisanship and 
shall, in accordance with law, hold trials independently, free from any interference’, it is commonly 
interpreted in Taiwan’s judiciary that the Constitution ‘linguistically’ prohibits precedent (Li, 2014: 60-
68) – despite the fact that many legal academics disagree (ibid). What is more, the debate on precedent 
becomes undebatable when it comes to the Judicial Yuan – because Article 77 states that the Judicial 
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characteristic of the Taiwanese constitutional system.27 
 
Thirdly, classical Chinese is as far removed from contemporary native Chinese speakers 
as Latin is to contemporary Europeans. This is not just the few technical Latin or foreign 
terms or phrases that crop up in most legal systems, but a genuine and massive linguistic 
gap28 between legal experts and those who have never studied law. The Taiwanese rule 
of law doctrine includes the concept of legal clarity29 but this is not concerned with the 
use30 of classical Chinese. 
 
1.4 PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Perhaps the best definition of the term ‘public opinion’ as it is used in this thesis is 
proposed by Hans Speier, and underscores the unilateral communication between ‘the 
citizens and their government’ (Speier, 1950: 376), on which Chinese bureaucracy has 
depended for thousands of years: 
 
Public opinion, so understood, is primarily a communication from the 
citizens to their government. […] If a government effectively denies the 
                                                     
Yuan is the supreme judicial body of the ROC, and that a Judicial Yuan’s decision shall be deemed part 
of the Constitution which supersedes precedent. In other words, Taiwan is a country that paradoxically 
has no precedent, despite the fact that its Justices’ decision remains part of the Constitution. See 
generally Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984]. 
27 Because the Constitution is linguistically abstract, its implementation must rely on judicial decisions, 
which function as de facto judge-made-laws. For example, there is only an abstract principle regarding 
the freedom of speech embodied in the Constitution and it is likely to authorise the Justices of judicial 
law-making power in determining what should be deemed as the freedom of speech in Taiwan. See 
Constitution of R.O.C. § 11 (1947). 
28 For example, in 2012, a former Member of the Legislative Yuan complained publicly that he could 
not understand an official document of the Legislative Yuan because it is written by classical Chinese 
(Ho Meng-Kuei: Central News Agency 05 March 2012). 
29 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.432 [1997]. See also Lord Bingham: ‘the law must be accessible 
and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable’ (Slapper and Kelly, 2015: 37). 
30 No judicial decision regarding legal clarity has been made due to the use of classical Chinese – and 
no case on the matter has even been discussed. 
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claim that the opinion of the citizens on public matters be relevant, in 
one form or another, for policy-making or if it prevents the free and 
public expression of such opinions, public opinion does not exist. (ibid) 
 
Speier probably had no intention of arguing that analytical tools are necessary in order 
to read public opinion; however, it is definitely true that for 2400 years Chinese 
bureaucrats decided what should be deemed public opinion without referring to 
sophisticated methodology, since Mencius constructed the theory of indirect democratic 
legitimacy (King, 1993: 57-62). In other words, it would be considered unjust to 
criticise a Chinese official who never read public opinion, because no public opinion 
surveys were performed 2400 years ago. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
Mencius arbitrarily decided what form of public opinion should take. Such decision-
making processes have been used for thousands of years, and precisely reflect the way 
the Judicial Yuan read public opinion in the 1990s. 
 
In England, according to John Locke, public opinion since the late 17th century was 
deemed to be ‘equal in importance to civil and divine law’ (Ferguson, 2000: 6). In 
Taiwan, it is considered a measurable facet of good governance even today (King, 1993: 
57-62). Linguistically, public opinion and ‘the voice of the people’ (Dicey, 1914: 19) 
are synonyms in Chinese, and public opinion in Taiwan has been placed at the centre 
of constitutional arguments, as Dicey argues: 
 
The experience, at any rate, of democratic countries where the 
constitution provides a regular mode of appeal from the legislature to 
the people, proves that the voice of the people may be just as ready to 
check as to stimulate the energy of parliamentary law-makers. (ibid) 
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If we choose to understand public opinion in a philosophical sense, there can be no 
denial of the existence of public opinion as claimed by classical political philosophers. 
According to Speier (1950: 377) ‘John Locke pointed out that men judge the rectitude 
of their actions according to three laws, namely, the divine law, the civil law, and the 
law of opinion or reputation’. However, Rousseau ‘speaks of public opinion positively 
and celebrates it as the guardian of public morality … public opinion forms the real 
constitution of the state’ (Sheehan, 2009: 64). Moreover Kant, according to Jürgen 
Habermas, held that ‘legislative laws based on public opinion’ represent the genuine 
public law (Nixon, 2011: 89). Mencius, according to Li (2012: 128-135) associated 
public opinion with legitimacy. In a nutshell, the aforementioned political philosophers 
had no doubt about the political influence of public opinion, and they all believed that 
public opinion was at the core in politics.31 Political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neuman 
(1991:257) commented: 
 
It is not only governments that are subject to the pressure of public 
opinion. Every individual, every member of society, is subject to the 
pressure of public opinion. John Locke wrote in the late seventeenth 
century that there is not 1 in 10,000 who remains untouched when public 
opinion turns against him. To quote James Madison, one of the US 
Constitution’s founding fathers: ‘If it be true that all governments rest 
on opinion, it is no less true that the strength of opinion in each 
individual, and its practical influence on his conduct, depend much on 
the number he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The 
                                                     
31 For Locke it was part of the law, for Rousseau it was the real constitution of the state, for Kant it 
represented the ideal of public law, and for Mencius it stood for the legitimacy of governance. 
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reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious, when left alone; 
and acquires firmness and confidence, in proportion to the number with 
which it is associated’. Thus it has been known since antiquity that 
public opinion exerts pressure on the government as well as on every 
individual in society. But how this pressure develops and functions is a 
subject that social research has yet to deal with successfully. 
 
However, when we aim to describe public opinion in a more sophisticated manner, we 
are forced to conclude that no readily acceptable definition exists. The Round Table on 
Political Statistics of the National Conference on Science of Politics in 1924 even 
suggested that it would be wise to ‘avoid the use of the term public opinion, if possible’ 
(Hall et al., 1925: 124), even though ‘twenty-three methods by which opinion might be 
measured were suggested for consideration’ (ibid). Uncertainties in definition do not 
result in the criticism of proposed research methods simply because academics from 
the humanities ‘have no qualms about assuming its existence’ (Binkley, 1928: 390), 
despite the fact that ‘it perplexes sociologists, political theorists’ (ibid: 389) and thus 
jurists. For example, the broader definition offered by political scientist Valdimer Key 
(1961: 14) is that public opinion represents: 
 
[T]hose opinions held by private persons which governments find it 
prudent to heed. Governments may be compelled toward action or 
inaction by such opinion; in other instances they may ignore it, perhaps 
at their peril; they may attempt to alter it; or they may divert or pacify it. 
 
Like Speier’s definition, Key’s take on public opinion still fails to tell us precisely who 
these ‘private persons’ are. However, both definitions clearly show how governments 
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will respond when they sense political pressure. Public opinion exists when a 
government accepts ‘the claim that the opinion of citizens on public matters be relevant’ 
(Speier, 1950: 376) because ‘governments find it prudent to heed’ them (Key, 1961: 14). 
In the case of Judicial Yuan in the 1990s, this definition is more than adequate because 
the Justices never intended to discover exactly who constituted public opinion (at least 
as far as this thesis is concerned), although we can observe that the Justices considered 
some ‘voices of the people’ (Dicey, 1914: 19) to constitute public opinion, and behaved 
accordingly. 
 
In other words, even political scientists have acknowledged that ‘there is no generally 
accepted definition’ of public opinion (Davison, 1968: 188). However, there is an 
acceptable definition of public opinion, depending on ‘its different uses’ (Price, 1992: 
4), and this thesis concludes that public opinion represents political pressure from the 
public as it is received or inferred by the Justices in their examination of how the 
decision-making process influences the eventual result. 
 
[S]trong currents of public opinion [are] difficult to determine. […] 
Studies find that the attitudes of some Supreme Court Justices change, 
consciously or not, in response either to long-term shifts in the public 
mood or to the changing social forces that underlie them. (Epstein et al., 
2013: 88) 
 
In order to understand how vox populi may be considered as public opinion, we shall 
address the factors that influence the Justices psychologically and socially. This thesis 
therefore proposes traditional legal-cultural (Shapiro, 1981: 157-193) and judicial self-
interest (Marshall, 1989: 131-166) evaluations. According to Noelle-Neumann, ‘it is 
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fairly easy to find out which opinion can be expressed openly without any negative 
sanctions – the “public opinion” – and which cannot’ (Schoenbach and Becker, 1995: 
325) because ‘humans, as social beings, have a “quasi-statistical sense” making them 
aware of which opinion is fashionable and which is not’ (ibid). The Justices therefore 
had every reason, either from the perspective of traditional legal culture or judicial self-
interests, to make good use of their ‘quasi-statistical sense’ (ibid) on decision-making. 
This meant that the Justices would be motivated to decide which voices of the people 
should be deemed important to their decisions, either ‘consciously or not’ (Epstein et 
al., 2013: 88). 
 
Mencius constructed a theory of indirect democratic legitimacy, and this theory founded 
the general relationship between the ruler and the ruled in China for thousands of years 
(Li, 2012: 50-52). Mencius saw public opinion as fundamentally relevant to China’s 
political system (Li, 1999: 169). The legitimacy of both decision-maker and decision 
depends on its congruence with public need (Dunstan, 2004: 325-326), such as 
American sex discrimination cases in which Epstein and Kobylka suggested that court 
decisions reflected public opinion (Erickson and Simon, 1998: 152). The echoes of 
Mencius’ political theories resonate through many judicial decisions.32 Justices Herbert 
H.P. Ma and Wu Geng said: 
 
In terms of whether the Justice of the Republic of China take public 
opinion seriously or not, [and] the question of whether [they] read public 
opinion or not, I think, speaking overall, it is nearly impossible for a 
jurist in the Republic of China, including Justices and judges, to 
                                                     
32 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]; Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995]. 
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completely ignore social reactions […]33 (Interview with Ma on 19-
JUL-2013) 
 
[S]ince being commissioned as a Justice, I have always made decisions 
humbly and cautiously. During my 18-year career as a Justice, the only 
aphorism in my mind has been a phrase by Zhuge Liang in the Manifesto 
Before Military Expedition: ‘Ever since [I] received such a 
responsibility, [I] have been feeling anxious day and night because [I] 
fear that [I] may not accomplish the task and will tarnish the Late 
Emperor’s reputation’. Of course, there is no emperor nowadays, but 
there is concern with mass public opinion instead, along with our law 
society’s criticism […]34 (Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-2004) 
 
In addition to Mencius, Vanberg’s indirect enforcement mechanism (Vanberg, 2005: 1-
178) provides another dimension in which to analyse Taiwan Justices’ decisions. If the 
Justices pursue self-interest (Chapter 8) or are harmed (Chapter 9) by public opinion, 
they would choose to decide in accordance with it. 
 
Public opinion in Taiwan is no longer ‘difficult to define’ (Rosillo-López, 2017: 18), 
and can be observed from political-sociological standpoinits (Weakliem, 2005: 227-246) 
because morality and reputation are attached to public opinion, which functions as 
judge and jury, as Charles Duclos argues (Walton, 2009: 22-23). Mencius’ indirect 
democratic legitimacy, along with Vanberg’s indirect enforcement mechanism ‘may be 
for the building of a reputation with a view to further aims, but it is also a very important 
                                                     
33 Author’s Translation. 
34 Author’s Translation. 
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final, direct motivation’ (Kolm, 1996: 399). Judges are also ‘public men judged in this 
way by public opinion. The state of this opinion is often a means to future power by 
election or choice’ (ibid). 
 
Public opinion is something you can’t discount. No judge wants to be 
seen to be unpopular or out of step with what are held up to be 
community values. Vast numbers of judges uphold these values, but one 
has to ask are they subconsciously affected by popular opinion? 
(Mackenzie, 2005: 139) 
 
Whilst the different chapters that make up this thesis explore different dimensions of 
the nexus between public opinion and the Judicial Yuan nexus, the core understanding 
remains married to a conceptualisation of public opinion as the judges’ understanding 
of the distribution of the political preferences of Taiwanese citizens. The thesis presents 
case studies in which the Justices received third party analyses of how these preferences 
are controlled by the media; this thesis also advances evidence in Chapter 5 showing 
that the Judicial Yuan actively pursue a great deal of judicial data analysis. Lastly, this 
thesis compiles case studies in which the Justices simply rely on empirical idealism – 
their imagined35 understanding of what the public expects. 
 
1.5 SELF-INTEREST AND CULTURAL BIAS 
 
                                                     
35 The Judicial Yuan is a court that only decides crucial and per incuriam cases, so that the Justices in 
most cases can rely on their imagined understanding of public opinion. It is pointless to criticise the 
Justices for accuracy, because in many of these cases, everyone knows where public opinion stands. 
Taking the case on capital punishment as an example, there is no need for the Judicial Yuan to do any 
form of statistical analysis if they simply want to know public preference – that is a given. Public 
opinion surveys were simply for confirmation or academic purposes in this case. See generally Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]. 
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This thesis upholds the Western theory that human beings are tending to pursue self-
interests as a powerful analytical tool. Western scholars – in particular Posner (Stout, 
2011: 36-37) – have used a homo economicus approach to raise fascinating research 
questions about self-interest and judicial decision-making. Based on his 
interdisciplinary background, Posner reframes the way we think about a judge in a court 
from an economist’s perspective: what is the judge maximizing (Posner, 1993: 1-41)? 
According to Posner, ‘judges are rational, and they pursue instrumental and 
consumption goals of the same general kind and in the same general way that private 
persons do’ (ibid: 39). This thesis has no doubt about Posner’s conclusion. However, 
the thesis shall particularly highlight Eric Posner’s opinion, a norm-based model 
observation that strengthens his father’s ideas: 
 
The curious persistence of the homo economicus account in the norms 
literature has been forthrightly explained by Eric Posner, a son of 
Richard who is himself a prominent legal scholar. The young Posner 
observes that ‘people appear to obey norms both in order to avoid being 
sanctioned by others (“shame”) and in order to avoid being sanctioned 
by their own conscience (“guilty”).’ (Stout, 2011: 36-37) 
 
Based on Posner’s homo economicus approach and norm-based model, this thesis will 
deem judicial decisions decided in accordance with social and cultural norms as judicial 
self-interest. However, this thesis will stress that displays of self-interest may vary as a 
result of diverse cultural biases. Here is a good example: 
 
Confucius honoured those who die for righteous causes and Mencius 
admired those who sacrificed their lives for justice. Because I have 
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devoted my whole life to what I found to be just, I am proud to profess 
that I am righteous at the time of my execution. What I have done 
indicates what I have learnt from our sages, and right now I no longer 
feel I have failed my beloved fatherland.36 – Wen Tian-Xiang (1283) 
 
Duke Wen Tian-Xiang of the Imperial Chinese Song dynasty (960-1279) was captured 
by the Mongol Empire in 1278. Kublai Khan admired him, and offered him two options, 
either to serve Kublai Khan or be executed. The duke was steadfast in his choice of 
execution. The above note, in which he told the Chinese descendants why he refused to 
surrender, was discovered after his execution. As a Han Chinese, his loyalty to China 
was a matter of principle. In the light of Western realist thought, he gave priority to his 
reputation37 (Olsthoorn, 2015: 61-62). 
 
Duke Wen Tian-Xiang’s choice in 1283 illustrates the concept that people may not 
always consider political position and wealth as a priority when making political 
decisions. Sometimes a good public reputation amongst the public is more politically 
honourable. As a matter of fact, Duke Wen has become a public symbol for loyalty and 
honesty as ideal values underlying the Chinese self-image of their civilisation. The 
political influence of such ideas is magnified by the practice of Chinese ancestor 
worship (Lakos, 2010: 57-80) because Duke Wen has been ‘canonised’ as China’s sage 
                                                     
36 Author’s Translation. 
37 I do not intend to imply that only the Han Chinese people would die for reputation – it happens in the 
West as well. For example, the most common critique of the homo economicus theory is that ‘people 
not only leave tips in restaurants that they anticipate never again visiting, they sacrifice and even die 
for beliefs that do not materially enrich them, or for that matters their kin and descendants’ (Ross et al., 
2010: 33). Even though I apply Eric Posner’s opinion of homo ecomomicus theory, my view of choosing 
death for reputation coheres Benjamin Franklin’s thought – ‘the motive shifted to self-interest, for 
business virtues were “natural means of acquiring wealth, honour, and reputation”’ (Frey, 2009: 27). 
For Adam Smith (Olsthoorn, 2015: 61-62), reputation was considered as a kind of self-interest, so I 
hold that Duke Wen Tian-Xiang’s choice represented his self-interest because reputation mattered to 
him. 
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through the cultural construction of memory and the practice of remembering (cultural 
relevance).38 His decision may enlighten modern political scientists to rethink the 
scope of their political interests, or at least to subsume their choices into one of the 
available political options in the Chinese world.39 
 
1.6 THE PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST 
 
The pursuit of judicial self-interest has become a common theme in judicial behaviour 
literature, and most scholars assume that self-interest can have a considerable impact 
on judicial decision-making. An initial and fundamental assumption of this thesis is 
therefore that the construction of models of Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan’s behaviour begins 
by embracing this habitual reiteration of the pursuit of judicial self-interest. As a next 
step, the concept of judicial self-interest is then explored in the context of cultural 
differences, Taiwan’s judiciary’s specific professional ethics, judicial career paths and 
judicial education. 
 
Various scholars have conceptualised judicial self-interest in somewhat elusive ways 
that cover a wide variety of meanings, so the concept could almost be said to encompass 
any motivation of judges at any point in time in the judicial decision-making process 
(Baum, 2006: 11). Self-interest has been said to refer to a general concern for public 
policy (Smith, 1995: 4), material benefits for judges or their courts (Zhang, 2009: 143), 
                                                     
38  China’s fundamental philosophy, as constructed by Confucius dictates that ‘personal individual 
perfection is situated within the notion of “Chun-tzu” (gentlemen), whereas interpersonal communal 
perfection is manifested through the notion of “Shen-jen” (sage). The philosophy of life is the focus of 
Confucianism’ (Woo, 1997: 85-86). In other words, we are dealing with a social context in which 
concrete cultural practices structure and reinforce distinct value orientations. 
39 I would apply Eric Posner’s shame-and-guilt argument (the norm-based model), holding that Duke 
Wen Tian-Xiang was maximising his reputation (homo economicus theory) because he felt ashamed or 
guilty (Stout, 2011: 36-37) if he were to choose to ignore the Confucian norm. 
54 
 
or simply reputation40 (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009: 452-454; Posner, 1993: 15). No 
matter what kind of judicial self-interest is prioritised by judges, they are still pursuing 
the maximisation of their judicial self-interest (Posner, 1993: 1-41). 
 
The idea of judicial self-interest can also be read in accordance with the classical 
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. The purpose of the doctrine is to 
restrain ‘a natural human tendency toward expansion of personal power’ (Carper and 
McKinsey, 2012: 47). There is no reason, especially not from the perspective of legal 
realism, to exclude judges from such natural human tendencies (Bond and Smith, 2008: 
526). 
 
One of the best examples of the complexity of judicial motivation was provided by the 
US Supreme Court in 1989, when Chief Justice Rehnquist held a news conference about 
salary increases for Supreme Court Justices (Smith, 1995: 45-46). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s pursuit of judicial self-interest seems straightforward here, because a call 
for salary increases is exactly the sort of material benefit homo economicus pursues as 
an individual. But at the same time we can also conceptualise the Chief Justice’s actions 
as a more selfless pursuit of institutional self-interest, with adequate judicial salaries as 
a cornerstone of the judicial independence of the court as a whole.41 Whilst money is 
                                                     
40 I refer to Richard Posner’s homo economicus theory (Posner, 1993: 1-41). He begins with non-profit 
enterprise theory, assuming that judges shall not work as hard as lawyers because courts are non-profit 
institutions (ibid: 7-13); however, judges work as hard as lawyers in reality. Posner then lists some 
elements of judicial utility function (ibid: 13-15), holding that judges ‘must be deriving utility from the 
work of being a judge, and not just from the status of being a judge … their utility function must in 
short contain something besides money income (from their judicial salary) and leisure’ (ibid: 13). One 
of the elements that concerns judges, according to Posner, is reputation (ibid: 15). 
41 Legal academics worldwide often distinguish individual self-interest from institutional self-interest 
(Connelly, 2010: 147). However, the pursuit of institutional self-interest seems to lie at the core of 
Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan. I have no intention of saying that Taiwan’s Justices do not pursue individual 
self-interest, but Chinese culture determines Chinese approaches to pursuing self-interest, in that ‘the 
correct way to pursue self-interest is “subjectively for oneself, but objectively for all others”’ (Yan, 
2011: 42). In other words, it is quite difficult to distinguish the pursuit of individual self-interest from 
the pursuit of institutional self-interest in this thesis – even when the Justices intend to pursue individual 
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the key factor here, the non-material benefits that judges are pursuing are substantially 
more important throughout this thesis. Non-material interests within the Taiwanese 
judiciary are not easily visible, although they do exist, particularly in relation to judicial 
careers (Posner, 1993: 1-41). 
 
Taiwan’s Constitution of 1947 acknowledges the presence of judicial self-interest by 
safeguarding the interests of judicial decision-makers and judicial institutions through 
Article 81: 
 
Judges shall hold office for life. No judge shall be removed from office 
unless he has been found guilty of a criminal offense or subjected to 
disciplinary measure, or declared to be under interdiction. No judge shall, 
except in accordance with law, be suspended or transferred or have his 
salary reduced.42 
 
Constitutional law scholars agree that Article 81 is crucial for the development and 
maintenance of judicial independence in Taiwan (Chang, 2006: 301-302; Chen, 2005b: 
779-782; Li, 2008: 61-83; Tung, 2005: 476-477). However, none of these scholars have 
ever conceptualised Article 81 within a framework of ‘self-interest’.43 Although Article 
81 is at first sight a straightforward, standard constitutional safeguard for judicial 
independence, it is also a window into the judicial mind, informing the 
conceptualisation of a judge’s or court’s self-interest through the study of actual 
practice. Right and interest are indeed two sides of the same coin, and the ways judges 
                                                     
self-interest, their conduct may be interpreted as the pursuit of institutional self-interest. 
42 Constitution of R.O.C. § 81 (1947). 
43 Nigel N.T. Li argues that Article 81 is an institutional safeguard of judicial independence (Li, 2008: 
82-83), and Chen Tsi-Yang holds that the Article embodies judges’ constitutional right against political 
interference (Chen, 2005b: 781). 
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make use of their rights can be understood from the perspective of self-interest as well. 
 
Historical evidence deriving from Article 81 case law thus substantiates assumptions of 
self-interest pursued by Taiwan’s judiciary in both material and non-material terms. For 
instance, the first ever salary increase44  for all levels of judges was initiated and 
promoted by Lin Yang-Kang, the then Head of Judiciary45  (1987-1994), and was 
considered one of his most important judicial reform policies (Interview with Lin on 
10-MAR-2004). It is a common global assumption that ‘the personal independence of 
judges emphasizes a very important aspect of judicial independence, namely that the 
judges’ personal income should be determined in a way which removes any possibility 
of influence over judicial decision-making’ (King, 1985: 410). However, in Taiwan it 
was the Head of Judiciary who pursued such interests on behalf of the judiciary. No 
matter how justified Lin’s salary increase policy was, it is evident that Taiwan’s 
judiciary shows a tendency to pursue judicial self-interest. 
 
[I think that our] judges’ salaries must be high enough not only to avoid 
corruption but also to maintain reputation. It is said that ‘only rich lords 
sit on good chairs’ and [as long as] our judges behave like rich lords, 
sitting on good chairs with reputation, [they] would find no motivations 
                                                     
44 Lin Yang-Kang doubled the salary for all levels of judges via a salary increase bill in the Legislative 
Yuan (Interview with Lin on 10-MAR-2004), explaining that judges cannot be treated as normal public 
functionaries. Before Lin Yang-Kang’s bill, judges in Taiwan were paid as much as normal public 
functionaries, and Lin successfully distanced judicial salaries from those of other public functionaries. 
45 The Head of Judiciary is an unusual terminology in English, but this position can only be translated 
in this way because there is no comparative position in either America or Britain. According to Article 
5I of the Additional Articles of the Constitution 1997, the Chief Justice was not appointed Head of the 
Judiciary until 2003 and before 2003 the Head of Judiciary was neither a Justice nor a judge, and had 
no adjudicating power whatsoever. Lin Yang-Kang was even not a legal professional. The Head of 
Judiciary took the role of head of judicial administration, and was appointed by the President before 
2003. This position now belongs to the Chief Justice (Full title: Chief Justice and the Head of Judiciary 
of the Republic of China). 
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and will refrain from corruption.46 (Interview with Lin on 10-MAR-
2004) 
 
Furthermore, the machinations of judicial power often resemble self-interest, 
particularly when strengthening the court and its reputation in institutional terms. The 
Judicial Yuan, from a global comparative perspective, has ripened into a paragon of 
judicial power in the realm of maximising non-material forms of self-interest. It 
successfully seized the ultimate constitutional power in 2000 – the power to strike down 
constitutional amendments it considered unconstitutional47 (Kommers, 1997: 48). This 
strengthened the political position of the Judicial Yuan as the state’s ultimate policy 
maker, namely ‘the guardian of the constitution’ (Sze and Tsai, 2007: 699). In this 
remarkable case the Justices widely elaborated the theory being the guardian of the 
constitution, citing Karl Larenz’s Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft and Emillo 
Betti’s Allgemeine Auslegungslehre als Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften, claiming 
that: 
 
The primary function of interpreting the law is to resolve overlap or 
conflict of rules, including doubts resulting from defects or gaps created 
by contradictory rules enacted at different times and this should also be 
the duty for the institution charged with the power of constitutional 
interpretation.48 
 
In addition to the Judicial Yuan’s claim of ‘duty’, the Justices further cite the German 
                                                     
46 Author’s Translation. 
47 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000]. 
48 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 Reasoning [2000]. 
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Federal Constitutional Court decision of December 15, 1970 (BVerfGE 30, 1ff.) and 
hold accordingly that ‘cases have shown that their constitutional courts not only take 
on procedural matters, but also conduct reviews of substantive matters’.49 In other 
words, even the Justices themselves were aware that the ROC Constitution did not 
clearly give them the power to strike down unconstitutional constitutional amendments, 
and they realised that they could expand judicial power through the interpretation of the 
guardian of the constitution that was provided by the Constitution itself. 
 
It is possible that judges simply make sincere decisions (Baum, 1997: 98-100). For 
instance, a judge decides according to his cultural sense of justice (system justification 
theory) without any conscious thoughts of self-interest. However, this thesis – like all 
other studies on apex court decision-making – gives more weight to the external 
perspective of the scientific observer. If an external observer’s analysis shows that a 
judicial decision was made in relation to the actions of a third party,50 then such a 
decision will be labelled as strategic. Whether the judge was cunning in his strategic 
approach, partially self-aware of the strategic dimension or genuinely convinced that 
the decision was purely a matter of legal interpretation, it makes no difference to the 
external observer. As a starting point, all the scientific observer needs to identify a 
strategic pattern – a pattern that can become overwhelming evidence of strategic 
judicial decision-making. This forms the basis of judicial activism in most cases, and 
judicial deference in death penalty case51 and the ‘Is Taiwan part of China?’ case.52 
Such patterns of assertion and deference offer us strong insights through the application 
                                                     
49 Id. 
50 E.g., Would it be implemented? Would there be retaliation? Would the public celebrate the court as 
wise or condemn it as out of touch? How would it appear to the formation of a coalition on the bench, 
who will vote for it? 
51 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]. 
52 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993]. 
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of the strategic model. In addition, we can ask the Justices themselves (interviews can 
provide evidence of how judicial decision-making works) and we can read their 
musings in the archive of Judicial Yuan in Taiwan. 
 
There is an arsenal of different conceptual tools for analysing judicial decision-making. 
Decisions can represent self-interest, plain and simple, either in terms of prestige or 
gaining the ultimate power in the separation of powers setting. Justices may perceive 
the role of the court as naturally avaricious, not in the lust for power of an individual 
judge but in the way they define their constitutional duty, checking other branches of 
government. However, unless the decision brings no interest whatsoever to the Justices, 
or causes political damage to the Judicial Yuan, it cannot be considered by this thesis to 
be a truly sincere decision because as soon as Justices start looking at the future 
behaviour of other actors, their motives can be seen to be strategic and their real 
preferences are then modified by strategic considerations. In the absence of viable 
alternatives, we have to think of judicial decision-making in this way. Of course, there 
is a distinction between the judge’s opinions and his belief in his motivations (is he self-
less, law-bound or politically motivated). But we are not him; we are not privy to his 
inner thoughts. All we can do is interpret, search for meaning, try to discover patterns, 
so for us the strategic paradigm creates the most convincing narrative. 
 
1.7 THE COURT, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
Modern democracies have historically turned the doctrine of separation of powers into 
a cornerstone of their government systems (Bagehot, 1867: 155-177; Madison, 1788: 
317-322; Schmitt, 1928: 186-187). Whenever a new constitution is written or an 
existing one revised, particularly if international and foreign advisors are involved, 
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separation of powers arrangements will find a prominent place in the document. 
Undergraduate law students and the legal profession have internalised the necessity of 
the separation of powers into the realm of the ‘unquestioned’ (Staab, 2006: 83), as 
something that is a fait accompli, beyond the need for discussion; and for Taiwan, 
academics seem enmeshed in discourses on separation of powers too (Wu, 2004: 51-
54). 
 
For well over a hundred years we rigorous critiques have remained perplexed by the 
contradictory answers, in which each institution is meant to check and balance the other 
institutions – yet a rule for who should have the last word is conspicuously absent. This 
thesis is not concerned with the normative and theoretical dimensions of the separation 
of powers scholarship; instead it treats the separation of powers as a practice. A judicial 
decision can be assertive or deferential (we can further distinguish between weak or 
strong levels of assertion or deference). Similarly, whether a legislature overrides a 
judicial decision or defers to a court is a question of practice, for which we can find 
specific historical examples. The same applies to the degree of implementation of 
judicial decisions by the executive; does an executive agency take strong measures to 
implement an order? Or does it refuse to implement it? Does it fail to implement the 
order by stealth? From Marbury v. Madison (1803) to Lochner v. New York (1905) and 
the New Deal crisis, from Golaknath v. State of Punjab (1967) in India to the Crucifix 
Decision (1995) of the German Constitutional Court we find examples of intra-branch 
conflict, although we also find intra-branch cooperation (Dahl, 1957: 279-295; 
Whittington, 2005: 583-596). 
 
The separation of powers doctrine sets in motion the practice a series of associated 
political machinations that help us identify various branches of government and their 
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interests; however, it does not help us to predict or even explain which branch will win 
(or have the last word) or when. What is more, the separation of powers doctrine does 
not even give us a normative framework which could allow us to decide which branch 
should win. All we have are contradictory statements: parliament decides with 
democratic legitimacy and judges must overrule parliament to protect minorities or 
minority opinion. When parliament makes a bad decision or does something that is not 
approved (tyranny of majoritarianism) provoking a court to intervene, some scholars 
struggle with Bickel’s ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’ (Bickel, 1962: 9-22), although 
these debates are usually destined to be inconclusive. As far as this thesis is concerned, 
there is just a question of fact: who wins? All we need to do is observe trends and 
discover who has the last word most often. If the Justices usually win, that represents 
judicial power. This thesis will not stand in judgement of whether the outcome is a good 
or a just one. 
 
The power of the Judicial Yuan is puzzling to those who think about institutional 
legitimacy only in terms of elections. How can a court be powerful enough to effectively 
check and balance the elected branches of government without democratic legitimacy? 
There are fine theoretical distinctions that describe the legitimacy that derives from the 
idea of ‘representation’. Elections, or rather electoralism, is linked to legitimacy, but 
can also lead to the illegitimacy of brute majoritarianism. Constitutional democracy is 
designed to solve the problem of a tyrannical majority by setting out a clear and specific 
role for judicial review, but it leaves us with a paradoxical relationship between the rule 
of law and democracy.53 Institutions can also derive legitimacy from culture, tradition, 
                                                     
53 E.g., Habermas: ‘The procedural legitimacy of the outcome of any given discourse depends on the 
legitimacy of the rules according to which that type of discourse has been specified and established 
from temporal, social, and material points of view. If procedural legitimacy is the standard, then the 
outcome of political elections, the decision of parliaments, or the content of court decisions is in 
principle subject to the suspicion that it came about in the wrong way, according to deficient rules, and 
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history or pure technocratic brilliance (such as Singapore’s authoritarian model) or 
jurisprudential strength and the power of argument in a deliberative democracy: 
 
[W]hen a convinced democrat with this mentality, in the role of a highly 
activist Supreme Court judge, has no qualms in making extensive use of 
the dubious instrument of judicial oversight, then perhaps the 
jurisprudence he has shaped exposes the secret of how one can combine 
the principle of popular sovereignty with constitutionalism. (Habermas, 
2001: 769) 
 
We can see examples of the practice of judicial review and patterns of assertion after 
1990: democracy in Taiwan began54 with the injunctive dissolution of the authoritarian 
National Assembly via a constitutional court order.55 Hence, it was the judiciary rather 
than the legislature that in many ways became the most crucial trigger for Taiwan’s 
democratic transition (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157). Although there is no clear evidence56 
that shows the Justices were inspired57 by a series of international political events (such 
                                                     
in a deficient institutional framework’ (Habermas, 2001: 774). 
54 It is commonly believed that Taiwan’s democracy began in 1990 (Vanhanen, 1997: 148). The reason 
I differentiate ‘democracy’ from ‘politics’ is because Taiwan has held elections at local government 
levels ever since 1945. See generally Chapter 6. 
55 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
56 Justice Herbert H.P. Ma: ‘I was one of the Justices who supported the decision of the Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990], and I can tell you why I supported it … at that time the public opinion 
in our country was already changed, and the society could no longer accept a state of emergency, so I 
think the law should be modified. We the Justices had already noticed the changing political atmosphere 
in which [our] nationals wanted a constitutional reform, whereas our people’s desire was just. Therefore, 
the fifth-term Justices had a common consensus that we should push the country’s constitutional and 
political system towards this necessary reform’ (Interview with Ma on 13-JUL-2013). (Author’s 
Translation) 
57 Taiwan’s democratic transition in 1990 was politically extremely complex, and it is therefore difficult 
to estimate how influential these international events were in Taiwan’s constitutional politics. Taking 
German reunification as an example, it is hard to see how influential this event was on Taiwan, because 
Taiwan attempted to break through the constitutional barrier which dictated that the constitutional 
democracy must consist of the whole of China. Taiwan wanted the ROC’s constitutional democracy to 
consist only of the Taiwanese people; this was Taiwan’s so-called democratisation. See generally 
Chapter 6. 
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as the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre and German Reunification in 1990), the Justices had 
a truly historic opportunity if they wanted to do something (Chapter 6), and in practice 
they stood with their people in pursuit of democracy at this special58 constitutional 
moment. From such an alliance, the judiciary of Taiwan was rewarded with the judicial 
interest of maintaining independence (Wang, 2010b: 141-143) and of expanding power 
(Li, 2012: 332-352). 
 
Some constitutional legal scholars such as Alexander Bickel voice doubts about the 
judiciary’s capacity to obtain democratic legitimacy at any level. Where does the 
legitimacy of unelected judges come from, and is it even possible to conceptualise the 
legitimacy of unelected judges as democratic legitimacy? As long as our norms are 
narrowed to the concept of electoral democracy59 (MacKuen and Rabinowitz, 2003: 1-
12), we cannot consider democratic representation without the electoral process as a 
possible answer.60 For Taiwanese jurists and lawyers – and even for politicians – the 
starting point of considering the legitimacy of unelected institutions is not so much the 
question of an electoral process. Instead they look first towards Mencius. 
 
Mencius devised a theoretical basis for the democratic legitimacy of unelected judges. 
                                                     
58 As mentioned previously, this thesis follows the strategic model, holding that the Justices chose the 
year 1990 as their starting point of their vocally strategic politicisation because it represented a unique 
point at which third wave democracy (Huntington, 1991: 31-108) emerged internationally. Though the 
argument of this thesis is not to prove how influential these international events were over the Justices. 
Their decision in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No. 261 [1990] answers to the strategic paradigm which 
the Chinese traditionally call ‘the opportunity given by the Heaven’. 
59 Of course, this thesis does not intend to challenge electoral democracy. The intention here is to point 
out that it is possible for an unelected administrator or judge to obtain democratic legitimacy if his/her 
decision answers to public interests, and he may be as powerful as elected officials in politics by doing 
so. This thesis considers that elections provide the fundamental precepts of democracy and does not 
support the Chinese definition of democracy, i.e. democracy with Chinese characteristics. 
60 Hanna Pitkin defines representation as ‘making present again’ (Pitkin, 1967: 209) and according to 
her, if there is another mechanism of representation, why should an institution necessarily be non-
representative without elections? The distinction between the elected and the unelected is not equal to 
the distinction between representative and non-representative. 
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With Confucian intuition, Mencius argued that office holders – including judges – are 
obliged to serve the needs of the people (Birdwhistell, 2007: 89-110). Moreover, if a 
person who is in power does not rule the country justly, he is no longer a qualified ruler 
and deserves to be overthrown or even executed61 (Bloom, 2009: 156-168). Mencius’ 
political thought illustrates the importance of the interrelation between judges and the 
public because it refers to the legitimacy of decision makers in the Chinese world: 
 
What our people see is what Heaven sees, [and] what our people hear is 
what Heaven hears.62 – Mencius (372-289BCE) 
 
Mencius […] agrees that heaven is the ultimate source of political power 
and its legitimacy. […] Heaven owns sovereignty. […] In its rightful 
exercise of sovereignty, heaven must be shown in one form of action, 
the gravitation of the people’s hearts, which is a sign of the decision 
taken by heaven to transfer sovereignty, supreme political power, to 
another […] the will of the people is but one form of sign of the will of 
heaven. (Jiang, 2013: 184) 
 
Salus populi suprema lex esto. – Cicero63 (106-43BCE) 
 
                                                     
61 Birdwhistell (2007: 89-110) symbolises the traditional Chinese relationship between the ruler and the 
ruled using the parent-child model, holding that ‘the ruler’s behaviour as father and mother establishes 
new ideas both about the relationship between the ruler and the ruled and of the ruler and the ruled 
themselves’ (ibid: 89). This thesis does not agree entirely with the parent-child model because it cannot 
explain why Mencius allowed the revolution against the father-king. However, Mencius established a 
behavioural norm for the ruler and the ruled. 
62 Author’s Translation. 
63 In my opinion, Mencius’ political thought establishes a decision-making norm for rulers based on the 
salus populi suprema lex esto doctrine. See generally Shapiro’s Courts: A Comparative and Political 
Analysis, in which he narrates the duties of the imperial Chinese district magistrate when exercising 
judicial power (Shapiro, 1981: 177-179). 
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Li explains the mechanism of Mencius’ political thought further through a legal 
philosophical approach. He argues that in Confucianism, the Chinese concept of 
democracy consists only of democracy of the people and for the people, but not by the 
people through elections (Li, 2012: 50-52); therefore, the Confucian school particularly 
highlights the need for other forms of interaction between the ruler and the ruled (ibid: 
42-45) in order to maintain good governance in ancient China, in turn providing 
legitimacy. Contemporary scholars are duty-bound to question such political designs 
played out in real life over 2400 years ago, but Mencius’ writings, in terms of both 
historical imagination and the more abstract realms of ideal-types, imposes a cultural 
and moral burden upon judges in Taiwan that is bound to self-reinforce judicial 
behaviour. 
 
Given Storey’s suggestion that Chinese political philosophy ranks legitimacy as good 
governance (Storey, 2006: 22-23), it is – theoretically at least – irrelevant or 
insignificant whether an office holder has been elected, appointed or even determined 
by lottery64 (Duxbury, 1999: 27). The mechanism of accountability – whether the office 
holder is elected or unelected – can therefore also be considered irrelevant, and 
legitimacy can derive from the just use of power or mere technocratic acumen and 
outcome-based legitimacy. To use an agricultural metaphor, if a large harvest is 
obtained through skilful administration of irrigation systems, what does it matter 
whether the administrators were elected or selected, trained, appointed and then 
                                                     
64 For example, in ancient Athens, the office holders were picked by lottery not by election (Duxbury, 
1999: 27), so how can we consider this as a democratic process? In other words, there are wide 
differences in the way we conceptualise both democracy and representation – what we have today in 
the USA and the UK, an ancient Greek philosopher would have considered as mob rule. Similarly, until 
the 19th century, many scholars considered representative democracy not as democracy at all (Mezey, 
2008: 2) – because only direct forms of democracy such as referendums were considered truly 
democratic. The question here is how can we call ancient Athens a democracy on the one hand, whilst 
blaming the Justices for anti-democracy when they made decisions in accordance with public opinion? 
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supervised by the emperor? To offer a contemporary example, in contrast to many states 
in the USA, where judges are elected, or the election of constitutional court judges in 
Bolivia (Barrera, 2012: 380), the notion of elected judges is completely alien to the 
political system of Germany, where judges are career judges, and are thus constantly 
being trained, examined, trained again, selected and promoted on merit, rather than 
arbitrarily elected by popular vote. However, the German system is not only one of the 
most reputable legal system in the world, but also ‘thought to be a desirable object for 
transplantation to Taiwan’ (Williams, 2005: 382). Germany’s unquestioned trust and 
the legitimacy of its judiciary (Slagter, 2006: 1) allows us to think of indirect democracy 
and other mechanisms of considering the preferences of a population (Vanberg, 2005: 
121) as a common notion of governance. 
 
Traditional Chinese political thought thus had memes (Dawkins, 1989: 245-260) that 
helps us understand both judicial behaviour (i.e., Max Weber’s moral attitude towards 
law, dogmatic jurisprudence and sociological understanding in terms of ideals; 
Kronman, 1983: 7-14) and public support for the judiciary in Taiwan. Whenever the 
Judicial Yuan manages to decide in line with the preferences of the majority (often 
overwhelming majorities, such as when it comes to perceptions of power-abuse, 
corruption and incompetence that are so often associated with the legislature and 
executive), the indirect democratic legitimacy of the court grows. The result of this is 
that Taiwan’s citizens learn to trust and respect the Judicial Yuan more than – and often 
at the expense of – other branches of government. Over time, public support for the 
Court – as an institution as well as in specific cases – has thus grown so strong that the 
Judicial Yuan in crucial constitutional moments wins any separation of powers games 
because of its ability to build a strategic alliance with the public. The actual practice of 
constitutional judicial review thus constitutes the court as a majoritarian institution in 
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most of the time. 
 
Mencius’ writing thus offers powerful conceptual tools for the study of judicial practice 
in Taiwan, and the citizens of modern Taiwan display high levels of trust in electoral 
democracy (Fell, 2012: 29-40). At the same time, with Mencius and Confucius taking 
the place of Socrates and Plato in Western democratic discourses, Chinese culture can 
also instil a strong predisposition towards trust and support for unelected judges, 
associated with the possibility for transformative justice through ‘right’ decisions that 
may even become legendary.65 Outcome-based forms of legitimacy – as opposed to 
procedural legitimacy through elections, see the agricultural metaphor outlined above 
– can thus matter more in the Chinese worldview, and someone who exercises his power 
justly, prudently and wisely can wield enormous power over those who have only been 
legitimated through elections. 
 
1.8 CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL BEHAVIOUR AND PUBLIC OPINION 
 
For almost a hundred years, American jurists have shed fresh light on judicial decision-
making, inspired by the rise of legal realism66 and the polarisation of debates between 
legal formalist schools of thought (Tamanaha, 2010: 11-63) and legal realists (ibid: 65-
108). As Tamanaha’s recent analysis illustrates, these debates often involve a good deal 
                                                     
65 The best example is provided by Lord Bao Zheng of the Imperial (Chinese) Song Dynasty (960-1279). 
He was a legendary judge and was honoured (and titled) ‘the Blue Sky’ (meaning he could make 
everything clear, like a cloudless blue sky). Lord Bao was certainly not elected by the people, but he 
remains a symbol of justice and the anti-prerogative within the Chinese civilisation. In Taiwan, people 
still honour their respectful judges as ‘the Blue Sky’ even nowadays. 
66 There is no doubt that judicial appointment matters not only in the USA (Krehbiel, 2007: 231-240) 
but also in Taiwan. However, judicial appointment was irrelevant in Taiwan in the 1990s for two reasons: 
Firstly, the Justices who dismissed the authoritarian congress were all appointed by that same 
authoritarian regime, and Taiwan’s first party alternation occurred in 20 May 2000. Secondly, the 
political party that organised the authoritarian regime, the Nationalist Party, lost its majority in the ROC 
congress until 2016. The Nationalist Party appointed the Justices who voted against them in the 1990s, 
making Taiwan’s case even more valuable. 
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of straw-man argument and caricature, in which each side portrays the other as naive 
models. To put it positively, we encounter different ideal-types of judging, in the 
Weberian sense that ideal-types (Kronman, 1983: 7-14) are useful conceptualisations 
even if they are not matched in reality. Legal formalism treats law as ‘a closed and 
gapless system of rules that can be applied logically, without the need to take into 
account any policy or moral considerations’ (Ratnapala, 2009: 94). In terms of this 
thesis, such mechanical jurisprudence cannot even begin to conceptualise public 
opinion as a factor in judicial decision-making, because legal interpretation is imagined 
along mathematical lines in terms of outcome stability as well as in terms of a right-
wrong binary. In contrast, legal realists would approach the Judicial Yuan from the 
perspective of Hughes: ‘The Constitution is what the judges say it is’.67 This often 
gives room for law to be ‘made through the medium of the courts’ (Tonapi, 2010: 34) 
to the extent68 that ‘a judicial decision might be determined by what the judge had for 
breakfast’ (a well-known quote from Judge Jerome New Frank) (Piedrahíta, 2012: 67). 
For a legal realist, it would be just as natural to accept the idea that judges can be 
                                                     
67 See also Cardozo: ‘There is in each of us a stream of tendency, whether you choose to call it philosophy 
or not, which gives coherence and direction to thought and action. Judges cannot escape that current 
any more than other mortals. All their lives, forces which they do not recognize and cannot name have 
been tugging at them – inherited instincts, traditional beliefs, acquired convictions; and the resultant is 
an outlook on life, a conception of social needs. … In this mental background every problem finds it 
setting. We may try to see things as objectively as we please. None the less, we can never see them with 
any eyes except our own’ (Cardozo, 1921: 12-13). 
68 Some very impressive research was reported by Israeli academics: ‘A paper in the Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences describes how Shai Danziger of Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 
and his colleagues followed eight Israeli judges for ten months as they ruled on over 1,000 applications 
made by prisoners to parole boards. The plaintiffs were asking either to be allowed out on parole or to 
have the conditions of their incarceration changed. The team found that, at the start of the day, the 
judges granted around two-thirds of the applications before them. As the hours passed, that number fell 
sharply … eventually reaching zero. But clemency returned after each of two daily breaks, during 
which the judges retired for food. The approval rate shot back up to near its original value, before 
falling again as the day wore on’ (The Economist: The Economist 14 April 2011). 
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influenced by public opinion69 as it would by what they had for breakfast.70 
 
Whilst it is important for our analysis to have ideal types, we do not need to embrace 
the idea of a single and unified theory of judges and courts – let us be realistic: why 
can’t a judge who normally embraces legal realism behave like a formalist in a specific 
case?71 The are many judicial roles, and our expectations of what a judge should do 
vary, thereby shaping variation in the theories of judging. But if we consider 
sociological understandings and the expectations of the Taiwanese version of ‘the man 
on the Clapham omnibus’ – or in the language of political science, the values of the 
average citizen in Taiwan – we are bound to find strong opposition to the idea of 
mechanical jurisprudence. Traditional Chinese legal-cultural values have strongly 
favoured substantive justice and subjective dispute resolution over procedural justice 
and formalism (Woo and Gallagher, 2011: 13); there is no expectation of a guarantee 
that the law is absolutely just, and there is an intuitive understanding that each case will 
differ. This matters in various ways: if a Justice pays attention to the expectations of 
what makes a good judge in the eyes of the public, he will feel more confident about 
openly following the role model of legal realism. While Justice Scalia and other 
conservative judges in the USA expend a great deal of effort and resources on 
                                                     
69 Taking Justice Cardozo as an example, it is obvious that he acknowledged that a judicial decision must 
be determined not only in accordance with law, or he would not have said: ‘If you ask how he is to 
know when one interest outweighs another, I can only answer that he must get his knowledge just as 
the legislator gets it, from experience and study and reflection; in brief, from life itself’ (Cardozo, 1921: 
113). Of course, Cardozo did not construct the judicial audience theory (Baum, 2006: 1-175) – or he 
would continue to address the idea of where the legislator normally gets the political knowledge from. 
70 Jurists were also constantly prodded by the emerging academic discipline of political science (the 
attitudinal model for constitutional judicial review) to the extent that jurisprudential skills of judges 
and quality/plausibility of legal interpretations completely disappear from the analytical framework 
(Maveety, 2003: 1-51). However, the judges themselves – whenever they encountered these arguments 
at conferences or in scholarly conversations – always insisted that the law and interpretation matters. 
71 Epstein and Knight admitted that it was wrong to assume that judges only ‘seek to etch their political 
values into law’ (Epstein and Knight, 2013: 11) because there is more than one policy goal for judicial 
motivation in reality (ibid: 11-31). Epstein and Knight caused this thesis to reconsider strategic models 
and legal realism again – why cannot judges embrace legal formalism strategically? 
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convincing their audiences that they are only following the law when interpretation 
through originalism is not just theoretically possible but also their actual practice, the 
Judicial Yuan distances itself from such debates. A Taiwanese Justice trying to 
maximise prestige does not have to pretend to be a formalist – neither the public in 
general, the legal profession, academic law departments nor other elite constituencies 
outside the legal realm would expect that a Justice could or should make decisions 
according to mechanical syllogism.72 This is not to say that any of these audiences 
would embrace statements that cases might be determined by ‘what a judge had for 
breakfast’ or that they do not intuitively understand the purpose of court procedures to 
encourage specific types of decision-making (reasoned, transparent, deliberative). 
However, Taiwan’s public preference for substantive justice (ibid) eventually provided 
the Justices with the ‘necessary evil’, inter alia, to override ‘unreasonable73’ acts of the 
legislature as well as administrative decisions. In Taiwan, the ideal type of court is one 
that follows substantive justice, and underlines that the public is comfortable with the 
idea of general principles and broad normative orientations and has had no bad 
experiences74 with this powerful Judicial Yuan. There is neither a culture of judicial 
restraint nor a century long celebration of participation through elections, as there is in 
                                                     
72 The best example is could we expect a judiciary to dismiss an authoritarian regime by claiming the 
present constitutional amendment is mistimed? But this is exactly what happened in Taiwan. If the 
Judicial Yuan was not expected to decide like a syllogism machine, how could such a decision be 
enforced in good faith? See generally Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
73 The so-called ‘unreasonable’ law is widely open to debate, but such a legal philosophical debate is 
beyond the remit of this thesis. The public in Taiwan determines reasonable law via a rather 
unsophisticated approach based on Weber’s moral attitude towards law (Kronman, 1983: 7-14). Take 
capital punishment as an example: it is not the intention of this thesis to discuss whether capital 
punishment is just, but there is no doubt that the majority vote for an eye-for-an-eye justice in Taiwan. 
The majority people of Taiwan would appreciate the Justices if they were to strike down any Act of the 
Legislative Yuan that abolishes capital punishment. This is a problematic area, but such a problem 
encapsulates the importance of this thesis – that the Justices consider themselves as substantive 
providers of justice, and that so-called substantive justice is in fact defined by public preference. But if 
this is the case, why not just be realistic and accept that the Justices strategically stand in line with 
public opinion? 
74 In the 1990s, from Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.250 [1990] to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.498 
[1999], no case is found that shows that the Justices disregarded public opinion. All we can see is that 
the Justices applied political question doctrine or avoided provoking public opinion. See also Chapter 
9. 
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the UK. Values and experience gave the Judicial Yuan a strong impetus; in the 1990s 
the ROC Government was still controlled by nationalists who operated the authoritarian 
regime in pre-democracy, and the ROC congress was notorious for its legislative 
violence (Ig, Nobel Peace Prize, 1995) as well as incompetence, leaving the Taiwanese 
people with no authority they could in reality turn to or count on. 
 
This thesis has no intention of claiming that the Taiwanese people unconditionally 
favoured the Judicial Yuan in the 1990s; In contrast, the core of the thesis is to prove 
that the Justices never chose to defy public opinion, explaining why they were able to 
successfully challenge the other two branches of government.75 As Lippmann argued 
that: 
 
Representative government, either in what is ordinarily called politics, 
or in industry, cannot be worked successfully, no matter what the basis 
of election, unless there is an independent, expert organization for 
making the unseen facts intelligible to those who have to make the 
decisions. (Lippmann, 1922: 31) 
 
We therefore need to accept that a court with the support of public opinion may step in 
and challenge elected branches of government successfully because the court is 
                                                     
75 Ordinarily a public opinion survey of judicial reliability is deemed an index, but here such a survey 
would be irrelevant because the Taiwanese people do not trust any institution unless they can see 
‘substantive justice’ being offered. In other words, no governmental institution is considered reliable in 
Taiwan. Take public opinion surveys conducted by the Judicial Yuan in 2000 as an example: only 38.3% 
of the public considered the judiciary reliable (ROC Judicial Yuan, 2000a) but 84.8% of lawyers 
answered that the courts’ reliability is acceptable (ROC Judicial Yuan, 2000b). In contrast to the 
reliability of the Government or the congress, the judiciary is a lot better – a public opinion survey of 
corruption conducted by the Ministry of Justice in 2003 shows that judges scored 5.42, but elected 
government functionaries scored 4.79, and congressmen and congresswomen scored only 3.97 (ROC 
Ministry of Justice, 2012). 
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following Pitkin’s definition of representation as ‘making present again’ (Pitkin, 1967: 
209). In other words, whilst the Taiwanese people consider the representativeness of 
their representative democracy, they would expect the Judicial Yuan to ‘make it present 
again’ (ibid) in politics. 
 
In the 1990s the Judicial Yuan highlighted the merit of strategic decision-making with 
attention to public opinion. In the name of salus populi suprema lex esto, they did not 
even have to pretend to be formal. As long as they stood in line with public opinion, 
they would have more room to manoeuvre towards the expansion of judicial power. 
History shows that the Judicial Yuan was originally no different than a privy council 
offering regime support (Dahl,1957: 279-295) during the period of dictatorship (Li, 
2012: 295-296). However, it appeared to fall in line with the preferences of the mass 
public opinion by judging strategically, moving very carefully, step by step,76 testing 
the patience of the authoritarian government as it went77 (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157). 
Subsequently, the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] constructed 
and illustrated the logic of accumulation of legitimacy against the other two branches 
of government through ‘strategically correct’78 decisions (Baum, 2006: 5-9). When 
such separation-of-powers-games increase in frequency, and as the context shifts from 
authoritarianism to democratisation in the 1990s, the ‘equilibria’, or optimal positions 
                                                     
76 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.86 [1960]. It was the Justices’ first attempt to test the patience 
of the authoritarian government, but this attempt was unsuccessful because public opinion at the time 
was ‘not interested in’ the case (Interview with Ma on 19-JUL-2013): The Justices ordered the Ministry 
of Justice to surrender the supervision power of all the high courts and district courts to the Judicial 
Yuan on 15 August 1960, but the Ministry of Justice conveyed the power on 1 July 1980 (Wang, 2000: 
240-241) under the name of ‘complexity’ (Tung, 2005: 441-442). In this, the Justices learned a useful 
lesson: the authoritarian government would not choose to strike down any judicial decision roughly to 
avoid stirring up public anger. 
77 Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova define this as ‘tolerance interval’ (Epstein et al., 2001: 128) and hold 
that ‘judicial decisions must remain within the tolerance intervals of other actors’ even in democracies 
(Vanberg, 2015: 179). 
78 Nigel N.T. Li prefers the term ‘politically correct’ (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) but this thesis 
considers that when a decision-maker seeks a politically correct answer, he or she is unquestionably 
acting strategically. 
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for maximising judicial power, fall within the gravitational sphere of public opinion, 
turning the Judicial Yuan de facto into a majoritarian institution. The court learns to 
understand public opinion and to formulate strategically correct decisions in order to 
‘earn respect as a unit within its own political system’ because ‘this will allow the 
judiciary to capture more resources and enhance their political and social influence’ 
(Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009: 453). US scholars have demonstrated the applicability 
of such models many times, even if the strength of the impact of public opinion upon 
federal judges is not always easy to identify or measure (Baum, 2006: 71-72; 
Wrightsman, 1999: 59-62). What is new and original about this thesis is its systematic 
application and adaptation of this model to Taiwan, where the influence of public 
opinion upon their Justices is shown to be evidential79 (Wu, 2004: 58580). 
 
At the core of this thesis we therefore situate the argument that the shift towards judicial 
supremacy in Taiwan during the 1990s is rooted in the relationship between the 
Justices81 and public opinion. On this basis, judicial behaviour in constitutional cases 
in Taiwan on the whole can be modelled and perhaps even predicted according to the 
following formula: Taiwan’s Justices not only ‘want to maintain the court’s legitimacy 
and thus efficacy as a policymaker’ through withheld interest, maximising strategic 
                                                     
79 Statistics offer the best evidence: how could we explain that there was not a single case where public 
opinion backfired in the 1990s? In addition, why we only find cases in which the Judicial Yuan avoided 
provoking public opinion (such as the political question in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] 
or even the silence in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999])? 
80 Here, Justice Wu’s book is cited because he frankly states on page 585 that in some cases there was 
no need to give the Justices ‘mighty invisible pressure’ (Wu, 2004: 585). By this we know that one of 
the greatest Justices in Taiwan’s legal history, Justice Wu Geng, was concerned with public opinion 
pressure. 
81 It is an open secret in Taiwan that the Justices are not all equal in importance, but there is no evidence 
that puts this beyond reasonable doubt. Generally speaking, the Justices prefer to be considered as one, 
and they rarely leak judicial lobby information to outsiders – even when they informed my research I 
was requested not to go public. At present this thesis only has Justice Wu’s interview to support this 
claim (Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-2004). However, my statistics regarding the Justices in Chapter 
5 also provides systematic figures for studying the roles and the degree of activeness of each of the 
Justices. 
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attention to public opinion (Baum, 2006: 87), but also bear a heavy cultural burden 
imposed by the people’s traditional expectations of judicial ideals (Shapiro, 1981: 157-
193). Valerie Hoekstra also identifies two particular concepts with regard to public 
support for a court: firstly, diffuse support (general trust in the institution, broader value 
orientations and traditional understandings of judicial roles) as well as specific support 
(public opinion – or rather, the preferences of a majority of Taiwanese citizens in 
relation to a specific judicial decision) (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15). For Taiwan’s Justices 
in the 1990s, and in their quest for judicial self-interest at least in the realm of 
institutional independence, chances of success would have been very low if the court 
had ignored the implications of Baum’s model and had failed to build on the two pillars 
of judicial support. The most convincing analytical framework for the Judicial Yuan, 
whether Justices pursue their own judicial independence in a self-interested way or try 
to maximise a sincere belief in a ‘correct’ way of interpreting the constitutional text, is 
the strength of both diffuse and specific public support in determining judicial deference 
or assertiveness. Whilst Ginsburg’s analytical framework of a general trend towards 
judicial power maximisation results from the recognition of political opportunity for 
judicial assertion during the period of political fragmentation and democratic transition 
(Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157), this thesis offers a second and more refined explanation of 
judicial power expansion during the 1990s. This explanation coincides with a time 
period in which we also find variations of assertiveness and cases of judicial 
deference,82 which Ginsburg’s model cannot explain at all. That is to say we not only 
distinguish cases in term of assertive vs deferential, but we also look for variation within 
the group of assertive cases: Which are the most assertive cases? Which cases are 
assertive in terms of language but have no real-world impact? Which cases are only 
                                                     
82 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993]. See also Chapter 9.3. 
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assertive in a limited way? In a nutshell, this thesis breaks new ground because it closes 
a major gap in Ginsburg’s model which neither explains a binary understanding of the 
Judicial Yuan’s decisions (assertive and deferential) nor offers a graded understanding 
of different levels of assertiveness or deference. What is peculiar to Taiwan is its fusion 
of the prominent role of public opinion in legal culture and its tradition of ideal types 
of judging, with the rational choice, strategic logic of judicial decision-making of public 
support (Hejl, 1993: 234). 
 
Both Nigel N.T. Li and Tom Ginsburg agree that Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan has become 
expert in making strategic decisions (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157; Li, 2012: 332-352); this 
thesis moves this insight into new realms through the study of the audience preferences 
of the judges (judicial self-presentation83), and above all, public opinion (ibid; Marshall, 
1989: 136-138). Baum’s judicial self-presentation theory illustrates a crucial factor of 
the interrelationship between the Judicial Yuan and Taiwanese citizens: given the 
political development in Taiwan in the 1990s, the people benefited from Judicial Yuan 
interventions which strengthened democratic transition. At the same time, the court 
gained legitimacy and deep public support for judicial independence – both became 
inseparably bound together for good or ill.84 
 
1.9 JUDICIAL POWER EXPANSION AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
                                                     
83 Judicial self-presentation theory assumes that judges will decide in favour of their most important 
audience because ‘people want to be liked and respected by others, especially those who are most 
important to their social identities. What they do to win popularity and respect can be understood as 
efforts to make favourable impressions. These efforts have been conceptualized as self-presentation’ 
(Baum, 2006: 28). 
84 This thesis considers that the Judicial Yuan now finds itself confronting a different dilemma: can they 
stop Taiwan’s public opinion moving towards radical populism? For example, could the Justices 
reverse Taiwan’s eye-for-an-eye justice without repudiating the alliance between the judiciary and 
public opinion? In realistic terms, the Justices may become guardians of the constitution when the 
executive or the legislature are perceived as the wrongdoers, but what if public opinion is in the wrong, 
and the country’s lawmakers are subjected to the tyranny of the majority? 
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Tom Ginsburg’s study of Taiwan’s judiciary has become a milestone in comparative 
constitutional law and constitutional politics. However, there is a gap in his work, as he 
does not explore the possibility of public opinion and public support as key variables 
in the expansion of Taiwan’s judicial power. This thesis will therefore pick up 
Ginsburg’s original question – ‘how can a constitutional court that served an 
authoritarian regime become an instrument for democracy and human rights?’ 
(Ginsburg, 2003: 106) – but offers different answers. Baum’s judicial self-presentation 
theory – that judges will choose their own audiences according to the form of judicial 
self-interest they are pursuing (Baum, 2006: 39-42) – provides a window into the study 
of public opinion and court relations. In other words, if judges choose the public as their 
primary audience, it is because the public are the most important constituency in terms 
of support, and this support allows the court to expand its jurisdiction, defy the other 
branches of government and reinforce its own institutional independence. 
 
Realistically speaking, should we expect a court to disregard its ‘most important 
audience’ (Baum, 2006: 28), or should we expect it to be bound by it in terms of 
decision-making (ibid)? If we agree that the court prefers a politically wise choice, 
Ginsburg’s question can be answered in accordance with Baum’s judicial self-
presentation theory insofar as the Judicial Yuan shifted85 its ‘most important audience’ 
(ibid) in the 1990s, from the authoritarian regime to public opinion, thereby changing 
the court’s alliances. Baum’s theory also explains both the fearfulness and hesitance of 
the Judicial Yuan concerning some specific types of cases – what if public opinion is 
                                                     
85  If we allow that the Judicial Yuan considers public opinion as its most important audience, in 
accordance with Baum, it seems to be reasonable to assume that the authoritarian regime was its most 
important audience before 1990. 
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politically divisive, or even biased, as in its cultural preference for capital 
punishment?86 
 
It is worth noting that the Judicial Yuan has applied the political question doctrine twice 
in order to avoid becoming trapped in a political quagmire.87 When public opinion is 
divided, there was no way88 the Justices could have resolved the case without angering 
half the population, so they re-presented the case as a political question. That is to say, 
even a very powerful constitutional court can sometimes have feet of clay (Hirschl, 
2004: 84-86). But what does not change is that the power of the court is political in 
origin (ibid: 71-108), and is thus subject to changing contexts and never politically 
invincible.89 It therefore becomes critically important to examine the real cause of the 
Judicial Yuan’s political apprehension. Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] and 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] are key examples of judicial passivism, and 
are therefore crucial from the analytical perspective of this thesis in terms of comparing 
cases of assertion with cases of deference, as they contain the variables that matter most 
in judicial decision-making, by contrasting cases with different outcomes and finding 
which variables have changed. 
 
In contrast, the judiciary is always bound by its audiences – including the mass, media, 
the legal profession or academia – to actively enhance and maintain the influence of 
                                                     
86 See also Chapter 9 in detail. 
87 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993]; Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.419 [1996]. 
88 Borrowing Hirschl’s term, this is a ‘no-win political dilemma’ (Hirschl, 2004: 85) In Alexander 
Fischer’s words, it is a ‘lose-lose political situation’. Take Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] 
as an example; it was a Brexit-like case – how could such a political decision be made without angering 
half the population? 
89 Nigel N.T. Li holds that the legislature is always the greatest threat to the judiciary (Interview with Li 
on 17-JUN-2013). Meanwhile Hirschl explains the political grounds on which the legislature would 
accept the delegation of law-making authority to the court (Hirschl, 2004: 84-86). What we learn from 
this is that the court is not politically invincible. 
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judiciary (legal-political realism) (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009: 452-490). In Taiwan, 
the Judicial Yuan itself has chosen public opinion as its most important audience, and 
public opinion has thus become the most important factor in limiting the Justices’ 
choices when making decisions (judicial self-presentation) (Baum, 2006: 25-49). 
Moreover, Georg Vanberg’s study of the German Constitutional Court has also 
established that public opinion, under specific circumstances, is very influential to 
judicial decision makers, acting as an indirect enforcement mechanism (Vanberg, 2005: 
1-178). One of the best examples is Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan’s declaration that the death 
penalty was constitutional90 because of public opinion, even though the abrogation of 
the death penalty has become the majority voice in the law society (Su, 2000: 178-198). 
Nigel N.T. Li further highlights that Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung, a self-confessed proponent 
of abolishing the death penalty, surprisingly has submitted no dissenting opinion in this 
case (Li, 2012: 341). 
 
Another important layer of evidence for this thesis consists of political question doctrine 
cases – in other words, the things we learn when the Judicial Yuan decides not to decide. 
In comparison with the US Supreme Court, this thesis concludes that the Judicial Yuan 
has neither docket control91 (Fontana, 2011: 624-641) nor a system92 of deciding each 
case along a fixed roster of submission (FIFO). A case in the Judicial Yuan may be 
decided with 4 weeks or take as long as 4 years. Research for this thesis was 
inconclusive as to whether or not the Judicial Yuan delays cases, deciding them during 
                                                     
90 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]. 
91 Originally the thesis proposed an examination of the statistics on docket control in the 1990s but this 
aspect of the project was unsuccessful, as because instruments of appeal did not note the dates of 
submission. However, the research did discover that the duration of court action is irregular – from 
weeks or months to between 2 and 4 years. Accordingly, I can conclude that the Judicial Yuan had no 
docket control. 
92 For example, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was appealed on 3 April 1990 and decided 
on 21 June 1990; but Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.264 [1990] was appealed on 10 February 1990 
and decided on 27 July 1990 – there is no first-in-first-out rule in Judicial Yuan. 
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a big event, when people are distracted, or postpones them until the issue resolves itself. 
Technically they are capable of doing both, but this research shows that political 
doctrine cases are particularly relevant as evidence for strategic engagement with public 
opinion. The Judicial Yuan does not want to alienate half of Taiwan’s citizens, so it 
sometimes opts out, refusing to render a decision, although normally, it is not scared of 
being political at all.93 
 
The application of political question doctrines in Taiwan particularly illustrates that 
there are some cases that the Judicial Yuan prefers not to touch because of the pressure 
imposed by public opinion upon the Justices (Wu, 2004: 585). A political analysis of 
these ‘disfavoured cases’ shows that the Judicial Yuan has successfully managed to read 
public opinion in these cases, correctly predicting a division of public opinion and a 
consequent lose-lose situation for court. 94  The Judicial Yuan strategically avoids 
deciding on the merits of such cases (Gerhardt, 2000: 120), allowing the citizens of 
Taiwan to continue to imagine that the Justices share their views. If the Judicial Yuan 
were to make decisions on certain cases, it would lose the support of half the population 
– not just for the specific case, but because the issue is sufficiently dramatic that general 
support would be affected too. Justice Wu Geng, who made decisions on political 
question cases in the 1990s, even confessed that the applications of the political 
question doctrine were nothing more than an opposing strategic judicial decision (Wu, 
                                                     
93 Nigel N.T. Li further holds that the Judicial Yuan is designed to be constitutionally political (Interview 
with Li on 17-JUN-2013). In Li’s classroom, he compares the Judicial Yuan and the US Supreme Court, 
teaching his students that the Judicial Yuan was born to be political (ibid). 
94 In the political situation between Taiwan and China, if the Justices were to decide whether the Chinese 
mainland is still part of the ROC territory or not, would they anger half the population? This is the core 
of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] in which the Justices applied the political question 
doctrine – a divisive case that touches the core of Taiwanese national identity. 
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2004: 584-585). That is to say the Justices in Taiwan would prefer95 a strategic96 
decision to be made by avoiding such a case instead of making a sincere decision in 
cases on which the Judicial Yuan could not read public opinion with a clear majority. 
This is illustrated by Justice Wu Geng’s confession on Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.328 [1993]: 
 
As everyone knows, this case was appealed due to the political debate 
on the reunification/independence issue in the Legislative Yuan; 
therefore, the consequences would be more serious or deadly if the 
Judicial Yuan made a concrete answer in this case.97 (ibid: 584) 
 
Cases like Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] and Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.476 [1999] promote the argument that judicial supremacy in Taiwan is driven by the 
relationship between the Judicial Yuan and public support. On one hand, the Judicial 
Yuan accumulates its own democratic legitimacy by staying in line with the preferences 
of public opinion whenever possible and avoiding decisions altogether if public opinion 
is divided. On the other, Taiwan’s constitutional judicial decision-making is thus limited 
into fewer choices controlled by the boundaries of majoritarianism because of the 
preferences of the majority of citizens. 
 
1.10 CONCLUSION 
 
                                                     
95 As mentioned previously, Taiwan’s Justices in the 1990s prefer to be considered as a singular body, 
so that they could make strategic decisions together, instead of making sincere decisions respectively 
in cases in which public opinion is divided or biased. No judicial opinion was submitted in this type of 
case. 
96 My research also discovered that no case that involved political controversies was not decided en banc 
in the 1990s and I do not believe this was a coincidence. See also Chapter 5 in detail. 
97 Author’s Translation. 
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The concept of public opinion as an important cultural element has shaped Chinese 
political developments towards mechanisms of indirect democracy for almost five 
millennia. Hence, in the flow between Chinese political philosophy and Chinese social 
history, ideal types of legitimacy celebrate rulers who exercise political power in 
accordance with the common will of the people (Bloom, 2009: 156-168).98 In such an 
environment, it is natural that the executive and the legislature pursue their quest for 
power and legitimacy in accordance with this cultural mechanism, and that judges also 
fine-tune their actions in the same way – or else the image of a doctrine of checks and 
balances will sadly prove ineffective. 
 
According to Shapiro (1981: 157-193), such cultural elements have always played an 
important role in judicial decision-making in China, as they have in other cultural 
systems. The arguments presented over the following chapters not only embrace 
Shapiro’s theory of system justification, arguing that Taiwan’s Justices ‘within a given 
cultural system are motivated to perceive existing social structures as legitimate, fair, 
and valid’ (Anson et al., 2009: 211), but also use the Montesquieu’s classical separation 
of powers model as an analytical framework with the Judicial Yuan as a political player 
seeking to maximise its power as much as possible, imposing its will upon the other 
branches (Posner, 1993: 1-41). Through quantitative approaches and the examination 
of original datasets, this thesis analyses and describes the reality of judicial power 
expansion in new and empirical ways. At the same time, the key hypothesis of the thesis 
– that the origins of judicial power within Taiwan’s judiciary-public opinion alliance 
are formed by the Judicial Yuan – is tested through qualitative evidence that derives 
                                                     
98 Like Rousseau’s volonté générale, the common will can of course offer a basis for authoritarianism. 
This thesis argues that the Chinese political tradition of volonté générale can support both fierce 
democracy (la Terreur), and fierce resistance against those who oppose the common will. Questions on 
whether the common will is just or not shall be identified on a case-by-case basis, and 
legal/philosophical justifications are beyond the remit of this thesis. 
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from interviews and unpublished primary sources from Taiwan’s extensive system of 
official records and archives. 
 
The Justices’ ability to have the last word and to impose common will upon other 
branches of government works because Mencius has provided them with theoretical 
advantages in judicial power expansion. Through public support (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-
15), the Justices know that they have little to fear in terms of retaliation by the executive 
and the legislature when they chose judicial assertiveness. However, the Judicial Yuan 
has also constructed a clear boundary for judicial power expansion. In other words, 
public opinion in Taiwan has become both a ‘tiger’ that helps the Judicial Yuan to 
impose its will upon the other branches of government, as well as a ‘tiger’ that the 
Judicial Yuan does not ‘dare to pet’ (ibid). 
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2: THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL YUAN PRE-1990 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Judicial Yuan has been Taiwan’s supreme judicial body since the end of the Second 
World War, although it was officially founded on the Chinese mainland at Nanjing in 
November 1928, at a time when Taiwan was part of the Japanese Empire. Before 
Taiwan’s restoration to the ROC under Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration, the 
Judicial Yuan had no jurisdiction over Taiwan – however, its jurisdiction is now mainly 
limited to Taiwan, and has been since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949 because 
of the communist revolution. 
 
Before the implementation of the ROC Constitution, the role of the Judicial Yuan was 
politically unclear. In theory it was formed in accordance with the nationalist 
Pentapartite constitution, but this furnishes it with almost no judicial mechanism apart 
from judicial independence, because the founder of the theory, Sun Yat-Sen, was no 
more than a political leader. The role of the Judicial Yuan therefore depended on 
authoritarian politics until 1947. 
 
The Constitution, however, provides a clear role for the Judicial Yuan, stipulating that 
the Judicial Yuan is the supreme judicial body99 and exclusive constitutional court100 
of the ROC. Ironically, the Judicial Yuan remained inactive after the implementation of 
the Constitution due to the Chinese Civil War. The ROC was totally defeated by the 
communists in 1949, and the authoritarian government called for state of emergency 
                                                     
99 Constitution of R.O.C. § 77 (1947). 
100 Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947). 
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under which the Judicial Yuan chose to serve (Ginsburg, 2003: 106) in Taiwan until 
1990. 
 
In 1990, the Judicial Yuan dismissed the authoritarian congress and opened the gate for 
democracy in Taiwan.101 However, little attention has been paid to what the Judicial 
Yuan had done between 1947 and 1990, so Ginsburg’s conclusion that the Judicial 
Yuan’s dramatically transformation from ‘a constitutional court that served an 
authoritarian regime’ into ‘an instrument for democracy and human rights’ (Ginsburg, 
2003: 106) remains puzzling. Historical evidence shows that the Judicial Yuan never 
came under the full control of the Nationalist Government between 1947 and 1990, and 
that the Justices still tried to play a proper role under Taiwan’s state of emergency. 
 
This chapter addresses the history of the Judicial Yuan before 1990, outlining the 
construction of an entity that grew in strength until it gained an identity of its own. 
 
2.2 PRE-CONSTITUTION PERIOD 
 
The Judicial Yuan was based upon Article 77 of the Constitution, taking the role of 
supreme judicial authority of the modern ROC despite its original formation102 by 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Government on the Chinese mainland at Nanjing in 
November 1928 (Sze and Tsai, 2007: 708). It was organised as one of five branches of 
the ROC Government according to ‘the teachings bequeathed by Dr Sun Yat-sen in 
founding the Republic of China’103 as part of the nationalist Pentapartite constitution 
                                                     
101 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
102 Organic Law of the Nationalist Government of R.O.C. § 5 (1928). 
103 Constitution of R.O.C. pmbl. (1947). 
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(ROC Ministry of National Defense, 1973: 1-93). However, neither the role of the 
Judicial Yuan nor the scope of its judicial power were clearly demarcated, because Sun 
Yat-Sen had ‘bequeathed’ it nothing beyond judicial independence (Chuang, 2007: 372-
379). Since the publication of the Pentapartite constitution (Blaustein, 1993: 31-32) in 
1906, an unsophisticated idea developed by a politician who had never studied law has 
become a fundamental part of Chinese nationalist constitutionalism (Ching, 1984: 437-
445). This appears to reflect a cult of personality surrounding Sun Yat-Sen, because no 
one really knew the nature of judicial power within this Pentapartite system, especially 
in contrast with the Tripartite system. 
 
The Pentapartite system was little more than a fancy constitutional concept invented by 
Sun Yat-Sen via the creation of two independent powers of impeachment and civil 
service examination that were supposed to work alongside the classical three powers, 
making a system with five branches of government. Sun declared the system to be the 
most suitable constitutional mechanism for China (Sun, 1970: 29-34), in spite of the 
fact that it was crude and based on nothing more than nationalist political beliefs (Lee, 
2000: 131-133). It quickly become a burden on the ROC Constitution imposed by the 
nationalists, although the ultimate Pentapartite system adopted by the Constitution was 
largely modified and streamlined by Carsun Chang (Yang, 1993: 129-132), along with 
Wang Chung-Hui, and John C.H. Wu (Ching, 1984: 413-419). Before this, the Judicial 
Yuan was run as an organ with no clear and exclusive position before the 
implementation of the 1947 Constitution.104 
                                                     
104  Since the Imperial period, a court of final appeal named the Dah-Li Yuan was formed, which 
exercised the judicial power of final appeal after the ROC was established (1906-1928). The nationalists 
renamed the Dah-Li Yuan the Supreme Court in 1927 and it has operated under that name to the present 
day. Before the implementation of the Constitution appointing the Judicial Yuan as the constitutional 
court, the Supreme Court was still the court of final appeal within the ROC. In other words, it appears 
odd that China needed a Judicial Yuan over a court of final appeal between 1928 and 1947, particularly 
as the Judicial Yuan was neither redesigned as a court of final appeal nor commissioned as a 
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It is reasonable to conclude from his personal experience and writings that Sun Yat-Sen 
had only a limited knowledge of judicial power. He was trained academically to be a 
physician in Hong Kong (HKU) (Chuang, 2007: 139-156), and held no legal or political 
qualifications. Moreover, his interpretation of judicial power, according to the literature, 
is informed by nothing more than Sun’s own common sense. The absence of a precise 
constitutional role for judicial power resulted in structural pathologies towards the ROC 
judiciary (Li, 2001: 8; Sze and Tsai, 2007: 708-709); however, it also provided 
possibilities for unexpected judicial developments. 
 
Justice Tung Hsiang-Fei noted the best examples to explain the uncertainty of the role 
of the Judicial Yuan. He found that the original Judicial Yuan was not only the court of 
final appeal,105 but was also in charge of the judicial administration that had supervised 
the lower courts since its establishment in 1928.106 The Judicial Yuan’s supervisory 
powers over the magistrates’ courts and high courts was taken away by the Executive 
Yuan in 1931 – only to be returned three years later, in 1934, before being taken away 
for a second time in 1941 (Tung, 2005: 463). Obviously, the power of supervision over 
magistrates’ courts and high courts was arranged capriciously amongst the judiciary and 
the executive because of uncertainties surrounding the precise role of the Judicial Yuan, 
although the most convincing explanation regarding the persistent reorganisation of the 
Judicial Yuan remains political. 
 
                                                     
constitutional court. 
105 The first version of the Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan, announced on 20 October 1928, stipulates 
that the Judicial Yuan shall be the court of final appeal. Compare Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan § 5 
(October 1928), with Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan § 5 (October 1928). However, this was modified 
on 17 November 1928 (28 days later) and the Supreme Court became the court of final appeal again. 
See also Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan § 5 (November 1928). 
106 Organic Law of the Judicial Yuan § 4 (October 1928). 
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Despite the lack of any direct evidence proving that the Judicial Yuan’s loss of 
supervisory power in the 1930s and 1940s was due to political interference by the ruling 
Nationalist Party, it is generally agreed that the power was always taken away when 
Chiang Kai-Shek or his associates were the Heads of Government. In contrast to the 
history of the Executive Yuan in the 1930s, the most persuasive explanation as to why 
the Judicial Yuan reclaimed its supervisory powers in 1934 was also political, because 
Chiang’s strongest political enemy within that period, Wang Jing-Wei, was 
commissioned Head of Government in 1932 (Chiang, 2009: 274-284). After the fall of 
Wang’s faction within the Nationalist Government, supervisory power was once again 
transferred to the Executive Yuan in 1941, and all the magistrates’ courts and high courts 
remained under the supervision of the Executive Yuan until Chiang Kai-Shek’s death 
in 1975 (Tung, 2005: 440-442). 
 
Despite the Nationalist Party’s political intervention, the Judicial Yuan had still not been 
designated as a constitutional court because there was almost no separation of powers 
in the Basic Law before 1947 (Ching, 1984: 383-393). According to Sun Yat-Sen’s 
teachings, the Nationalist Party safeguarded China’s democracy, and was thus 
responsible for the ‘political tutoring’ in constitutionalism107 of the Chinese people for 
a limited time period (Kuei, 2008: 184-212) before the promulgation of the Constitution 
of 1947. During that political tutelage period, the Basic Law of 1931 – as China’s 
constitutional law – had legitimised the Nationalist Party’s autocracy108 as a proper 
safeguard in order to prepare for the implementation of a more formal constitution 
(Ching, 1984: 394-400). In other words, Sun Yat-Sen truly believed that a democracy 
could be founded by an autocracy, so it is easy to imagine political intervention against 
                                                     
107 Basic Law of R.O.C. pmbl. (1931). 
108 Basic Law of R.O.C. § 30 (1931). 
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the Judicial Yuan in the years leading up to 1947. 
 
At this juncture it should be pointed out that the Nationalist Party had no intention of 
politically tutoring China indefinitely. A first draft constitution was promulgated by the 
Nationalist Government on 5 May 1937, and the nationalists planned to summon the 
Constituent National Assembly in November 109  (Chang, 2006: 65-73). The 
communists’ accusation of permanent autocracy against the nationalists (Zhang, 2004: 
238-250) is in contrast to history, but the organic defect of Sun Yat-Sen’s political 
tutelage theory offered the ROC judicial independence dating back almost seven 
decades from 1928 to the 1990s. 
 
During the political tutelage period (1928-1947), the Judicial Yuan was merely an 
institution that ‘served an authoritarian regime’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 106). Its supervisory 
power towards the magistrates’ courts and high courts was politically removed by 
Chiang Kai-Shek, and the Judicial Yuan was not even a constitutional court.110 The 
power of interpreting the Basic Law was (probably for political reasons) given to the 
Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party. 111  Sun Yat-Sen’s political 
tutelage theory had structurally weakened both the function of judicial power and the 
performance of judicial independence within the ROC, and the Judicial Yuan was little 
more than a symbolic governmental organ in the pre-constitution period. 
 
2.3 DR CARSUN CHANG’S CONSTITUTION OF 1947 
 
                                                     
109 The 1937 Constituent National Assembly was terminated because the Second World War in China 
broke out on 7 July 1937 (Hsieh, 2007: 16-17). 
110 Basic Law of R.O.C. § 85 (1931). 
111 Id. 
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The ROC Constitution – which was actually implemented by and on behalf of China as 
a whole on 25 December 1947, before China’s disunion–remains effective as part of 
modern Taiwan’s fundamental law. It was absolutely not drafted by the Nationalist 
Party,112 as the communists officially allege (Bian, 2006: 155-163; Yang, 1987: 18-20) 
in their historical discourses. However, it was boycotted by the Communist Party, and 
became one of the grounds for conflict that resulted in the Chinese Civil War (Fenby, 
2003: 460-472). The legitimacy of the Constitution has been criticised by the 
communists, even though it was formed in a completely lawful manner. Its draftsman, 
Carsun Chang, was the chairman of the Chinese Democratic Socialist Party, and 
presided over the Constituent National Assembly which harmonised Chinese nationalist 
constitutionalism in 1946 (Chen, 2005b: 32-35; Wu, 2004: 51-54). The rival Nationalist 
Party did not favour this version of the Constitution (Ching, 1984: 453-456; Wang, 2000: 
17-21) and suspended it through a series of (partially wartime) constitutional 
amendments over the following 42 years (1949-1990). After the implementation of the 
Constitution in 1947, the Judicial Yuan became the ROC constitutional court, although 
its first judgement was not held until 6 January 1949. 
 
Unlike Sun Yat-Sen, Carsun Chang was a legal philosopher who believed in German-
style social democracy (Jeans, 1997: 41-47). He earned his doctorate at the University 
of Berlin (Humboldt) and was a student of Rudolf Eucken and Henri-Louis Bergson. 
Chang lectured at many universities in China, although he was expelled by the 
nationalists twice. He also lectured in Germany (Jena), India (Delhi and Calcutta), and 
the United States (Stanford) and helped draft the Charter of the United Nations in 1945 
                                                     
112 The nationalist Draft Constitution was abandoned by the National Assembly under the threat of 
nonattendance from the Young China Party (YCP) and the China Democratic Socialist Party (CDSP) 
that held 20% of representatives (Nationalist: 31.4% and Communist: 27.1%) in the National Assembly. 
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(Jiang, 1980: 409). Much of the literature suggests that he deliberately harmonised or 
even intended to expunge Sun Yat-Sen’s unique constitutional designs from the 
Constitution, although he knew that it was impossible to completely ignore the 
nationalist constitutionalism ‘bequeathed by Sun Yat-Sen’ (Kuei, 2008: 239-300; Wang, 
2000: 21; Wu, 2004: 51-54). 
 
According to Carsun Chang’s speeches (Chang, 1947: Chapter 7), he believed in a 
constitutionalism that embraced judicial supremacy. This meant that the ROC judicial 
power under his Constitution is defined in both abstract and concrete terms. Articles 
pertinent to the mechanism of the Judicial Yuan are always abstract, but articles in 
relation to its role are always concrete; more tellingly, there are no articles to be found 
within the Constitution concerning limitations on the use of judicial power. Indeed, 
Carsun Chang stated that the Judicial Yuan enjoyed the powers to ‘interpret the 
Constitution’ and to ‘unify the interpretation of laws and orders’ exclusively,113 and 
laid down no strict methodologies or demarcations on how to exercise these powers. 
Moreover, the Judicial Yuan was deemed the supreme judicial authority114 and the 
exclusive constitutional court,115 and was entitled to define and interpret the nature of 
the Constitution.116 With this came a regulation that any doubts of unconstitutionality 
that arose must be decided by the Judicial Yuan only. 117  Hence, Carsun Chang 
commented: 
 
[T]he jurisdiction of the [Republic of China’s] judiciary not only refers 
                                                     
113 Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947). 
114 Constitution of R.O.C. § 77 (1947). 
115 Constitution of R.O.C. § 79II (1947). 
116 Constitution of R.O.C. § 173 (1947). 
117 Constitution of R.O.C. § 171 (1947). 
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to adjudications between civilians and civilians, or between civilians and 
officials, but further includes constitutional judicial review power 
against both congressional legislations and the President’s 
administrative discretion. [Our] rule of law shall not be considered 
successful, ultimate or prefect until such a power is exercised, the power 
of judicial supremacy.118 – Carsun Chang (1946) 
 
In contrast to articles relating to the mechanisms of the Judicial Yuan, the Constitution 
provides concrete protection for the entire judiciary. For example, every judge is 
protected from being removed, transferred, suspended or having his salary reduced by 
anything other than legal means (Gesetzesvorbehalt),119 and no judges shall be legally 
bound by judicial precedents (Verfassungsvorbehalt). 120  In other words, the 
Constitution was deliberately written in order to provide judicial safeguards against 
political intervention. 
 
Ironically, the Constitution was not politically appreciated by either the nationalists or 
the communists. According to Carsun Chang, the Communist Party was the first 
political interest group that favoured and supported judicial supremacy (Yang, 1993: 
130-131), but after the revolution they boycotted the Constitution, claiming it had 
exclusively designed by and for the nationalists121 (Xiao, 2002: 74-79). Meanwhile the 
Nationalist Party followed the Weimar precedent, suspending the Constitution partially 
by a declaration of state of emergency (ROC National Assembly, 1961: 267-268) that 
                                                     
118 Author’s Translation. 
119 Constitution of R.O.C. § 81 (1947). 
120 Constitution of R.O.C. § 80 (1947). 
121 The most illogical example (given by Xiao Wei-Yun of Peking University) concerns Article 23 of the 
Constitution. Xiao insists that this Article is specially designed to benefit the Nationalist Party (Xiao, 
2002: 76). The article refers only to the principle of proportionality, yet it has become the most powerful 
weapon against the ROC Government. 
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lasted 44 years. In real terms, neither the nationalists nor the communists adjusted well 
to a constitutional republic – they mainly sought to maximise their own political 
influence by respectively supporting or boycotting the Constitution. However, the 
process marked the start of China’s (and Taiwan’s) long march towards judicial 
independence – the ROC has been ruled more or less exclusively by Carsun Chang’s 
democratic Constitution since 1947. 
 
2.4 A HARD POLITICAL DECISION: STAY OR RETREAT? 
 
It is beyond doubt that the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party have played the 
two decisive roles in the 20th century Chinese politics (Gupte, 1974: 1-670), and that 
the relationship between the two parties has always been – and is still – considered a 
political problem of great complexity in the Chinese world. The word ‘communism’ is 
still a synonym for ‘immorality’ and ‘enemy’ in modern Taiwan, 122  while the 
nationalists are not portrayed positively in mainland Chinese textbooks (People’s 
Education Press, 2000: B2 50-56). 
 
People of Chinese origin are easily labelled as either nationalists or communists, 
depending on their philosophies or ideologies, but such labels are simplistic and often 
erroneous. For example, if a Justice chose to remain in Mainland China after the 
Chinese Civil War, he would be labelled as a communist – even though he might just 
want to stay at home instead of retreating to Taiwan with the nationalists. Similarly, if 
a Justice decided to move to Taiwan after the War, he would in objective terms be 
labelled as a nationalist as well, whereas he may have been a ROC national with no real 
                                                     
122 See Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.644 [2008] (Lin Tzu-Yi, concurring). 
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political affiliation. In other words, a Justice’s political leanings, irrespective of whether 
he was labelled as a nationalist or a communist, cannot be ascribed without providing 
further evidence. Overall, however, the number of Justices who decided to move to 
Taiwan – as well as the number who chose to remain on the mainland – might be 
meaningful in that it offers a broad picture of the independence of members of the 
Judicial Yuan in the initial stage. Table 2.1 shows a list of Justices and the residence 
decisions they made in the wake of the 1949 revolution. 
 
2.1 List of First-term Justices’ Decision after 1949 
DECISION JUSTICES 
Retreat to Taiwan Hu Pou-Yeh (1894-1985) 
Chang Yu-Shun (1887-1951) 
Lin Bin (1893-1958) 
Yueh Jai-Jun (1885-1951) 
Wei Da-Tong (1893-1950) 
Su Shi-Shun (1890-1970) 
Stay in Hong Kong Hsia Chin (1892-1950) 
Death during Retreat Lee Pou-Shen (1887-1951) 
Remain in the mainland Yan Shu-Tang (1891-1984) 
Huang You-Chang (1885-1970) 
Hong Wen-Lan (1891-1971) 
Liu Ke-Jun (1893-1974) 
Shen Jia-Yi (1881-1954) 
Hsiang Che-Chun (1892-1987) 
Death before Disunion Chang Shih-I (Unknown-1948) 
Did Not Report for Duty Jiang Yong (1878-1960) 
Chi Chao-Jun (1882-1965) 
Weng Jing-Tang (1884-1956) 
Mei Ju-Ao (1904-1973) 
Li Hao-Pei (1906-1997) 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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The Judicial Yuan’s first-term Justices (1948-1958) were the only ones who had to make 
a decision between retreating to Taiwan and remaining on the mainland; surprisingly, 
they gave historians and constitutional legal scholars a perfectly balanced figure: six 
Justices remained on the mainland whilst six retreated to Taiwan. Initially there were 
seven, but one (Lee Pou-Shen) died on the journey. Although the figure is finely 
balanced, it does not demonstrate that 50% of first-term Justices favoured a communist 
republic, although it is still persuasive enough to allow us to conclude that the 
Nationalist Government did not wield total control over the Judicial Yuan. 
 
According to Judicial Yuan publications, President Chiang Kai-Shek had made the 
initial appointments of first-term Justices – 17 candidates in all – to the Control Yuan123 
on 14 July 1948 (ROC Judicial Yuan, 1998: 55-56). Five candidates were rejected by 
the Control Yuan, and two of the appointees – Jiang Yong and Chi Chao-Jun – did not 
report for duty. The remaining appointees were granted their commissions by the 
Control Yuan the following day, and heard the first two constitutional cases124 in the 
nationalist Chinese capital, Nanjing, on 6 January 1949. After the Chinese Civil War, 
four out of ten Justices chose to remain on the mainland, whilst five decided to retreat 
to Taiwan; however, as mentioned above, Justice Lee Pou-Shen did not reach Taiwan – 
he was captured by the communists and died in prison in 1951. 
 
President Chiang Kai-Shek was forced to resign on 21 January 1949 after failing to 
account for military frustration against the communists (Kuo, 1986: 763-766). Vice 
President Li Tsung-Jen succeeded him, and renewed the appointments of the first-term 
Justices – 8 candidates – on 31 March 1949. Three of President Li’s appointees did not 
                                                     
123 Constitution of R.O.C. § 79I (1947). 
124 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.1 [1949]; Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.2 [1949]. 
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report for duty: Mei Ju-Ao, Li Hao-Pei, and Weng Jing-Tang. The remaining five were 
commissioned. After the Chinese Civil War one of the five, Justice Hsiang Che-Chun, 
remained in the mainland, while three Justices retreated to Taiwan. The remaining 
Justice, Justice Hsia Chin, stayed in Hong Kong because of illness. 
 
The chronicle of the first-term Justices is detailed and fascinating: either the Nationalist 
Party was too generous in appointing Justices who would never be controlled, or the 
Nationalist Party underestimated the independence of Chinese judges in the 1940s. If 
the Judicial Yuan was completely a subsidiary of the Nationalist Government, as the 
communists suggest, it would reasonable to anticipate more favourable outcomes for 
the nationalists, and that more of the Justices would have moved to Taiwan. However, 
the outcome of the stay-or-retreat decisions made by the first-term Justices must surely 
have surprised the nationalists, but it stands as a good illustration of judicial 
independence and impartiality in the ROC in the 1940s. 
 
As a result of the complexity of the political interrelationships between the nationalists 
and the communists, the greatest concern for the first-term Justices in the Chinese world 
is undoubtedly the political preferences shown towards these Justices. Records show 
that Justices Lin Bin and Hu Pou-Yeh were the only two who were by their own 
admission nationalists – they were both registered as party members, and they both 
enjoyed high-flying careers in government circles (ROC Judicial Yuan, 1998: 77-223). 
Justice Lin Bin even tried to stop the government from being investigated by the Control 
Yuan in 1953.125 In fact, there is no literature that lists the party memberships of all 15 
Justices, while the evidence obtained is too unreliable to categorise any of the remaining 
                                                     
125 Control Yuan’s Censure against the Supreme Prosecutors Office, pmbl. (11 February 2009). 
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13 Justices as either nationalists or communists. 
 
Unearthing the political preferences of these Justices through a study of their legal 
education backgrounds is a rather fruitless task. Ordinarily, nationalist jurists are more 
likely to be educated in Germany or Austria because Taiwan’s nationalist legal system 
was transplanted from Europe and constructed on the German model. It is therefore 
deeply influenced by German jurisprudence126 (Newman, 2010: 222-223) dating back 
to a period of Sino-German cooperation in the 1920s (Ma and Qi, 1998: 1-39). However, 
the first generation of Justices were all born before the founding of the ROC in 1912, 
and most of them were educated during the Imperial period, obtaining their legal 
education from universities in China, Japan, France and the United States. None were 
educated in German speaking universities. In contrast to the predomination of German 
law degrees among Justices of subsequent generations, the most crucial part of the 
ROC’s legal-academic culture – deliberately introduced by the nationalists from 
Germany – did not dominate the Judicial Yuan in its initial stages. In other words, if the 
definition of ‘nationalist jurists’ refers to those who were bred under the nationalist legal 
culture, they would still have been too young to sit on the Judicial Yuan in the late 1940s. 
 
Due to the lack of literature under the political systems of anti-communism in Taiwan 
and the Cultural Revolution in mainland China, it is difficult to undertake a detailed 
background survey of all of the 20 appointees listed in Table 2.1. However, a piecemeal 
investigation can still be accomplished which is helpful in providing a snapshot of the 
first days of the Judicial Yuan’s history. Unfortunately, this seems to be the best that we 
                                                     
126 Mark Williams: ‘[T]he predominant legal-academic culture in Taiwan has been heavily influenced 
by German jurisprudence and training … the German system was thought to be a desirable object for 
transplantation to Taiwan, especially as much of the Taiwanese legal system originated in the adoption 
of a German inspired codal system by the ROC in the 1920s’ (Williams, 2005: 382). 
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can expect at the moment. 
 
2.5 MOVING FROM NANJING TO TAIPEI 
 
As one of five branches of the ROC Government, the Judicial Yuan has always been 
located in the nationalist Chinese capital, although this capital had no permanent 
location until the government retreated to Taipei in 1949. Through a broad political 
consensus at the foundation of the ROC in 1912, the capital was temporarily sited at 
Nanjing – a city about 450 kilometres away from Shanghai (Li and Li, 2008: 390-395). 
However, it was moved to Beijing by President Yuan Shi-Kai shortly afterwards (ibid). 
Nanjing became the capital again in 1927 when the nationalists came to power, but the 
city fell into Japanese hands during the Second Sino-Japanese War (the Second World 
War in China, 1937-1945) (Hsu, 2009: 169), and the capital was then relocated to 
Chungking. At the end of the Second World War, the nationalists immediately moved 
the government back to Nanjing, but in April 1949 the city once more fell into enemy 
hands – this time the communists (Kuo, 1986: 765). The Judicial Yuan was moved along 
with the government several times before the ‘Great Retreat of 1949’ (Lin, 2009: 2-7). 
 
Due to the political instability of the ROC on the Chinese mainland between 1912 and 
1949, the Judicial Yuan was often forced to exercise its power under difficult 
circumstances within diverse temporary wartime settings located in different cities. It 
therefore came as a luxury for the Judicial Yuan to choose its own site and surroundings. 
Even the original Judicial Palace in Nanjing was rather unmemorable; it was built in 
1935, occupied by the Japanese colonists from 1937 to 1945 and then burnt down by 
the communists in 1949. The Judicial Palace in Taipei was also considered as a 
temporary wartime refuge by the then Judicial Yuan – who considered it as an ad hoc 
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location borrowed from the Taiwan High Court.127 
 
The Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] is undoubtedly the best constitutional 
judicial review that sets out the Judicial Yuan’s initial position following the Great 
Retreat of 1949. The case refers to the impossibility of re-electing legislators in both 
houses due to the fall of the Chinese mainland. The Judicial Yuan concluded that: 
 
[O]ur state has been undergoing a severe calamity, which makes re-
election of the second term of both Yuans de facto impossible. […] 
Before the second-term Members are elected, convene and are convoked 
in accordance with the laws, all of the first-term Members of both the 
Legislative and Control Yuans shall continue to exercise their respective 
powers.128 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] mirrored the ROC’s One China Policy during 
the 1950s, and the Judicial Yuan’s choice was a sensible one. As opposed to having no 
legislature, it would be wise to maintain the old one in order to represent all of China. 
However, it was the timing issue that mattered; if the Judicial Yuan was to tolerate any 
temporary imperfections concerning the legitimacy of both houses, the Justices must 
believe that they would not endure in the long term. As a matter of fact, most Taiwanese 
believed at the time that the government would soon retake the Chinese mainland 
during the 1950s (Chen, 2005a: 221-227) because they thought the ROC was on the 
                                                     
127 It is reasonable to assume that the Judicial Yuan did not anticipate using the Judicial Palace of Taipei 
in perpetuity. In fact, the Judicial Yuan was one of a group of court systems that were squeezed into the 
Palace, which played host to four separate courts – the Judicial Yuan, the Supreme Court, Taiwan’s 
High Court and Taipei’s District Court. 
128 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] (Official Translation). 
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right side. 129  The first-term Justices made many decisions on a basis of such an 
expectation. 
 
The first-term Justices (1948-1958) placed no consilia within their judicial reviews 
although second-term (1958-1967) Justices Wang Ji-Jong, Tseng Shau-Shun and Huang 
Yien-Wou submitted a dissenting opinion alongside their very first decision, Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.80 [1958]. It was the first dissenting opinion ever expressed 
within the Chinese legal system, but more importantly it represented a small step on the 
road towards judicial independence in the ROC. Moreover, the second-term Justices 
went further than simply building a consilia system: 
 
Article 77 of the Constitution stipulates that the Judicial Yuan is the 
highest judicial organ of the State and holds the judicial power over trials 
of civil and criminal litigation, the trials of which shall include trials of 
civil and criminal litigation at courts of all levels. In view of this fact, 
Article 82 of the Constitution, which stipulates that the structure of the 
Judicial Yuan and courts of all levels shall be organized by law and is 
incorporated into the chapter of the Judiciary intending to establish the 
consistency of the judicial system, contributes as cross-evidence. Based 
on this reason, all levels of courts and subsidiary courts below the High 
Court shall be subordinate to the Judicial Yuan. All relevant acts and 
regulations shall respectively be amended to comply with the concept of 
Article 77 of the Constitution.130 
                                                     
129 Retired Agent Tang Chu-Kuo of the ROC Secret Service said in his memoir that he is proud to have 
served the ROC because history shows that the nationalist republic is just, as opposed to the communist 
republic, even though the Government failed to retake the Chinese mainland (Tang, 1997: 8). 
130 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.86 Reasoning [1960] (Official Translation). 
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It is said that Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.86 [1960] represents the Judicial Yuan’s 
first endeavour towards judicial independence, although it did not bring about the 
desired result. Whilst the Nationalist Government did not oppose the decision, it 
deferred any progress on the matter for nineteen years, until 1979 (Tung, 2005: 440-
442; Wang, 2000: 240-241). In this sense, Ginsburg’s comment that the Judicial Yuan 
was ‘a constitutional court that served an authoritarian regime’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 106) 
in the pre-democracy era is probably a little unfair, because the Judicial Yuan’s efforts 
were rebuffed, rather than not existing in the first place. From the start of the second 
term, the Judicial Yuan showed willingness to confront the regime. 
 
It was the third-term Justices (1967-1976) who were really voiceless, deciding only 24 
cases over a nine-year period. 131  In retracing the political history of the ROC, a 
persuasive answer as to why the third-term Justices chose judicial deference centres 
around the state of emergency that existed at the time: 
 
Recognizing that the representatives of the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the 
United Nations […] to restore all its rights to the People’s Republic of 
China and to recognize the representatives of its Government as the only 
legitimate representatives of China to the United Nations, and to expel 
forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which 
they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations 
related to it.132 
                                                     
131 From Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.123 [1968] to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.145 [1976]. 
132 UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 (XXVI). 
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In 1971, the ROC was deprived of its representation in the United Nations and its place 
was given to the communist PRC.133 The resulting domino effect in both domestic and 
international politics was predictable – the ROC lost official diplomatic ties with 
foreign countries, withdrawing from international organisations and setting the 
importance of political unity above domestic affairs. In other words, it was an era 
defined by an intense state of emergency, and one of the results of this was deference 
from the Judicial Yuan. 
 
After Chiang Kai-Shek’s death in 1975, the ROC quickly moved towards 
democratisation. The nationalists’ final submission to Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.86 [1960] in 1979 reflected a changed political atmosphere and sent a political signal 
to the fourth-term Justices (1976-1985) that it was the time for them to change too. In 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977], the fourth-term Justices placed the first 
caution on the legislators (Die sog Appellentscheidung), claiming that the Judicial Yuan 
would not tolerate any modification of the legislators’ term of office constitutionally, 
although it could accept a temporary arrangement in political practice: 
 
Due to national emergencies, although in reality it was impossible to 
conduct elections after the terms of members of the First Legislative 
Yuan’s term had expired, in accordance with this Yuan’s Interpretation 
No. 31 and to uphold the five-branches constitutional framework, 
members were allowed to continue to carry out their duties until the 
Second Legislative Yuan was elected and convened. Based upon this 
                                                     
133 Id. 
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Interpretation, only those who were already members at the time the 
term of the First Legislative Yuan expired could remain in office. […] It 
is abundantly clear that these provisions were not created to alter the 
term of the first central representatives.134 
 
The fourth-term Justices also set out an important doctrine for the future expansion of 
judicial power: 
 
The interpretations of the Judicial Yuan shall be binding upon every 
institution and person in the country, and each institution shall abide by 
the meaning of these interpretations in handling relevant matters.135 
 
From the perspective of legal-constitutional development, the Judicial Yuan was never 
fully controlled by the authoritative Nationalist Government from the very start, and 
sought to occupy a central political arena decade by decade. It is reasonable to conclude 
that neither the Congress Dissolution case136 decided by the fifth-term Justices, nor the 
case of Striking Down the Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment137 determined 
by the sixth-term Justices were unanticipated judicial decisions. The Justices had been 
accumulating political capital step by step and generation by generation for the 
upcoming expansion of their judicial power. 
 
2.6 CONCLUSION: NOMINATION AND CONCENT 
 
                                                     
134 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 Reasoning [1977] (Official Translation). 
135 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984] (Official Translation). 
136 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
137 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000]. 
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[T]he courts are all operated by and for the ruling [Nationalist] Party.138 
– Hsu Shui-The, Secretary-General of the Nationalist Party (1995) 
 
When we look back on the Judicial Yuan’s history in terms of the Justices’ nomination 
and consent, official records only reveal that Hsu Shui-The’s ‘dictum’ (Yang Ho-Lun: 
The Journalist vol.437: 23 July 1995) was a good deal less than objective: 
 
On 14 July 1948, the President nominated 17 candidates as first-term 
Justices and asked for the consent of the Control Yuan. […] However, 
on 15 July, the Control Yuan […] only gave consent to […] 12 
candidates. The remaining five – Shih Shang-Kuan, Liu Tong, Zhang 
Ying-Nan, Chou Shu-Yun and Chen Yi-Qing – were rejected.139 (ROC 
Judicial Yuan, 1998: 55) 
 
The President referred to here, on 14 July 1948, was the most powerful autocrat in the 
history of ROC, Chiang Kai-Shek. But surprisingly even Chiang could not appoint the 
Justices at will, making it hard to believe even in those early days that the Judicial Yuan 
was ‘operated by and for the ruling [Nationalist] Party’ (Yang Ho-Lun: The Journalist 
vol.437: 23 July1995). 
 
If President Chiang Kai-Shek’s record was not already sufficiently astonishing, the 
rejection of Maestro Shih Shang-Kuan is almost beyond belief. Shih was a Humboldt 
graduate who was commonly considered the greatest proponent of civil law in China. 
He was also the draftsman of China’s first civil code – the ROC Civil Code of 1929, a 
                                                     
138 Author’s Translation. 
139 Author’s Translation. 
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great deal of which remains effective in Taiwan today. Despite being approved as a 
Justice for a second term in 1958, his nomination by Chiang Kai-Shek was rejected by 
the Control Yuan in 1948. The rules of nomination specified that: 
 
The Judicial Yuan shall have a certain number of Grand Justices to take 
charge of matters specified in Article 78 of this Constitution, who shall 
be nominated and, with the consent of the Control Yuan, appointed by 
the President of the Republic.140 
 
Justice Shih Shang-Kuan’s rejection was the first case but not the last. Chang Chien-
Han was also rejected by the Control Yuan in 1976 (he was nominated by President Yen 
Chia-Kan on 8 September 1976): 
 
[I]n that year [my] teacher Chang Chien-Han was nominated as a Justice 
but was rejected [by the Control Yuan]. […] The old senators of the 
Control Yuan […] firmly boycotted him […] [and] finally there was a 
gentleman’s agreement that […] the old Senators gave him the minimum 
of consent but refused to swear him in. So [my] teacher Chang Chien-
Han never became a Justice […]141 (Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-
2004) 
 
Apparently, the Judicial Yuan was not completely controlled by the dictators – even 
during the period of autocracy – offering it a great deal of space for pursuing judicial 
independence. In other words, while there is no doubt that the nationalist dictatorship 
                                                     
140 Constitution of R.O.C. § 79II (1947) (Official Translation). 
141 Author’s Translation. 
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(1928-1990) existed, the extent of the nationalists’ political influence may be 
exaggerated. They did not fully control the ROC judiciary at least, in stark contrast to 
the communist control of modern Chinese judicial power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
3: METHODOLOGY: RECONSTRUCTING THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
THROUGH DATA AND ARCHIVES 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis seeks to produce new understandings of the Judicial Yuan through a 
combination of methodological tools and theoretical models that have not been 
previously applied to the study of courts in Taiwan. In terms of methods, systematic 
attention to court data and case-coding opens up new ways of analysing constitutional 
judicial review; meanwhile, interviews with the Justices of the Judicial Yuan provide 
fresh and original insights into the judicial decision-making process – in particular, the 
discovery of the Judicial Yuan’s official interview series. 
 
Concepts of judicial assertiveness (Kapiszewski, 2007: 213-220) and deference (ibid: 
236-237) are often applied to model a court’s decision-making patterns. Ginsburg’s 
model only takes account of judicial assertiveness, and can therefore only explain why 
politicians began to support judicial power (Finkel, 2008: 1-19; Tridimas, 2009: 1-24). 
It fails to explain why the court sometimes defers, and which policies will be pursued 
or not pursued. Ginsburg’s insurance model of judicial review (Ginsburg, 2003: 25) 
thus ignores the question of why the Judicial Yuan would come out in favour of certain 
ideas (such as the dissolution of congress or deference on capital punishment). The 
model fails to account for public opinion as a core judicial audience (Baum, 2006: 60-
72) and thus ignores its strength and relevance. 
 
In contrast to Ginsburg, this thesis constructs a modified strategic model that embraces 
multiple judicial audiences, allowing it to analyse how influential public opinion has 
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become in Taiwan in a situation in which the Judicial Yuan knows it has little fear from 
retaliation by the executive and the legislature. Public opinion supports judicial 
assertiveness, so when the court defers to strong public opinion and public preferences, 
we observe that public opinion is where the Justices’ attention is mainly concentrated. 
 
3.2 GENERAL METHODOLOGY: SINGLE HISTORICAL CASE STUDY 
 
The general framework of this thesis can be described as a single historical case study, 
as defined by Dietrich Rueschemeyer (2003: 305-336), covering Taiwan’s judicial 
power expansion from 1990 to 1999. The purpose of the study framework is to construct 
a model of judicial power expansion of the Judicial Yuan as a sequence of events, 
illustrating a pattern of strategic decision-making based on the interaction between the 
Justices and public opinion. Whilst the singularity of the object of study – the Judicial 
Yuan – ties this thesis together, it is of course possible to view the time period 1990 to 
1999 in two different but complimentary ways. It can be considered as a series of 
individual case studies, with each case providing a piece of evidence supporting the key 
arguments of the thesis, or as a connected sequence of events, with each event 
constituting a case study in itself, tied together through a feedback mechanism or path 
dependency in which each event impacts upon the next. The level of diffuse public 
support for the court as institution links the singularities into a chain via longitudinal 
analysis offering a more holistic view of individual cases and causality. 
 
The time period of research from 1990 to 1999 is defined according to specific 
milestones. On 21 June 1990 the Judicial Yuan held Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990], in which the Justices dismissed the authoritarian ROC congress and called a 
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constituted assembly for democratisation; on 24 March 2000142 it successfully obtained 
the ultimate judicial power in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000], where the 
Justices struck down the Additional Articles of the Constitution 1999. This thesis will 
therefore study the Judicial Yuan’s decisions between 1990 and 1999, from Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.250 [1990] to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.498 [1999] (249 
cases in total143). As diffuse support and legitimacy gradually increases throughout the 
decade, each judicial intervention builds upon the previous one as the Justices come to 
rely on growing public support and judicial review as mutually reinforcing variables 
until they finally obtain the ultimate power via Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 
[2000]. 
 
3.3 GENERAL METHODOLOGY: INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 
 
Ginsburg considered judicialisation (Sweet, 2000: 1-30) over a period of time, arguing 
that political fragmentation opens up political opportunities for judicial power 
(Ginsburg, 2003: 251-252). The key weakness of Ginsburg’s fragmentation thesis is not 
its assumption of strategy or power-maximisation, but its unclear understanding of 
Sinology (morality, philosophy, legal custom and sense of justice), upon which the 
Taiwanese judicial ideal is constructed. In other words, Ginsburg’s study on Taiwan 
fails to explain144 why Taiwan’s Justices changed their minds and their behaviour ‘all 
                                                     
142 Although the case was promulgated as the Judicial Yuan’s first case of the year 2000, it was appealed 
on 28 October 1999. 
143 I consider Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000] as the outcome of Taiwan’s judiciary-public 
opinion alliance, so it does not count statistically. 
144 For example, Ginsburg says that ‘the appointment mechanisms similarly reflect the prospective 
position of political parties in the political system. The most dominant party in our three cases, the 
KMT (i.e. the Nationalist Party), reserved to the president all appointments to the Council of Grand 
Justices, allowing much tighter control of the membership of the constitutional court’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 
250). But only a few pages later, he states that ‘the Council of Grand Justices on Taiwan has rendered 
a number of politically important decisions supporting the liberalization of the political system, most 
notably Interpretation No.261 forcing the retirement of the “old thieves” from active political life’ (ibid: 
253-254) – Ginsburg fails to explain why the Justices appointed by the Nationalist Party suddenly 
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of a sudden’ (ibid: 106) in the 1990s. Ginsburg addresses crucial cases such as Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] under the vague and all-encompassing umbrella of 
‘Confucian constitutionalism’ (ibid: 106-157). However, Ginsburg is right in one sense 
– Taiwan’s judicial ideal – and this thesis will, at least from this viewpoint, stand at 
Ginsburg’s shoulder, applying new interdisciplinary approaches to find out why and 
how the Judicial Yuan changed from a court that ‘served an authoritarian regime’ to ‘an 
instrument for democracy and human rights’ (ibid: 106). 
 
Scholars recognise that judicialisation is a worldwide trend; however, it is considered a 
consequence rather than an ambition because no judiciary has yet come to occupy a 
crucial political role (Landfried, 1994: 113) by following the worldwide trend of 
judicialisation. In other words, we need to seek out genuine political grounds for 
judicialisation on a country by country basis. In terms of Taiwan, Ginsburg was only 
aware of the importance of culture, but this thesis takes matters further to explore how 
Taiwan’s culture (including its morality, philosophy, legal customs and sense of justice) 
influences judges by analysing not only judicial activism but also its passivism.145 In 
Taiwan’s case, this thesis can build an even more persuasive model146 to identify the 
genuine political grounds and the sources of Taiwan’s judicialisation in accordance with 
Baum’s idea of judicial audience (Baum, 2006: 25-49). 
 
                                                     
changed their mind/behaviour. Even if we all agree with Ginsburg that the Justices were not anti-
nationalists (ibid: 254), he still fails to explain why they suddenly chose to ‘assert their authority’ 
(Kapiszewski, 2007: 213-220) instead of deferring (ibid: 236-237) to the authoritarian government. 
145 Deciding not to decide in political cases (judicial passivism) is the strongest form of judicial deference, 
and we discover that the Justices only deferred to public opinion during the 1990s – this cannot be 
explained by Ginsburg’s model. 
146 There are patterns and degrees of judicial assertiveness (Kapiszewski, 2007: 213-220) and deference 
(ibid: 236-237). I will attempt to explain these patterns and degrees by looking at the different audiences 
the Judicial Yuan faced in the 1990s. The government and the congress were audiences that the Judicial 
Yuan met with assertiveness – the Justices were not scared of retaliation after democratisation. However, 
the Justices always deferred to public opinion (not a case being found that goes against it), which 
represents a clear boundary for judicial decision-making. 
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In Taiwan, it is not just that some cases were more assertive (Kapiszewski, 2007: 213-
220) than others in terms of separation of power games, it is about judicial audience 
and what it means to our understanding to assertiveness. A case may be radically 
powerful in terms of dismissing the congress, but at the same time defer to strong public 
opinion against the congress. In other words, we must study the relationship between 
Judicial Yuan and the public in order to fully understand judicial decision-making, 
because we need more variables and analytical dimensions than Ginsburg used. 
Understanding the fragmentation of congress is a necessary prerequisite to 
understanding judicial power expansion because it is that fragmentation which opens 
up opportunities for judicial decision-making and reduces the risk of retaliation. 
However, it is not sufficient just to understand judicial decision-making, so we must 
add public opinion to the mix, as well as the judicial strategy of building public support. 
Hence, this thesis adopts a series of ‘but for’ causations to examine the relationship 
between Judicial Yuan and public opinion: 
 
1. If there was no political fragmentation through democratisation (Ginsburg, 
2003: 251-252), the political space for judicial power expansion would not 
have opened up147 (see also Chapter 6). 
 
2. If there was no strong public support (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15) for the Judicial 
Yuan, the Justices would not have used the opportunity148 for judicial power 
expansion in a different way (see also Chapter 7). 
                                                     
147 I would specially cite Nigel N.T. Li, who holds that the Judicial Yuan’ greatest reward for Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] is to surprise the whole nation into realising that the Justices can be 
very important in politics (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013). Moreover, Li believes that the Justices 
learned how to be strategic from this case (ibid). 
148 Although this impression is based on my teenage memory, the Justices in the 1990s (unlike the 
Justices nowadays) were unbelievably authoritative in politics – no political controversy remained 
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3. If the Justices had never considered public opinion as a political source for 
judicial power expansion, they would not have had to educate the public on 
higher fundamental rights standards149 (see also Chapter 8). 
 
4. If the Justices had never considered public opinion as their primary150 
judicial audience (Baum, 2006: 25-49), they would not have to avoid 
strategically angering the public (see also Chapter 9). 
 
3.4 GENERAL METHODOLOGY: AMENDED DOCTRINAL ANALYSIS 
 
The case studies used in this thesis illustrate that neither the constitutional text of 1947 
– which has remained stable even though judicial interpretation has changed 
dramatically over time – nor the intervention of other branches in the separation-of-
powers model can successfully stand in the way of the power expansion of the Judicial 
Yuan. On the contrary, in terms of abstract constitutional language, Taiwan’s 
constitutional design emboldens, or at least acquiesces to the Justices in judicial power 
expansion. There is no formula in the constitutional text151 that encourages the Justices 
                                                     
debatable after the Chief Justice’s gavel fell: Newspapers reported what the Justices had decided and 
the whole nation was pacified. Moreover, their political decisions are still massively cited as Taiwan’s 
public law standard at the present – it is not an overstatement to say that they established Taiwan’s rule 
of law and constitutional politics. 
149 In realistic terms, how can a judiciary obtain nothing by telling the public that they deserve to have 
something better than they were anticipating? How can we simplify the Justices’ motives to the ordinary 
when they choose to alter people’s minds using double-rewards? 
150 In my opinion, if a situation arises in which a large majority of Taiwanese citizens supports the 
abolition of the capital punishment, or in a situation in which the PRC suddenly disappears, both the 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] and Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] will be 
overridden. 
151 Such as Henkin, who challenged the political question doctrine (Henkin, 1976: 597-625). There is a 
gap between limitations (Stennis, 1958: 1179-1181) and self-imposed limits (Neubaver and Meinhold, 
2010: 441-472) on judicial power. 
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to be assertive in some cases and opt for deference in others. Similarly, even if 
Montesquieu (Singer, 2009: 97-112) thought of judges as the bouche de la loi, the idea 
of separating, balancing or competing branches of government – including the judiciary 
– implies the assumption that each branch aims to maximise its own power. Such a 
separation of powers model of judicialisation thus helps us understand when one branch 
becomes more powerful than another branch in terms of who has the last word and why. 
However, it is much harder to explain why, in an identical separation of powers game 
with a fragmented legislature and a weak executive, judges sometimes choose assertion 
and sometimes opt for deference. We thus need to bring in other variables (topics, 
audiences, public support) if we want to understand variations in judicial power 
expansion case by case – Ginsburg’s model, in other words, cannot explain the 
examples of judicial deference that we find in the 1990s. 
 
As a matter of fact, no limitation to judicial power regarding the political question 
doctrine is embodied in the Constitution; all we read there is that political controversies 
shall be controlled by the Judicial Yuan.152 Using legal doctrinal analysis alone, we 
cannot explain why the Justices sometimes opt for deference unless we take public 
opinion into account. Because the Judicial Yuan paid so much attention to public 
opinion, strong public preferences became a boundary the Justices dared not cross, and 
this constituted a limitation to judicial power expansion. In other words, this thesis 
reviews Taiwan’s judicial power expansion using the judicial audience theory (Baum, 
2006: 25-49) as its main doctrinal amendment. 
 
3.5 SPECIFIC METHODOLOGY 
                                                     
152 Constitution of R.O.C. § 171II (1947). 
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Case-coding is a common quantitative method153 used to measure and analyse judicial 
behaviour. Case-coding plays a particularly useful role in the study of Taiwan’s judicial 
power expansion because it provides us with a data-set that not only illustrates the 
frequency of judicial decisions but also many other variables for the time period 
between 1990 and 1999. We can code each of the 249 cases, from Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.250 [1990] to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.498 [1999], according 
to type (see also Chapter 7), judicial opinion (see also Chapter 5), nature (see also 
Chapter 8), bench size (see also Chapter 5), the name of the appellant (see also Chapter 
5), which branch of government (the executive or the legislature) was declared to have 
acted unconstitutionally (see also Chapter 7), and the frequency of declarations of 
unconstitutionality (see also Chapters 5, 7 and 8). This allows us to search for 
correlation between judicial decisions and public opinion. It is important to stress that 
the quantitative sections of this thesis are not aimed at empirical proof of causality. 
Correlation is not causality, and the coding only provides us with new ways of 
identifying patterns and trends. As a second step, qualitative narratives based on 
interviews, archival work and secondary sources establish a qualitative dimension of 
evidence that supports the key argument of the thesis in terms of causal relationships 
between public opinion and judicial behaviour. 
 
The qualitative approach of this thesis takes its empirical rationale from the well-
established presence of judge-made law in modern constitutional democracies.154 This 
                                                     
153 In terms of national statistics, Taiwan is ranked as the world’s number one open-data country by the 
Open Knowledge Foundation in 2015 (Merit Times: Merit Times 10 December 2015). As a result, all 
figures and tables in this thesis, unless mentioned otherwise, have been compiled on the basis of official 
data via the use of the National Central Library (Chinese linguistic competence is required). The case-
coding and resulting datasets have been developed by the author from scratch, and related figures and 
tables are thus labelled as ‘compiled by the author’. 
154 There were 32 Justices in the 1990s, but not all of them were equal in importance. In 2012, when I 
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is acknowledged by the judges themselves (Barak, 2006: 155-158) as well as theorists 
using civil law (Kelsen, 1945: 150-153) at different points of time and for different 
countries. Such recognition of judge-made law ad hoc verifies the pivotal role of judges’ 
subjective opinions – both jurisprudential and value-based – in judicial decision-
making, including unconscious biases. The 18 interviews 155  conducted with 17 
Taiwanese Justices who served on the bench between 1990 and 1999 therefore 
constitute an empirical examination of the Justices’ subjective awareness of ‘non-
constitutional’ elements as well as strategic positioning in their decision-making. The 
interviews enable this thesis to present the Justices’ own explanations in order to assess 
the substantiality of the role of various audiences and the extent to which Justices’ make 
strategic decisions in the light of the reactions expected from these audiences. Because 
the Judicial Yuan is the only state organ empowered to make per incuriam constitutional 
judicial decisions, there is no better way to explore judicial decision-making in Taiwan 
than by interviewing the Justices in order to gain insights into their personal values and 
motivations. 
 
                                                     
began this research, all had retired and 5 were now deceased. This thesis is based on 17 interviews with 
former justices including Justices Yang Yu-Ling, Herbert Han-Pao Ma, Wu Geng, Shih Shen-An, Chen 
Rui-Tang, Chang Cheng-Tao, Chang Teh-Sheng, Lin Kuo-Hsien, Vincent Sze, Sun Sen-Yen, Chen Chi-
Nan, Tseng Hua-Sun, Tung Hsiang-Fei, Yang Huey-Ing, Tai Tong-Schung, Su Jyun-Hsiung and Hwang 
Yueh-Chin. The thesis often cites the interview of Nigel N.T. Li, who is not only one of the core 
draftsmen of the Additional Articles of the Constitution but also the best-known lawyer in the field of 
constitutional judicial review. He is also one of Taiwan’s most authoritative professors in constitutional 
law. In other words, Li is the most important participant in amending the Constitution, teaching 
constitutional law and filing constitutional litigations. 
155 All the interviews took place in Taipei, during the fieldwork period for this thesis, from May 2013 to 
September 2013, along with heavy archival studies in the National Central Library. Because most of 
the interviewees answered the questions by guiding me to read his/her writings and official interviews. 
My understanding is that they are more comfortable to provide information with careful consideration, 
so that they prefer archives – it does not mean that they were unwilling to answer my questions, but 
most of them wanted me to cite in accordance with archives. They told stories, but they wanted these 
stories to be cited in accordance with their writings, biographies and official interviews. Here I cite 
Justice Ma’s personal exhort that influences me deeply: ‘I want you to review the proportionality 
principle, David. Do everything by minimum means as long as it works. It does not mean you are afraid 
of them, but it is worthless to waste your time on them because your energy is limited. Please use your 
energy for our country and do not waste it on unnecessary political means’. 
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As explained previously, the interview project turned into a prolonged archival study in 
the National Central Library for two reasons. Justice Herbert H.P. Ma kindly offered 
me a copy of an official interview conducted by the Judicial Yuan in 2003, along with 
his books and writings, guiding me to read and cite his opinions extensively. It was not 
until this point that I realised that the Judicial Yuan had conducted an interview project 
on retired Justices and judges – even Nigel N.T. Li had not heard about this project until 
I told him about it. But Justice Ma was not the only one who asked me to search the 
archives for previous interviews; all the Justices interviewed provided me with their 
interviews, as well as their books and writings. Moreover, it was suggested that I wrote 
about them in accordance with their archives, books and writings. They were more 
comfortable about providing information after careful consideration, so they prefer 
archival material over face-to-face interviews. In Taiwan, there is a cultural tradition 
that judicial elites prefer to state their professional opinions through their writing, 
memoirs or newspaper editorials; This meant that the published archives are just as 
important as my interviews with the retired Justices. 
 
3.5.1 Subjective Judicial Bias and Preferred Position 
 
It is an open secret amongst constitutional lawyers worldwide that judges have 
preferences outside the realm of formal judicial decision-making (Williams, 2011: 168). 
Segal and Spaeth (1993: 390) have built an entire sub-field of scholarship around this 
insight, and the attitudinal model is also relevant for the US Supreme Court insofar as 
Justices can vote for their preferences sincerely. In other words, the nine US Supreme 
Court Justices do not have to be strategic. However, this thesis does not follow the 
attitudinal model; instead it maintains the distinction between judicial attitude 
(preference) and actual decisions mediated by strategic considerations. As such, the 
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interviews and the study of archival sources had a different objective and did not follow 
an attitudinal-based model. Segal and Spaeth attempted to identify the actual political 
values of a judge, then modelled judicial behaviour on the basis of such values, whereas 
this thesis searches for evidence – through interviews as well as the Judicial Yuan auto-
biographies archive – that illustrate the audiences Justices are thinking of when they 
make their decisions, and whether Justices make decisions strategically. In other words, 
do Justices think about how their audiences will react, and do their expectations of such 
reactions form part of the judicial decision-making process? 
 
As Odendahl and Shaw (2001: 300) contend, personal interviews represent ‘an effective 
method of data collection for research on elite subjects and culture’. This thesis on 
Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan treats Justices as elite subjects by using such interviews, and 
explores the Judicial Yuan’s culture and organisation of its decision-making. My 
interviews with the retired Justices provided me with an opportunity to analyse their 
preferences, their awareness of bias, their understanding of the judicial decision-making 
process, their ideals of what makes a good judge and thus their general view of the role 
the Judicial Yuan should play. The compilation of narratives through interviewing 
former Justices of the Judicial Yuan supports the theoretical framework chosen for this 
thesis156 and verifies the key arguments presented. For example, in 1992 Dr Shih Chi-
Yang 157  said ‘Public opinion is like gurgling water [that I must comply when it 
                                                     
156 Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung’s recall of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000] reveals that formalism 
is not dominant. He said that the National Assembly stressed the fact that they were supreme because 
they were empowered to amend the Constitution (Interview with Su in NOV-2009). Su’s interview is 
formal in this section, but we can still infer that he intended to tell us that the National Assembly 
considered the Judicial Yuan passive because of its formalism (ibid). However, Su said that Justice Wu 
Geng argued that the decision of the National Assembly was unconstitutional per se, after which all the 
Justices agreed that the National Assembly must be checked with judicial activism (ibid). 
157 Dr Shih Chi-Yang was the Head of the Judicial Yuan, and publicly warned the Nationalist Party that 
public opinion in Taiwan was too powerful to disobey. He cautioned the nationalists against an indirect 
presidential election in 1992, finally resulting in Taiwan’s direct presidential election in 1996. 
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changes].’158 
 
3.5.2 An Unexpected Discovery: The Importance of Archival Studies and The Judicial 
Yuan’s Oral History Project 
 
Fieldwork for the interview project began between May and September 2013. Because 
of administrative traditions and the exceptional bureaucratic capacity of the ROC, the 
Judicial Yuan compiled extensive statistical data for the ROC Government. It would be 
no exaggeration to say that ROC officials collected most of the country’s first-hand data, 
filing them in national libraries in readiness for academic analysis. However, they 
remain mainly unused by either law or political science.159 
 
Since 2002, the Judicial Yuan has even embarked upon a series of oral history 
projects,160 which involve interviewing senior Justices and judges of the ROC. These 
official interviews were published161 in 2004 (Book 1), 2006 (Book 2), 2007 (Book 3), 
2008 (Book 4), 2010 (Book 5), 2011 (Book 6) and 2013 (Book 7). The contents of these 
books inspired this thesis to shift the focus of its approach162 from a pure interview 
                                                     
158 Author’s Translation. 
159 Taking Ginsburg as an example, no official data were used either in his book or in his original S.J.D. 
thesis on which his book is based. It is probably reasonable to assume that Ginsburg was not aware of 
the official data, because, as mentioned earlier, even Nigel N.T. Li did not know until I told him. One 
of the reasons for Ginsburg’s omission of official data is, I assume, due to the Chinese linguistic habitus 
– the Chinese language prefers abstract descriptions, which can create difficulties in terms of library 
cataloguing. For example, a great deal of unrelated statistics is embodied in a book called the ‘Taiwan 
Statistical Data Book’ and it takes a great deal of time to discover statistics relevant to research topics. 
160 According to the project director, Wang Tay-Sheng, the project was proposed by the Institute of 
Modern History of the Academia Sinica (ROC Judicial Yuan, 2004: Preface) and conducted by the 
Judicial Yuan in order to record how senior Justices and judges strove towards judicial independence 
in Taiwan (ibid) – the interviewees were chosen by the Judicial Yuan (ibid). 
161 The Judicial Yuan, as the publisher, has titled these interviews ‘Oral Histories Told by Elder Judges 
and Justices in Taiwan’. Theoretically we can purchase these publications, but this is problematic 
because Taiwan’s governmental publications are not published for commercial purpose and the ROC 
Government has no budget whatsoever for advertising, so researchers find themselves not knowing if 
information exists or where to look for it if it does. 
162 The Judicial Yuan’s oral history project has continued for 15 years (since 2002) and 38 interviews 
were conducted in the 12 years between 2002 and 2013) – at a rate of 3.79 months per interview. Most 
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approach to a much stronger focus on archival studies. 
 
During the first set of key interviews, the following pattern emerged: Justices provided 
information during these interviews, but advised me to consult the oral history project 
firstly because it revealed a more substantial amount of information and secondly 
because the official interviews took place closer in time to the cases themselves, at a 
time when the Justices’ memories of the cases was fresher.163 When I came to edit the 
interviews I had compiled, I realised that the information the Justices had provided in 
their interviews required massive supplementation from archival studies, including 
judges’ official interviews, writings, books and memoirs, because all of these had been 
produced by the Justices themselves, which made pronounced improvements in 
clarity.164 In other words, I was advised by the Justices to shift my focus to the archives. 
Some of them even provided me with those archives, and they all pointed me towards 
the official interviews conducted by the Judicial Yuan.  
 
In a nutshell, the discovery of the judicial biography project interrupted – in a positive 
way – the flow of the original plan for my research, partly because the Justices 
                                                     
interviews include judges’ personal opinions on specific cases and all the crucial cases from the 1990s 
are covered by the Justices interviewed. In other words, this oral history project is like gold dust to 
researchers, but no one uses it in the field of constitutional law as far as I know because legal-historical 
study is not popular in Taiwan. For example, Justice Ma was a little surprised when he heard that I 
wanted to interview him, and told me that almost nobody from my generation would listen to his stories. 
He sighed for the loss of wisdom in judicial politics. 
163 Most of the 1990s Justices were born in the 1920s or 1930s and they all told me that I would have to 
undertake archival studies to make sure their memory is chronologically correct. This meant that I had 
to rely on the official interviews with the Justices conducted by the Judicial Yuan, because these 
interviews were double-checked by the Institute of Modern History of the Academia Sinica in terms of 
time and accuracy. There are 270 pages in Book 1 of the Oral Histories Told by Elder Judges and 
Justices, 273 in Book 2, 284 in Book 3, 236 in Book 4, 419 in Book 5, 358 in Book 6 and 201 in Book 
7 (2041 pages in total). 
164 The official interviews provided the Justices at least one or two years to reconsider their words before 
publication. This means they have more time to consider what they are going to publish, including their 
writings and books. Eventually they will disclose more – which was precisely the case in the Judicial 
Yuan’s oral history project, in which the Justices gave out carefully worded information. I sensed that 
the Justices I interviewed were trying to tell me this: why not rely on the archives first, since I have 
already published my carefully-worded opinions? 
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themselves, during my first interviews with them, recommended that I consult the oral 
history project for more detailed information; this seemed logical, as the official oral 
history interviews took place much closer to each Justice’s actual experience on the 
bench,165 whereas the interviews conducted for this thesis took place about 16 to 26 
years after the cases were decided. Nevertheless, the comparatively brief series of 
interviews conducted for this thesis still provides a number of important insights – the 
delay in time can also be a strength, as the most prominent memories of Justices have 
come to the forefront more clearly. For instance, all the Justices I interviewed in 2013 
made strong comments about the collective honour of the Justices as a court,166 and did 
not want to consider the possibility of discussing any Justice’s individual behaviour167 
within the Judicial Yuan: 
 
Regarding Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000], the 
Representatives of the National Assembly lodged an accusation in the 
form of an impeachment against me in the Control Yuan; [however], all 
of the Justices stood as one, responding to the Control Yuan by asking 
why this accusation concerned only one Justice. The Council of Justices 
is based on the collegiate system; hence it must be the Judicial Yuan’s 
joint decision when any decision is made.168 (Interview with Wu on 19-
OCT-2004) 
                                                     
165 For a list of all interviews undertaken by the oral history project and their respective dates, see 
generally pages 31-32 in detail. 
166 Justice Lin Tzu-Yi, an expert in the field of freedom of speech, told me in his interview that in his 
opinion a retired Justice in Taiwan should have limited freedom of speech because this is good for the 
present Justices. Justice Lin Tzu-Yi stuck to his principles after retirement, and avoids writing critical 
comments because he believes that the collective honour of the current Justices is crucial to the Judicial 
Yuan. 
167 Take Justice Herbert H.P. Ma as an example. One of his typical responses was: ‘It was a long time 
ago and I do not remember. However, this is just irrelevant gossip’. 
168 Author’s Translation. 
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Such insights reinforced the fundamental methodological and theoretical choices of this 
thesis, such as the concept of the Judicial Yuan as a composite institutional actor per se 
(Goetz, 2003: 68) and the corresponding decision to ignore where possible the 
formation of coalitions on the bench (Baum, 2006: 50-60) as well as all other aspects 
of intra-institutional politics and hierarchies. The absence of specific types of 
information 169  can thus reveal almost as much about the character of a judicial 
institution as the information that is available. For the US Supreme Court, for example, 
we learnt a lot about the internal workings of the institution from its clerks (Peppers 
and Zorn, 2008: 51-77), investigative journalists (Woodward and Armstrong, 2005: 1-
592) and some judicial autobiographies. For Taiwan, the internal institutional system of 
the Judicial Yuan remains closed to outsiders, and Justices, journalists and most jurists 
do not consider the internal judicial politics as an important part of any academic 
study.170 Similarly – and in contrast to the USA and many common law apex courts – 
the Judicial Yuan does not reveal which Justice wrote which judgement – neither the 
judgment itself nor any of the interviews or comments in newspapers reveal anything 
about judicial authorship. Chapter 5 of this thesis tries to confirm the widespread and 
plausible assumption amongst Taiwanese lawyers and jurists that not all Justices were 
equally important in the 1990s (see generally the statistics on pages 197-219). Even if 
this was true, and only 4 or 5 out of 15 Justices (or their legal preferences) shaped the 
Judicial Yuan in the 1990s, none of the Justices would ever confirm this in any 
                                                     
169 In the personal interviews, all Justices directly refused (if asked) to answer questions about ‘internal 
affairs’; nothing related to ‘internal affairs’ is mentioned in the judicial biography project, either 
because Justices were asked directly and refused to answer or because such topics were indirectly 
avoided to begin with. 
170 In the personal interviews, questions leading in this direction would immediately be dismissed as 
gossip – of course, some US scholars, such as Noah Feldman in his book Scorpions: The Battles and 
Triumphs of FDR’s Great Supreme Court Justices (Feldman, 2010: 1-528) have illustrated how 
insightful internal judicial politics can be. Either way, it matters little to this thesis, or to Taiwan in 
general, as it seems impossible to penetrate the institutional silence. 
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interview.171 
 
To summarise, this thesis provides fresh and original empirical evidence through the 
analysis of 43 interviews with Taiwan’s Justices and judges, along with 4172 interviews 
with a politician (Hsu Hsin-Liang), two constitutional lawyers (Lin Chih-Chung and 
Nigel N.T. Li) and a journalist (Wang Wen-Ling). The 50 interviews can be divided into 
12 personal interviews at the beginning of the first period of fieldwork and the archival 
work in the Judicial Yuan, locating and analysing 38 interviews from the ‘official’ 
interview series carried out by the judicial biography project. During the first phase of 
interviewing in Taiwan, many of the Justices interviewed stated at some point during 
the interview that the questions I was asking had already been covered extensively 
during official interviews for the judicial biography project. Step by step, it became 
clear that the archives of the Judicial Yuan not only held an extremely significant 
resource in terms of its discovery for a PhD project, but also because the official 
interviews were exceptionally information-rich and detailed. My evolving research 
strategy then came to focus mostly on the identification and analysis of the judicial 
                                                     
171 The prestige of a judicial giant here rests more on the Justice’s capacity to protect the reputation of 
his colleagues as equals than the claim to authorship of a judicial opinion. Chief Justice Weng Yueh-
Sheng (Interviewed in NOV-2009) and Justice Herbert H.P. Ma (Interviewed on 19-JUL-2013) 
expressed any particular concern about judicial reputation by holding that the Judicial Yuan should be 
considered as a single entity, and they do not believe that the public sight of a divided Judicial Yuan 
would do the institution any favours. In my opinion, this again relates to Taiwan’s judicial culture – no 
Justice can be exempted from political accountability because they made decisions together, and any 
challenge against one Justice will be deemed a challenge against the Judicial Yuan as an entity 
(Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-2004). 
172 Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang’s interview was the first I conducted, because he was the leader of the 
Democrats at the time of democratisation. I sought to know what happened and what the role of the 
Judicial Yuan was in democratisation from the leader of the opposition party. I also interviewed another 
important politician from the Democrats, Chairman Wu Jan-Fu, for the same reasons, but Chairman 
Wu’s interview was too political – he simply wanted to let me know how evil the Nationalist Party was. 
Nigel N.T. Li’s interview was conducted because he is the most important person in this thesis other 
than the Justices themselves. Chairman Lin Chih-Chung’s interview was conducted later because he 
was not only the lawyer who defended former President Chen Shui-Bian in courts, but was also one of 
the first judges who allied themselves with public opinion for judicial independence in Taiwan’s history. 
Journalist Wang Wen-Ling’s interview was the last interview I conducted because I was looking for a 
law journalist like Noah Feldman to profile the image of the judiciary-public opinion alliance. 
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biography archive; whenever it was difficult to understand an aspect of an individual 
interview, when there were gaps in relation to the specific information required for this 
thesis, the Justices were consulted again. However, they recommended that I should put 
the judicial biography project first, and consider it as the most important resource. In a 
nutshell, it was neither necessary nor possible in terms of fieldwork time to undertake 
both archival work and a complete interview series. The key source of information 
about judicial decision-making and finding evidence to support the hypothesis of this 
research thus became the official archives, along with the memoirs and academic 
publications of the Justices. 
 
3.5.3 Judicial Archives in Taiwan 
 
Anybody – whether Taiwanese citizens or foreign scholars visiting Taiwan – can access 
the judicial archives in national libraries throughout the country. The practice of 
Taiwanese government publication is that each department publishes respectively and 
places the publications in national libraries together, so anybody in the country can 
access the archives without going to a specific archive. However, the first problem we 
confront in Taiwan is that there are too many archives, and the Taiwanese filing system 
is generally speaking not systematic enough. We can easily become lost in archives and 
may not be aware of new archives published, such as the Judicial Yuan’s biography 
project. Neither Nigel N.T. Li nor I knew of this project until the Justices interviewed 
provided me the examples.173 
 
                                                     
173 In my opinion, the Taiwanese bibliography is not systematic. Taking the Judicial Yuan’s biography 
project as an example, it is online and can be accessed via the Judicial Yuan’s database, as long as we 
know it exists. If we do not know, we will probably not accidentally stumble across it using a database 
search because of Taiwan’s unsystematic bibliographic system. 
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Specific sections of Taiwan’s judicial archives are not open to the public, although it is 
unclear why. Surprisingly, many of the Justices said they do not know why either. It is 
likely to be an obscure bureaucratic tradition that everyone follows without knowing 
the reason.174 In the cases studied by this thesis, access to judicial biography interviews 
or case files was never problematic, but access was restricted to the minutes of the 
Justices’ meetings filed in the Judicial Yuan (the Justices I interviewed contended that 
these minutes should be open because there is nothing to hide from the public). Even 
the minutes of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.1 [1949] meeting are not 
accessible.175 This ‘bureaucratic tradition’176 particularly regarding the model of this 
thesis is strategic, because no one in the world can read judicial decisions in accordance 
with the Justices’ internal interaction unless these minutes are made available.177 A 
possible prediction suggested by this thesis is that the Justices may have no intention to 
avoid talking about the cases, because while many Justices have spoken widely in 
official interviews, they intend not to disclose any information about intra-institutional 
politics. 
 
Of the archives that are open, a good understanding of the coding system is needed in 
order to access the database. Even for a trained Taiwanese lawyer or an experienced 
jurist, the database is the opposite of user-friendly. There are no instructions or manuals, 
                                                     
174 Although I am forbidden from providing names, many Justices clearly told me that in their opinion 
these archives should be open to the public. However, when I asked them why they are not open, the 
common answer I received was: ‘I don’t know, it’s just bureaucracy’. 
175 In Taiwan’s legal education, minutes of judicial meetings are completely irrelevant because no 
judicial minutes have ever been open to the public. Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that most 
Taiwanese academics are not aware of the importance of these minutes. 
176 As mentioned previously, the importance of judicial minutes is commonly disregarded, but Justice 
Wu Geng has suggested at least once that they should be open to the public (Interview with Wu on 19-
OCT-2004). However, his proposal was not considered, and we cannot know from his wording whether 
the proposal was deferred or rejected (ibid). 
177 Though I am not authorised to provide the name, a Justice I interviewed told me that the minutes 
remain traditionally confidential. He said that there is no reason to be confidential, but this is just the 
way things are. 
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and no glossary for abbreviations, and a lot of ‘research-time’ had to be invested in the 
deciphering of the Judicial Yuan’s case-labels, numeration and coding systems. 
However, the pay-off turned out to be a treasure chest of information, and the moment 
the catalogue of case-meeting-minutes is understood, it reveals an enormous amount of 
details178 that can be accessed online. 
 
The aforementioned case-coding system consists of one or two Chinese characters and 
case numbers in sequence. Each case is classified in accordance with the dominant 
subject matter: Chinese characters thus label the cases in terms of content-based 
taxonomy (as opposed to a procedural law-based taxonomy for instance). For example, 
the Chinese character Shih represents ‘constitutional interpretation’, so each case coded 
with this character is a constitutional judicial review case decided by the Judicial Yuan. 
In other words, the Chinese character shows not only the subject matter of the case but 
also the court jurisdiction; in this way each case can be found by a search for specific 
Chinese characters along with a number in sequence on the Judicial Yuan’s online 
database. 
 
Such patterns of cataloguing and case-coding have a long history in China, and are 
rooted in the dense bureaucratic tradition of Chinese culture, impervious to change and 
renewal even when the database moves to the online realm. At the moment, access to 
the judicial database requires strong intuitive and linguistic skills, enabling the 
researcher to ‘guess’ which Chinese character is used for which courts and subject 
matter, or to ‘read’ the Chinese characters used in order to know what the case is about. 
                                                     
178 Judgement, judicial opinion, instrument of appeal, previous decision held by inferior court and 
administrative decision concerned (if available) are all included. We may even discover much 
additional information if we read scientifically, such as bench size and time taken for decision-making, 
which is something most Taiwanese academics usually ignore. 
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Once the system is understood, however, the identification of cases is waterproof, and 
the stories and legal processes proceeded are clearly displayed – except for any 
information regarding intra-institutional politics. 
 
3.5.4 What is New and Original 
 
The research angle of this thesis itself is already new and original, because no academic 
in Taiwan has yet considered the exercise of judicial power through the lens of judicial 
politics. More precisely, no academic in Taiwan has yet systematically attempted to 
discover whether or not the Justices are influenced by public opinion. Lawyers and 
jurists in Taiwan murmur, but no one attempts to testify. In other words, this thesis is 
the first academic work that aims to understand why and how Taiwan’s Justices made 
their decisions. Unlike most studies in Taiwan that only focus on the doctrinal analysis 
of these decisions, this thesis goes a step further, attempting to shape Taiwan’s 
constitutionalism in accordance with its judicial politics. 
 
Because there is not yet any trend to study the exercise of judicial power via judicial 
politics, official statistics and judicial archives have never previously been used for 
understanding judicial decision-making. For example, official statistics may be used to 
improve court services, but no one actually asks why the Judicial Yuan wants these 
improvements. According to Baum’s judicial audience theory (Baum, 2006: 25-49) all 
human beings behave purposely, and if we apply that dictum to this thesis we may be 
able to provide an academic reasoning for these improvements. In addition, whilst 
Justices’ signatures may be used only for formalities (although no one pays attention to 
them), this thesis transforms them into a new understanding of the exercise of judicial 
power. By counting signatures, this thesis successfully discloses the proper size of the 
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bench in each case, as well as providing a clear absence record for the Justices. The 
thesis also proves that all crucial cases in the 1990s were decided en banc. 
 
The new and original approach of this thesis is thus illuminated; its main fieldwork 
contribution is to collect statistics and archives that were not collected for judicial 
politics through linguistic and academic skills, sieving out relevant information from 
irrelevant documents, thus sketching out an image of Taiwan’s judiciary-public opinion 
alliance – an alliance which is discussed but never publicly admitted. 
 
3.6 SINOLOGY AND TRANSLATION 
 
Almost all the translations within this thesis are labelled ‘author’s translation’ – if 
government translations are available (for the Constitution and most importantly for the 
decisions of the Judicial Yuan) these are identified via a list of primary sources (official 
sources by the Government of the ROC in English). 
 
For studies dealing with the ROC, this thesis does not apply the Hanyu Pinyin system 
promoted by the PRC because the ROC, and in particular its government institutions 
and courts, does not fully apply the Hanyu Pinyin system. Personal names are always 
Romanised in the way an author or judge chooses to Romanise his or her own name 
when publishing in a European language, attending a European Conference or teaching 
at a Western institution. 
 
If the romanisation of a particular Chinese name is not found, the rule of romanisation 
within this thesis is as follows: 
 
127 
 
1. If he or she is a famous person in the West who already has a commonly 
Romanised name, this thesis adopts this name. 
 
2. If he or she is a Chinese person who is not famous in the West, this thesis 
uses the Hanyu Pinyin system. 
 
3. If he or she is or was a citizen of the ROC, this thesis uses the Wade-Giles 
system. 
 
4. If he or she is or was a citizen of the PRC, this thesis uses the Hanyu Pinyin 
system. 
 
It is worth noting that it is extremely impudent within the traditional Chinese culture to 
misspell a person’s name. For instance, using the Hanyu Pinyin system to spell out the 
name of an ROC citizen can sometimes amount to a slight against this person’s 
character. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis uses a data-heavy approach to study judicial decision-making of the Judicial 
Yuan, applying case-coding and statistical methods to narrate and analyse the history 
of the court throughout the 1990s. Although the ROC Government provides rich official 
statistics and archives, they are not collected just to help decipher judicial decision-
making. Official statistics and archives are trawled from massive official datasets by 
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this thesis and compiled to support a theoretically sophisticated argument. 
 
Instead of just reading cases which other Taiwanese scholars have already considered 
previously, this thesis applies interview methods that allow the former Justices to talk 
about the cases, using a method that brings fresh knowledge about what really 
underpinned the decision-making process. Surprisingly, most of what is new and 
original was discovered in the National Central Library in Taipei, where I discovered 
first-hand the court’s oral history project. No other scholar has used this treasury of 
information before – because they were unaware of its existence. 
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4: THEORISING JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: 
A TAIWANESE PERSPECTIVE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The ROC Constitution is to some extent a creation of judicial power expansion – it is 
abstract in content and requires a huge amount of interpretation. Moreover, it stipulates 
that the Judicial Yuan is the exclusive and ultimate interpreta auctoritate of the 
Constitution with no written limits at all. 179  The Constitution is structured in 
accordance with its founding father’s legal thoughts and ideals, and that founding father 
and draftsman, Carsun Chang, did not prefer a balanced separation of powers design. 
As a pioneer of judicial supremacy, he commented on the Constitution through a series 
of lectures in July 1946, stating: 
 
[T]he jurisdiction of the [ROC] judiciary not only refers to adjudications 
between civilians and civilians, and between civilians and officials, but 
also includes the constitutional judicial review power against both 
congressional legislations and the President’s administrative discretion. 
[Our] rule of law shall not be considered successful, ultimate or prefect 
until such a power is exercised as the so-called judicial supremacy.180 – 
Carsun Chang (1946) 
 
Even though the ROC Constitution of 1947 (enacted in 1946181) may be the world’s 
                                                     
179  Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), and 
Constitution of R.O.C. § 173 (1947). 
180 Author’s Translation. 
181 The ROC Constitution of 1947 was enacted on 25 December 1946, promulgated on 1 January 1947 
and implemented on 25 December 1947. 
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first constitution based on judicial supremacy, we know with hindsight that Carsun 
Chang’s constitutional designs, by authorising the Judicial Yuan with massive powers 
as well as concrete safeguards,182 did not bring about judicial supremacy in the ROC. 
It seems that Carsun Chang attempted to motivate the Justices for judicial activism 
institutionally, and by giving them swords (constitutional powers) and shields 
(constitutional safeguards) together, the Judicial Yuan were expected to made decisions 
sincerely. In this respect it is reasonable to consider Carsun Chang as China’s first legal 
academic who support the attitudinal model (Segal and Spaeth, 1993: 390) of judicial 
activism – although of course he was not aware of it. 
 
The ROC Constitution embodies Carsun Chang’s strong leanings towards judicial 
supremacy, but the practicality of such judicial supremacy relies on the Justices. If they 
could be easily threatened, the Justices might choose inaction and forgot about the 
massive judicial powers Carsun Chang was offering. In other words, it is crucial to 
know whether or not the Justices were fully protected from political intervention. As 
far as this issue is concerned, there is no doubt that Taiwan’s political history between 
1949 and 1990 (Roy, 2003: 76-182) becomes the best empirical evidence to prove that 
Carsun Chang’s institutional shields (constitutional safeguards) were not sufficiently 
effective to protect the Justices in reality. Before they found an even more powerful 
shield – public opinion – the Justices were not capable of wielding Carsun Chang’s 
institutional swords (constitutional powers) properly. 
 
There is no doubt that the American academics are the pioneers of judicial behaviour 
studies, whilst Carsun Chang knew nothing about this subject. However, it is reasonable 
                                                     
182 Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 80 (1947), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 81 (1947). 
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to conclude that he intended to found a constitution that provided political space for 
judicial decision makers to vote on the basis of their own policy preferences (Neubaver 
and Meinhold, 2010: 466). Since Pritchett and Murphy, who introduced concepts of 
judicial politics (Pritchett, 1948: 1-287) and strategies (Murphy, 1964: 3-212) 
respectively, the American idea of judges maximising policy preferences (Cross, 1998: 
511-570) dominated the world’s judicial behaviourism for decades. However, when we 
look at the Constitution, it is not difficult to discover that these American theories are 
exactly Carson Chang’s fundamental principles. It was his intention to maximise judges’ 
policy preferences, so that not only were the Justices the ultimate and exclusive 
constitutional interpreters, but they were given an unlimited scope for constitutional 
interpretation.183 In other words, Carsun Chang had sensed in 1946 the theories that 
Pritchett and Murphy refined in 1948 and 1964. 
 
Following Pritchett and Murphy, Schubert built the attitude activation model of judicial 
decision-making (Schubert, 1965: 22-43) and it is very interesting to discover how 
Carsun Chang’s immature (yet understandable) idea of judicial decision-making falls 
in line with Schubert’s arguably psychological and rational choice model (ibid: 10-13). 
According to Schubert, the Constitution expects the Justices to use their sweeping 
powers rationally so that no institutional limits need to be set. In other words, the 
Constitution infers Schubert’s 1965 argument of psychological rationality, regardless 
of whether Carsun Chang personally knew anything about the sophisticated attitude 
activation model or not. 
 
In the 1970s, Pritchett, Murphy and Schubert’s contributions were largely absorbed into 
                                                     
183  Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), and 
Constitution of R.O.C. § 173 (1947). 
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the attitudinal model built by Spaeth (Segal and Spaeth, 1993: 390). The attitudinal 
model dictates that ‘judges tend to vote according to their political preferences, attitudes, 
and ideologies’ (Weiden, 2011: 188), so this model supposes the judicial decision 
makers to be ‘policy makers, and they vote the way they do because they are interested 
in seeing their policy views made into law’ (Neubaver and Meinhold, 2010: 466). 
However, to some degree the attitudinal model only explains ‘why’ (motive) instead of 
‘how’ (method) a judicial decision-maker makes such decision – would he/she vote at 
all costs? If the answer is no, the attitudinal model should be applied only to a limited 
extent, because judges may not always vote in accordance with their policy preferences 
in reality. Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan studies might therefore be an extremely good 
empirical example for attitudinal behaviourists. 
 
As previously mentioned, Carsun Chang is a constitutional jurist whose thoughts may 
be categorised as attitudinal behaviourism. It should therefore come as no surprise that 
any political phenomenon the attitudinal model cannot explain in the judicial 
development of Taiwan goes beyond the original designs of the Constitution, although 
it may still be constitutional. The most remarkable political phenomenon in Taiwan’s 
judicial development is that the Justices under Carsun Chang’s Constitution did not 
exercise their extensive powers successfully until they were sure that public opinion 
was on their side (Baum, 2006: 25-49). This not only shows Carsun Chang’s failure to 
provide effective protection for the Justices (constitutional safeguards), but also 
indicates that public opinion is a crucial variable in terms of judicial decision-making 
in Taiwan. This phenomenon also implies that the Justices could no longer decide 
sincerely (attitudinal model) every time (Mishler and Sheehan, 1996: 169-198) because 
of this judiciary-public opinion alliance (Baum, 2006: 50-87). It meant that they had to 
decide strategically (Baum, 1997: 89-124) if necessary. 
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Ginsburg is the first academic to introduce the strategic model (Epstein and Knight, 
1998: 138) to studies of Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan. However, like Epstein and Knight 
(ibid), Ginsburg argued that the Justices’ strategic decisions were all determined in 
response to the other branches of government (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157). Ginsburg’s 
study follows the typical American strategic model – the Justices were playing 
separation of powers games (Gillman, 1999: 84), and would always decide accordingly 
(Epstein and Knight, 2000: 625-653), but this model fails to explain why the Justices 
became extremely powerful – such as when they fearlessly struck down a constitutional 
amendment.184 In other words, Ginsburg’s model failed to explain where the political 
ground (Whittington, 2007: 161-229) of judicial supremacy in Taiwan actually lies – or 
more precisely, who provides such power to the Justices? 
 
Ginsburg was completely unaware of the importance of Taiwan’s judiciary-public 
opinion alliance. If public opinion is evaluated in accordance with Baum’s judicial 
audience theory (Baum, 2006: 25-49), then the strategic model would be more 
appropriate as a lens through which to study Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan. The Constitution 
is intentionally designed to permit judicial supremacy (Chang, 1947: Chapter 7), but 
the Justices’ institutional protection (constitutional safeguards) against political 
intervention proved ineffective, meaning that Carsun Chang’s original purpose of 
providing political space for sincere voting (the attitudinal model) was unsuccessful. It 
was the Justices themselves who found the political ground for judicial supremacy, and 
it is certain that the Justices had to pay for this somehow (the strategic model). As long 
as the judiciary-public opinion alliance remains in place, little space is left for sincere 
                                                     
184 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000]. 
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judicial decisions. 
 
During the period of study (2012-2016), a review model was suggested by Epstein and 
Knight (2013: 11-27) because they came to see ideology as ‘just one of several forms 
of motivation that should be incorporated into a realistic and comprehensive conception 
of judicial decision-making’ (ibid: 24). Epstein and Knight’s new idea fits with this 
thesis because the so-called ideology or value may not be mirrored cross-culturally (i.e., 
Wen Tian-Xiang’s story in Chapter 1.5). Therefore, some modifications are required to 
this thesis. 
 
1. Judicial self-interests should be defined in accordance with Chinese classical 
political thoughts and cultural or social biases. 
 
2. The content and scope of political preferences may not be the same cross-
culturally and thereby the Justices’ motives must be adjusted accordingly. 
 
4.2 PUBLIC OPINION, MEDIA AND THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
 
In terms of whether the Justice of the Republic of China take public 
opinion seriously or not, [and] the question of whether [they] read public 
opinion or not, I think, speaking overall, it is nearly impossible for a 
jurist in the Republic of China, including Justices and judges, to 
completely ignore social reactions […]185 (Interview with Ma on 19-
JUL-2013) 
                                                     
185 Author’s Translation. 
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As Justice Herbert Han-Pao Ma indicates, it is impossible to discount the influence of 
the public on judicial decision-making (Baum, 2006: 60-72) in Taiwan, though it is also 
hard to define specifically the scope of such influence – either as public preference 
(McGuire and Stimson, 2004: 1033) or as public opinion (Flemming and Wood, 1997: 
468-495). Such difficulty is rooted in the ambiguity of public opinion – in particular, 
‘what moves public opinion’ (Page et al., 1987: 23-43) and ‘what shapes public opinion’ 
(Heymann, 2000: 375). 
 
Upon hearing my open-ended question about the meaning of public 
opinion, twelve of the staffers answered ‘the media’. Some of these men 
and women mentioned interest groups as well, but all believed that 
newspapers, television, or radio content was not simply a conduit for 
public opinion expression: In their view, it was the very essence of 
public opinion and can support or destroy legislative initiatives. (Herbst, 
1998: 65) 
 
At some moments we can detect what we believe are clear media effects. 
But very often the causal order of these relationships can be rather murky 
since the initial content of journalism does reflect the views and 
concerns of readers and audiences: In fact, if media content did not 
appeal to attitudinal currents already flowing through the social world, 
we would not find such texts attractive or relevant to our lives. It seems 
that non-systematic evidence supporting the conflation of media opinion 
and public opinion is everywhere […] this is not to say that we must 
abandon the notion of media effects […] yet the possibility of public 
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opinion/media conflation does present to us a tremendous challenge that 
can only help us understand the unique nature of contemporary 
American politics. (ibid) 
 
This thesis has no intention of trying to analyse how public opinion is shaped in terms 
of the distinction between media and public opinion, because the core of this research 
centres on how judicial decision-makers were influenced by what Herbst refers to as a 
‘public opinion/media conflation’ (ibid). Judges are like politicians – the distinction 
between media and public opinion may not be considered a necessity whilst making 
decisions, but the preference of public opinion and the media that ‘can support or 
destroy legislative initiatives’ (ibid) is always something that needs to be considered in 
political terms – unless they do not care about the political consequences. Moreover, 
judges can read public opinion through the media (ibid) as well as anyone else. Even 
though this public opinion represents a public opinion/media conflation, they are still 
capable of sensing public pressure as much as we are. 
 
Judges have friends, family and neighbours as well as other people. They 
have the same exposure to public opinion as everyone else. We don’t 
live in an ivory tower. (Mackenzie, 2005: 141) 
 
If we were to ask a British Member of Parliament how he read public opinion in the 
mid-19th century when the Representation of the People Act 1832 was being enacted, 
what would we expect him to say? As a politician, he would not read public opinion 
until the result of the election, because he wanted to win, but how could he read public 
opinion without public opinion polls? If we all agree that he was aware of public 
opinion through friends, newspapers or whispers in gentlemen’s clubs, there is no 
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reason why the same answers cannot apply to Taiwan’s Justices in the 1990s. 
 
Though they are not elected, judges read the same newspapers as 
members of Congress, and thus they, too, are aware of public opinion. 
[…] It is nonetheless true that the Court is sensitive to certain bodies of 
opinion, especially of those elites – liberal or conservative – to which its 
members happen to be attuned. The justices will keep in mind historical 
cases in which their predecessors, by blatantly disregarding public 
opinion, very nearly destroyed the legitimacy of the Court itself. (Wilson 
et al., 2015: 432) 
 
Many interviews with and writings by the Justices in Taiwan show that they also read 
public opinion through media, and that their sense of public pressure attaches to China’s 
classical concept of judicial responsibility to the common people. In other words, the 
judicial understanding of public opinion in Taiwan is a broad and unsophisticated 
sociological and philosophical idea, so that previous models of judicial self-
presentation for the USA (Baum, 2006: 25-49), communication for Mexico (Staton, 
2010: 53-64) and transparency for Germany (Vanberg, 2005: 19-60) require adjustment 
in order to comply with Taiwanese actuality: 
 
Public opinion is like gurgling water [that I must comply when it 
changes].186 – Shih Chi-Yang, Head of the Judicial Yuan (1992) 
 
As mentioned previously, the Judicial Yuan actually decided what constituted public 
                                                     
186 Author’s Translation. 
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opinion to the Justices in the 1990s according to the definition of public opinion 
provided by Hans Speier (Speier, 1950: 376), which means that the core of this research 
thus moves from how the Justices read public opinion through media to focus on what 
kind of vox populi would be considered public opinion by the Justices. In theory, the 
Justices had no constitutional obligation to listen to any voice of the people187 but it 
was their choice to respond to it. They could apply the Universal Declaration of the 
Independence of Justice 1983 and tell the people that genuine judicial independence is 
to ‘avoid being influenced by any considerations other than those of … justice’,188 but 
as Ma (2013) said: ‘it is nearly impossible for a jurist of the Republic of China, 
including Justices and judges, to completely ignore social reactions189’ (Interview with 
Ma on 19-JUL-2013). In other words, it was their intention to read public opinion over 
and above their legal obligations190 , which according to this thesis means how the 
Justices read public opinion is less important than understanding how the vox populi is 
considered public opinion by the Justices. 
 
[Rulers who] have been honoured to be the parents of the people shall 
favour what people prefer and abhor what people dislike.191 – The Great 
Learning of the Four Books (505-436BCE) 
 
                                                     
187 Cf. Universal Declaration of the Independence of Justice § 1.5 (1983). 
188 Id. 
189 Author’s Translation. 
190 Some may agree with Circuit Judge Thomas Gee of the US Court of Appeals that ‘the purpose of the 
judiciary is not to reflect public opinion in its deliberations or to satisfy public opinion with its 
decisions’. League of United Latin American Citizens Council v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990). 
However, this opinion, as far as I am concerned, illustrates only the judges’ legal-constitutional 
responsibility rather than their political and moral responsibilities. There is no doubt that the Justices 
were not obliged to reflect public opinion legally and constitutionally, but there would be no chance for 
them to build up a Chinese ideal judiciary in Taiwan if they did not. See generally Max Weber’s moral 
attitude towards law, dogmatic jurisprudence and sociological understanding – ideal types (Krnoman, 
1983: 7-14). 
191 Author’s Translation. 
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The Chinese concept of judicial responsibility to the common people originated in the 
historical debate between Chinese legalism and Confucianism (Head and Wang, 2005: 
49-50), and ended up with a doctrine of ‘Confucianism prevailing’ (Huang, 1997: 488-
489) in 134 BCE – a doctrine192  born to remedy excessive legalism because the 
Chinese people were historically the victims of the harsh rule by law193 (Head and 
Wang, 2005: 63-70; Yang, 1937: 4). This meant that the Chinese have carried a terrible 
collective image of the rule by law (Li, 2012: 3) and their negative perceptions would 
only be amended by ‘substantive justice’ (Woo and Gallagher, 2011: 13). Judges in 
China are morally expected to uphold substantive justice, but the idea of this elusive 
concept is mostly defined and distinguished by the public (Anson et al., 2009: 211). So 
let us be realistic; it is impossible for a Chinese judge with a great reputation to rid 
himself of public influence (and pressure) in such a society. 
 
Public support is what the courts survive on, and if they ignore this they 
do themselves a great disservice. […] Public opinion is important, the 
whole legal system depends on it in one way or another. (Mackenzie, 
2005: 140) 
 
In contrast to American legal studies (Collins and Collins, 2008: 165-186; Wrightsman, 
1999: 56-82), the Chinese concept of public pressure against judges (Wrightsman, 1999: 
27-56) is unsophisticated. However, at the empirical level, the concept provides the 
Justices in Taiwan with great flexibility in making either sincere or strategic decisions 
(Epstein and Knight, 2000: 625-653; Spiller and Gely, 2007: 2-15). As long as it is 
                                                     
192 Because the Confucians replaced law with morality (Ren, 1997: 19-23), morality has become China’s 
natural law (Finnis, 1980: 18) and is being further legitimised (Jernigan, 1905: 72; MacCormack, 1996: 
54). 
193 The Chinese cannot distinguish rule of law from rule by law linguistically because the Chinese 
language can only express ‘rule in accordance with law’. 
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commonly defined as ‘public opinion’, the Chinese classical legal and political theories 
will continually breed judicial legitimacy to the Justices – with or without sophistication 
– thus avoiding Western constitutional dilemmas such us countermajoritarian 
difficulties (Bassok, 2012: 335-382) by simply focusing on Hoekstra’s two models of 
public support for the Judicial Yuan (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15), i.e., what is the 
expectation of the mass to the Justices (diffuse support), and what is the evaluation of 
the mass to a specific judicial decision (specific support)? 
 
That is to say, unlike the American court studies, Taiwan’s studies in relation to the 
interaction between the Justices and the masses should focus more specifically on the 
Hoekstra models of public support, paying full attention to how these Justices make 
strategic decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
 
4.3 MENDEL, GINSBURG AND THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
 
It is no exaggeration to conclude that the world does not pay much attention to Taiwan 
or its legal system – despite the fact that its Justices dismissed the authoritarian congress 
in favour of democratisation and struck down an unconstitutional constitutional 
amendment – and most legal scholars worldwide do not even hear of these exploits: 
According to Fell, ‘Judged only by its population and size, Taiwan … would not 
commend much attention in the global community’ (Fell, 2012: Foreword). 
 
Mendel is probably the first non-Taiwanese legal academic to study Taiwan’s Judicial 
Yuan. In his 1993 article (Mendel, 1993: 157-189), Mendel applied the attitudinal 
model (Segal and Spaeth, 1993: 390) to the Justices, holding that the then Justices were 
well aware of changes in the political atmosphere, and considered that the right time 
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had come to achieve their political ideal (ibid: 176-189) of democracy and rule of law. 
Mendel’s model was later validated by Ginsberg. 
 
Ginsburg applied the strategic model (Epstein and Knight, 2000: 625-653) to the 
Judicial Yuan, explaining that: 
 
The Taiwan example illustrates the merits of careful expansion of 
judicial power through a gradual, step-by-step process. Individual cases 
illuminate the judges’ careful process of testing how much judicial 
power political authorities would tolerate [...] (Ginsburg, 2003: 106) 
 
The expansion of judicial power was achieved, and ‘as of 1998 no government body 
had failed to comply with any order from the council, issued after democratization 
commenced in 1987, to amend legislation or administrative regulations’ (ibid: 144). In 
other words, Ginsburg’s model represents a milestone in studies of Taiwan’s Judicial 
Yuan, because he made a great contribution to Taiwan’s fundamental methodology of 
judicial power expansion. 
 
It is to some extent a little embarrassing that the first two models of Taiwanese judicial 
behaviour were developed by non-Taiwanese legal academics – both the attitudinal and 
strategic models. Taiwanese legal academics are not yet interested in knowing how their 
judges and Justices think, although Taiwanese legal academics have achieved 
impressive theoretical and empirical developments. However, no legal academic 
anywhere has sought to continue Ginsburg’s work because Taiwan is generally 
considered too small and ineffective to be heard. Therefore, since Ginsburg’s 2003 
publication there has been no further studies Taiwan’s court system until this thesis. 
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There remains one puzzle that both Mendel and Ginsburg fail to explain: on what 
grounds would Taiwan’s political authorities choose to ‘tolerate’ (ibid: 106) or comply 
with the judicial decisions made by the Justices? In 2015 Vanberg, using his endogenous 
and exogenous models (Vanberg, 2015: 167-182), concludes that the political 
authorities’ submission to judicial decisions is purposive: 
 
Executives and legislators respect judicial authority only as long as, on 
balance, the presence of independent courts sufficient benefits or 
subverting them is too costly. There are limits to the willingness of the 
other branches to respect judicial authority. (ibid: 179) 
 
Although it seems a little unfair to criticise Mendel’s 1993 article in the light of 
Vanberg’s work more than two decades later, the fact remains that Mendel chose to 
avoid properly answering a question of which he was well aware, namely why do 
Taiwan’s political authorities choose to respect judicial authority? 
 
The ROC Council of Grand Justices has contributed to this period of 
reform through a number of constitutional interpretations which have 
resulted in greater individual liberties and further restrictions on 
government actions. This has been accomplished even though the 
Council operates against substantive and procedural limitations on its 
power. […] The Council […] is not sufficiently protected from the 
influence of other government branches and still issues decisions 
carefully. (Mendel, 1993: 157) 
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The quote cited here implies Mendel’s paradox – on the one hand, he agrees that the 
Justices successfully imposed their will upon other branches of government; on the 
other, he believed somewhat paradoxically that the Justices were not fully protected 
from political intervention (ibid: 167-189). How can a court that is respected in reality 
not be fully protected? The only answer given by Mendel is that the court is protected 
by its relationship with public opinion, although he does not pay much attention to this 
issue: 
 
The Council’s gradualist approach toward regaining its full 
constitutional authority has made […] contributions in the areas of 
individual rights and political reform. […] The Council […] responded 
to the public’s dissatisfaction with the government by issuing 
interpretations […] (ibid: 176) 
 
In contrast to Mendel’s work, which mainly applied the attitudinal model, holding that 
the Justices attempted to ‘regain their power’ (ibid), Ginsburg built his explanation on 
Mendel’s sub-argument, careful decision-making (ibid: 176-189), applying the 
strategic model to Taiwan’s Justices (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157). However, Ginsburg 
still disregarded the interaction between the Justices and the public, paying more 
attention to how Justices decide strategically in Taiwan. For example: 
 
As the council expanded its power over various subjects and appellate 
review power, it turned to the question of enforcement of its judgements. 
[…] The council […] stipulating that unconstitutional government or 
legislative action had to be remedied within a particular period of time 
or the provision in question would be void. (ibid: 143) 
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Ginsburg’s contribution lies in his impressive discovery of the way the Justices in 
Taiwan imposed their will upon other branches of government, but he still failed to 
provide a sophisticated answer as to how the Justices actually managed to accomplish 
this. Ginsburg successfully displayed diverse methods reflecting the strategies of 
judicial power expansion adopted in Taiwan, offered no explanations in relation to the 
root causes of Taiwan’s judicial power expansion. 
 
This is the principal reason for this research project. Both Mendel and Ginsburg were 
more or less aware of the importance of public opinion in Taiwan’s judicial decision-
making; however, they were both unaware that public opinion is the key variable in 
explaining the roots of judicial power expansion in Taiwan. Through the remodelling 
of Taiwan’s Justices according to Vanberg’s new approaches (Vanberg, 2015: 167-182), 
Mendel and Ginsburg’s incomplete study of Taiwan’s judicial power expansion may be 
continued. 
 
4.4 MODELLING THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
 
[A king] who is not benevolent is simply a demon; [a king] who is not 
just is merely a ruffian. One who is neither benevolent nor just is no 
longer qualified to be a king and should be deposed. [Therefore], I only 
know a person named Zhou [King Zhou of Shang] being killed, instead 
of a king being overthrown.194 – Mencius (372-289BCE) 
 
                                                     
194 Author’s Translation. 
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If the ancient Chinese had any sense of democracy, that concept would definitely be 
refined by Mencius under the ideals of Confucianism around 2400 years ago. Of course 
it is unfeasible to evaluate Mencius’ political thought against a background of modern 
democracy; however, his 2400-year-old political idealism on the subject of indirect 
democratic legitimacy helped shape the Taiwanese Judicial Yuan into an ideal of 
judicial power expansion. 
 
According to Nigel N.T. Li, the Chinese idea of democracy in Confucianism comprises 
only democracy of the people and for the people, but not by the people (Li, 2012: 50-
52). The Confucian school therefore always highlighted the need for interaction 
between the ruler and the ruled (ibid: 42-45) in order to maintain good governance and 
provide indirect legitimacy. The common Chinese people had no participation in 
governance, leaving them with only a poor sense of procedural justice that continues 
today (Woo and Gallagher, 2011: 13). To some extent it is reasonable to assume that the 
Chinese people do not really care about procedural details (elections) as long as their 
demands are fulfilled (Wang, 2010a: 38). This provides a crucial cultural variable 
allowing judicial power expansion as long as the Justices decided strategically, in line 
with the preferences of public opinion (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009: 452-457). 
 
Mencius’ ancient political doctrine determines that Baum’s judicial audience theory 
(Baum, 2006: 25-49) is applicable to Taiwan, and the audience is chosen (ibid: 46-47) 
culturally. Mencius’ political approach emphasises the importance of the interrelation 
between government officers (including judges) and the common people (public 
opinion) because it refers to a decision maker’s legitimacy in the Chinese world (King, 
1993: 53-68). This compels Taiwan’s Justices to remain on the side of public opinion 
in order to fulfil their legal responsibilities (legal motivation: Posner, 2008: 84-85), 
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political ideals and even their self-interests (ideological and self-interested motivations: 
Epstein and Knight, 2013: 24-26). In other words, Mencius’ political thoughts provide 
immutable grounds for a judiciary-public opinion alliance according to Baum’s 
audience theory: 
 
People want to be liked and respected by others who are important to 
them. The desire to be liked and respected affects people’s behaviour. In 
these respects, judges are people. (Baum, 2006: 25) 
 
This opinion also implies that judges may attempt to placate their audiences 
strategically (Baum, 1997: 89-124), and that any judicial decision that favours public 
opinion may suggest that public opinion ‘played an appreciable part in causing (a 
case) … to be decided the way it was’ (Rehnquist, 1987: 98). When it comes to Taiwan, 
the statistics are even more persuasive because no case decided by the Justices in the 
1990s (there were 249 in total) is found to contradict the public opinion that pertained 
at the time, whilst many cases were observed in which the Justices deliberately chose 
not to provoke the masses. As a matter of fact, Mencius’ political doctrine provides an 
even stronger motivation for Taiwan’s Justices to placate their main audience via 
Carrubba’s dynamic model (Carrubba, 2009: 55-69). As the beneficiaries of Mencius’ 
philosophy, the Justices would have had few reasons to be concerned about Bickel’s 
well-known countermajoritarian difficulties (Bickel, 1962: 9-22). In other words, the 
Justices in Taiwan could override executive actions and acts of legislature (Whittington, 
2007: 230-284) with few worries about attracting censure on the grounds of legitimacy 
(Friedman, 1998: 334-343), as long as they were able to convince the majority of the 
public that they were right (Carrubba, 2009: 55-69). They could take advantage of the 
fact that as a result of cultural advantages in the Chinese world (Shapiro, 1981: 157-
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193), legitimacy may spring from public support (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15) directly (Li, 
2012: 42-45): 
 
[B]ecause courts are, by their nature, weak institutions, as famously 
argued by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 78. Without either ‘the 
purse or the sword’, they must largely rely on other actors to give life to 
their decisions. (Vanberg, 2015: 168) 
 
Executives and legislators respect judicial authority only as long as, on 
balance, the presence of independent courts sufficient benefits or 
subverting them is too costly. There are limits to the willingness of the 
other branches to respect judicial authority. (ibid: 179) 
 
Mencius’ political philosophy of indirect democratic legitimacy also strengthens 
Taiwan’s endogenous and exogenous conditions for judicial power expansion (ibid: 
167-182). As far as Taiwan’s endogenous condition is concerned, it is quite obvious 
empirically that having a powerful and independent Judicial Yuan would help the 
Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan ‘to achieve their purposes more efficiently 
than would be possible in its absence’ (ibid: 170). The Justices are always the ultimate 
political arbitrators between two branches of government, and it is not difficult to see 
that Taiwanese state organs are used to resolving political controversies (separation of 
powers games) via judicial reviews (39 cases). Moreover, it is very impressive that the 
Taiwanese state organs were able to consult the Justices about internal affairs 
voluntarily (19 cases), requesting a compulsory advisory opinion for direction: 
 
[A]s for the Legislative Yuan’s submission of an official letter titled Tai-
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Yuan-Yi No. 2162 to this Yuan on July 26th of this year (1994), in which 
the former Yuan sought to obtain this Yuan’s opinion on whether 
Members of that Yuan are qualified to propose future amendments to the 
unconstitutional Article 1089 of the Civil Code, the request made is not 
in conformation with […] the […] Act […] it is therefore unnecessary 
to make a further interpretation.195 
 
In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.365 [1994], the Legislative Yuan requested a judicial 
review as to how to amend Taiwan’s Civil Code 1929. The Judicial Yuan replied that it 
was beyond the remit of the judicial power because a bill is not a law. Even though it is 
reasonable to conclude that the Legislative Yuan in this case attempted to accomplish a 
task more efficiently (Vanberg, 2015: 170), it also implies that, from the Legislative 
Yuan’s perspective, the Judicial Yuan’s authority had already been accepted and 
acknowledged (indirect democratic legitimacy). If the Justices were not satisfied with 
these modifications, they could strike these modifications down. So why not ask the 
Justices first? 
 
In relation to Taiwan’s exogenous conditions, Mencius’ political thought plays a crucial 
role that makes the Executive Yuan or the Legislative Yuan ‘too costly’ (ibid: 176) to 
defy the Justices’ decisions. As mentioned previously, the Chinese concept of 
legitimacy is not a procedural issue of entitlement, but always springs from public 
support (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15) in accordance with Mencius. In other words, raising 
countermajoritarian arguments (Bickel, 1962: 9-22) does not directly constitute an 
effective attack against the Justices if the Justices earn massive public support in a 
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specific case (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15). In contrast, challenging any state organ with 
massive public support in Taiwan would almost assuredly bring political suicide: 
 
Generally speaking, whilst the atmosphere is that public opinion 
obviously supports the Justices of the Judicial Yuan, the Legislative 
Yuan would never act rashly and blindly!196 (Interview with Li on 17-
JUN-2013) 
 
To some extent it is reasonable to conclude that Mencius’ indirect democratic 
legitimacy has been rendered more sophisticated largely by Vanberg. His indirect 
enforcement mechanism (Vanberg, 2005: 1-178) for German court studies echoes 
Mencius’ political vision of the interrelationship between the courts and public opinion, 
testifying to the effectiveness of his 2400-year-old theory: 
 
[I]f the public is sufficiently aware of the case, if the case is sufficiently 
transparent (i.e., not too legally complex) such that the public can tell 
whether the government complies with the court ruling, and if the public 
agrees with the court’s preferred outcome, then the public can act as an 
indirect enforcement mechanism by sanctioning its government for 
evasion for a court ruling. (Carrubba and Gabel, 2015: 215) 
 
Although Vanberg does not intend to redefine Mencius’ definition of legitimacy, he does 
acknowledge that public opinion could in reality restrict a decision-maker to fewer 
choices. However, unlike Mencius, who illustrated no precise scope for this mechanism, 
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it is obvious that Vanberg disambiguates Mencius’ political thought to two prerequisites: 
 
1. Vanberg highlights the importance of transparency as a prerequisite to the 
effectiveness of Mencius’ idea. If the public remains unaware of the case, 
the indirect enforcement mechanism is ineffective (Vanberg, 2005: 95-115). 
 
2. Vanberg also indicates that the indirect enforcement mechanism is effective 
only within non-complex cases (ibid: 19-60) because the public could easily 
express an opinion – if the case is too complicated, the public may have no 
interest in it at all. 
 
Vanberg’s indirect enforcement mechanism was later used by Staton in Mexican court 
studies (Staton, 2006: 123-204). However, Vanberg’s mechanism is still an unfamiliar 
(or even unknown) concept in studies of Taiwanese court, despite the fact that it shares 
so many similarities to Mencius’ political philosophy. Ginsburg’s great work on Taiwan 
was accomplished in 2003 (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157) and he was thus unable to 
evaluate Taiwan’s judiciary-public opinion alliance in the light of Vanberg’s 
mechanism, thereby leaving a question mark hanging over his work by inquiring: ‘how 
can a constitutional court that served an authoritarian regime become an instrument for 
democracy and human rights?’ (ibid: 106) In this thesis Ginsburg’s question can be 
answered as follows: 
 
1. A study of the interaction between a court and public opinion shall focus on 
the cases that the mass public are aware of. It is illogical to study cases where 
there is no public opinion. This thesis shall therefore follow Vanberg’s theory, 
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limiting its research scope to those Taiwan’s judicial reviews which attracted 
public attention in the 1990s. 
 
2. Concerning the transparency issue raised by Vanberg, this is of course 
crucial to Taiwan. However, Taiwan has a very different media culture, and 
even Taiwanese journalists believe that Taiwan is a nation of court 
transparency (Interview with Wang on 27-SEP-2014). Therefore, this thesis 
will not concentrate on how the Justices ‘attempt to’ display themselves 
publicly – although Baum’s judicial self-presentation theory (Baum, 2006: 
25-49) may come tobe appreciated by the Judicial Yuan in the future. 
 
4.5 SUN YAT-SEN AND CARSUN CHANG 
 
China in a way had three coördinate departments of government, just as 
the modern democracies of the West have their three departments, with 
this difference – the Chinese government has exercised the powers of 
autocracy, censorship, and civil examination for many thousands of 
years, while Western governments have exercised legislative, judicial, 
and executive powers for only a little over a century. However, the three 
governmental powers in the West have been imperfectly applied and the 
three coördinate powers of ancient China led to many abuses. If we now 
want to combine the best from China and the best from other countries 
and guard against all kinds of abuse in the future, we must take the three 
Western governmental powers – the executive, legislative, and judicial 
– add to them the old Chinese powers of examination and censorship 
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and make a finished wall, a quintuple-power government. Such a 
government will be the most complete and the finest in the world. (Sun, 
1927: 357-358) 
 
According to Ching Chih-Jen, Sun Yat-Sen’s fancy constitutional creation, namely the 
Pentapartite system, was embodied in the ROC Constitution because of the nationalists’ 
political persistence within the Constituent National Assembly in 1946 (Ching, 1984: 
437-445). He said: 
 
Though the Nationalist Party deeply respected the agreements decided 
in the Political Consultative Conference, they upheld that it was 
improper to alter the fundamentals of [Sun Yat-Sen’s] division of 
political rights and governing power, as well as [his] Pentapartite 
constitution. Thus, [they] wished that the other political parties could 
respect [China’s] history of revolution under which the Nationalist Party 
founded the Republic [of China and thereby] understood their [political] 
position and claim.197 (ibid: 443) 
 
Despite the fact that Sun Yat-Sen undoubtedly masterminded the Pentapartite system 
(Wang, 2000: 17-18), this thesis argues that he actually misunderstood the separation 
of powers doctrine completely. He devised a new constitutional doctrine, dividing 
political rights from ruling powers, splitting China’s political activities into two 
categories: the four political rights owned by the people (the rights of suffrage, recall, 
initiative and referendum), and the five ruling powers (executive, legislative, judicial, 
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control, examination powers) owned by the government (ibid). This looked a good in 
theory but did not work in practice, because: 
 
1. Sun Yat-Sen completely misunderstood the operation of representative 
politics when trying to improve it. The legislative power is not and cannot 
be a ruling power in accordance with representative politics in theory. The 
legislative power is actually an instrument of political rights owned by the 
people. 
 
2. Sun Yat-Sen did not understand that in theory the will of the people is 
materialised by using legislative power, and thus it would be very dangerous 
to categorise the legislative power into an institutional ruling power. 
Astonishingly, Sun Yat-Sen intended to create a National Assembly as 
China’s house of representatives, while giving almost all the legislative 
powers to the government-owned Legislative Yuan. 
 
3. In this sense, Sun Yat-Sen misunderstood the doctrine of separation of 
powers. His Pentapartite system is not a constitutional system based on 
separation of powers, and his system only creates five ministries of 
execution, legislature, judiciary, control and examination for the ROC 
Government. 
 
4. Sun Yat-Sen’s misunderstanding reflects the Chinese cultural sense of 
politics – even the Members of the Legislative Yuan can be governmental 
officials. If lawmakers are accepted as governmental officials, why can’t the 
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Justices become lawmakers simply because they are not elected by the 
people? 
 
Carsun Chang, the accredited founding father of the Constitution of 1947 who drafted 
the Constitution by coordinating the interests of each political party at the 1946 Political 
Consultative Conference, finally accomplished a Montesquieu type of constitution 
using Sun Yat-Sen’s Pentapartite idea (Wu, 2004: 51-54). The Constitution supposedly 
acts as a system of checks and balances between the five powers (ibid), though the two 
powers Sun Yat-Sen created do not subsequently show their political importance (Lee, 
1997: 212-215). Carsun Chang recalled: 
 
One day I told Mr Sun Fo that I had already drafted a constitution. [I could 
share my draft constitution with all the members of the 1946 Political 
Consultative Conference] if they wanted, it would be fine [to me] if they did 
not want [my draft] (submitted on 12 April). Then surprisingly [my draft] was 
accepted and printed out by Secretary-General Lei (Chen) as the blueprint for 
discussion. […] The [Nationalist] Government demanded Democratic 
National Socialism, we wanted democratic politics like Europe and America. 
The [Chinese] Youth Party asked for a Westminster system, [and] the 
[Chinese] Communist Party insisted on judicial independence between 
provinces [judicial dualism], as well as international trade localisation. […] 
About the Pentapartite [system], Sun Yat-Sen pieced the [political] systems 
of foreign nations together; although [he] attempted to create an ingenious 
[new constitutional design], everybody had witnessed how [in]effective the 
Pentapartite constitution had been over the past 20 years. [However], the 
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Nationalist Party would never abandon the nominal Pentapartite system, thus 
[I gave them] the system as usual […]198 (Yang, 1993: 130-131) 
 
4.6 THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL POWER 
 
[T]herefore, the feature of the judicial power could be summarised as: 
 
1. Judicial power is passive, so the principle of no trial without 
complaint applies. 
2. Judges are independent and neutral, thus the judges’ free exercise of 
power from [any] interference must be secured, and the recusal 
regulation also applies. 
3. [The Judiciary] safeguards the due process of law, so that various 
procedures, investigations [and] debates are compulsory. 
4. Judicial power is authoritative; [therefore], it has the ultimate 
jurisdiction over legal issues.199 (Weng, 1994: 355) 
 
The above definitions of the features of judicial power were written by Chief Justice 
Weng Yueh-Sheng of the ROC within his masterpiece, The Administrative Law and 
Constitutional Law of the Rechtsstaat (1994), in which he attempted to illustrate his 
personal and professional opinions about the worldwide trend of judicial power 
development. One of his profoundest commentaries was: 
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As everyone [in the world] knows, Montesquieu not only promoted the 
Tripartite system but also the idea of checks and balances […] he did not 
believe that the judiciary would be able to check and balance either the 
executive or the legislature; therefore, the [original] system of checks 
and balances that he promoted was only between the executive and 
legislature, rather than between the judiciary and legislature and 
between the judiciary and executive […] he did not foresee that the 
judiciary could check and balance the legislature and executive. […] 
After judicial power has played [an important role] within [modern] 
legal constitutional [development], [even] the political institutions 
[legislatures] and politicians, as well as political activities are all subject 
to the law and [also] adjudicated by the courts. Such a trend [of judicial 
power development] goes far beyond anything Montesquieu ever 
imagined.200 (ibid: 336-340) 
 
Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng observed the world’s judicial development in 
democracies and concluded that the political balance between, as well as the legal 
constitutional roles of, the three powers are actually floating and by far-reaching (ibid: 
329-350). His opinion about Montesquieu’s Tripartite system was that, in 
Montesquieu’s mind, as long as the judiciary remained completely independent without 
intervening politically, the judiciary would already count as a qualified judicial 
department within the Tripartite system. In other words, Montesquieu demanded only 
an independent adjudicator who must remain free from political intervention. Marshall, 
however, had instituted a powerful constitutional interpreter who should and could 
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intervene (or control) politics constitutionally, even though the principle of judicial 
independence still remains fundamental: 
 
But the judiciary in Montesquieu’s scheme has no grand power akin to 
what will come to be known as judicial review, the power of courts to 
determine the constitutionality of ordinary legislation. And even when it 
comes to the separate powers keeping one another in their proper places, 
it is primarily the political give-and-take between the executive and the 
legislative, not the exercise of judicial power as a matter of 
constitutional law, that maintains that necessary system of balances and 
checks. (McDowell, 2010: 221) 
 
4.7 FAVOURING THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONSTITUTION THEORY 
 
In contrast to other democracies in which the courts are regularly doubted and 
challenged by countermajoritarian difficulties (Bickel, 1962: 9-22), the Justices of 
Taiwan have few reasons to be criticised on the grounds of legitimacy (Friedman, 1998: 
334-343) because of Mencius’ political thought. However, the Justices not only apply 
Mencius as political safeguard, they also largely promote Schmitt’s theory as political 
grounds for the expansion of judicial power (Sze and Tsai, 2007: 699-700). Therefore, 
it is crucial to discuss this German concept in the context of Taiwanese court studies, 
as one result of the concept promoted by the Justices is Carrubba’s strategy (Carrubba, 
2009: 55-69) which states that the Justices will attempt to make people believe that the 
German concept is just: 
 
Since the Weimar Constitution, we are once again interested in the 
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specific Guardian of the Constitution theory, and seek for its [genuine] 
safeguard and protection. The State Court of the German Reich declares 
itself to be ‘the Guardian of the Constitution of the German Reich’. Yet 
the President of the Supreme Court of the German Reich, Dr Simons, 
called the Supreme Court ‘the Ward and Watch’ of the Constitution. 
Many proposals suggest that either the State or the Constitutional Court 
should [behave] as guardian, guarantor, watch or trustee of the 
Constitution, [and this] issue has become conspicuous within the legal 
profession.201 (Schmitt, 1931: 3) 
 
The above quote comes from Carl Schmitt’s book, Der Hüter der Verfassung, originally 
published at Tübingen in 1931. Schmitt wrote his magnum opus to dicuss the most 
suitable safeguard for the Weimar Constitution of 1919, following the trend raised by 
Hans Kelsen’s constitutional court proposal (Baume, 2012: 1-6; Lane, 2008: 176-177; 
Robertson, 2009: 174-200) in Austria in the 1920s. Both Schmitt and Kelsen represent 
human efforts to seek for an ultimate constitutional safeguard in order to ‘establish for 
their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their 
own happiness’202  – despite the fact that Schmitt’s original idea of constitutional 
safeguard was not the German judiciary but the President of the Reich (Schmitt, 1931: 
132-159). However, Schmitt foretold in 1931203 that such legislations: 
 
[M]ostly refer to the inevitable [issue of] quis custodiet ipsos custodes 
                                                     
201 Author’s Translation. 
202 Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 5 U.S. 137. 
203 Carl Schmitt’s opinion on the constitutional amendment changed very dramatically. Before 1933, he 
argued that the Reichstag could not pass any amendment because the Weimar Constitution had its basic 
structure. But when he became a Kronjurist in 1933, he changed his position 180 degrees and said that 
there should be no limits to the amendment process (Dyzenhaus, 1999: 38-101; Müller, 2003: 63-75). 
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as well as an additional warning that those guardians [could] easily make 
themselves masters of the Constitution and [thereby] bringing in the 
danger of [having] double heads of state […]204 (ibid: 7) 
 
In other words, Carl Schmitt foresaw205 and foretold the mighty political power of 
being the guardian of the constitution in 1931 – reflecting what Justice Charles Evans 
Hughes said on 3 May 1907: 
 
We are under a Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say 
it is […] (Hughes, 1908: 139) 
 
The German people, along with the Weimar Republic, examined what Chief Justice 
John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison (1803) via the extraordinarily expensive 
lesson learned by Adolf Hitler and his Third Reich. They eventually learned a lesson 
and concluded that: 
 
Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Federation 
into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislative process, or 
the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall be inadmissible.206 
 
The German Basic Law of 1949 directly prohibited any of the German legislatures from 
altering the ‘principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20’207 because these principles were 
                                                     
204 Author’s Translation. 
205 In Taiwan, Schmitt’s legal term, der Hüter der Verfassung, is widely used and appreciated by the 
Judicial Yuan (Sze and Tsai, 2007: 699-700) as well as legal professionals, because of the German legal 
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was the pioneer who foresaw the political power of the constitutional interpreter. 
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‘supreme, and … designed to be permanent’.208 This took the protection of German 
constitutionalism from unconstitutional constitutional amendments one step further – 
as history shows, this was the most expensive constitutional lessons in law that the 
German people learned from their former ‘Reich und Führer’: 
 
The National Assembly exercises its powers and carries out its duties in 
accordance with Article 174 of the Constitution in amending the 
Constitution with due process. The resulting enactment of the 
Amendment to the Constitution has equal status with the original 
constitutional provisions, yet the permission of any amendment 
designed to alter existing constitutional provisions concerning the 
fundamental nature of governing norms and order and, hence, the 
foundation of the Constitution’s very existence destroys the integrity and 
fabric of the Constitution itself. As a result, such an amendment shall be 
deemed improper. Although our Constitution does not expressly identify 
those unchangeable provisions, among the several constitutional 
provisions, principles such as establishing a democratic republic under 
Article 1, sovereignty of and by the people under Article 2, protection of 
fundamental rights of the people under Chapter Two as well as the check 
and balance of governmental powers are some of the most critical and 
fundamental principles of the Constitution. Constitutional freedom and 
democratic rule of law derived from these principles (See Article 5, 
Paragraph 5, Amendment to the Constitution and Interpretation No. 381), 
are the foundations upon which the current Constitution is constructed, 
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and all institutions installed thereunder are obligated to abide by its rules. 
Since the National Assembly is a constitutionally installed institution 
and its power is bestowed by the Constitution, it must also be regulated 
by the Constitution. At the time of inauguration, delegates of the 
National Assembly must be sworn in and pledge allegiance to the 
Constitution. This means loyalty and adherence to the Constitution 
which must be taken into consideration while exercising the power 
granted by Article 174 of the Constitution in amending that Constitution. 
In the event an amendment to the Constitution touches purely on the 
adjustment of national organizational structure, it falls under “the 
discretionary scope of the institution empowered to amend the 
Constitution, taking into consideration the totality of the circumstances” 
(See the Reasoning for Interpretation No. 419, COMPILATION OF 
JUSTICES INTERPRETATIONS, SECOND SERIES, Volume 10, p. 
333) and must be respected. However, any violation that touches upon 
the basic principles of constitutional freedom and democratic rule of law 
breaches the fiducial duty to the people, affects the foundation of the 
very existence of the Constitution, and must be checked and balanced 
by other constitutionally installed institutions. This is also the built-in, 
self-defensive mechanism in the Constitution. Therefore, any provision 
that contradicts the basic principles of the Constitution and results in a 
conflict of rules does not possess proper merits.209 
 
Res dura, et regni novitas, me talia cogunt. Moliri, et late fines custode 
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tueri. – Publius Vergilius Maro (70-19BCE) 
 
Since its establishment in 1951, the German Federal Constitutional Court has not yet 
experienced an unconstitutional constitutional amendment. However, the ROC Judicial 
Yuan was unfortunately forced to deal with such an issue in 1999, and made a decision 
on 24 March 2000.210 In this case the Justices struck down the fifth amendment of the 
Constitution (promulgated on 15 September 1999) and showed their courage and 
determination to be guardians of the constitution: 
 
The anonymous balloting by which the Third National Assembly 
adopted to vote on the proposed amendments to Articles 1, 4, 9 and 10 
of the Amendment to the Constitution in its 4th Session, 18th 
Conference on September 4, 1999, violated the principle of openness 
and transparency and the then-applicable Article 38, Paragraph 2, of the 
Regulations of the National Assembly Proceedings. The process was 
clearly and grossly flawed and in violation of the fundamental principles 
based upon which the provisions of the Constitution would take effect. 
Among the provisions in question, the contents of Article 1, Paragraphs 
1 to 3, and Article 4, Paragraph 3, further conflict with the fundamental 
basis upon which the Constitution relies for its very existence, and are 
not permitted by a state of freedom and constitutional rule of law. As to 
Articles 9 and 10, while their contents are not in question, they shall 
nevertheless lose their effect since the process violates the due process 
in amending the Constitution. The aforementioned Articles 1, 4, 9, and 
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10 shall immediately become null and void as of the date this 
Interpretation is announced, and the text of the Amendment to the 
Constitution promulgated on July 21, 1997, continues to be effective.211 
 
4.8 JUDICIAL POWER EXPANSION IN TAIWAN 
 
The Chinese people traditionally show radical preference for substantive 
justice, to the extent that if anyone were to bring them substantive justice, 
they would give them power in return. 
 
The author understands such a cultural comment as this, although it makes good sense 
within Chinese communities worldwide that the pursuit of substantive justice is China’s 
core of the jurisprudence, as Gao Xi-Qing and Judge Chou Yu-Lan said: 
 
For the Chinese, substantive law always represents the ultimate sense of 
fairness and social justice, which for the most part is reflected by the 
customs, practices and usages of Chinese society. The written law is only 
a form through which to realise justice. As long as justice is done, people 
are not bothered too much about the statutory basis of the judgement. To 
most Chinese, ‘due process’ is an unknown quantity. To the legal 
profession, it is something desirable, rather than something 
indispensable. (Gao, 1989: 89-116) 
 
If there is a conflict between substantive justice and procedural justice, 
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unless it is a serious infringement of the defendant’s personal rights, I 
will prioritise substantive justice.212 (Interview with Chou on 24-JUN-
2013) 
 
The legal grounds for choosing ‘prioritising substantive justice’ (ibid) is provided in the 
ROC Criminal Procedure Law 1928, which is an act of the Legislative Yuan that 
embodies the Chinese traditional preference for substantive justice: 
 
The admissibility of the evidence, obtained in violation of the procedure 
prescribed by the law by an official in execution of criminal procedure, 
shall be determined by balancing the protection of human rights and the 
preservation of public interests, unless otherwise provided by law.213 
 
According to this article, criminal evidence ‘obtained in violation of the procedure 
prescribed by the law by an official’214 is not directly inadmissible, because judges are 
empowered to decide on admissibility, and their decisions are only subject to the 
principle of proportionality ‘unless otherwise provided by law’.215 In other words, the 
procedure for obtaining criminal evidence can be ignored in accordance with judicial 
decisions authorised by an act of congress in the event of public interests prevailing 
over human rights.216 What we can conclude is that the Taiwanese prefer substantive 
justice to procedural justice, because due process is just ‘something desirable, rather 
than something indispensable’ (Gao, 1989: 89-116). 
 
                                                     
212 Author’s Translation. 
213 Criminal Procedure Law § 158-4 (1928/2003) (Official Translation). 
214 Id. 
215 Id. 
216 See id. 
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This thesis has no intention of arguing that substantive justice is dominant and little 
importance is attached to procedural justice in Taiwan. Evidence provided by Article 
158-4 of the Criminal Procedure Law 1928/2003 only shows that procedural justice is 
not ‘indispensable’ (ibid). This does not mean that due process is undesirable, so the 
employment of the proportionality principle is required. However, this thesis puts 
forward an argument that judicial decision-makers in Taiwan have benefited greatly 
from such cultural characteristics, because due process has never become the core of 
the Chinese sense of justice (ibid). Judges are not criticised in accordance with 
countermajoritarian arguments (Bassok, 2012: 335-382) in cultural terms. Moreover, 
this thesis has no intention of arguing whether substantive justice or procedural justice 
is more important; this thesis seeks only to explain the chain reaction of public and 
cultural preferences over substantive justice within a Chinese judicial system: 
 
1. Procedure, to the Chinese people, is considered as a method of pursuing 
substantive justice; if it becomes obvious that procedure is becoming an 
obstacle to substantive justice, the Chinese people will ignore procedural 
issues unhesitatingly. 
 
2. Election (procedure) is deemed a method of pursuing good governance in 
Taiwan, but there is no guarantee that the electoral Legislative Yuan would 
do everything on behalf the people. If there is an extreme political 
situation in which the electoral Legislative Yuan does not legislate in 
accordance with the will of the people, the Taiwanese people would 
expect that the Judicial Yuan would safeguard the people’s interests 
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(substance) from unconstitutional acts of the legislature enacted by the 
electoral Legislative Yuan (procedure). 
 
3. This thesis argues that the Judicial Yuan becomes an alternative lawmaker 
in the event of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan going 
beyond or against the will and interests of the people (dereliction of 
legislative duty). It is therefore vita that the Judicial Yuan reads and analyses 
Taiwan’s public opinion correctly (judicial strategy) before making judicial 
decisions as an alternative lawmaker (strategic decision-making). 
 
4.9 JUDICIAL YUAN: ALTERNATIVE LAWMAKER 
 
This thesis argues that the Judicial Yuan acts as an alternative lawmaker if the National 
Assembly and the Legislative Yuan no longer follow the will of the people. This means 
that the political power of the Judicial Yuan is moulded systematically by its role as 
alternative lawmaker: 
 
1. As an alternative lawmaker, the Judicial Yuan would not use its lawmaking 
power to override acts of legislature unless the Judicial Yuan knew that 
public opinion was standing on its side (specific support; Hoekstra, 2003: 
12-15). In other words, the Judicial Yuan would not raise a traditional debate 
of judicial independence and judicial accountability (Bassok, 2012: 335-382; 
Shapiro, 2013: 380-397), because the Justices are well aware of the limits 
of their democratic legitimacy. 
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2. Because of limits to democratic legitimacy,217 the Judicial Yuan is motived 
to stand in line with public opinion in non-complex cases (Vanberg, 2005: 
19-60), making decisions that are favoured and supported by the broader 
public (strategic decision-making). In other words, the Justices ‘want to 
maintain the Court’s legitimacy and thus its efficacy as a policymaker’ 
through interaction with their audiences, above all public opinion (Baum, 
2006: 87). 
 
Unlike the US Supreme Court (Flemming and Wood, 1997: 468-495), the connection 
between public opinion and the Judicial Yuan is not forged through electoral change. 
Party alternation in Taiwan does not have any clear influence over the Justices; however, 
the interaction between public opinion and the Judicial Yuan is still evident – when 
public opinion is clear, the Judicial Yuan will decide accordingly;218 but when public 
opinion is divided, the Judicial Yuan will apply political question doctrine directly.219 
Nigel N.T. Li comments: 
 
I think there are three interest groups that the Justices really care about: 
public opinion, law society and the other branches of government – 
especially the legislatures. The legislatures are not only the most 
powerful state organs against the Judicial Yuan, they also see themselves 
as the most qualified counterforces. To be honest, our national legislators 
                                                     
217 The Chinese pursuit of substantive justice has its legal philosophical limitations as far as this thesis 
is concerned. What is substantive justice? For example, is capital punishment substantially just or not? 
Though this thesis has no intention to discuss this legal philosophical issue, I should indicate that people 
are used to thinking that substantive justice reflects the majority voice. In other words, I agree only that 
the pursuit of substantive justice in Taiwan could be a check-and-balance method, controlling Taiwan’s 
representative democracy via the Judicial Yuan, making sure that the will of the people is materialised 
by law. 
218 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]. 
219 E.g., Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993]. 
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do not clearly understand the limits of the legislative power, so they 
always complain about why the Judicial Yuan can potentially override 
the legislation that they have put into place on behalf of the people. […] 
One thing that I must remind you particularly right here is that [it is 
worth] paying attention to public opinion as a key [political] factor in 
conflicts between the Legislature and the Judiciary – generally speaking, 
whilst the atmosphere is that public opinion obviously supports the 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan, the Legislative Yuan would never act 
rashly and blindly!220 (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
 
The pursuit of substantive justice was the original value orientation of 
China’s legal system, and the emphasis on substantive justice and the 
neglect of procedural justice became barriers to the rule of law. The 
system paid no regard to whether or not law enforcement or court rulings 
were carried out in accordance with the law; as long as the result was 
favourable, there was no need to care about procedural details. (Wang, 
2010a: 38) 
 
The above criticism of China’s traditional legal philosophy not only indicates China’s 
cultural difficulty in building a rule-of-law legal system, but also implies China’s 
cultural advantage towards judicial activism – ‘as long as the result was favourable, 
there was no need to care about procedural details’ (ibid). 
                                                     
220 Author’s Translation. 
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It is useful to consider that criticism, especially in terms of whom that decision favours? 
The answer given by this thesis is the mass public, and it is probably the most persuasive 
answer that fits with the Chinese legal culture. Thus, the Judicial Yuan should not only 
be culturally obliged but also politically wise to read public opinion and make strategic 
decisions accordingly. Justice Herbert H.P. Ma says: 
 
In terms of whether the Justice of the Republic of China take public 
opinion seriously or not, [and] the question of whether [they] read public 
opinion or not, I think, speaking overall, it is nearly impossible for a 
jurist in the Republic of China, including Justices and judges, to 
completely ignore social reactions […]221 (Interview with Ma on 19-
JUL-2013) 
 
In this chapter, we see that the ROC Constitution embraces the concept of judicial 
supremacy because of its founding father, Carsun Chang. We also acknowledge that his 
original constitutional design does not provide sufficient conditions for judicial 
supremacy in the ROC. In addition, we addressed the way Chinese people understand 
the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, including the political-philosophical 
ideal of ruling constructed by Mencius, cultural preferences for substantive justice and 
Sun Yat-Sen’s misinterpretation of the separation of powers. All explain why Schmitt’s 
concept of a guardian of the constitution is favoured in Taiwan, and how the Justices 
would behave if they intended to be that as they have implied (Sze and Tsai, 2007: 699-
700). 
                                                     
221 Author’s Translation. 
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5: STATISTICS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The records of the history of our nation show that statistics have been 
applied to governance by [our] administrators since the Zhou [1046-256 
BCE] and Qin [221-206 BCE] dynasties, [proving that] the concept of 
[using] statistics dates back more than two thousand years.222 (ROC 
Judicial Yuan, 1999: 1) 
 
This description of the history of the use of statistics was provided by the Department 
of Statistics of the Judicial Yuan in 1999. It not only illustrates China’s history of 
statistical analysis but also explains the political motive and purpose of using statistics 
to assist with policymaking. The concept of helping with decisions echoes the main 
notion of statistical analysis worldwide, as explained below: 
 
[S]tatistics […] are used to help people making decisions when there is 
not absolute certainty as to the final outcome of each alternative that 
could be selected by the decision maker. Many modern authors employ 
this notion in defining statistical analysis as a procedure for making 
decisions in the face of uncertainty. No one can tell with absolute 
certainty what is going to happen tomorrow, whether it be in the physical, 
social, economic, political, or psychic domain. […] Statistical analysis 
offers a set of procedures which becomes a valuable tool for decision 
                                                     
222 Author’s Translation. 
171 
 
making in the face of uncertainty. (Kent et al., 1980: 78) 
 
An interesting and meaningful record by the Statistics Department of the Judicial Yuan 
shows that the ROC judicial statistics began with some simple and crude inner reports 
dating back to the foundation of the ROC in 1912 (ROC Judicial Yuan, 1999: 3), and 
were later bureaucratised formally by the Nationalist Government in 1935 (ibid: 3-10). 
In other words, it was the Nationalist Government’s intention to collect judicial data 
and statistics in order to help decide avenues for judicial development. To some extent, 
it is reasonable to associate the initial nationalist purpose of producing judicial statistics 
with their authoritarianism, in that the government would control and direct the 
judiciary via statistics, although there is no clear proof of this intention. However, 
according to an official statement by the Department of Statistics of the Judicial Yuan 
in 1999: 
 
[D]ue to […] the popularisation of the merit of statistical analysis 
amongst management at all levels of government, statistics have become 
common practice as instruments of administrative supervision. 
[Furthermore, statistics] not only make a great contribution to 
administrative enforcement, but also functioned meaningfully in the 
realm of administrative project design and execution, as well as 
performance appraisal […]223 (ibid: 1) 
 
Regardless of the genuine purpose for producing statistics, the Nationalist Government 
kept thorough and diverse statistical records of Taiwan’s judiciary, which is both 
                                                     
223 Author’s Translation. 
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expedient and advantageous in terms of the study of judicial development on the island. 
This chapter will therefore concentrate on examining and analysing official statistics, 
using statistics from several NGO statistics as supplementary information relating to 
the evolution of the media, legal education and practice, the Justices and the Judicial 
Yuan in Taiwan for the time period under study. 
 
5.2 FROM MEDIA CONTROL TO PRESS FREEDOM 
 
Yet Taiwanese media operate in a much wider ideological spectrum than 
Chinese media, and they provide much more room for political debate. 
Each media outlet may be highly biased, but the diversity of views 
offered by these outlets arguably makes Taiwanese media more 
pluralistic than many mature democracies. Further, Taiwanese 
journalists may not take democratic norms seriously, but they do make 
politicians more accountable. In a comparative context, Taiwanese news 
coverage may be lacking in objectivity, but Taiwanese society offers 
considerable press freedom that is taken advantage of by Taiwanese 
journalists to provide checks and balances against public officials. (Tang 
and Iyengar, 2013: 3) 
 
The image of Taiwan’s mass media and the freedom of the press reported by Tang 
Weng-Fang and Shanto Iyengar in 2013 illuminates a crucial constituent of Taiwan’s 
powerful media, namely its diversity of views – despite the fact that the literacy levels 
of Taiwan’s media could be improved. The official number of Taiwan’s newspapers, 
periodicals, news agencies and publishing corporations between 1990 and 2009 are 
summarised in Table 5.1. 
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5.1 Taiwan’s Media Statistics, 1990-2009 
Year Newspapers Periodicals Agencies Publishers 
1990 209 4138 178 3273 
1991 234 4338 188 3524 
1992 272 4473 204 3769 
1993 274 4761 231 4112 
1994 300 4989 222 4439 
1995 335 5231 221 4777 
1996 361 5493 242 5253 
1997 344 5676 251 5826 
1998 360 5884 238 6380 
1999 384 6463 242 6806 
2000 445 6641 260 7093 
2001 454 7236 267 7810 
2002 514 3909 750 6023 
2003 708 4896 949 7538 
2004 2524 4185 977 7437 
2005 2442 4825 1108 8357 
2006 2381 5014 1208 9176 
2007 2216 5395 1275 9625 
2008 2065 5711 1321 10002 
2009 2063 6457 1471  10953 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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Table 5.1 shows the rich potential for research regarding the correlation between press 
freedom and diversity and the growth of media. In 1990, Taiwan had 209 newspapers, 
4138 periodicals, 178 news agencies and 3273 publishers; by 2009, there were 2063 
newspapers, 6457 periodicals, 1471 news agencies and 10953 publishers. Considering 
that Taiwan’s population grew from twenty million in 1990 to twenty-three million in 
2009, the above figures are very impressive and show that media grew out of all 
proportion to its potential readership: 
 
[I]f a lawsuit with social concerns or interests was filed, it would be 
almost impossible for ordinary people not to hear about it. Moreover, 
judges are social elites, so they will pay more attention to relevant public 
issues. As to the judges in charge of the lawsuit, unless they deliberately 
ignore the media they could easily access the relevant information 
provided by the media.224 (Interview with Wang on 27-SEP-2014) 
 
Senior judicial news reporter Wang Wen-Ling of the United Daily News Group holds 
an LL.B degree and offers the best footnote on Taiwan’s media, stating that it is very 
easy to access news reports and almost impossible to block information in this country. 
Wang’s opinion underscores the importance of media diversity, particularly in contrast 
to Taiwan’s notorious media suppression in the pre-democracy period, showing that the 
more newspapers, periodicals, news agencies and publishers there are within a country, 
the better press freedom that country has. Table 5.2 shows the contrast in statistics on 
the media from 1950 to 1990. 
 
                                                     
224 Author’s Translation. 
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5.2 Taiwan’s Media Statistics, 1950-1990 
Year Newspapers Periodicals Agencies Publishers 
1950 44 184 28 N/A 
1955 34 378 39 242 
1960 30 676 42 564 
1965 31 820 43 805 
1970 31 1404 43 1351 
1975 31 1316 44 1345 
1980 31 1982 44 2011 
1985 31 2849 44 2725 
1990 209 4138 178 3273 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.3 LEGAL EDUCATION AND THE ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW 
 
Law schools have been the first choice of the Joint College Entrance 
Examination for a decade in our nation, and thousands of elites devote 
themselves to studying law every year. […] A law school student should 
acquire the general capacity and the correct disposition of being a lawyer, 
as well as being able to graduate from law school. However, Taiwan 
limits the admission to practice law to about six percent [of all the 
candidates], which means that it is seriously guilty of wasting national 
human resources. As for the remaining ninety-four percent of students, 
it means they are unfairly deprived of their chances to practice law.225 
                                                     
225 Author’s Translation. 
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(Chen Charng-Ven: Judicial Reform Foundation 15 April 2001) 
 
Chen Charng-Ven’s words, written in his article ‘Super Low Admission Rate [to 
Practice Law] Puts the Brakes on a Society Governed by the Rule of Law’ in 2001, not 
only reflect his opinion on the low admission rate into legal practice in Taiwan, but also 
addresses the rise of legal profession after democratisation in 1990 (ibid). 
 
5.3 Law School Students and Their Percentage of Total Students, 1949-2005 
Year Law Students Percentages 
1949 173 2.93% 
1955 1229 6.83% 
1960 1143 3.26% 
1965 1654 1.94% 
1970 2844 1.40% 
1975 3746 1.29% 
1980 4387 1.28% 
1985 5349 1.25% 
1990 6615 1.15% 
1995 8227 1.09% 
2000 10951 1.00% 
2005 17978 1.39% 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The number of law majors in Taiwan grew from 6,615 in 1990 to 17,978 in 2005, 
indicating that more and more students were attempting to pursue careers in law since 
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democratisation. However, law school students still amounted to an extremely low 
percentage of total graduates in the 1990s; the percentage fell from 1.15% in 1990 to 
1.09% in 1995, and to 1.00% in 2000. The official statistics indicate an educational 
tendency towards elitism amongst law schools in Taiwan – which meant that whilst a 
law major was the first choice of many who took the national Joint College Entrance 
Examination in the 1990s, only 1.076% of them were admitted to law schools. 
 
5.4 Law School Students (Percentage of Total Students), 1990-2000 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
A lawyer’s license leading to the admission to practice law in Taiwan was (and still is) 
one of the most difficult licenses to obtain in the ROC. The reason for this is commonly 
understood to be due to nationalist political control over Taiwan’s bar associations (Shi: 
Judicial Reform Foundation 15 October 2003) in the dictatorship period (1925-1990). 
The number of lawyers before 1990 could not be found,226 although statistics show that 
there were 4755 lawyer licenses granted up to 2000, 1361 to 1990, 464 to 1980, 260 to 
1970, 144 to 1960 and 12 to 1950 (Liu, 2005: 238-239). 
 
                                                     
226 Statistics only show how many lawyer licenses were granted before 1990. We have no idea how many 
license holders practiced the law before 1990 because no relevant official statistics exist. 
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5.5 Number of Lawyer Licenses Granted (per Annum), 1950-2005 
 
(Source: Liu, Heng-Wen 2005) 
 
5.6 Number of Lawyer Licenses Granted (by Decade), 1946-2000 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Table 5.6 seems incompatible with Taiwan’s legal educational tendency towards elitism, 
because the figures indicate that Taiwan had a maximum of 1361 lawyers until 
democratisation in the year 1990, but 3394 lawyers were expeditiously trained during 
the following decade. However, the admission rate to practice law in the 1990s 
remained very low, especially in contrast to rates in the USA and Germany (Chen 
Charng-Ven: Judicial Reform Foundation 15 April 2001). In other words, the rise in 
admissions to practice law in the 1990s arguably echoes the common belief in Taiwan 
that the nationalists had attempted to control bar associations by constraining the growth 
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of numbers of lawyers during the pre-democratic period. 
 
5.7 Admission Rate to Practice Law, 1950-2005 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.8 Admission Rate to Practice Law, 1990-2002 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.4 JUDICIAL YUAN: TAIWAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
The interpretations of the Judicial Yuan shall be binding upon every 
institution and person in the country, and each institution shall abide by 
the meaning of these interpretations in handling relevant matters.227 
 
                                                     
227 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984] (Official Translation). 
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Unlike the UK Supreme Court, the Judicial Yuan is authorised by the Constitution to 
check-and-balance not only the government but also the congress.228 It is a Hans 
Kelsen court (Thornhill, 2011: 291-292) which is designed to safeguard the ROC 
Constitution from being trampled by political careerists. As a result, the Judicial Yuan 
does not accept regular appeals, but only recognises unconstitutional events.229 An 
appellant committee composed of three Justices would decide whether an appeal is 
accepted or not.230 
 
In terms of the number of cases reviewed per annum, it is probably improper to make 
a comparison between the UK Supreme Court and the Judicial Yuan because of the 
Judicial Yuan’s unique constitutional role as guardian of the constitution (Schmitt, 1931: 
12-70). However, by analysing the relevant statistical data, this thesis will examine the 
evolution of the Judicial Yuan as Taiwan’s constitutional court. 
 
5.9 Number of Judicial Yuan Decisions, 1950-2009 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
                                                     
228 Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947). 
229 Compare Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 4 (1948/93), with Act of Constitutional 
Interpretation Procedure § 5 (1948/93). 
230 Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 10 (1948/93). 
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5.10 Number of Judicial Yuan Decisions and Appeals (per term), 1948-2003 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 show the number of decisions the Judicial Yuan made by decade as 
well as by term of office over the last sixty years. In contrast to the number of appeals, 
it is easy to work out that on average only 8.145% of appeals were judicially reviewed 
between 1948 and 2003. The Justices actually decided approximately one case per 
month. The statistics support the aforementioned argument that the Judicial Yuan might 
not be an ordinary court of final appeal like the UK Supreme Court (Gillespie, 2013: 
191-193; 200-202). Instead it reflects a Hans Kelsen model of constitutional court 
which is only responsible for explaining what the Constitution is (a dictum of Chief 
Justice Charles Evans Hughes). 
 
5.11 Percentage of Appeals Being Reviewed (per term), 1948-2003 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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The political role of the Justices changed with Taiwan’s democratisation, and the 
Judicial Yuan’s changed from ‘a constitutional court that served an authoritarian regime’ 
to ‘an instrument for democracy and human rights’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 106). This 
argument can be supported by analysing the following statistical data. 
 
5.12 Classification of Cases Reviewed, 1948-2003 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Table 5.12 shows the change in judicial audience (Baum, 2006: 25-49) from 
governmental organs to individuals, especially in contrast to Table 5.13 below: 
 
5.13 Classification of Cases Appealed, 1948-2003 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
183 
 
Whilst the percentage of cases filed by individuals increased from 34.35% between 
1948 and 1958 to 80.56% between 1958 and 1967, and to 91.93% between 1967 and 
1976, it is astonishing that Justices in the first three terms reviewed only one case within 
this classification.231 In addition, they produced a series of outrageous records upon the 
protection of individual rights – the percentage was 0% between 1948 and 1958, 2.33% 
between 1958 and 1967, and 0% between 1967 and 1976. The aforementioned statistics 
support Ginsburg’s commentary on the early stage of the Judicial Yuan (Ginsburg, 2003: 
106). Ginsberg concluded that the main political role of the Justices was to serve the 
authoritarian regime, providing constitutionality and legitimacy to the ruling 
Nationalist Government, and further stabilising the ROC from its failure in the Chinese 
Civil War: 
 
In each era the Justices’ interpretations reflected the social needs of that 
[particular] time, and [these judicial reviews] often reflect the way 
people evaluated traditional values in those days. For example, you 
cannot expect a Justice not to be an anti-communist if [he or she] lived 
in the epoch of intense anti-communism […] there was an inextricable 
link between anti-communism and Chinese cultural conservation, so the 
old generation Justices’ ideologies of cultural conservation naturally 
evoked anti-communism. As a result, [I am] afraid that the old 
generation of Justices could not accept a judicial review that nullified 
the prohibition of upholding communism, such as the Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.644 [2008].232 (Interview with Ma on 19-JUL-2013) 
 
                                                     
231 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.117 [1966]. 
232 Author’s Translation. 
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This thesis has no intention of criticising the Justices during the first three terms, 
because Taiwan had been confronting crucial political challenges since the Chinese 
Civil War. The ROC’s political leaders had attempted to retake the Chinese mainland 
through military operations (Chen, 2005a: 212-229) and there was undoubtedly a 
common consensus in Taiwan before the 1970s (Jiang, 1978: 8-9; Tang, 1997: 6-8) – 
although many critics argue that this so-called common consensus had been created as 
a matter of expediency by the Nationalist Government. According to Justice Herbert 
H.P. Ma, it is reasonable to expect the Justices of the first three terms to stand in line 
with the nationalists during a state of emergency and a period of military mobilisation 
against the communists because of the intensely anti-communist background. In other 
words, stabilising the ROC regime to eliminate the communist PRC was a priority 
concern for the Justices, and the communist threat has never entirely disappeared: 
 
[Communist] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman, Sun Yuxi, is 
reported in a PRC-owned newspaper, Wen Wei Po, as indicating that ‘any 
one, the Taiwan authorities included, who engages in “Taiwan 
independence” will lead Taiwan to the disaster of a war. The mainland 
side has explicitly stated that “Taiwan independence” means war.’ And, 
of course, China did use force in the 1954, 1958, and 1996 Taiwan Strait 
crises. In general, Chinese leaders view the use of force as a ‘normal and 
legitimate’ means of settling international disputes. (Payne, 2001: 132) 
 
The death of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1975 symbolised the end of the ROC’s military 
attempt to reunify China. As a direct result, the Judicial Yuan’s attention moved step by 
step towards the protection of individual rights and democracy, and this is borne out by 
the statistics. For instance, the percentage of cases reviewed that focused on individual 
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rights protection increased from 50.94% between 1976 and 1985 to 72.46% between 
1985 and 1994, and then to 75.00% between 1994 and 2003. 
 
5.5 THE JUDICIAL YUAN: 1990-1999 
 
It is commonly believed that the golden age of the Judicial Yuan was the period between 
1990 and 1999, a time in which the ROC largely relied on the Judicial Yuan’s decisions 
to solve a variety of individual rights issues as well as political controversies resulting 
from Taiwan’s peaceful democratic transition. This argument is supported by the 
analysis of the pertinent official statistics summarised over the following tables. 
 
5.14 Cases Attributed to the Judicial Yuan (per Annum), 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The cases attributed to the Judicial Yuan per annum (Table 5.14) can be divided into 
cases that were not decided in the previous year, and cases appealed during the year. 
The reason why a case is not decided in the appellant year is not given, although it often 
takes a couple of years for a case to be reviewed (Lin, 1998: 46). The Judicial Yuan has 
three options upon an appeal – to review, to dismiss, or to suspend indefinitely. 
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5.15 Disposition of Cases of the Judicial Yuan (per Annum), 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
According to Table 5.15, only 6.08% (249 cases) of the total appeals (4097 cases) were 
judicially reviewed in the 1990s, whilst 59.85% (2452 cases) were dismissed and 
30.05% (1231% cases) were suspended. The table implies the Justices’ arbitrary use of 
judicial review power. An appeal might be dismissed with a reason given, or it might 
be suspended until the court decides whether to review it or not at a later date, or it 
might receive a constitutional judicial review which either approves or dismisses the 
case. 
 
5.16 Disposition of Cases of the Judicial Yuan, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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This thesis thus argues that if necessary the court could apply their disposition on cases 
suspended to situations requiring a strategic decision. As long as the Judicial Yuan 
remains entitled to make a decision at a later date – with no legally allotted timeframe 
and no reason given – no complaint can be made. This is tantamount to giving the 
Judicial Yuan the power to make no decision, or at least to avoid making decision in 
time. Given such circumstances, the Judicial Yuan’s disposition to review, dismiss or 
suspend cases lies within the court’s own adjudicative (or interpretative) power. It also 
reflects political power; no matter what the case is about, the timeframe and disposition 
of the case can be determined entirely according to the Justices’ political interests. 
 
5.17 Classification of Cases Reviewed (per Annum), 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.18 Classification of Cases Reviewed, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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Tables 5.17 and 5.18 are crucial in showing the court’s preferences and attention. Given 
that all cases are subject to the Justices’ arbitrary disposition we can see that of the cases 
the court reviewed in the 1990s, cases regarding individual rights apparently interested 
them the most, as the Justices reviewed 190 individual rights cases (76.30% of the total 
cases) within this decade. Meanwhile, the Justices decided 40 separation of powers 
controversies between state organs (16.06%), and provided 19 compulsory advisory 
opinions (7.64%). 
 
It is crucial to understand that there is no consultative authority offering advisory 
opinions in Taiwan. This means that if a state organ seeks an advisory opinion, any 
decision given by the Judicial Yuan must be complied with unconditionally.233 In other 
words, a state organ’s application for an advisory opinion in Taiwan is basically a 
transfer of power to the Judicial Yuan. Despite this, there were still 19 advisory opinions 
being sought, on subjects that were as surprising as they were varied. 
 
Another role the Judicial Yuan is obliged to play according to the Constitution234 is to 
exercise the power of the last word, effectively giving the Judicial Yuan all the power 
in the event of constitutionality.235 This means that anyone who attempts to challenge 
an act of congress or an ordinance of government within the ROC jurisdiction can only 
do so in front of the Justices. If, for example, the executive is not satisfied with an act 
of congress, or if the legislature is not pleased by an ordinance of government, one 
usually appeals against another under the guise of unconstitutionality (separation of 
powers games). 
                                                     
233 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984]. 
234 Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), with Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 5 
(1948/93), and Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 7 (1948/93). 
235 Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 171 (1947), Constitution 
of R.O.C. § 172 (1947), and Constitution of R.O.C. § 173 (1947). 
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Between 1990 and 1999, there were 40 cases (16.06% of the sum) that could be 
categorised as separation of powers games. Like advisory opinions, the quantity of the 
separation of powers games cannot reflect the actual importance of these 40 cases, and 
therefore a series of qualitative analyses will be undertaken and discussed in detail in 
Chapter 7. 
 
5.19 Classification of Cases Reviewed by Appellants, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.20 Classification of Cases Reviewed by Defendants, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Although statistics cannot explain the Judicial Yuan’s political vicissitudes regarding 
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the Justices’ decisions over separation of powers games and advisory opinions, statistics 
still show the court’s political influence upon other branches of government. As Tables 
5.19 and 5.20 show, 76.30% of the cases reviewed (190 cases) were filed by Taiwan’s 
individuals in the 1990s; however, around three quarters of the defendants (74.76%) 
were government organs, including central (45.63%) and local (29.13%) governments. 
The statistics regarding appellants and defendants imply a trend that citizens in Taiwan 
in the 1990s considered that taking constitutional legal action against governmental 
organs should be a facet of individual rights protection. Such a trend can be confirmed 
by the rise of the administrative court system in the 1990s. 
 
5.21 Classification of Cases Reviewed by Appellants and Defendants, 1990-1999 
 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Tables 5.22 and 5.23 particularly reflect the rise of the administrative court system in 
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Taiwan, catalysed directly by the Judicial Yuan: 
 
5.22 Attribution of Reviewed Cases Appealed by Individuals, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Of all the reviewed cases appealed by individuals between 1990 and 1999, nearly two 
thirds (65.26%) of the total reviewed cases (124 out of 190 cases) were appealed 
because of the refusal of decisions by the Administrative Court. This number shows 
how active and frequent administrative lawsuits were in Taiwan in the 1990s, and 
indicates the Justices’ attention and preference regarding administrative law cases. This 
contrasts strongly with figures for the Supreme Court (12.63%), High Courts (15.26%) 
and District Courts (3.16%). Cases appealed from the Administrative Court were 
apparently more favourable for judicial review. 
 
5.23 Attribution of Reviewed Cases Appealed by Individuals, 1990-1999 
 Admin.C. S.C. H.C. D.C. PFDS. CWDE. M.C. 
1990 6 4 4 0 0 0 0 
1991 8 1 2 1 0 0 0 
1992 7 3 6 0 0 0 0 
1993 11 1 2 0 0 0 0 
1994 21 4 6 0 0 0 0 
1995 11 2 4 0 0 0 0 
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1996 17 3 1 1 2 0 0 
1997 16 1 1 1 1 0 0 
1998 13 2 3 1 1 0 0 
1999 14 3 0 2 0 2 1 
Admin.C. = Administrative Court; S.C. = Supreme Court; H.C. = High Courts; D.C. = District Courts; PFDS. 
= Public Functionary Disciplinary Sanction Commission; CWDE. = Compensation for Wrongful Detentions and 
Executions Commission. 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
A persuasive argument for the Justices’ preference towards administrative lawsuits is 
that they reflect the conservative nature of the Administrative Court, earning the 
Administrative Court the nickname ‘the Court of Losing Cases’ (Nownews Network: 
NOW News 17 June 2013). Justice Wu Geng recalled the attribution of appealed cases 
in the Judicial Yuan, stating: 
 
As to the cases [I] confronted in the Council of Justices, administrative 
lawsuits amounted to 70% to 80% [of total cases appealed] and 
constitutional lawsuits were about 10% to 20%. Cases regarding either 
civil or criminal issues were very few.236 (Interview with Wu on 19-
OCT-2004) 
 
Despite the impact of the ‘Court of Losing Cases’, which would result in a large amount 
of appellate administrative lawsuits in the Judicial Yuan, Taiwan’s democratisation 
resulted in many necessary constitutional and administrative law reforms that needed 
to be adjusted to make the legal system more democratically relevant (democratisation 
in the realm of law). Justice Wu Geng said: 
 
                                                     
236 Author’s Translation. 
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I was commissioned a Justice for two terms [from 1985 to 2003] and 
was involved with [Taiwan’s] constitutional judicial review for 18 years. 
Moreover, the era of my participation a period in which [our] domestic 
environment was experiencing a dramatic political and economic 
transition, [and thus] the institutional function of the Judicial Yuan’ 
constitutional judicial review was in very high demand. It was also an 
epoch in which the Justices’ constitutional judicial review could be 
further developed.237 (ibid) 
 
In addition to administrative lawsuits, the foundation and the rise of the constitutional 
leapfrog procedure was also developed in the 1990s in accordance with Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.371 [1995]: 
 
[S]ince the Constitution’s authority is higher than the statute’s, judges 
have the obligation to obey the Constitution over any other statutes. 
Therefore, in trying a case where a judge, with reasonable assurance, has 
suspected that the statute applicable to the case is unconstitutional, he 
shall surely be allowed to petition for interpretation of its 
constitutionality. In the abovementioned situation, judges of different 
levels may suspend the pending procedure on the ground that the 
constitutionality of the statute is a prerequisite issue. At the same time, 
they shall provide concrete reasons for objectively believing the 
unconstitutionality of the statute, and petition to the Grand Justices of 
the Yuan to interpret its constitutionality.238 
                                                     
237 Author’s Translation. 
238 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 [1995] (Official Translation). 
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5.24 Constitutional Leapfrog Appeals, 1990-1999 
COURT CASES YEAR 
District Courts, Taipei and Shilin Interpretation No.384 1995 
District Court, Taichung Interpretation No.392 1995 
District Courts, Hualien and Changhua Interpretation No.471 1998 
District Court, Taipei Interpretation No.475 1999 
District Court, Taipei Interpretation No.476 1999 
District Court, Taipei Interpretation No.477 1999 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 [1995] arose from the Judicial Yuan’s proposal to 
authorise all inferior courts the power of constitutional judicial review, something 
which greatly displeased the Legislative Yuan: 
 
The Legislators of this Yuan […] doubt the judicial opinion approved by 
the Judicial Yuan that ‘a court shall be authorised the power of 
constitutional judicial review at trial and to decline the application of the 
law thereon if an unconstitutional opinion is held’. They allege that it 
would be incompatible with Articles 80 and 170 of the Constitution if 
the ‘power of substantive constitutional judicial review’ was given to 
ordinary judges [at different levels]. Such an action would cause a 
[constitutional and political] controversy regarding [both] the legitimacy 
as well as authority of the Constitutional Interpreter [of the Republic of 
China on a basis of the regulations provided by] Articles 171 and 173 of 
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the Constitution, Article 3 of the Organic Act of Judicial Yuan 1947/92 
and Articles 2 and 3 of the Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 
1948/58. Therefore, to safeguard the constitutional judicial review 
system, protect the stability of the law from [arbitrary] depredation, [and 
further] show respect to the legislative power held by the Legislative 
Yuan, [we the Legislators] hereby appeal to the Judicial Yuan for an 
interpretation. […] Your Lordships, please kindly determine right from 
wrong.239 (Instrument of Appeal on 30-JUN-1992) 
 
The instrument of appeal submitted by the Legislative Yuan indicates that: 
 
1. It was originally the Judicial Yuan’s intention to authorise the power of 
substantive constitutional judicial review to ordinary judges, namely that the 
Judicial Yuan attempted to promote the American judicial review model 
(Wolfe, 1994: 17-120) in Taiwan. 
 
2. The American judicial review model was considered a political menace to 
the legislative power, so the Legislative Yuan protested against this proposal 
through appeal (soft political admonition). 
 
In the end the Judicial Yuan strategically withdrew from its original proposal, adopting 
a constitutional leapfrog procedure promoted by Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng 
(Weng, 1994: 400-402), according to which the substantive constitutional review power 
defined by the Legislative Yuan was successfully given (albeit indirectly) to Taiwan’s 
                                                     
239 Author’s Translation. 
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ordinary judges (ibid: 401) through Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 [1995], with 
no additive political burden – because the Legislators remained unaware of the leapfrog 
mechanism: 
 
This constitutional leapfrog procedure system has […] merits. [...] 
[Ordinary] judges’ constitutional judicial review power is affirmed and 
the [political] status of judges shall therefore be raised […]240 (ibid) 
 
Since Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 [1995] was promulgated on 20 January 1995, 
six constitutional judicial reviews had been appealed through the constitutional leapfrog 
procedure in the 1990s, all of which were appealed by district court judges. Although 
the total number of leapfrog appeals is few, they remain crucial to Taiwan’s 
constitutional development in qualitative terms. The procedures also demonstrated the 
success of the leapfrog process during the 1990s, especially considering the fact that all 
the appellants were district court judges who reviewed cases ‘substantively’ during the 
trials and decided to appeal under their own judicial authority. It was obviously a victory 
for judicial power expansion. 
 
5.25 Constitutional Leapfrog Appeals, 1990-1999 
CASES ISSUES W/L 
Interpretation No.384 Criminal Law (Due Process of Law) Win 
Interpretation No.392 Criminal Law (A Writ of Habeas Corpus) Win 
Interpretation No.471 Criminal Law (Principle of Proportionality) Win 
Interpretation No.475 Cross-Strait Relations (National Debt) Lose 
                                                     
240 Author’s Translation. 
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Interpretation No.476 Criminal Law (Capital Punishment) Lose 
Interpretation No.477 Compensation (Democratic Transition) Win 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The constitutional leapfrog appeal has been developed further since the 1990s, and the 
system of Consilia (legal opinion) had also been greatly enhanced during the decade. 
 
5.26 Number of Consilia Submitted and Cases Reviewed, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Table 5.26 shows that the Justices submitted 197 consilia in the 1990s, alongside the 
249 cases reviewed by the Judicial Yuan. In other words, there were 0.7912 consilia 
submitted per case on average, including 0.1566 concurring opinions (39 in total), 
0.4016 dissenting opinions (100 in total), 0.0121 segmental concurring opinions (3 in 
total) and 0.2209 segmental dissenting opinions (55 in total) submitted per case on 
average. The sum of dissenting and segmental dissenting opinions is 155 consilia, 
which means that one Justice opposed to the majority opinion every 1.61 cases on 
average. This figure indicates the difficulties facing judicial decision-making during 
Taiwan’s judicial review, as supported by the following quote by Justice Herbert H.P. 
Ma: 
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Another reason is what was happening in reality. In our period, it was 
not that easy to find enough Justices to stand for [a majority opinion and 
thereby] pass a constitutional judicial review. If [any Justice] wrote a 
dissenting opinion, it meant that the majority opinion would have one 
more veto. Under such circumstances, I considered that the most 
important thing was to allow the case to be passed by the Justices’ 
supermajority vote (Pre-1993 this was 3 out of 4; Post-1993 it was 2 out 
of 3). In order to help cases to pass the supermajority vote, I wrote no 
dissenting opinion, even though I had a dissenting opinion. Of course, 
there will always be someone who disagrees with my viewpoint; 
[however, I think that] it is not at all acceptable at an institutional level 
if the Justices constantly suspend judgements for lengthy periods.241 
(Interview with Ma on 19-JUL-2013) 
 
5.27 Number of Consilia Submitted per Case Reviewed, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
                                                     
241 Author’s Translation. 
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5.28 Percentage of Consilia Submitted per Case Reviewed, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
According to the Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 1948/58 and 1948/93, 
the quorum for passing a constitutional judicial review before 1993 was three out of 
four, and after1993 two out of three. 
 
It requires a majority of three-fourths of the Justices present at a session 
having a quorum of three-fourths of total number of the Justices for 
passing an interpretation of the Constitution.242 
 
It requires a majority of two-thirds of the Justices present at a session 
having a quorum of two-thirds of total number of the Justices for passing 
an interpretation of the Constitution. However, only more than one-half 
of the Justices present at the same session is required for declaring a 
regulation or ordinance unconstitutional.243 
 
Article 13I of the Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 1948/58 confirms 
Justice Herbert H.P. Ma’s scruples about the completion of constitutional judicial 
                                                     
242 Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 13I (1948/58) (Official Translation). 
243 Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 14I (1948/93) (Official Translation). 
200 
 
review. It was difficult to pass a constitutional judicial review if there were too many 
dissenting or segmental dissenting opinions submitted because of the three-fourths 
supermajority rule; however, there were still 36 consilia (62 cases reviewed) submitted 
between 1990 and 1992, along with 25 dissenting opinions and 11 segmental dissenting 
opinions, meaning that for each case reviewed there were 0.4032 dissenting opinions 
and 0.1774 segmental dissenting opinions. 
 
5.29 Number of Consilia Submitted (per Annum), 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The statistics also show that there were more and more consilia submitted after 1993, 
resulting from the amendment of the Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 
1948/93. The quorum for passing a judicial review became two-thirds of total number 
of Justices,244 instead of the quorum of three-fourths.245 What is noteworthy about the 
change in the quorum is that the new Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 
1948/1993 was actually drafted directly by the fifth-term (1985-1994) Justices through 
the Justices’ Council (8 meetings moderated by Justices Herbert H.P. Ma and Chang 
Cheng-Tao between 1 July and 7 August 1992) (ROC Judicial Yuan, 1998: 228-274). It 
                                                     
244 Id. 
245 Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 13I (1948/58). 
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is therefore possible to speculate that it was the Justices’ deliberation that changed the 
quorum for passing a constitutional judicial review: 
 
In contrast to legislation in the United States, Japan, Germany and 
Austria, the original Act […] that regulated a quorum of three-fourths of 
the total number of Justices for passing a constitutional interpretation 
turned out to be proportionally too difficult. In the reality, there were 
many cases where determination was difficult because of the persistence 
of minority Justices […]246 (ibid: 256-257) 
 
5.6 THE HONOURABLE JUSTICES: 1990-1999 
 
A total of 31 Justices served in the ROC Judicial Yuan between 1990 and 1999, 15 of 
whom were fifth-term Justices between 1985 and 1994, and 19 of whom were sixth-
term Justices between 1994 and 2003. The total number that comprised the Justices’ 
Bench was between 14 and 16, though the maximum quorum in the 1990s was actually 
17.247 
 
The fifth-term Justices served until 1 October 1994, deciding Taiwan’s judicial reviews 
between Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.250 [1990] and Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.366 [1994] (117 cases in total). There were originally 15 fifth-term Justices term, 
but Justice Yang Zu-Zan passed away from cancer on 14 July 1994, leaving only 14 
fifth-term Justices between 14 July and 1 October 1994. Justice Yang Zu-Zan’s final 
judicial decision was made in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.350 [1994] on 3 June 
                                                     
246 Author’s Translation. 
247 Organic Act of Judicial Yuan § 3 (1947/80); Organic Act of Judicial Yuan § 3 (1947/92). 
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1994, only 41 days before his death. Justice Yang served his fatherland honourably until 
his final moment. 
 
5.30 List of Fifth-Term Justices and Their Terms of Office 
JUSTICE TERM OF OFFICE 
WENG Yueh-Sheng 13.07.1972 
01.10.2003 
31.01.1999 
30.09.2007 
CHAI Shau-Hsien 02.10.1976 01.10.1994 
YANG Yu-Ling 02.10.1976 01.10.1994 
LEE Chung-Sheng 10.06.1982 01.10.1994 
YANG Chien-Hua 10.06.1982 01.10.1994 
YANG Zu-Zan 10.06.1982 14.07.1994 
Herbert Han-Pao Ma 10.06.1982 01.10.1994 
LIU Tieh-Cheng 02.10.1985 30.09.2003 
CHENG Chien-Tsai 02.10.1985 01.10.1994 
WU Geng 02.10.1985 30.09.2003 
SHIH Shen-An 02.10.1985 01.10.1994 
CHEN Rui-Tang 02.10.1985 01.10.1994 
CHANG Cheng-Tao 02.10.1985 01.10.1994 
CHANG Teh-Sheng 02.10.1985 01.10.1994 
LEE Chih-Peng 02.10.1985 01.10.1994 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The sixth-term Justices served between 2 October 1994 and 30 September 2003, 
deciding Taiwan’s judicial reviews between Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.367 [1994] 
and Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.498 [1999] (132 cases in total). There were 
originally 16 sixth-term Justices, including 3 fifth-term Justices (Justices Weng Yueh-
Sheng, Liu Tieh-Cheng and Wu Geng). However, Justice Lin Kuo-Hsien ceased to be 
a Justice and became Secretary-General of the Judicial Yuan from 18 March 1997, while 
Justice Cheng Chung-Mo resigned his commission to become Justice Minister on 15 
July 1998. Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng suspended his position on the bench between 1 
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February 1999 and 30 September 2003 as a result of his appointment as Head of the 
Judicial Yuan248, so Justices Hwang Yueh-Chin, Lai In-Jaw and Hsieh Tsay-Chuan were 
commissioned to fill the three vacancies on 1 February 1999. 
 
5.31 List of Sixth-Term Justices and Their Terms of Office 
JUSTICE TERM OF OFFICE 
WENG Yueh-Sheng 13.07.1972 
01.10.2003 
31.01.1999 
30.09.2007 
LIU Tieh-Cheng 02.10.1985 30.09.2003 
WU Geng 02.10.1985 30.09.2003 
WANG Ho-Hsiung 02.10.1994 30.09.2007 
WANG Tze-Chien 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
LIN Young-Mou 02.10.1994 30.09.2007 
LIN Kuo-Hsien 02.10.1994 17.03.1997 
Vincent SZE 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
CHENG Chung-Mo 02.10.1994 
01.10.2003 
14.07.1998 
06.04.2006 
SUN Sen-Yen 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
CHEN Chi-Nan 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
TSENG Hua-Sun 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
TUNG Hsiang-Fei 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
YANG Huey-Ing 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
TAI Tong-Schung 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
SU Jyun-Hsiung 02.10.1994 30.09.2003 
HWANG Yueh-Chin 01.02.1999 30.09.2003 
LAI In-Jaw 01.02.1999 
01.10.2003 
05.10.2000 
12.10.2010 
HSIEH Tsay-Chuan 01.02.1999 12.10.2010 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
                                                     
248 Before 1 October 2003, the Head of the Judicial Yuan was a political appointee but not a Justice, even 
though most of them were famous jurists in Taiwan. The Additional Articles of the Constitution 1997 
terminated the above system and stipulated that from 2003 the Head of the Judicial Yuan shall be the 
Chief Justice, decreasing the quorum of Justices to 15. Constitution of R.O.C. amend. § 5 (1991/1997). 
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5.32 Number of Justices in Total, 1990-1999 
DURATION AND INTERPRETATIONS JUSTICES 
01.01.1990 – 14.07.1994 
(Interpretation No.250 – Interpretation No.357) 
15 
15.07.1994 – 01.10.1994 
(Interpretation No.358 – Interpretation No.366) 
14 
02.10.1994 – 17.03.1997 
(Interpretation No.367 – Interpretation No.422) 
16 
18.03.1997 – 14.07.1998 
(Interpretation No.423 – Interpretation No.460) 
15 
15.07.1998 – 31.01.1999 
(Interpretation No.461 – Interpretation No.476) 
14 
01.02.1999 – 31.12.1999 
(Interpretation No.477 – Interpretation No.498) 
16 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Tables 5.30 to 5.32 show not only the size of the full bench of the Judicial Yuan in the 
1990s (Table 5.32), but also the Justices’ signatures in sequence – the thesis discovers 
that Justices never subscribed to a constitutional judicial review beyond the 
aforementioned order. Moreover, by cross-checking the Justices’ signatures across all 
of the judicial reviews, this thesis also successfully notes the absence of some Justices 
and the proper size of the bench in each case: 
 
5.33 List of Absent Justices per Case, 1990-1999 
CASE ABSENCE 
FIFTH TERM JUSTICES 
(01.01.1990 – 01.10.1994) 
No.259 H.H.P. Ma 
No.260 H.H.P. Ma 
No.262 Cheng C.T. and Shih S.A. 
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No.263 Yang C.H. and Shih S.A. 
No.264 Yang C.H. and Shih S.A. 
No.267 Chang T.S. 
No.271 Lee C.S., Shih S.A. and Lee C.P. 
No.272 Weng Y.S. and Chai S.H. 
No.273 Weng Y.S. and H.H.P. Ma 
No.274 Weng Y.S. 
No.278 Chen R.T. 
No.279 Chen R.T. 
No.280 H.H.P. Ma and Shih S.A. 
No.282 H.H.P. Ma and Lee C.P. 
No.290 H.H.P. Ma 
No.295 Yang C.H. 
No.296 Yang C.H. 
No.299 H.H.P. Ma 
No.300 Lee C.S. 
No.301 Lee C.S. and Shih S.A. 
No.302 Lee C.S., Cheng C.T. and Chen R.T. 
No.303 Lee C.S., Cheng C.T. and Chen R.T. 
No.304 Lee C.S., Cheng C.T. and Chen R.T. 
No.306 Chai S.H. 
No.307 Chang C.T. 
No.312 Yang Y.L., Yang C.H. and H.H.P. Ma 
No.319 H.H.P. Ma and Chang T.S. 
No.320 Chang T.S. 
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No.321 Chang T.S. 
No.322 Chang T.S. 
No.323 Chang T.S. 
No.338 H.H.P. Ma 
No.339 H.H.P. Ma 
No.340 H.H.P. Ma 
No.341 Yang Z.Z. 
No.342 Lee C.P. 
No.351 Yang Z.Z. 
No.352 Yang Z.Z. 
No.353 Yang Z.Z. and Shih S.A. 
No.354 Yang Z.Z. and Shih S.A. 
No.355 Yang Z.Z. and Shih S.A. 
No.356 Yang Z.Z. 
No.357 Yang Z.Z. 
No.362 Yang C.H. and H.H.P. Ma 
No.363 Yang C.H. and H.H.P. Ma 
SIXTH TERM JUSTICES 
(02.10.1994 – 31.12.1999) 
No.368 Liu T.C. 
No.369 Yang H.I. 
No.370 Liu T.C. 
No.372 Yang H.I. 
No.373 Yang H.I. 
No.382 Lin Y.M., V. Sze, Chen C.N. and Tung H.F. 
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No.383 Lin Y.M. 
No.384 Chen C.N. 
No.386 Wang T.C. 
No.387 Lin Y.M. 
No.389 Sun S.Y., Chen C.N. and Tai T.S. 
No.390 Sun S.Y., Chen C.N. and Tai T.S. 
No.397 Chen C.N. and Tseng H.S. 
No.398 Chen C.N. 
No.401 V. Sze 
No.412 Lin Y.M., Chen C.N. and Tung H.F. 
No.413 Tseng H.S. 
No.414 Wang T.C. 
No.415 Wang T.C. 
No.420 Tung H.F. 
No.425 Chen C.N. 
No.426 Sun S.Y. 
No.427 Sun S.Y. 
No.432 Weng Y.S., Liu T.C. and Wang H.H. 
No.435 Lin Y.M. 
No.436 Liu T.C. 
No.438 Wang H.H. 
No.439 Wang H.H. 
No.441 Chen C.N. and Tseng H.S. 
No.444 Lin Y.M. 
No.445 Su J.H. 
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No.447 Cheng C.M. and Tai T.S. 
No.454 Lin Y.M. and Tai T.S. 
No.455 V. Sze, Chen C.N. and Tung H.F. 
No.456 V. Sze, Chen C.N. and Tung H.F. 
No.457 Lin Y.M. 
No.458 Weng Y.S., Wang T.C., Lin Y.M., Sun S.Y. and Tseng H.S. 
No.459 Weng Y.S., Wang T.C., Lin Y.M., Sun S.Y. and Tseng H.S. 
No.461 Chen C.N. 
No.462 Lin Y.M. 
No.471 Wang H.H. 
No.478 Wang T.C. 
No.479 Wang T.C. and Su J.H. 
No.480 V. Sze, Sun S.Y., Chen C.N., Tung H.F. and Hwang Y.C. 
No.481 V. Sze, Sun S.Y., Chen C.N., Tung H.F. and Hwang Y.C. 
No.483 Tai T.S., Lai I.J. and Hsieh T.C. 
No.484 Tai T.S., Lai I.J. and Hsieh T.C. 
No.485 Tai T.S. 
No.486 Liu T.C. 
No.487 Su J.H. 
No.488 I.J. Lai 
No.489 Lai I.J. 
No.490 Wang T.C. 
No.491 Wang T.C. 
No.498 Tai T.S. 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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Table 5.33 shows that out of 249 cases in the 1990s, 100 cases (40.16%) were reviewed 
by judicial panel from which at least one Justice was absent. There were 149 cases 
(59.84%) reviewed en banc, including 72 out of 117 (61.54%) reviewed by the fifth-
term Justices, and 77 out of 132 cases (58.33%) reviewed by the sixth-term Justices. It 
is likely that the Justices preferred to make crucial decisions en banc in the 1990s, 
because there no exception can be found in which the Justices reviewed a critical and 
sensitive case without a full bench. 
 
5.34 Number of Cases Reviewed According to Bench Sizes, 1990-1999 
 
YEAR Full One Two Three Four Five 
1990 15 3 3 1 0 0 
1991 11 3 4 0 0 0 
1992 11 7 1 3 0 0 
1993 15 4 1 1 0 0 
1994 21 11 5 0 0 0 
1995 13 7 0 2 1 0 
1996 20 5 1 1 0 0 
1997 14 8 1 1 0 0 
1998 16 6 2 2 0 2 
1999 13 9 1 2 0 2 
Total 149 63 19 13 1 4 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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There is no clear evidence to show that any of the Justices attempted to avoid reviewing 
a particular case in the 1990s, so the Justices’ absences listed above do not seem to be 
at all unusual. Most of the Justices’ absences were continuous instead of intermittent, 
and are more likely to be due to holidays, illness or institutional errands. Evidence 
shows that Justices might have been concerned about specific cases despite the fact that 
they were was actually absent. In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.389 [1995], for 
example, Justice Tai Tong-Schung and Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung submitted a co-
dissenting opinion to the Judicial Yuan, even though they were absent according to the 
official record (Judicial Yuan Gazettes Vol.37 No.12, 1995: 1-3). Statistics also reveal 
that the Justices always made crucial decisions en banc in the 1990s, so it is reasonable 
to speculate that there was a sense of unanimity amongst the Justices, and they would 
all admit political accountability together. It was a Nash equilibrium, from which none 
of them could avoid responsibility if the decision was made en banc. 
 
5.35 Absence Rate of the Fifth-Term Justices, 1990-1994 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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5.36 Number of Absences from Judicial Reviews (per Justices), 1990-1994 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Tables 5.35 and 5.36 show the absence rate and the number of absences of fifth-term 
Justices between 1990 and 1994, and the average absence percentage rate and number 
were only 3.97% and 4.6 respectively. Justice Herbert H.P. Ma had the highest absence 
rate in terms of both percentage and number, but he was only absent from 14 (out of 
117) constitutional judicial reviews (11.97%) – so even this figure does not seem 
unusual.249 Meanwhile Justices Liu Tieh-Cheng and Wu Geng were the only fifth-term 
Justices with no absence record; Justice Wu Geng was the only Justice who participated 
in every judicial review in the 1990s – he had the only perfect attendance record 
between 1990 and 1999. 
 
In comparison with the absence rate and number of the fifth-term Justices, the absence 
rate percentage and number of the sixth-term Justices are more or less the same – 5.42% 
and 5.0 per Justice in average. Justice Lai In-Jaw had an absence rate of 18.18% (4 
absences out of 22 cases) simply because he was commissioned a Justice on 1 February 
1999 but was absent four times from 22 judicial reviews. Even the leading absentee, 
                                                     
249 According to Justice Ma’s interview on 19 July 2013, it is reasonable to conclude that his absences 
were due to his voting strategies. Justice Ma chose not to confirm this, because he said no Justice shall 
be a hero – every decision was made by the Justices, not by a single Justice. 
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Justice Chen Chi-Nan, was only absent from 14 out of 132 judicial reviews (10.60%). 
Like the absence rate and number of the fifth-term Justices, these absences do not seem 
particularly unusual in the eyes of the author of this thesis at all. Justice Chen Chi-Nan’s 
attendance record, for instance, showing 14 absences within a period of five years and 
three months (2.67 absences per year in average) seems quite reasonable when 
considering his physical condition – he was a lifelong sufferer from poliomyelitis. 
 
5.37 Absence Rate of the Sixth-Term Justices, 1994-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.38 Number of Absences from Judicial Reviews (per Justices), 1994-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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As mentioned previously, the Justices might choose to dismiss an appeal according to 
Articles 4 & 9 of the Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 1948/58 (Before 1 
February 1993) and Articles 5 & 10 of the Act of Constitutional Interpretation 
Procedure 1948/93 (After 2 February 1993). Official documents show that the Justices 
held 240 councils to make dismissal resolutions (From Judicial Yuan Dismissal 
Resolution No.893 [1990] to Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution No.1132 [1999]) 
between 1990 and 1999. This means that on average there were 2 councils for dismissal 
resolutions per month in the 1990s. Each Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution contains 
multiple and diverse cases citing reasons for dismissal given by the Justices, despite the 
fact that many of the reasons given are rather ambiguous. 
 
5.39 List of the Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolutions, 1990-1999 
YEAR TERM DISMISSAL RESOLUTIONS BULLETINS 
1990 5 Dismissal Resolution Nos.893-918 16 
1991 5 Dismissal Resolution Nos.919-942 23 
1992 5 Dismissal Resolution Nos.943-965 23 
1993 5 Dismissal Resolution Nos.966-992 26 
1994 5 Dismissal Resolution Nos.993-1012 20 
6 Dismissal Resolution Nos.1013-1015 3 
1995 6 Dismissal Resolution Nos.1016-1039 21 
1996 6 Dismissal Resolution Nos.1040-1061 22 
1997 6 Dismissal Resolution Nos.1062-1084 21 
1998 6 Dismissal Resolution Nos.1085-1109 21 
1999 6 Dismissal Resolution Nos.1110-1132 23 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
[R]egarding the [Justices’] Dismissal Resolutions, the Justices often 
‘argue ambiguously’ that the appellant’s ‘argument is ambiguous’; 
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however, [they] dared not disclose the instrument of appeal or the 
Justices in charge of [the Dismissal Resolution] for fear of public 
criticism.250 (Chien Chien-Jung: Apple Daily 26 July 2012) 
 
District Court Judge Chien Chien-Jung was not the only legal professional to criticise 
the Justices’ Dismissal Resolutions. Nigel N.T. Li also stated that the Justices always 
avoided being politically criticised by the public via the strategic use of Dismissal 
Resolutions: 
 
[D]o you know that [the Justices] dismissed a case regarding an issue of 
flag burning in our country, which is an offense against Article 160I of 
the Criminal Law? Rumour has it that the reason given by some Justices 
[privately] was: ‘The United States Supreme Court has written down all 
the possible given reasons, so we could not write anything creative’. 
How can this be a reason for dismissal? To be honest, the entire law 
community knows that when confronting ‘a sensitive political question 
wherein public opinion has [clear] preference’, our Justices would either 
provide an ‘absolute politically correct answer’ in order to please the 
public, or dismiss [the appeal] for really obscure reasons – there would 
be no third possibility.251 (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
The flag burning case that Li mentioned was dismissed by the Judicial Yuan Dismissal 
Resolution No.1394 [2012] on 5 October 2012, and the official reason given by the 
Judicial Yuan was: 
                                                     
250 Author’s Translation. 
251 Author’s Translation. 
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[This Court holds that] the argument made by the appellant alleging that 
the disputed law was unconstitutional, is based only upon [the 
appellant’s] personal opinion, and there is no supporting argument that 
points out the specific unconstitutionality of the disputed law upon 
which the final judgement depended. [Therefore] his appeal is found to 
be incompatible with Article 5I(2) of the Act of Constitutional 
Interpretation Procedure 1948/93 and shall be dismissed according to 
Section 3 of the same Article.252 
 
Journalist Wang Chien-Chuang of the China Times Group wrote an article entitled ‘The 
Justices Chose Indifference’ after the case was dismissed, in which he said: 
 
The Justices find themselves confronting a Hamlet’s dilemma: When 
should they express their opinion and when should [they] choose silence? 
In other words, when should they interfere more and when should they 
interfere less?253 (Wang Chien-Chuang: United Daily News 14 October 
2012) 
 
Those who are familiar with the operation of judicial review know that 
the reason for dismissal [given by the Justices in this case] is actually 
the [Judicial Yuan’s] universal answer, which is applicable to all 
dismissals. [The Justices’] excuses ‘alleged on a basis of personal 
opinion] and ‘there is no specific argument found’ are vague and general. 
                                                     
252 Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution No.1394 [2012] (Author’s Translation). 
253 Author’s Translation. 
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Like the legal terminology often used by [our] judges in judgement, such 
as ‘it is hard to deny’ or ‘it is difficult to conclude that it is incompatible’, 
[these wordings are] all no more than reams of rubbish.254 (ibid) 
 
[I]t is obvious that the Justices’ Dismissal Resolution [over this case] 
implies additional reasons, or [they have] additional [political] 
misgivings.255 (ibid) 
 
Apart from the fact that the Justices’ Dismissal Resolutions are still rather ambiguous 
and controversial even nowadays, both the fifth-term and sixth-term Justices submitted 
consilia enthusiastically. Although there were four Justices (Justices Shih Shen-An, Lin 
Kuo-Hsien, Lai In-Jaw and Hsieh Tsay-Chuan) who submitted no consilia in the 1990s, 
this can still be considered normal. Justices Lai In-Jaw and Hsieh Tsay-Chuan were 
only commissioned on 1 February 1999 and Justice Lin Kuo-Hsien only served between 
2 October 1994 and 17 March 1997. The only real exception is the fifth-term Justice 
Shih Shen-An, who served as a Justice for nine years from 2 October 1985 to 1 October 
1994. He participated in 167 judicial reviews, from Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.200 
[1985] to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.366 [1994], but submitted no consilia during 
his career. 
 
5.40 Number of Consilia Submitted by the Fifth-Term Justices, 1990-1994 
JUSTICE 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 SUM 
CHENG C.T. 3 1 3 5 4 16 
YANG C.H. 0 5 3 3 2 13 
LEE C.P. 4 0 2 4 2 12 
                                                     
254 Author’s Translation. 
255 Author’s Translation. 
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LIU T.C. 2 2 1 1 3 9 
YANG Z.Z. 1 2 2 3 0 8 
LEE C.S. 0 2 2 2 1 7 
WU G. 1 1 0 4 1 7 
CHEN R.T. 1 0 3 2 1 7 
CHANG C.T. 2 0 2 1 1 6 
CHANG T.S. 1 0 1 2 2 6 
YANG Y.L. 0 1 1 1 1 4 
H.H.P. MA 0 0 1 0 2 3 
CHAI S.H. 1 0 0 0 1 2 
WENG Y.S. 0 0 0 1 0 1 
SHIH S.A. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
5.41 Number of Consilia Submitted by the Sixth-Term Justices, 1994-2000 
JUSTICE 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 SUM 
SUN S.Y. 0 6 7 6 5 2 26 
SU J.H. 0 6 8 3 2 2 21 
LIN Y.M. 0 8 3 3 4 0 18 
CHEN C.N. 0 2 2 5 7 2 18 
LIU T.C. 0 4 2 2 2 5 15 
TUNG H.F. 0 1 2 1 3 2 9 
WU G. 1 1 4 0 0 2 8 
V. SZE 0 2 1 1 2 2 8 
TAI T.S. 0 3 1 1 1 1 7 
WANG H.H. 0 1 1 0 1 1 4 
WANG T.C. 0 0 1 2 1 0 4 
CHENG C.M. 0 1 2 0 1 - 4 
YANG H.I. 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
HWANG Y.C. - - - - - 2 2 
WENG Y.S. 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
TSENG H.S. 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
LIN K.H. 0 0 0 0 - - 0 
LAI I.J. - - - - - 0 0 
HSIEH T.C. - - - - - 0 0 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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Tables 5.40 and 5.41 show the number of Consilia submitted by the fifth-term and sixth-
term Justices in the 1990s. From the tables, it is not difficult to conclude that the sixth-
term Justices were more willing to submit consilia than the fifth-term Justices. The 
modification of the quorum for passing a judicial review from three-fourths to two-
thirds of total number of the Justices in 1993 is the main cause of the distinction. 
Moreover, it is also useful to know that the Justices who submitted more consilia were 
mainly specialists in civil and commercial law mainly (Justices Cheng Chien-Tsai, Yang 
Chien-Hua, Lee Chih-Peng, Sun Sen-Yan, Lin Young-Mou and Chen Chi-Nan), instead 
of constitutional and administrative law (Justices Weng Yueh-Sheng, Wu Geng and 
Tung Hsiang-Fei). Such a phenomenon probably implies that many of the majority 
opinions in the 1990s were written by Justices who specialised in constitutional and 
administrative law: 
 
As to the cases [I] confronted in the Council of Justices, administrative 
lawsuits amounted to 70% to 80% [of the total cases appealed] and 
constitutional lawsuits were about 10% to 20%. Cases regarding civil or 
criminal issues were very few. […] Of all the constitutional and 
administrative lawsuits during my 18-year justice career, especially 
within the sixth-term [1994-2003], I was either the Justice who wrote 
the majority opinion, or the one who contributed crucial ideas [to the 
majority opinion]. Sometimes I wrote both the majority opinion and my 
own opinion in a case.256 (Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-2004) 
 
                                                     
256 Author’s Translation. 
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The only exception (21 consilia) was Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung, who specialised in 
criminal law, holding a Dr.Jur. Degree from Freiburg University and who was a legal 
academic standing against capital punishment. Statistics tell that Justice Su Jyun-
Hsiung was not someone who refrained from offering legal opinions against majority 
decisions. His judicial behaviour on capital punishment issues, such as Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.476 [1999], is particularly valuable in terms of Taiwanese 
constitutional legal study. 
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Statistics are commonly used by political scientists to examine hypotheses; however, 
this thesis does more than that. In this chapter, it has compiled large amounts of statistics 
pertinent to the ROC judicial power in the 1990s, telling a more persuasive story about 
the Judicial Yuan and the expansion of judicial power in Taiwan during the 1990s. 
 
Firstly, this chapter provided Taiwan’s media statistics between 1950 and 2005 in order 
to understand the development of Taiwan’s media, showing that even journalists in 
Taiwan agree that it is very easy to access news reports and almost impossible to block 
information in this country. The possibility for a judge to read and accept public opinion 
is strong, and has been confirmed by Taiwan’s leading legal journalist. 
 
Secondly, this chapter disclosed Taiwan’s elite-oriented legal education system through 
statistics, showing Taiwan’s strong tendency towards elitism in legal education and 
admission to practice law. Taiwan’s legal professionals are mainly social elites who are 
more likely to be bound by traditional Chinese values of good governance, justifying 
their motivation towards holding up the existing system. 
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Thirdly, this chapter reviewed the development of the Judicial Yuan between 1948 and 
2009 in statistical terms, showing that the then Justices’ common political belief in anti-
communism may have been the main reason for the contraction of judicial power. 
Before the 1980s there is no doubt that the Justices supported the state of emergency 
system that strove to retake the Chinese mainland via military operations, and the 
statistics show that the Justices not only used judicial power in a limited way but also 
decided according to anti-communist policies. However, since the 1980s, the Justices 
began to use their power more actively because the ROC policy had shifted towards the 
status quo by that point. 
 
Finally, this chapter has shown relevant statistics pertaining to the Judicial Yuan 
between the 1990 and 1999. Through these statistics, this thesis provides a vivid image 
of those legendary Justices who democratised and guarded the ROC – the Justices who 
have obtained the honourable title of guardians of the constitution. 
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6: A VICTORY FOR SINCERE DECISION-MAKING: 
INTERPRETATION NO.261 [1990] 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
A court order for democratisation promulgated before political negotiation is extremely 
infrequent, and the democratisation of a nation processed in accordance with a court 
order seems even more incredible. This is why Taiwan’s peaceful democratisation is 
globally recognised as ‘Taiwan’s political miracle’. However, much of the literature on 
Taiwan’s democratisation ignores the importance of the Judicial Yuan, and few studies 
have evaluated the impact of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], in which the 
court gave direct instructions for all negotiations that took place between the political 
parties. 
 
The boldness of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] seems almost unparalleled 
in the annals of constitutional history. The Justices showed courage in the face of 
political threats en banc, dismissing the authoritarian congress and forcing fresh and 
immediate elections. Moreover, the Judicial Yuan ordered the National Assembly to 
pass a specific constitutional amendment, thus reshaping the original Constitution that 
had been designed for the whole of China into a constitution that Taiwan could rely on 
to support democracy – precisely the sort of judicial intervention that has come to be 
referred to as a judicial coup d’état. 
 
Attempts by the Control Yuan to retaliate against the Justices came to nothing: 
impeachment proceedings were initiated against 13 out of 15 Justices after the judgment, 
but not one of the impeachments was successful because public support for the Judicial 
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Yuan became an overwhelming force. The Justices won in every respect, as fresh 
elections took place on 21 December 1991 in the National Assembly and on 19 
December 1992 in the Legislative Yuan. The constitutional amendment was passed on 
1 May 1991257 and the decision helped establish an early form of institutional alliance 
between the Judicial Yuan and public opinion. 
 
When we look back on the political history of the ROC, Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.261 [1990] can be seen as unprecedented. No judicial decision-maker had ever 
previously dared to challenge the government through such a radical measure, and no 
public opinion expected the Judicial Yuan to play such a crucial role in politics. The 
court order was like a surprise attack against the government, and the Judicial Yuan 
certainly behaved as a strong force within the move towards democratisation. It is hard 
to believe that the Justices who made this decision had little experience of politics 
beforehand, and obtained little by having made their decision. In other words, we shall 
bear in mind the first of four ‘but for’ causations embodied in the methodology Chapter 
3.3 before reading the stories of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] – If 
there was no political fragmentation through democratisation (Ginsburg, 2003: 251-
252), the political space for judicial power expansion would not have opened up. 
 
People do make decisions consciously, but it is often hard to see whether or not they 
visualise the actual outcome beforehand – for better or for worse. So we know the court 
order was given deliberately at a time when the Justices sought it political effectiveness.  
However, the consequences of the decision went against all expectations. There is no 
doubt that the Justices were attempting to achieve something despite the political 
                                                     
257 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1991). 
223 
 
fragmentation that was occurring as part of the process of democratisation (ibid), but 
they may not have realised that they were opening the gate for unexpected judicial 
power expansion, and were subsequently forced to behave in a different way. 
 
This chapter maintains that Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was not merely 
assertive but was also a sincere decision – a bold and rare judicial intervention that fully 
embraced the risk of retaliation through attacks on judicial independence, the 
institutional integrity of the court or even the stripping of its powers of jurisdiction. As 
the dust settled, the constitutional crisis became a pivotal constitutional moment for 
Taiwan, establishing a judicialised mode of governance at the heart of Taiwan’s 
democratisation process. All of this was set in motion by Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.261 [1990] – a decision immortalised in the realms of legal and political studies. 
 
6.2 THE ORIGIN 
 
In recent years, very little attention has been given to the state body of the ROC in 
western studies of Taiwan, in terms of either political or constitutional-legal research. 
Assumptions are mostly based upon the political precondition and the acknowledged 
concept that Taiwan is the same entity as the ROC. However, this precondition is 
actually debateable. 
 
In terms of its effective controlled territory, there is no doubt that the ROC is Taiwan, 
in geographical terms at least. However, in terms of national history and constitutional 
law, the ROC is much more than Taiwan even today. This thesis prefers to interpret the 
story of the origin of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] from multiple 
perspectives, including the separate perspectives of the ROC and Taiwan, in order to 
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prevent political bias. 
 
6.2.1 The Republic of China’s Perspective 
 
The constitutional problems the ROC Government confronted in the 1950s were mainly 
coping with a series of constitutional crises raised because of the Republic’s disastrous 
military frustration following the communist revolt between 1946 and 1949, as a result 
of which some 99.5% of the ROC’s legitimate territory was de facto taken over by the 
communists, whom the global community then recognised in political and diplomatic 
terms as the PRC from the 1970s onwards (International Business Publications, 2012: 
8). This historical event is now commonly referred to as the Chinese Civil War. At the 
time, however, it was seen as the communist-oriented PRC disuniting from the ROC 
via armed rebellion. As a consequence, the ROC’s territorial decline resulted in its 
inability to implement the original articles of the Constitution (Hsieh, 2007: 48-63). 
This became a serious and complex legal and constitutional crisis that the ROC 
Government was forced to deal with pragmatically. 
 
The ROC Constitution of 1947 was enacted by and for all of China, with national-level 
legislatures composed of representatives from each province and overseas Chinese 
(Lien and Chen, 2013: 50). The government considered the Constitution and its national 
representatives as symbolising the ROC’s claim to be China’s only legitimate 
international regime, despite the founding of the PRC (Taiwan Daily Editorial, 1987: 
136-138). However, it was immediately obvious after the communist revolt that holding 
subsequent elections for national level legislatures in order to represent the whole of 
China would be politically impossible unless the PRC was successfully eliminated 
(Jacobs, 2006: 85; Li, 1987: 8). As a result, the government and the National Assembly 
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had little option but to declare a state of emergency (Wachman, 1994: 105-107) whilst 
mobilising the military to retake the Chinese mainland (Woo, 2011: 90-93). Meanwhile 
the Judicial Yuan granted the national representatives a court order,258 allowing them 
to continue exercising legislative power until elections could be held once more 
(Schafferer, 2003: 31-142). 
 
This was the political and legal response of the ROC to the communist revolt. Despite 
endless political debates (Taylor, 2009: 337-408), it was at least agreed that armed 
rebellion against government was considered unacceptable, even in modern democratic 
terms. As such, this thesis can find no persuasive reason in law that would have 
prohibited the ROC from recovering its lost territory via the suppression of a revolt, 
and no sensible political reason to stop the government from declaring a state of 
emergency (Joes, 2010: 5-67). Generally speaking, the ROC’s political standpoint and 
the measures it took to regain its lost territory are quite understandable; the government 
tried by all means, with no methodological proportionality, to save the country from the 
communist rebels – any government would do the same, although they may devise 
slight variations in legalising the due process. In Taiwan’s case, we can summarise the 
political and legal logic of the situation as follows: 
 
1. Because of the communist revolt, a state of emergency is required; because 
of state of emergency, democracy is deferred. 
 
2. Because of the communist revolt, holding elections for legislators according 
to the Constitution is de facto impossible; because of this impossibility, the 
                                                     
258 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954]. 
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original legislative bodies cannot be dismissed. 
 
6.2.2 Taiwan’s Perspective 
 
It is essential to recognise at this point that Taiwan was a disputed territory, much like 
Alsace-Lorraine in France. It was also a land of controversy. Maurits van Nassau of the 
Netherlands (1567-1625) was historically Taiwan’s first sovereign (Cheng, 2004: 121-
122) recognised under international law, and the Han-Chinese takeover of the island 
did not happen until 1662 (Andrade, 2011: 3-20). From 1895 Taiwan existed as a 
Japanese colony ceded by the Chinese Qing Empire after the First Sino-Japanese War 
(Roy, 2003: 32-54). However, it came under ROC control again in 1945 after the 
Second World War (ibid: 55-74). Although Taiwan’s ethnic majority is Han-Chinese, 
its history sets them very much apart from the mainland Chinese. 
 
The origin of the Taiwanese pursuit of democracy was its struggle against the Japanese 
colonialism259 (Interview with Hsu on 10-MAY-2013) between 1921 and 1934. Their 
experience of Japanese colonialism fundamentally drove the Taiwanese people to 
pursue democracy. The ROC’s declaration of emergency after the communist revolt 
was commonly seen as Taiwan’s second colonisation (Lee, 2013: 86-90). In other words, 
the nationalists – at least in the eyes of the democrats – were commonly considered to 
be either colonisers of Taiwan (Interview with Hsu on 10-MAY-2013; Shih, 2009: 60-
67), or the traitors to democracy and the country (Interview with Wu on 31-MAY-2013; 
Shih, 2009: 60-67). The long-term state of emergency (1948-1991) of the ROC was 
considered a profound betrayal of democracy. 
                                                     
259 See generally Petition of the Establishment of Taiwan Council, 1921-1934. 
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6.3 PUBLIC OPINION 
 
The evaluation of the influence of Taiwan’s public opinion upon Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990] shall be carried out by answering the following questions: 
 
1. Did public opinion in Taiwan support democratisation in 1990? 
 
2. If so, did the Justices bow to this public opinion whilst making its judicial 
decision? 
 
6.3.1 Did Taiwan’s Public Opinion Support Democratisation? 
 
Unfortunately, no public opinion survey was undertaken in 1990 to show whether or 
not public opinion in Taiwan favoured democratisation. The reason for this is simple: 
in 1990 the ROC was still an authoritarian regime, so there was no possibility that the 
government would allow any such public opinion survey to be performed (Interview 
with Hsu on 10-MAY-2013). Even if the government were to permit a public opinion 
survey, its credibility under an authoritarian regime would be questionable. However, 
the recollections of the political leaders and constitutional law jurisprudents involved 
in diverse interest groups can be used to evaluate the tendencies of Taiwan’s public 
opinion in 1990. 
 
One of the most important political leaders as far as Taiwan’s pursuit of democracy was 
concerned was Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang. His opinions insinuated that it was irrational 
and unnecessary to have any doubts over Taiwan’s desire for democracy: 
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The groundswell of Taiwan’s public opinion was in favour of 
democratisation and [our people’s desire of democratisation] had 
reached very obvious levels – even though we [the Democrats] had no 
public opinion survey [in support of that claim] under the state of 
emergency, because surveys were prohibited by the Nationalist 
Government. However, the Democrats, through a series of political 
demonstrations, such as the Chung-Li and Kaohsiung incidents, won the 
people’s enthusiastic support. [We could see] ardent and inspired 
upholders of democracy everywhere, so why [would we] need a public 
opinion survey [to demonstrate that we were supported]? [Moreover], if 
[democratisation] was not highly supported by [our] society, the 
nationalists’ compromise for peaceful democratisation would never have 
been materialised.260 (ibid) 
 
Lee Teng-Hui, then Chairman of the Nationalist Party and the ROC President (1988-
2000), also recollected the political atmosphere in 1990: 
 
The demonstration referred to as the ‘Wild Lily Student Movement’ 
shook both the government and society; [as a result], all kinds of appeals 
for [Taiwan’s] democratisation became more and more radical. I made 
a televised speech appealing to our nationals to be calm and rational, and 
I reaffirmed [the government’s] determination to accelerate the process 
of [Taiwan’s] democratisation, pacifying the public opinion against the 
                                                     
260 Author’s Translation. 
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Extraordinary Conference of National Assembly and responding to the 
radical appeal from the whole of the nation for political reform.261 (Lee, 
2013: 50) 
 
Nigel N.T. Li, an essential constitutional professional who drafted the upcoming 
Additional Articles of the Constitution in 1991 262  for Taiwan’s democratisation, 
particularly recalled the then social response to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990]: 
 
I certainly had no idea about what the motives of the Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan were to make such a decision as Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990]. However, as one of the participants of the 
1990 National Affairs Conference, I can confirm to you that all the 
participants at the Conference at the time, when they were told about 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], regardless of their political 
affiliations, were all surprised and excited, and appreciated what the 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan had done.263 (Interview with Li on 17-
JUN-2013) 
 
6.3.2 Did Justices Read Public Opinion? 
 
Before answering this question, a question regarding common sense should first be 
considered, namely is it possible that judges were completely unaware of the tendencies 
                                                     
261 Author’s Translation. 
262 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1991). 
263 Author’s Translation. 
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of public opinion? Justice Lin Tzu-Yi is probably the jurist who provided the best 
answer: 
 
It is always very difficult to [define] public opinion [precisely], or to 
read the tendency of public opinion [correctly]. […] I think that within 
the process of judicial decision-making, a Justice should and will pay 
attention on public opinion, as well as other [relevant] professional 
comments.264 (Interview with Lin on 16-MAY-2013) 
 
One of the Justices who decided Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], Justice 
Herbert H.P. Ma, not only seconded Justice Lin Tzu-Yi’s opinion, but also affirmed his 
judicial decision upon this case. His recollection was: 
 
In terms of whether the Justice of the Republic of China take public 
opinion seriously or not, [and] the question of whether [they] read public 
opinion or not, I think, speaking overall, it is nearly impossible for a 
jurist in the Republic of China, including Justices and judges, to 
completely ignore social reactions […]265 (Interview with Ma on 19-
JUL-2013) 
 
I was one of the Justices who supported the decision of the Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990], and I can tell you why I supported it […] 
at that time the public opinion in our country was already changed, and 
the society could no longer accept a state of emergency, so I think the 
                                                     
264 Author’s Translation. 
265 Author’s Translation. 
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law should be modified. We the Justices had already noticed the 
changing political atmosphere in which [our] nationals wanted a 
constitutional reform, whereas our people’s desire was just. Therefore, 
the fifth-term Justices had a common consensus that we should push the 
country’s constitutional and political system towards this necessary 
reform.266 (ibid) 
 
6.3.3 Conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that the leaders of the only two political interest groups, Chairman 
Hsu Hsin-Liang of the democrats and President Lee Teng-Hui of the nationalists, were 
in the best position to evaluate Taiwan’s public opinion tendencies. Their testimonies 
show that, even without any public opinion surveys, it was certain that Taiwan’s public 
opinion at the times had a clear orientation towards democratisation. Being one of the 
drafters of the democratic constitutional amendments, Nigel N.T. Li further confirmed 
that the Judicial Yuan had received specific affirmative support (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15) 
via the decision favouring democratisation in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990]. Justice Herbert H.P. Ma’s reminiscences disclose not only the common 
consensus of the then Justices in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], but also 
the Justices’ collective awareness of the public’s desire in this case. 
 
6.4 THEORETICAL DILEMMAS OVER THE CONSTITUTION 
 
Western political academics often consider that Taiwan’s peaceful democratisation was 
                                                     
266 Author’s Translation. 
232 
 
little short of a political miracle (Fell, 2007: 16-17). However, in the eyes of 
constitutional legal experts and academics, this so-called ‘political miracle’ could only 
be achieved after clearing up a series of constitutional dilemmas. If this did not happen, 
the political miracle would become a revolution. 
 
6.4.1 Divided Nation’s Dilemma 
 
[T]he German people, in the Länder Baden […] and Württemberg-
Hohenzollern, has enacted, by virtue of its constituent power, this Basic Law 
of the Federal Republic of Germany to give a new order to political life for a 
transitional period. […] It has also acted on behalf of those Germans to whom 
participation was denied.267 
 
This is the original Preamble of the 1949 German Basic Law enacted at the time of 
German division (1945-1990), which includes an unusual legal term that deserves a 
specific mention: ‘on behalf of those Germans to whom participation was denied’.268 
There is no doubt that legal academics worldwide would challenge Federal Germany 
on the meaning of ‘on behalf of all of Germany’ (Chang, 1999: 106-109; Zimmer, 1997: 
57-82) because Federal Germany only consisted of 10 of 16 German Länder plus West 
Berlin (Thomaneck and Niven, 2001: 8-22), so the claim of representing the whole of 
Germany was a controversial one which went against democratic principles. However, 
was there any better option for the Federal Germany on the drafting of constitutional 
law in 1949? The constitutional dilemma of divided nations was taking place not only 
in Germany, but in the ROC as well. 
                                                     
267 Basic Law of Germany pmbl. (1949) (Translated by German History in Documents and Images). 
268 Id., see Wiederverreinigungsverhinderungsverbot (Blumenwitz, 1982: 59); BVerfGE 5, 85. 
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The ROC had paid a massive political price, both domestically and internationally, in 
order to represent all of China. As mentioned previously, the government and the 
Judicial Yuan believed that legislators should be elected from the throughout China in 
order to represent the country fairly, which is why the Judicial Yuan froze subsequent 
elections because this of course was no longer possible: 
 
However, our state has undergone a severe calamity, which makes the 
re-election of the second term of both Yuans de facto impossible.269 
 
This ‘de facto impossibility’ approach reflected Federal Germany’s ‘on behalf of those 
Germans’ attitude, because both were attempting to represent the entire nation through 
legal means, and both were basing this upon their own political beliefs for national 
reunification. Moreover, both ignored the possible shift in national identity from Great-
nation (N) towards Minor-nation (N1) (National Identity from N to N1; Su, 1994: 406-
411). In contrast to Federal Germany, the ROC’s approach appeared potentially suicidal: 
it was sacrificing an entire system of democracy in the name of national reunification, 
which was looking increasingly impossible and thus becoming more and more 
unacceptable as time went by. 
 
6.4.2 From Groß-ROC towards Klein-ROC Dilemma 
 
As a piece of advice to Western political academics in the field of Taiwanese studies, 
Taiwan’s national identity is still an issue that cannot be precisely decided (Corcuff, 
                                                     
269 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] (Official Translation). 
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2013: 133-170). Most Western articles did not really see the whole picture regarding 
Taiwan’s national identity (Brown, 2004: 1-34; Hughes, 2013: 95-128)270 as far as this 
thesis is concerned – what constitutes Taiwanese national identity is still debatable. 
 
This thesis has no intention of analysing Taiwan’s national identity in any great depth 
because of this reason. However, the ROC Constitution is based upon the national 
identity of China as a whole (Groß-ROC), and if the implements of the Constitution are 
narrowed to only a Taiwanese context (Klein-ROC), the connection of the constitutional 
legitimacy from the identity of Great-China towards Minor-China (Groß-ROC to Klein-
ROC; Constitutional Identity from N to N1) represents more than politics and would 
necessitate – in politico-legal terms at least – a complex surgical operation on the 
Constitution (Su, 1999: 296-308). 
 
The reason for the necessity of the constitutional law shifting from the identity of Groß-
ROC towards Klein-ROC was provided by Justice Su Yeong-Chin, who was one of the 
drafters of the upcoming Additional Articles of the Constitution 1991.271 He held: 
 
I always discuss this [concept] since in the past, there was no logical 
causation and no realistic necessity for a choice between reunification-
independence and democracy. […] The serious imperfections recently 
revealed in our state’s constitutional development are not because of the 
uncertainty of reunification or independence, they are due to our failure 
                                                     
270 Some famous political leaders categorise themselves as independent promoters of Taiwanese identity, 
such as Shih Ming-Te Nori and Wu Jan-Fu, who hold that the ROC is their fatherland and refute any 
connections with the PRC (Interview with Wu on 31-MAY-2013; Shih, 2011: 1-171). Wu Jan-Fu even 
accepts Chinese reunification if ‘the ROC remains and the PRC ceases to exist’ (Interview with Wu on 
31-MAY-2013). If Western academics were aware of such things, they may reconsider their conclusions 
on what Taiwan actually is. 
271 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1991). 
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to reflect the reality of national division. If our legislative body […] is 
still operated under the preconditions of unification, then democracy is 
surely beyond its reach […]272 (Su, 1994: 406-407) 
 
However, the constitutional shift from Groß-ROC towards Klein-ROC was not easy: 
there was still a paradoxical constitutional dilemma between the use of constituted 
power and democratic legitimacy, and this was what either the Justices or the drafters 
of the Additional Articles of the Constitution had to straighten out: 
 
Even if the [first-term] National Assembly was dismissed spontaneously, 
the problem was still not solved. The first-term National Assembly had 
already lost democratic legitimacy; thus, a constitution amended by 
them should have no democratic legitimacy at all. So, the constitutional 
dilemma with no historic precedent that our country was facing was that 
the National Assembly were the only organ authorised by Constitution 
with the power of amending the Constitution, but they already lacked 
democratic legitimacy. However, the constitutional amendments must 
be amended by them in order to be procedurally constitutional, but the 
amendments would never be democratically legitimate as long as it was 
the [first-term National Assembly] that amended them.273 (Interview 
with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
6.5 PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
 
                                                     
272 Author’s Translation. 
273 Author’s Translation. 
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There were two pertinent judicial decisions made before Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.261 [1990] which must be reviewed in order to understand both the theoretical 
grounds and the political background of the Judicial Yuan within Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990]. These are Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] and 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977] 
 
6.5.1 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] was the first decision taken in response to 
the constitutional crisis raised due to the dramatic loss of Mainland China. The ROC 
National Assembly was the beneficiary of this interpretation because it was 
acknowledged that it was the best constitutionally legal means of expanding legislative 
power. The story behind this is that the term of office of the first-term legislative bodies 
was coming to an end in 1951, and with the legislative bodies in their current form it 
would be de facto impossible to hold subsequent elections without retaking the Chinese 
mainland. The government at the time was very confident that it would be able to 
suppress the communist rebellion quickly, so the term of office of the first-term 
legislative bodies was extended annually under the President’s emergency powers until 
1954. By this time, however, the ROC Government had become aware of the 
inappropriateness of such a use of emergency power, which had not been confirmed by 
the Judicial Yuan (Lin, 1983: 44-55). As a result, the Executive Yuan appealed to the 
court and received the following ruling: 
 
[O]ur state has been undergoing a severe calamity, which makes re-
election of the second term of both Yuans de facto impossible. It would 
contradict the purpose of the Five-Yuan system as established by the 
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Constitution, if both the Legislative and Control Yuans ceased to 
exercise their respective powers. Therefore, before the second-term 
Members are elected, convene and are convoked in accordance with the 
laws, all of the first-term Members of both the Legislative and Control 
Yuans shall continue to exercise their respective powers.274 
 
Obviously the court came to this decision pragmatically: compared to having no 
legislators representing the entire China, it would be wiser to retain the old one. The 
decision was made under a logical presumption that the communist revolt would be 
suppressed soon, a presumption that seems irrational only in hindsight. However, 
because of the political propaganda, this presumption was commonly held in Taiwan in 
the 1950s (Chen, 2005a: 221-227) and in consequence its influence over judicial 
decision-making was unavoidable (Lin, 1983: 44-55). 
 
It seems reasonable to consider Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] as a careless 
decision, because the duration of the communist revolt was never considered seriously. 
But the decision offered further hints at the National Assembly’s desire for legislative 
power expansion. The National Assembly repealed their original decision over the 
Temporary Provisions Act 1948 through the cancellation of its annual review: 
 
The National Assembly, in response to the realistic requirements of the 
restoration [of the Republic of China], with respect to the procedure 
regulated by the Constitution and by common agreement with no 
objections, promulgates that the Temporary Provisions shall be 
                                                     
274 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] (Official Translation). 
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automatically enacted before it is officially abolished.275 
 
6.5.2 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977] 
 
The Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977] is commonly considered the sequel to 
the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] because it was the first case in which the 
Judicial Yuan restrained the National Assembly from legislative power expansion. The 
the Justices held that: 
 
Paragraph 6 of the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of 
National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion does 
not alter the term of elected central representatives under the 
Constitution […]276 
 
[O]nce the term of the First Legislative Yuan expired on May 7, 1951, there 
were no vacancies to fill. Due to national emergencies […] members were 
allowed to continue to carry out their duties until the Second Legislative Yuan 
was elected and convened […] only those who were already members at the 
time the term of the First Legislative Yuan expired could remain in office.277 
 
Nigel N.T. Li commented on the virtue of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977]. 
It was a case, he said, in which the Justices deliberately stopped the National Assembly 
from altering the term of office of the first-term legislators ‘by fact’ rather ‘by law’ – it 
                                                     
275 National Assembly Declaration (11 March 1954) (Author’s Translation). 
276 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977] (Official Translation). 
277 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 Reasoning [1977] (Official Translation). 
239 
 
was rather unfortunate ‘by fact’ that a second-term could not be elected, so the first-
term legislators were needed. However, it was not legally constitutional that the 
legislators’ term of office was extended, even though the decision was made by the 
National Assembly (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013). Li considered that: 
 
[T]he Judicial Yuan knew that they had no power to stop the old National 
Assembly from exercising legislative power indefinitely in the era [of 
state of emergency], but at least they could make this a de facto 
indefinite congress under constitutional control, without letting the old 
National Assembly arbitrarily modify and ruin [our] respected 
Constitution. You [surely] could accuse [our] Justices in the early period 
of not being brave enough to oppose [the authority] more openly, but I 
think that they were brave enough to protect the dignity of [our] 
Constitution at their age – this was probably all they could do at the 
time.278 (ibid) 
 
6.6 INSTRUMENT OF APPEAL 
 
The instrument of appeal enshrined in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was 
originally promoted and co-signed by 26 congressmen/women in the Legislative Yuan, 
including 19 democrats, 5 nationalists and 2 independents. Although the appeal was 
supported by multi-party advocates, it is normally seen as a democratic-oriented appeal, 
because 90.47% of all democratic congressmen/women co-signed it (19 out of 21), 
comprising 73.07% of all signatories. Congressmen Chu Kou-Jeng and Hong Chi-
                                                     
278 Author’s Translation. 
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Chang were the only two democrats who did not promote the appeal. 
 
Democratic congressman Chen Shui-Bian was undeniably the heart and soul of the 
appeal (Chen, 2000: 78; Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013), and he was probably the 
greatest political beneficiary thereafter – Chen won the ROC presidential campaign in 
2000. However, Chen was not the only politician to benefit – the future political careers 
of all 26 signatories are astonishing, including 2 premiers, 1 vice premier, 5 ministers 
and 1 vice minister, as well as 2 county mayors and 1 vice mayor.279 
 
6.6.1 The Unusual Appellant 
 
One of the most remarkable details of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] is 
that it was not a case that was appealed by a number of legislators; in fact it was an 
unusual case in that it was appealed in the name of the Legislative Yuan as a whole, on 
the basis of legislative resolution: 
 
This appeal was approved by the Resolution of the 17th Conference of 
the 85th Session of the Legislative Yuan.280 
 
One obvious political question is why did the first-term legislators appeal against 
themselves? The genuine reason will probably remain unknown. However, Nigel N.T. 
Li provided a possible and persuasive explanation: 
 
                                                     
279 Premier: Chang Chun-Hsiung and Hsieh Chang-Ting; vice premier: Yeh Chu-Lan; minister: Hsieh, 
Shen-San, Huang Chu-Wen, Chang Po-Ya, Chen Ding-Nan and Yu Cheng-Hsien; vice minister: Tai 
Chen-Yao; mayor: Chiou Lien-Hui and Pang Pai-Hsien; vice mayor: Lin Cheng-Chieh. 
280 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 App’x [1990] (Author’s Translation). 
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It was very unusual in those days that the Legislative Yuan would 
[consent to] pass its political power to [our] judiciary for a [judicial] 
decision by a resolution of appeal; [I am] afraid that there may have been 
some political bargains made under the table. On the surface, the case 
was promoted by opposition democrat legislators. However, there was 
no constitutional appeal system for individual legislators at that time, so 
this appeal could not have been [successfully] made if the ruling 
nationalist legislators had disapproved. […] [As far as the reason why] 
those old nationalist legislators approved [this appeal], despite the fact 
that it was probably a nationalist fixed policy, one of the highest 
possibilities was just like your interpretation of [the attitude of] the then 
legislators – they arrogantly believed that the judiciary could change 
nothing. I think that these old legislators really underestimated the 
determination of the Justices of the Judicial Yuan on protecting [our] 
constitutional [system].281 (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
6.6.2 The Promoters 
 
The original 26 promoters of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] can be 
identified by their signatures, which are listed in the instrument of appeal.282 The most 
noticeable common feature of these 26 promoters was that they could all be categorised 
as 1989 supplementary legislators elected in Taiwan, as opposed to the so-called ‘old 
legislators’ elected by and from the Chinese mainland in 1948, including 19 (out of 21) 
democrats, 5 nationalists and 2 independent congressmen. 
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Technically there were two kinds of first-term legislators in 1990: the ‘old legislators’ 
who retained their position until death or voluntarily retirement (Lee, 2009b: 283); and 
the ‘supplementary legislators’ who substituted the old legislators as their seats became 
free. This procedure had been followed since 1969, through the process of regular 
elections held only in the ‘Free Area of the ROC’ (mainly, but not only Taiwan) (Taiwan 
Daily Editorial, 1987: 136-138). Despite the fact that the government held regular 
elections for supplementary legislators in 1969 (7 Seats), 1972 (29 Seats), 1975 (37 
Seats), 1980 (64 Seats), 1983 (65 Seats), 1986 (73 Seats) and 1989 (101 Seats) (Wang, 
2005: 68); the ‘old legislators’ still constituted an absolute majority in 1990 (Lee, 2009b: 
283). 
 
Around 20 months before the appeal, in September 1988, an official symposium entitled 
‘Constitution and Constitutionalism’ was published by the Legislative Yuan, including 
an article written by Justice Hsu Tzong-Li, who was still an academic in those days. 
The said article called upon the then Justice to behave more actively in order to dismiss 
these old legislators to pave the way for democratisation (Hsu, 1988: 8-12). Although 
the extent of Justice Hsu’s article’s influence upon these 26 promoters is actually 
unknown, this thesis argues283 that Justice Hsu’s article, by providing legal means at 
least in theory, enlightened the 26 promoters to work towards legal action – especially 
considering that 10 of them were originally legal professionals (democrats: 7 284 ; 
nationalists: 2285 ; independent: 1286 ) who were familiar with legal action and had 
                                                     
283 Because both the editor and the publisher of this symposium was the Legislative Yuan, it is reasonable 
to presume that Justice Hsu Tzong-Li’s article was meaningful to the then legislators. 
284 Congressmen Chen Shui-Bian, Hsieh Chang-Ting, Chang Chun-Hsiung, Yeh Chu-Lan, Chiou Lien-
Hui, Tien Tsai-Ting and Lee Ching-Hsiung. 
285 Congressmen Huang Chu-Wen and Huang Chung-I. 
286 Congressman Chen Ding-Nan. 
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enough encouragement to try. 
 
6.6.3 The Claim 
 
The instrument of appeal firstly implored the Justices to fully reconsider Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.31 [1954] according to the clausula rebus sic stantibus (Zimmermann, 
1996: 579-582), claiming: 
 
It has been more than 40 years since the government moved to Taiwan, 
[and our] politics and economy are steady [nowadays]. Moreover, [we] 
have become a developing country by [our] people’s common efforts, 
and [we] all pursue the development of [our nation’s] constitutional 
democracy. A complete re-election of the congress has become a 
common goal of [our] nationals, and it is the preference of public 
opinion. The objective [political] environment nowadays is not as it was, 
and [for this reason we hold that] the first-term members of both the 
Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan shall cease to exercise their 
power.287 
 
The use of the term clausula rebus sic stantibus is an attempt to persuade the court to 
override Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954], claiming that this judicial decision 
was only relevant under the irregular and tense political situation of the 1950s, and had 
no relevance in the 1990s. Moreover, the government’s unlimited application of the 
decision of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] amounted to an unconstitutional 
                                                     
287 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 App’x [1990] (Author’s Translation). 
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denial of democracy, underlining the idea that the court should ‘reinterpret’ the Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954]:288 
 
Article 2 of the Constitution concludes that the sovereignty of [our 
Republic] shall reside in the whole body of its nationals, [whereby] the 
voice of the nation shall be formed from its nationals and [delivered] to 
the government, in order to ensure unity between the ruler and the ruled. 
Moreover, the specific spirit [of popular sovereignty] is to fulfil 
democratic politics, and this shall be materialised by [holding] regular 
elections for congress. [By this reason we hold] that Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.31 [1954] […] is incompatible with the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty.289 
 
The instrument of appeal applied the litigating strategy of joinder of claims which 
attempted to convince the Justices via a submission of multiple arguments, an approach 
commonly used by lawyers in Taiwan. This submission of multiple arguments offered 
the Justices two options: the primary argument was the main argument of the appeal, 
and if it was rejected, the alternative argument would take its place immediately: 
 
1. We claim that the decision of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] is 
unconstitutional because the decision is incompatible with the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty. 
 
2. If our pervious claim is disproved, then we claim that the decision of 
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289 Id. (Author’s Translation). 
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Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] is still unconstitutional because it 
no longer reflects current circumstances, although we accept that the 
decision was not unconstitutional at the time it was made. 
 
6.7 DECISION 
 
The decision on Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was promulgated on 21 
June 1990, a week before the 1990 National Affairs Conference (amongst political 
parties) was held (28 June 1990), thereby setting up the constitutional legal grounds for 
democratisation for the ROC (Li, 1991: 156). It is certainly one of the most 
unforgettable and important judicial decisions in history – a unified judicial decision 
held en banc with no dissenting opinion in content. It aimed to strike down the 
authoritarian congress in favour of democratisation, and ultimately it succeeded. 
 
6.7.1 A Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus Decision 
 
The Judicial Yuan actually supported the alternative argument of the instrument of 
appeal, holding that Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] was constitutional at the 
time it was made, and recalling Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.150 [1977] on the 
question of the expansion of legislative terms that the Judicial Yuan had never permitted: 
 
The Constitution provides specific terms of office for all national 
representatives: six years for the National Assembly Delegates, three 
years for the Legislators and six years for the Members of the Control 
Yuan, respectively. […] After the current Constitution took effect, our 
nation suffered severe calamities. Upon expiration of the first term of 
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the Legislators and Members of the Control Yuan, it was de facto 
impossible to hold elections of the second-term representatives in 
accordance with the laws. […] J.Y. Interpretation No. 31 therefore 
declared that “before the second-term representatives are elected and 
convene in accordance with the laws, all of the first-term representatives 
of both the Legislative and Control Yuans shall continue to exercise their 
respective powers.”290 
 
After clarifying the court’s position on the issue of legislative term expansion, the 
Justices reaffirmed the spirit of popular sovereignty embodied in the ROC Constitution, 
holding that the permission of the first-term legislators to exercise legislative power as 
set down in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] was nothing but a clausula rebus 
sic stantibus decision; therefore, there was no reason to prevent another clausula rebus 
sic stantibus decision to be made in 1990 if necessary. In other words, the Justices did 
not intend to ‘override’ the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] – the decision 
had simply ‘expired’: 
 
However, periodical election of representatives is an essential avenue 
for reflection of the will of the people and implementation of 
constitutional democracy. That the abovementioned national 
representatives were allowed to continue the exercise of their powers 
was necessary in order to deal with the then-existing situations and 
maintain the constitutional system. Since publication of the 
abovementioned Interpretation on January 29, 1954, the first-term 
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national representatives have been exercising their powers for more than 
three decades. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned Interpretation was not 
intended to permit the indefinite exercise of powers by the first-term 
Legislators and Members of the Control Yuan, or to change their 
respective terms. Furthermore, Article 28, Paragraph 1, of the 
Constitution expressly provides “The National Assembly Delegates 
shall be elected every six years.” Obviously, the intention of Paragraph 
2 of this Article is to avoid any time gap between elections in the course 
of the National Assembly’s exercise of their powers. It is not intended 
to extend the term of office of the National Assembly Delegates 
indefinitely.291 
 
6.7.2 An Astonishing Constitutional Court Order 
 
To cope with the present situation, those first-term national 
representatives who have not been re-elected on a periodical basis shall 
cease the exercise of their powers no later than December 31, 1991. 
Among them, those who have been de facto incapable of exercising or 
constantly failed to exercise their powers shall be immediately dismissed, 
after thorough investigation, from their offices. The Central Government 
is further mandated to hold, in due course, a nationwide second-term 
election of the national representatives, in accordance with the spirit of 
the Constitution, the essence of this Interpretation and the relevant 
regulations, so that the constitutional system will function properly.292 
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This was the court order given by the Justices in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990], determining not only the legal position of the first-term legislators, but also 
burdening both the executive and legislature with compulsory constitutional obligations. 
This court order was composed of 4 decisions: 
 
1. All the ‘old legislators’ shall be dismissed no later than 31 December 1991. 
 
2. Of those ‘old legislators’, any who are de facto incompetent shall be 
dismissed immediately. 
 
3. The central government is obliged to hold a national election for second-
term legislators according to the Constitution. 
 
4. If holding new election is incompatible with the Constitution, the Judicial 
Yuan orders the National Assembly to amend the Constitution. 
 
The court order amending the Constitution is not easily separated from the context of 
the decision of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] because it is an implied legal 
obligation phrased in implied wordings, which is a very common judicial approach in 
Taiwan. As a matter of fact, there was no possibility of holding ‘a nationwide second-
term election of the national representatives’293 without constitutional amendment, 
which meant that holding an election ‘in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution, 
the essence of this Interpretation and the relevant regulations’294 implied a court order 
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amending the Constitution in order to make sure ‘the constitutional system will function 
properly’.295 Nigel N.T. Li commented: 
 
According to the reasoning of [this Interpretation], the so-called 
‘nationwide second-term election of national representatives’ refers to 
the ‘election […] [held only] within the Free Area [of the ROC]’ […] 
and this [Judicial Yuan] Interpretation de facto terminates Mainland 
Chinese representation [...]296 (Li, 1991: 158) 
 
6.7.3 The Only Dissenting Opinion 
 
The only dissenting opinion was submitted by Justice Lee Chih-Peng, who put forward 
a procedural dissent that the deadline of dismissal of the first-term legislators, 31 
December 1991, was improper because there was no guarantee that the second-term 
legislators would be able to assume power before this deadline of dismissal: 
 
The central government, based on the Constitution, by considering the 
present national conditions, shall enact the Act of Election and Recall 
Concerning the National Representatives before Reunification as 
quickly as possible, without being bound by the quotas provided by 
Articles 26, 64 and 91 of the Constitution, and the second-term national 
representatives shall be elected with all deliberate haste.297 
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The [original] and supplementary first-term national representatives, 
including members of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and 
the Control Yuan, shall be dismissed one day before the date that the 
second-term national representatives report for duty. Moreover, of those 
the first-term national representatives, anyone with more than 50% 
absence record from the conferences in a session shall be dismissed 
immediately.298 
 
This was a mock-decision written by Justice Lee Chih-Peng, which formed his 
dissenting opinion in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. By reading his 
dissenting opinion, it is not difficult to identify Justice Lee’s worry – he was not sure 
whether the second-term legislators would be able to replace the first-term legislators 
in time. Whilst there was no doubt that Justice Lee supported the majority opinion, he 
was strongly opposed to the fixed deadline of 31 December 1991. 
 
Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng repeatedly explained why this fixed deadline must be 
maintained. According to Nigel N.T. Li he said: 
 
In terms of the fact that the Judicial Yuan was ordered to dismiss the 
congress with a fixed deadline, Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng repeatedly 
explained the legal reasoning behind the Judicial Yuan’s decision in his 
personal speeches. Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng said that the Judicial 
Yuan’s constitutional court order for the dismissal of congress before 31 
December 1991 was an ‘executive method’ designed to force the 
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decision of the Judicial Yuan into effect […]299 (Interview with Li on 
17-JUN-2013) 
 
Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng’s interpretation is certainly well-considered. It seems 
that the Judicial Yuan was challenging the government and congress by providing a 
deadline for the dissolution of congress in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
This meant that political pressure from public opinion would be transferred towards the 
government and the congress, which meant that either the government or the congress 
would experience an even tougher political crisis if the decision was infringed, 
regardless of the terms of the breach. 
 
6.8 RESPONSES 
 
The responses to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] can be evaluated by 
examining Taiwan’s political and social responses thereafter. Political responses refer 
to the reactions of pertinent political interest groups in Taiwan after the decision was 
made, as well as social responses referring to comments on the decision and specific 
support given by society afterwards (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15). 
 
6.8.1 Political Responses 
 
Political academics worldwide appreciated the role of Taiwan’s political elites in the 
process of democratisation (Fell, 2012: 29-42). However, many of them overestimate 
the importance of the 1990 National Affairs Conference to the detriment of the 
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contribution of the Judicial Yuan. For example, Joseph Wong argued: 
 
In June 1990, he [President Lee Teng-Hui] convened the National 
Affairs Conference (NAC), where political elites from the ruling and 
opposition parties drew up a blueprint for constitutional reform. 
Moderate factions from both parties forged a consensus on several 
important reform measures, including the forced retirement of life-
tenured parliamentarians […] (Wong, 2004: 75-76) 
 
There is no doubt that the 1990 National Affairs Conference was crucial to Taiwan’s 
democratisation; however, the role of the Conference should be considered carefully 
within the chronological order of Taiwan’s democratisation (Su, 1994: 4). The judicial 
decision for democratisation was promulgated on 21 June 1990, a week before the 
National Affairs Conference was held. Even though the Conference aimed at 
democratisation for Taiwan, it certainly did not fire the first shot, as Nigel N.T. Li recalls: 
 
I certainly had no idea about what the motives of the Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan were to make such a decision as Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990]. However, as one of the participants of the 
1990 National Affairs Conference, I can confirm to you that all the 
participants at the Conference at the time, when they were told about 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], regardless of their political 
affiliations, were all surprised and excited, and appreciated what the 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan had done.300 (Interview with Li on 17-
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JUN-2013) 
 
The memory of the then Justice Wu Geng is even more detailed: 
 
During [my entire] 18-year Justice career, I was almost impeached twice 
[by the Control Yuan]. As well as the one I mentioned, the other 
impeachment was due to the decision of the ‘old’ congress via Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. However, I was not particularly 
afraid of being impeached at the time, [because they] attempted to 
impeach 13 [out of 15] Justices [who supported the congress dismissal 
positively] […]301 (Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-2004) 
 
In fact, the political responses to the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] were 
polarised. The politicians who sought democratisation for Taiwan were ‘all surprised 
and excited, and appreciated what the Justices of the Judicial Yuan had done’ (Interview 
with Li on 17-JUN-2013). However, the politicians who held a more conservative 
opinion sought political retaliation against the Justices (Interview with Wu on 19-OCT-
2004). The polarised political responses demonstrated the importance of this 
interpretation. 
 
6.8.2 Social Responses 
 
It was fairly obvious that Taiwan’s public opinion would appreciate the decision of 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], considering the previous demonstration of 
                                                     
301 Author’s Translation. 
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public support for democratisation. However, after 25 years on from 1990, this thesis 
intends to re-examine how this case has been recorded in order to evaluate the weight 
of this specific case by examining the social responses. 
 
An undergraduate textbook entitled ‘History of Taiwan’ written by Taiwan’s own 
historians commented: 
 
After the Supplementary Election of the Legislative Yuan in 1989, the 
senior congressmen [old legislators] still held more than half the seats, 
and the situation in the National Assembly was even worse. The 
situation triggered an intense discontent across the entire nation. […] 
Finally, via the decision of the Justices of the Judicial Yuan, the deadline 
of dismissal, 31 December 1991, was given to the first-term national 
representatives, and so the reform of the national-level legislators was 
ultimately accomplished.302 (Lee, 2009b: 283) 
 
Congressman Chen Shui-Bian, the most important promoter of Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990], as well as the first democratic President of the ROC 
(2000-2008), evaluated the political weight of this case in his autobiography as a 
participant, and he concluded: 
 
In order to terminate the political actuality of an indefinite congress, [we] 
must think outside the box and map out [our] strategy at a constitutional 
litigation level. [...] On 21 June 1990, when I heard that the case had 
                                                     
302 Author’s Translation. 
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been approved, I was pleasantly surprised. If there had beem no Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], there would be no complete re-
election of the congress, and there would be no democratic innovation 
or advancement even now.303 (Chen, 2000: 78) 
 
Justice Tung Hsiang-Fei was a national representative of the National Assembly who 
participated in the enactment of the upcoming constitutional amendments.304 He also 
wrote his own account of social responses to Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990]: 
 
The 1990s was [not only] an epoch of challenges but also the most 
convulsive era in the history of our nation’s constitutionalism. […] The 
guardians of the constitution, namely the Justices, promulgated Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] on 21 June 1990, the eve of the 
convocation of the National Affairs Conference, in response to the 
announced issue of the termination of office of national representatives 
on time […] the Justices’ historical declaration freed up the convoluted 
circumstances relating to the issue of the term of office of the old 
national representatives for decades, and terminated a series of 
misconstructions over the issues of the indefinite congress and 
legislative legitimacy. [Moreover, the Justices] completely reconstructed 
the genuine constitutionalism of [this] nation.305 (Tung, 2005: 24) 
 
                                                     
303 Author’s Translation. 
304 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1991). 
305 Author’s Translation. 
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6.9 JUDICIAL SELF-INTEREST 
 
The most common pattern of judicial power expansion in the West occurs when Justices 
decide strategically, considering their own judicial self-interest (Smith, 1995: 1-13) in 
order to secure or expand their influence over the political system. Such a pattern, 
however, would likely be incompatible within Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990] because the court’s political influence was suddenly and dramatically amplified, 
although they made no strategic decision at all. 
 
6.9.1 Did Justices Decide Strategically? 
 
The answer to whether the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was decided 
strategically or not is surprising – all the related evidence leads to a negative conclusion: 
 
[T]he issue of indefinite congress must be solved at some time or other, 
so the Judicial Yuan was not able to sit idly by indefinitely. [I think that 
people from] your generation should have heard exactly what happened 
[in those days]: it was questionable whether those old national 
representatives represented the public opinion of the time, despite the 
fact that they were still [physically] capable of exercising power? They 
were all elected from the Chinese mainland. Besides, how could a 
representative elected 40 years ago reflect public opinion now? For this 
reason, we – the majority of the fifth-term Justices – held that [our] 
nation must have [constitutional and political] innovation.306 (Interview 
                                                     
306 Author’s Translation. 
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with Ma on 19-JUL-2013) 
 
Justice Herbert H.P. Ma was not the only Justice to mention the common consensus 
amongst the Justices, proving that the decision of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.261 [1990] was mostly a sincere decision. Justice Yang Yu-Ling recalled an 
unsuccessful ‘political intervention’ during the decision-making process, explaining the 
difference between political belief (sincere decision) and political intervention 
(strategic decision): 
 
The Constitution, after all, is a creation of politics, so it would be wrong 
to conclude that the Justices were not political. However, [a Justice] 
being political does not mean politics will interfere with his duties – as 
far as I know, [I experienced] no political interference [in general]. If 
there was any political interference [during my career], it would have 
been Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], [namely] the case of 
the dismissal of the indefinite congress for complete re-election. Despite 
that, I think the political interference did not come from the government. 
Frankly speaking, the deadline for the dismissal of congress for re-
election was originally planned to be 24 months. However, the then 
democratic congressmen interfered in [the decision] because they 
wished to expel these ‘old thieves’ immediately, [or at least] within 12 
months. Finally, an 18 months deadline was placed by the Judicial 
Yuan’s Interpretation because [all] the relevant laws must be amended 
before the deadline, and re-elections needed to be held too. 307 
                                                     
307 Author’s Translation. 
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(Interview with Yang on 26-NOV-2002) 
 
According to Justice Yang Yu-Ling, the only strategic decision308 in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990] was the shortening of the deadline of the indefinite 
congress dismissal from 24 to 18 months, whereas the main decision was sustained: 
 
It was a common consensus that the ‘old legislators’ should be dismissed 
at the time; however, the ‘old legislators’ misjudged and held that the 
Justices would not dare to make a detrimental decision against them. The 
outcome [for sure] ‘pissed the old legislators off’, and they attempted to 
reverse the situation by impeaching the Justices through the Control 
Yuan.309 (ibid) 
 
6.9.2 Did Judicial Power Expand Thereafter? 
 
In 1998 Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng published an article to mark the 50-year 
anniversary of the establishment of the Justices, retracing the political roles of the 
Justices through specific cases in every decade, and his comment on Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990] was: 
 
In 1990 the Justices promulgated Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] 
[…] which constructed the constitutional legal grounds for the upcoming re-
                                                     
308 This thesis argues that the political intervention from the democrats was only a message (or pressure) 
to remind the Justices about public opinion under the democrats’ view. The Justices did not surrender 
to the democratic idea of political intervention (deadline: immediately or no more than 12 months). 
However, they revised their original deadline because of political intervention. Therefore, it is hard to 
define whether or not this was a genuine strategic decision. 
309 Author’s Translation. 
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elections of the national representatives, [thus] opening the door for Taiwan’s 
[political] innovations in democratic constitutionalism. 
 
The number of highly politicised cases did not reduce because of 
democratisation due to the termination of the authoritarian rule. In fact, due 
to the Justices’ contribution to Taiwan’s democratisation via Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990], there were more and more highly political cases 
[claiming to be] constitutional controversies appealing to [the Judicial 
Yuan].310 (Weng, 1998: 310-311) 
 
Nigel N.T. Li can be considered Taiwan’s most successful barrister in the field of 
constitutional litigation. He is undoubtedly one of the leading legal professionals, and 
is well experienced in monitoring Taiwan’s constitutional judicial behaviour. His 
opinion as to whether the Justices captured more political power via the decision of the 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was: 
 
I agree that you think the Justices of the Judicial Yuan are [also] a 
[political] beneficiary of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
However, that is because the Judicial Yuan allowed the entire country to 
believe that constitutional litigation is the best option for resolving 
political controversies. Moreover, the reason why the Judicial Yuan is 
capable of playing such a role is because its constitutional legal 
decisions are usually theoretical brilliant level, as well as compatible 
with the spirit of the Constitution. So the Judicial Yuan’s political 
                                                     
310 Author’s Translation. 
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credibility is created and reinforced because the entire nation is satisfied 
[with their decisions].311 (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
The story of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] exactly 
demonstrates that Western thoughts, on a theoretical basis of power and 
interest, may not be an appropriate way of explaining our nation’s 
[judicial behaviour]. Deciding the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990] would have been the worst strategy of the fifth-term Justices, if 
they had been attempting to reinforce their own political interests. Their 
best approach was to do nothing but to wait until the final political 
resolution was made as a reflection of political reality. The then 
Nationalist Party controlled the Republic of China for more than 60 
years, and their power within the government was deep-rooted, so how 
dare these 15 Justices challenge the Nationalist Party [if they thought 
about political interests]? According to Western power theories, who 
would agree that a judiciary’s brave challenge against a 60-year-
authoritarian rule was a very wise political decision?312 (ibid) 
 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
 
[T]his [old lady’s behaviour] reveals that the job a Justice [or judge] is 
doing, from the perspective of [our] citizens, is authorised by and on 
behalf of God, so [she] begs for a just judicial decision. As long as [you 
are] a judge, [you are] obliged to contribute [your knowledge] sincerely. 
                                                     
311 Author’s Translation. 
312 Author’s Translation. 
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[…] Being a judge, [you] must dedicate [your life to society] […]313 
(Interview with Sun on 28-NOV-2004) 
 
Justice Sun Sen-Yan encouraged the next generation of Justices and judges by sharing 
his opinion of the moral tradition of the ROC judiciary, showing how and why an 
‘unbelievably’ sincere decision was made by the Justices in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.261 [1990]. The fifth-term Justices in 1990 did what they thought to be just without 
any extra considerations. This meant that they did not realise their just decision in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] could play to their own judicial self-interest, 
as Nigel N.T. Li’s commented: 
 
The Justices of the Judicial Yuan later found themselves becoming the 
arbitrators of political controversies in the Republic of China, which was 
probably an outcome beyond their expectations or their original 
intentions when they decided Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 
[1990]. [However], I believe that every jurist in our country would have 
attempted to find a path towards [our] nation’s constitutionalism at that 
moment; [thus], whoever was the fifth-term Justice, the decision of the 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] would be the same. 314 
(Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] was a victory for sincere decision-making, 
manifesting not only the moral belief that justice shall triumph over evil, but also 
affirming Taiwanese aphorism that ‘God blesses [only] the honest and straightforward 
                                                     
313 Author’s Translation. 
314 Author’s Translation. 
262 
 
people’. However, this thesis does not hold Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] 
to be an example that contradicts judicial power expansion theories in the West; indeed, 
it is an extraordinary example that can only improve Western theories – Judges may 
decide strategically; however, making a sincere decision, in some circumstances, is 
actually the best judicial strategy, even though judges may not be aware of that. 
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7: JUDICIAL POWER EXPANSION THROUGH 
ADVISORY OPINIONS AND STATE ORGAN CASES 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Chapter 7 illustrates the new role of the Judicial Yuan that opened up after the 
promulgation of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], transforming it from ‘a 
constitutional court that served an authoritarian regime’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 106) into an 
assertive political actor in favour of democratisation during the Nationalist 
Government’s political crisis. Throughout this period, the fifteen Justices not only 
demonstrated their assertiveness but also showed their skill and capacity for playing a 
crucial role in the realm of mega-politics (Hirschl, 2004: 71-108). Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990] signalled to all other actors in Taiwan – interest groups, 
opposition politicians and citizens – that constitutional litigation was now a new 
mechanism for political action. The data-sets compiled for this chapter illustrate the 
dramatic rise in constitutional litigation in relation to political controversies. Meanwhile, 
the increasing number of state organ disputes that needed to be resolved through judicial 
intervention pushed the Judicial Yuan towards the centre of Taiwanese politics and fed 
directly into the process of judicial power expansion (judicialisation of politics). 
 
According to Article 173 of the Constitution, the authority of the Judicial Yuan in 
constitutional matters is absolute, and all of the court’s decisions enjoy binding force 
with immediate legal effect. In other words, whether state organs’ litigations or 
governmental requests for advisory opinions come before the court, the Justices’ orders 
must be unconditionally complied with. Given this institutional design, any state organ 
that approaches the Judicial Yuan admits deference in general and encourages the 
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Justices to exercise the power of the last word in particular cases. The increasing 
frequency of state organ cases provides the quantitative basis for Chapter 7, whilst the 
increasing importance and politicisation of the matters brought before the court is 
explored from a qualitative angle. 
 
There is no denying that the Judicial Yuan carried more and more weight in politics, 
whilst state organs’ litigations and governmental requests for advisory opinions became 
logical options for solving political controversies in the 1990s. Since the promulgation 
of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] the Judicial Yuan was seen by the public 
as a populist institution that would protect democracy from autocracy, and the Justices 
enjoyed the constitutional power of the last word without intervention accordingly. In 
contrast to the Judicial Yuan pre-1990, the Justices projected a confident image of being 
capable of judging political controversies because they were capable of ‘making present 
again’ (Pitkin, 1967: 209) through judicial decision-making. Hence, the second of the 
four ‘but for’ causations embodied in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3.3) reminds 
us of the power of judicial assertiveness in Taiwan – If there was no strong public 
support for the Judicial Yuan (Hoekstra, 2003: 12-15), the Justices would have used the 
opportunity for judicial power expansion in a different way. 
 
American scholars such as Segal and Spaeth have no doubt that elected judges will be 
influenced by public opinion, but whether public opinion influences appointed judges 
or not remains to be seen (Segal and Spaeth, 2002: 427). However, the Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan in the 1990s – along with public opinion – broke through the barrier of 
appointed judges by challenging them and even successfully dissolving their 
appointments in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. This crucial historical 
event thus changed the political character of the Justices. They were no longer 
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appointed judges; instead they became elected judges, and their judicial power 
expansion was based upon public support. In reality, this meant that democracy could 
not be consolidated simply by the fall of the authoritarian regime, and freedom can only 
be safeguarded until genuine rule of law is restored. None of these can be done 
immediately, and people expected the Justices to be the guardians of the constitution at 
all times (Sze and Tsai, 2007: 699-700). 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the Judicial Yuan decided a total of 58 state organ cases. Out of 
these, 19 were coded as advisory opinions and 39 were constitutional litigation cases 
with a state organ as both appellant and respondent. Due to the involvement of apex 
political institutions, all these cases play a special role in this thesis. They form a group, 
complementing each other in terms of appellant type, namely litigation between 
branches of government. Together, these 58 cases provide strong quantitative and 
qualitative evidence of Taiwan’s judicial power expansion, and open a window into the 
Judicial Yuan’s decision-making process. 
 
Chapter 7 begins by categorising the 58 cases under three headings: 315  Firstly, 
separation of powers games, or inter-branch governmental conflicts, for example when 
the legislature litigates to force a minister to reveal the contents of a report; secondly 
intra-branch conflicts, for example, members of a legislature litigate in relation to a 
legislative procedure, and thirdly non-partisan cases which are mostly (although not 
limited to) technical or procedural legal details that are completely unrelated to the 
political agenda. 
                                                     
315 In Taiwan, both constitutional litigation and requisition for advisory opinion are counted as judicial 
reviews and are reported in the same series of Judicial Yuan case law reports, as Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation plus a numeric identifier. 
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As far as separation of powers games are concerned, the Judicial Yuan acts as the most 
important political mediator. The quantitative and qualitative approaches of this chapter 
illustrate how complex political conflicts between different state organs were resolved 
through constitutional litigation. Moreover, the Judicial Yuan played a crucial role in 
the resolution of intra-branch conflicts, in which competing factions within the 
legislative body had been unable to resolve between themselves. The Judicial Yuan was 
even approached for the resolution of non-partisan cases, such as a state organ’s 
requisition for advisory opinion simply because the appellate organ did not know what 
to do next. collectively, these cases not only reveal the expansion of judicial power after 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], but also display the Justices’ capacity for 
strategic decision-making in the context of separated powers. 
 
7.2 THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIAL YUAN IN STATE ORGAN LITIGATION 
 
Whilst more litigants brought more and more cases to the Judicial Yuan after 1990316 
(Weng, 1998: 310-311), the number of judicial reviews requested by state organs also 
increased, providing the first quantitative evidence. In addition, the nature of the issues 
that the Judicial Yuan was meant to address through the judicial review mechanism also 
changed, pushing the court into the realm of mega-politics (Hirschl, 2004: 71-108). 
State organs and individuals were coming to rely on the Judicial Yuan’s judicial review 
for settling contentious political controversies.317 
                                                     
316 See Tables 5.9 and 5.10 on pages 180 and 181. 
317 Basic game theory (McCarty and Meirowitz, 2007: 1-26) explains how power is balanced and 
imbalanced between separated branches. When different government organs or legislators fight a case 
in the Judicial Yuan, they all have a preferred outcome. As the Justices usually have the final word in 
state organ litigation – it is practically almost impossible to override via constitutional amendment – 
judicial review in such cases is, by nature, an exercise of power (Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, 
2004: 45). 
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As in other countries, various types of constitutional litigation can be distinguished, 
even if at first sight the abstract and general nature of the ROC Constitution leaves 
questions of process and locus standi entirely open: 
 
The Judicial Yuan shall interpret the Constitution and shall have the 
power to unify the interpretation of laws and orders.318 
 
Laws that are in conflict with the Constitution shall be null and void. 
When doubt arises as to whether or not a law is in conflict with the 
Constitution, interpretation thereon shall be made by the Judicial 
Yuan.319 
 
Due to the abstract nature of the Chinese language, particularly in its official and form, 
Articles 78 and 171 may seem to be mere principles, but in combination with the 
Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act, 1948/1993 320  they actually form the 
concrete legal basis for constitutional litigation practice: 
 
1. Article 171 stipulates that the Constitution is supreme and anyone who 
doubts its constitutionality shall request an interpretation which can only be 
made by the Judicial Yuan. 
                                                     
318 Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947) (Official Translation). 
319 Constitution of R.O.C. § 171 (1947) (Official Translation). 
320 The amendment of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act in 1993 reveals the expansion of 
judicial power. After the Constitution was amended in accordance with the Judicial Yuan’s order, the 
aforementioned Act was also amended, by which the Judicial Yuan’s review power was largely 
expanded, along with a lower quorum level – from three-fourths to make up a majority to two-thirds 
votes (ROC Judicial Yuan, 1998: 36-42). See also Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 14 
(1948/93). 
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2. Article 78 stipulates that the Judicial Yuan is the only state organ that has 
the ultimate power to interpret laws and orders. 
 
3. Linguistically,321 both Articles stipulate that the Constitution, the acts of the 
Legislative Yuan (laws) and the executive actions (orders) are all what the 
Judicial Yuan say they are. Hence the compulsory nature of Judicial Yuan’s 
advisory opinions is not even up for debate. The moment a request for 
judicial interpretation is made, the Justices’ orders are ‘binding upon every 
institution and person in the country, and each institution shall abide by the 
meaning of these interpretations in handling relevant matters322’.323 
 
In Taiwan, an advisory opinion requested by a state organ can be ex ante or ex post. For 
example, the Justices were asked for guidance ex ante in relation to the amendment of 
Civil Code in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.365 [1994] and the proper procedures for 
enactment of the laws ex post in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.342 [1994]. The 
distinction of advisory opinions in Taiwan between ex ante and ex post is therefore 
irrelevant, but the distinction between an event which cannot be agreed upon within a 
state organ (intra-branch conflict) and a requisition based on an agreement of a state 
organ (non-partisan case) is crucial, because the former is appealed in accordance with 
                                                     
321 Almost paraphrasing Justice Hughes’ comment that ‘the constitution is what the judges say it is’. 
322 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984] (Official Translation). 
323 Chien-Liang Lee further sub-categorises Taiwan’s state organ litigation into authority disputes (Lee, 
2010: 86, 97-100) and ‘doubt interpretation’ (ibid: 87-89, 100-103); at the same time Lee merges the 
‘litigation between government organs’ (ibid: 86) and the ‘interpretation initiated by one-third of the 
Legislators or more’ (ibid: 99) into the same category. As far as this thesis is concerned, what matters 
first and foremost is not the subject of litigation but the identity of appellant and respondent to identify 
all ‘separation of powers games’ that lead to judicial interventions, no matter if the latter ‘advisory 
opinions’ or ‘intra-branch conflicts’. 
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Article 5I(3) of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act 1948/93, and the latter 
is requested on the basis of Article 5I(1)324: 
 
The grounds on which the petitions for interpretation of the Constitution 
may be made are as follows: 
 
1. When a government agency, in carrying out its function and duty, has 
doubt about the meanings of a constitutional provision; or, when a 
government agency disputes with other agencies in the application of a 
constitutional provision; or, when a government agency has questions 
on the constitutionality of a statute or regulation at issue; 
 
3. When one-third of the Legislators or more have doubt about the 
meanings of a constitutional provision governing their functions and 
duties, or question on the constitutionality of a statute at issue, and have 
therefor initiated a petition.325 
 
7.3 STATISTICAL INSIGHTS 
 
During the time period 1990-1999, 58 out of a total of 249 cases (23.29%) were 
constitutional judicial review cases in which both appellant and respondent (if 
applicable, some cases had no respondents) were state organs, and these 58 cases could 
be categorised into three classifications: ⑴ Separation of powers games, ⑵ Intra-
                                                     
324 This thesis does not apply Lee’s categorisation for a variety of reasons. It is illogical to categorise 
separation of powers games and intra-branch conflicts as authority disputes because the grounds of 
requisition for judicial review are categorised differently by the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure 
Act 1948/1993. 
325 Act of Constitutional Interpretation Procedure § 5 (1948/93) (Official Translation). 
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branch conflicts, and ⑶ Non-partisan cases. 
 
7.3.1 Separation of Powers Games 
 
This chapter sees separation of powers games as constitutional litigation cases being 
appealed to the Judicial Yuan which involve political controversies (Mason and 
Stephenson, 2009: 49-50). These cases occurred between state organs in terms of 
allegations of unconstitutionality by the appellant organ, seeking a judicial decision that 
could constitutionally force the respondent organ to back down from its original 
position. The virtue of studying the separation of powers games in the realm of 
constitutional politics is therefore to observe the genuine interactions between state 
powers via statistics (case-coding), evaluating a state organ’s political influence as it 
waxes and wanes (Clark, 2011: 159-206). In this way, a nation’s true separation of 
powers structure can be found. This means that knowing the appellant organ in a 
specific case represents a way of identifying the weaker power, and by knowing the 
respondent organ, the identity of the stronger power is uncovered. So by calculating the 
numbers of appellants and respondents via case-coding, the real political balance of 
powers will be disclosed by studying the statistics. 
 
7.1 Number of Separation of Powers Games, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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From 1990 to 1999, 39 of a total of 249 constitutional judicial reviews fell within the 
ambit of separation of powers games, and surprisingly the legislatures in Taiwan acted 
as the appellants within 32 (82.05%) of these cases, including the Legislative Yuan (25 
cases), the City Councils of Taipei (5 cases) and Kaohsiung (1 case), as well as the 
Taiwan Provincial Assembly (1 case). The Legislative Yuan was not only the champion 
of all the appellants (64.10%); in contrast to the Executive Yuan’s figure (4 cases, 
10.26%). It appears that the Legislative Yuan was always the underdog in the separation 
of powers games, bringing 16 cases to the Judicial Yuan against the Executive Yuan, as 
well as 2 cases against the President. 
 
Statistics covering the respondents also confirm the political situation of the Legislative 
Yuan. The administrations in Taiwan played respondent roles in 24 (61.54%) cases, 
including the Executive Yuan (18 cases), the City Government of Taipei (4 cases) and 
the President (2 cases). In contrast to the figures on the appellants, the Executive Yuan 
was filed 16 out of 18 (88.89%) lawsuits by the Legislative Yuan, along with the 
President who was sued twice, both times by the Legislative Yuan. A glance at the 
separation of powers games in Taiwan between 1990 and 1999 easily reveals that the 
Legislative Yuan was the main political underdog, fighting the Executive Yuan (16 out 
of 25 cases: 64.00%) and the President (2 out of 25 cases: 8.00%) through constitutional 
litigation. 
 
7.3.2 Advisory Opinions: Intra-branch Conflicts 
 
This thesis considers constitutional litigation in relation to the legislature’s internal 
conflicts to resolve stalemate between political parties as intra-branch conflicts. The 
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legislature appeals to the Judicial Yuan for an advisory opinion in order to subdue 
contention through judicial means, seeking advice. However, this is more about 
political strategies – when a legislature appeals to the Judicial Yuan for constitutionality, 
they blame their colleagues from the opposite parties for acting unconstitutionally, 
thereby requesting an injunction that will force the opposition to surrender. 
 
7.2 Number of Intra-branch Conflicts, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
7.3 List of Intra-branch Conflicts Cases, 1990-1999 
Year Case Number Appellant 
1990 No.254 National Assembly 
1991 No.283 Legislative Yuan 
1993 No.314 National Assembly 
1994 No.342 Legislative Yuan 
1995 No.381 National Assembly 
No.391 Legislative Yuan 
1996 No.401 Legislative Yuan 
1998 No.467 Legislative Yuan 
1999 No.485 Legislative Yuan 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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From 1990 to 1999, 9 out of a total of 249 cases could be categorised as intra-branch 
conflicts, including 6 cases appealed by the Legislative Yuan and 3 cases appealed by 
the National Assembly. Even though 9 cases are a fairly small number, the total is still 
importance because it means that the Judicial Yuan was involved in the legislative intra-
branch conflicts almost once per year, replacing the original resolutions with advisory 
opinions, thus becoming the genuine decision maker through judicial means, and 
defying legislative autonomy in the process. 
 
7.3.3 Advisory Opinions: Non-partisan Cases 
 
There were 10 advisory opinions requested beyond the realm of political controversies 
in the 1990s – 1 case per year on average. This thesis defines these cases as non-partisan 
cases. However, it is important to study these non-partisan cases because they are still 
political. If a state organ appeals to the Judicial Yuan for any of its legal and 
constitutional functions, asking the Justices whether its use of power is constitutional 
or not, this implies that the appellant state organ considers the Judicial Yuan as the 
ultimate constitutional authority within Taiwan’s political system. 
 
7.4 Number of Non-partisan Cases, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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7.5 List of Non-partisan Cases, 1990-1999 
Year Case Number Appellant 
1990 No.258 Kaohsiung City Council 
No.259 Taipei City Council 
No.260 Taiwan Provincial Assembly 
No.262 Control Yuan 
1991 No.278 Examination Yuan 
1992 No.298 Judicial Yuan 
No.308 Executive Yuan 
1994 No.365 Legislative Yuan 
1998 No.466 Examination Yuan 
No.470 President 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The list of the appellant state organs illustrates the Judicial Yuan’s political importance 
particularly well – all of Taiwan’s Pentapartite powers requested at least one non-
partisan advisory opinion in the 1990s, including the President (1 case), the Executive 
Yuan (1 case), the Legislative Yuan (1 case), the Judicial Yuan (1 case), the Examination 
Yuan (2 cases) and the Control Yuan (1 case). 
 
7.4 SEPARATION OF POWERS GAMES 
 
Between 1990 and 1999 the separation of powers games in Taiwan was composed of 
multiple political players from across the nation, including the President, the National 
Assembly and all the Pentapartite powers, as well as the local governments and 
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legislatures. The results of the separation of powers games can be analysed through 
case-coding. From this we can see that the Legislative and Executive Yuans played the 
most important roles in these games, not only because of the total of lawsuits from the 
two Yuan(s) combined represented the largest proportion of cases, but also because the 
strategic decisions made by Judicial Yuan sought to ‘mould’ the two powers silently. 
 
7.4.1 The Legislative Yuan 
 
Between 1990 and 1999, the Legislative Yuan being as the appellant state organ in 
Taiwan’s separation of powers games, set a record of 12 approvals, 9 dismissals, 3 
partial approvals and 1 political-question dismissal, as well as 2 wins and 9 losses whilst 
being the respondent. The Legislative Yuan, in sum, was involved in 30 out of 39 
separation of powers games (25 appellants and 5 respondents, 76.92%), and set a record 
of 14 wins (46.67%), 12 losses (40.00%) and 3 draws (10%). 
 
7.6 The Legislative Yuan’s Records over the Separation of Powers Games, 1990-1999 
TOTAL 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 12 9 3 1 
Respondent 2 3 0 0 
against THE PRESIDENT 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 1 1 0 0 
against THE EXECUTIVE YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 9 6 0 1 
Respondent 0 1 0 0 
against THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 1 0 1 0 
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against THE EXAMINATION YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Respondent 0 1 0 0 
against THE CONTROL YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 0 0 1 0 
Respondent 1 0 0 0 
against TAIWAN PROVINCIAL ASSEMBLY 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Respondent 0 1 0 0 
against KAOHSIUNG CITY COUNCIL 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Respondent 1 0 0 0 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
It is obvious that the Executive Yuan was the Legislative Yuan’s most important 
political competitor. The Legislative Yuan appealed against the Executive Yuan on 16 
different occasions, with a record of 9 approvals, 6 dismissals and 1 political-question 
dismissal. Conversely, the Executive Yuan appealed against the Legislative Yuan only 
once, winning the case. The second most important political competitor to the 
Legislative Yuan was the National Assembly. The Legislative Yuan appealed against 
the National Assembly for 4 times, with a record of 2 approvals, 1 dismissal and 1 
partial approval. From 1990 to 1999, the Legislative Yuan actually filed separation of 
powers games against all the other 4 Pentapartite powers in Taiwan, as well as the 
President and the National Assembly; however, no one played as important a role as the 
Executive Yuan. 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.461 [1998] 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.461 [1998] was a typical separation of powers game 
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between the Legislative Yuan and the Ministry of National Defense (Executive Yuan), 
regarding whether or not the Chief of the General Staff was obliged to be interrogated 
by the legislators. Ordinarily the Chief of the General Staff claimed to be the President’s 
chief staff member in the military, which meant that he was not obliged to be 
interrogated by the legislators because the Constitution and its amendments imposed no 
such an obligation upon the President.326 
 
The Chief of the General Staff represented the separation between military command 
and administration, a Prussian doctrine that the Republican Army had adopted for more 
than seven decades. He claimed that he was not one of the Ministers of the Executive 
Yuan and therefore had no obligation to be interrogated by the Legislative Yuan in 
accordance with the new constitutional amendments.327 The Legislative Yuan, however, 
held that the Chief of the General Staff should be a Minister of the Executive Yuan, 
even though the Legislative Yuan was aware that the Constitution and its amendments 
embodied no such regulation.328 The Legislative Yuan therefore petitioned the Judicial 
Yuan for constitutionality, claiming that the legislators’ demand for the power to 
interrogate the Chief of the General Staff should, according to the genuine spirit of 
democracy, be the Legislative Yuan’s as of right. The Judicial Yuan should therefore 
support the Legislative Yuan, imposing such an obligation upon the Chief of the General 
Staff. The Judicial Yuan held: 
 
Article 3, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph 1, of the Amendment to the 
Constitution, promulgated on July 21, 1997, provides that the Executive 
                                                     
326 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.461 App’x [1998]. 
327 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. § 3I (1997). 
328 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.461 App’x [1998]. 
278 
 
Yuan has the duty to present to the Legislative Yuan a statement on its 
administrative policies and a report on its administration, while the 
Legislators may interpellate, during the sessions, the Premier and the 
heads of ministries and other agencies under the Executive Yuan. […] 
Since the Ministry […] is in charge of affairs concerning national 
defense, the Legislators may interpellate […] the Minister of National 
Defense on the policy statements and administrative reports involving 
the issues of national defense. The Chief of the General Staff, who is the 
chief staff member for, and reports directly to, the Minister of National 
Defense in the administrative system, is not a head of ministry under the 
Constitution. Therefore, the above provision does not apply.329 
 
The Chief of the General Staff, as the chief staff member for the Minister 
of National Defense, is in charge of important affairs concerning 
national defense, including the compilation and execution of budgets. 
Such powers and duties are closely related to the jurisdiction of the 
Legislative Yuan. Accordingly, the Chief of the General Staff is a 
government official under Article 67, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution, 
who may not reject the invitation to be present at the committee meetings 
unless there is a justifiable reason that relates to the execution of military 
activities concerning national security. Nevertheless, the Chief of the 
General Staff does not have to answer questions involving important 
national defense intelligence.330 
 
                                                     
329 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.461 [1998] (Official Translation). 
330 Id. (Official Translation). 
279 
 
The importance of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.461 [1998] is that it shows that the 
Judicial Yuan can not only impose a constitutional obligation upon the Chief of General 
Staff, which is beyond the Constitution’s original blueprint. This also demonstrates its 
political and constitutional power in Taiwanese politics. The Justices were like law 
school professors, lecturing the legislators that: 
 
We the Justices do agree with you the legislators that the Chief of the General 
Staff should be interrogated; however, the constitutional article that you the 
legislators applied is wrong. Let us teach you what the correct article is. 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.435 [1997] 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.435 [1997] was another example of Taiwan’s 
separation of powers games between the Legislative Yuan and the Judicial Yuan 
(primarily, although the Ministry of Justice and the Executive Yuan were also involved), 
concerning the extent of legislative privilege. The Legislative Yuan challenged the 
Judicial Yuan to confirm that legislative privilege was embodied in the Constitution331 
and that privilege should therefore include all kinds of legislative conducts.332 The 
Legislative Yuan also demanded that the Judicial Yuan should confirm that no legislator 
could be prosecuted (Ministry of Justice) or tried (courts) in accordance with Article 73 
of the Constitution. However, the Justices dismissed this appeal and held: 
 
To ensure that a member feels less inhibited when acting as a member, 
the boundaries of the immunity of speech conferred by the Constitution 
                                                     
331 Constitution of R.O.C. § 73 (1947). 
332 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.435 App’x [1997]. 
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should be construed as liberally as possible. Accordingly, all statements, 
questioning, motions, voting and directly related conduct made in 
sessions or committees, such as party negotiations and statements 
expressed in public hearings, should thereby be protected. However, 
conduct beyond such extent and irrelevant to the exercise of the 
member’s authority is not protected, such as the use of an intentional 
physical movement that is obviously improper to express opinions and 
that impairs others’ legally protected interests. Whether a member’s 
conduct transgresses the protective boundaries in a specific case should 
be subject to the decision of the Legislative Yuan based upon its self-
disciplinary practice in maintaining congressional order. But, for the 
purpose of maintaining the social order and protecting a victim’s rights, 
the judiciary can also exercise its authority to investigate and adjudicate 
such conduct if necessary.333 
 
The Justices’ admonition to the legislators was clear: legislative privilege would be 
secured – but this did not mean that the Judicial Yuan would tolerate any improper 
legislative conduct. 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.325 [1993] 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.325 [1993] was certainly the most symbolic of all the 
separation of powers games raised because of the promulgation of the Additional 
Articles of the Constitution 1992.334 The Legislative Yuan claimed that the Control 
                                                     
333 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.435 [1997] (Official Translation). 
334 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1992). 
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Yuan was no longer a house of congress after the Constitution was amended by the 
Additional Articles of the Constitution 1992, so the Control Yuan’s congressional power 
of investigation should be transferred to the Legislative Yuan.335 The legislators also 
complained that it was extremely irrational that the Legislative Yuan, as the genuine 
house of representatives, had no such power, considering that the original senate, the 
Control Yuan, was suspended before national reunification:336 
 
[Having the congressional power of investigation] is important because 
it is about whether the Legislative Yuan is able to play its role properly 
by fully exercising the power given by the Constitution. […] The 
superiority of the executive power is a trend that cannot be stopped, so 
it is important to confirm that the congressional power of investigation 
is the Legislative Yuan’s necessary and auxiliary legislative power.337 
 
The Justices tried to maintain the favour of both the Legislative and Control Yuan(s). 
On one hand, the Justices confirmed that the Control Yuan’s investigatory power should 
not be taken away because the Constitution and its amendments were not designed to 
do this; on the other, the Justices granted the legislators their desired congressional 
power of investigation via judicial authority and held: 
 
In addition to the National Assembly, the Constitution has established 
five Yuans to be in charge of the executive, legislative, judicial, 
examination, and control powers, all of which are the highest authorities 
                                                     
335 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.325 App’x [1993]. 
336 After the Chinese Civil War in 1949, Taiwan became only 1 out of 37 member states of the ROC, so 
the Control Yuan, as the original Senate of the ROC, was suspended and its function altered towards an 
administrative supervision organ before national reunification. 
337 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.325 App’x [1993] (Instrument of Appeal) (Author’s Translation). 
282 
 
of the country, and their respective powers are mainly delineated by the 
Constitution. This is not entirely similar to the separation-of-powers 
system adopted in other countries. The question as to which entity is the 
equivalent of a “congress” in a democratic country is not necessarily 
intrinsically related to the delineating of powers amongst the five Yuans. 
The amended provision in the Amendment has not made changes to the 
five-yuan system, nor has it enlarged the powers of the Legislative Yuan. 
Since no amendment is made to the censure and impeachment powers 
exercisable by the Control Yuan where it considers the central or local 
public servants negligent or in breach of law, the power of rectification 
which is confined to the Executive Yuan and its relevant divisions and 
the investigative power granted by Articles 95 and 96 of the Constitution 
for the exercise of the said power, such power should nevertheless be 
exercised exclusively by the Control Yuan.338 
 
In order for the Legislative Yuan to maximize its functions […] the 
legislators can be questioned or can raise questions at the meetings and 
acquire an understanding of the relevant matters from the explanations 
or opinions proffered by the persons being so questioned or the attendees 
in response to the subject matter in question. Where something is still 
not clear, they can […] request the relevant authorities to provide 
reference materials with respect to issues involved in the subject matter 
under discussion. Where necessary, the Legislative Yuan may request for 
review of the original documents so as to comply with the constitutional 
                                                     
338 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.325 [1993] (Official Translation). 
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provisions with respect to the exercise of powers by the legislators in 
meetings. The authority being so requested may not decline such request 
unless in accordance with the laws or for other justifiable reasons.339 
 
7.4.2 The Executive Yuan 
 
In contrast to the Legislative Yuan, the Executive Yuan rarely brought suits itself (4 
cases), was frequently being sued by other powers between 1990 and 1999 (18 cases). 
Of the separation of powers games involving the Executive Yuan (22 out of 39 cases: 
56.41%), the Executive Yuan made a record 10 approvals (45.45%), 11 dismissals 
(50.00%) and 1 political-question dismissal (4.55%). Moreover, the Executive Yuan as 
appellants (4 cases), only filed lawsuits against the Administrative Court (2 wins and 1 
loss) and the Legislative Yuan (1 win). This statistic illustrates the Executive Yuan’s 
attitude towards the separation of powers games, and shows that the judiciary (mainly 
the Administrative Court) was more threatening than the legislature. 
 
7.7 The Executive Yuan’s Records over the Separation of Powers Games, 1990-1999 
TOTAL 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 3 1 0 0 
Respondent 7 10 0 1 
against THE LEGISLATIVE YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 1 0 0 0 
Respondent 6 9 0 1 
against THE JUDICIAL YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Appellant 2 1 0 0 
                                                     
339 Id. (Official Translation). 
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against THE EXAMINATION YUAN 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Respondent 0 1 0 0 
against CITY COUNCILS OF TAIPEI & KEELUNG 
 Win Lose Draw Political 
Respondent 1 0 0 0 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
When reviewing the Executive Yuan’s separation of powers games, a quick glance 
might easily conclude that the Executive Yuan was politically powerful in comparison 
to the other powers, even though it was restrained quite effectively by the 
Administrative Court. The Executive Yuan mainly appealed against the Administrative 
Court (75%) and mostly responded to lawsuits conducted by the other powers. Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.307 [1992], for instance, was a typical separation of powers 
game against the Executive Yuan, brought by the City Councils of Taipei and Keelung 
together, complaining that the Executive Yuan budgeted for their metropolitan police, 
which amounted to an unconstitutional administration.340 The Justices concluded that: 
 
For the matters over which the central government delegates the power 
of administration to the provincial or hsien governments, the central 
government shall cover such matters in its own budget according to the 
legal procedures. […] However, pursuant to Article 109, Paragraph 1, 
Subparagraph 10, and Article 110, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 9, of the 
Constitution, the provincial government has jurisdiction over the 
administration of provincial police, while hsien governments have 
jurisdiction over hsien police and security.341 
                                                     
340 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.307 App’x [1992]. 
341 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.307 [1992] (Official Translation). 
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The Justices played an artful political role as arbitrator in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.307 [1992], convincing the City Councils of Taipei and Keelung that beneath the 
Executive Yuan’s veneer of victory in this case, the Executive Yuan was actually the 
loser in political terms: 
 
In terms of the budget issue, the Judicial Yuan holds that the Executive Yuan is 
right; however, in terms of the control power, the Justices affirm that the City 
Councils are the bodies in control. Henceforth the Executive Yuan is entitled to 
budget the police without claiming control power, so why not just appreciate 
this gift? 
 
7.4.3 The Judicial Yuan 
 
The Judicial Yuan, as the ultimate trial organ and political mediator within Taiwan’s 
political system, is theoretically incapable of bringing actions or of being sued against 
by other powers (Weng, 1998: 288-290). However, the judiciary was sued five times, 
for unconstitutionality by the Executive Yuan (3 cases) and the Legislative Yuan (2 
cases) between 1990 and 1999, although the judiciary de facto sued nobody in return 
or for any other reason. From the 1990s, it appears that the Executive Yuan mainly 
aimed its lawsuits against the judiciary at the Administrative Court (Supreme 
Administrative Court since 2000) because of the Executive Yuan’s discontent over the 
decisions the Administrative Court had made. In contrast, the Legislative Yuan mostly 
challenged the whole of the judiciary in the Judicial Yuan, asking the Judicial Yuan to 
circumscribe the inferior courts. These two patterns illustrate the role of the Judicial 
Yuan from different angles. 
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Of all the lawsuits brought against the judiciary, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 
[1995] is undoubtedly the most important separation of powers game between the 
Legislative Yuan and the Judicial Yuan. The conflict came about due to the Judicial 
Yuan’s decision to grant all the inferior courts the power of constitutional judicial 
review, which the Legislative Yuan would not accept. The Legislative Yuan therefore 
brought a lawsuit against the Judicial Yuan directly, asking the Judicial Yuan to 
withdraw from its original position.342 Once again, the Justices played a clever role in 
politics, withdrawing the Judicial Yuan’s original position on the one hand, and granting 
all inferior courts the power of constitutional judicial review by implication on the other. 
On the surface the Legislative Yuan appeared victorious, but the judiciary was actually 
the real winner. The Justices held: 
 
A judge shall have no capacity to hold a statute unconstitutional, and 
shall not refuse to apply a statute for that reason. Nonetheless, since the 
Constitution's authority is higher than the statute’s, judges have the 
obligation to obey the Constitution over any other statutes. Therefore, in 
trying a case where a judge, with reasonable assurance, has suspected 
that the statute applicable to the case is unconstitutional, he shall surely 
be allowed to petition for interpretation of its constitutionality. In the 
abovementioned situation, judges of different levels may suspend the 
pending procedure on the ground that the constitutionality of the statute 
is a prerequisite issue. At the same time, they shall provide concrete 
reasons for objectively believing the unconstitutionality of the statute, 
                                                     
342 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 App’x [1995]. 
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and petition to the Grand Justices of the Yuan to interpret its 
constitutionality.343 
 
When the author of this thesis was a law school student in Taiwan, he asked his mentor, 
Nigel N.T. Li, whether the inferior courts were granted the power of constitutional 
judicial review or not? The author still remembers Li’s response: 
 
If you were a judge and you made the decision to suspend a trial because 
you think the law is unconstitutional, are you judicially reviewing the 
law or not? 
 
7.5 INTRA-BRANCH CONFLICTS 
 
It is interesting that the Judicial Yuan has often been involved with intra-branch 
conflicts in Taiwan’s national-level legislatures, including the Legislative Yuan and the 
National Assembly. The Justices have played the role of political mediators and legal 
advisors amongst politicians, settling Taiwan’s contentious political controversies by 
judicial means (Hirschl, 2004: 71-108). Such a convention illustrates the political 
weight of the Judicial Yuan, even though there were only 9 cases within this category 
between 1990 and 1999. 
 
The best approach to understanding the role of the Judicial Yuan within these intra-
branch conflicts is not by statistics, nor by quantitative analyses, but by case study, 
examining a specific case, Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.342 [1994]. This represented 
                                                     
343 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.371 [1995] (Official Translation). 
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a litigation appealed amongst congressmen/women of the New Party, 344  the 
Democratic Progressive Party and the Nationalist Party with regard to the abuse of 
legislative power. 
 
Bone of Contention: Democratisation 
 
The case arose in the course of Taiwan’s democratisation due to the abolition of war 
establishments against the PRC in 1990. It began with a fierce debate on the continuing 
utilisation (after democratisation) of the disputed three executive organs established 
according to the authorisation of the Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period 
of Communist Rebellion from 1948 to 1966. These executive organs included the 
National Security Council (established without legislation in 1952), the National 
Security Bureau (established without legislation in 1955) and Bureau of Personnel 
Administration (established in 1967). These three executive organs lacked any 
constitutional authorities pursuant to the Constitution, thus becoming unconstitutional 
organs after the Temporary Provisions 1948/1972 was nullified in 1991. 
 
The ROC has become a constitutional state via the enforcement of the Constitution in 
1947; however, it experienced a communist revolution in the Chinese mainland, thus 
promulgating the Temporary Provisions345 that were in effect during the communist 
rebellion in 1948, with four additional modifications amended in 1960, 1966a, 1966b 
and 1972. The 1966b Temporary Provisions authorised the President to organise 
additional executive organs 346  for the war establishment, overriding the original 
                                                     
344 The New Party was an active political party in the 1990s. 
345 Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion (1948). 
346 Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion § 5 (1948/1966b). 
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constitutional limitation during the period of communist rebellion, and placing a legal 
condition that these additional executive organs should be dismissed immediately the 
period of communist rebellion ended, which it did on 1 May 1991. 
 
However, the Additional Articles of the Constitution 1991, which legally replaced the 
Temporary Provisions of 1972, controversially allowed these three executive organs to 
remain in existence if the President (National Security Council and National Security 
Bureau)347 and the Premier (Bureau of Personnel Administration) 348 held it to be 
necessary. In other words, the Legislative Yuan had no power to determine whether the 
disputed executive organs should cease to exist or not. On the contrary, it would be 
responsible for reviewing the relevant organisation bills if these executive organs were 
allowed to remain.349 
 
Fact 
 
The ambiguity of the Article 9III of the Additional Articles 1991 set off a political storm 
firstly within the Legislative Yuan, and eventually into constitutional litigation. The 
Article regulated that the three disputed executive organs ought to be reorganised by 
new acts of congress based upon the authority of the Constitution and the Additional 
Articles, thereby providing a deadline for the application of the original organisation 
laws authorised by the Temporary Provisions 1966b/72 – 31 December 1993. However, 
this Article could be interpreted differently: either it burdened the Legislative Yuan with 
a constitutional obligation to pass these organisations’ bills before 31 December 1993 
                                                     
347 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. § 9I (1991). 
348 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. § 9II (1991). 
349 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. § 9III (1991). 
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because the power of establishing or abolishing these three executive organs belonged 
to the President and the Premier, or it implied that the Legislative Yuan was entitled to 
grant (or not grant) legislative permissions over the continuing utilisation of the 
disputed executive organs through the legislative courts. 
 
Unfortunately, the Legislative Yuan had no common consensus until 30 December 1993, 
and the ruling nationalist congressmen/women were out of patience. It was the 
nationalists who ignored the normal procedures of assembly, including the second and 
third readings; however, it was also true that members of the opposition New Party and 
the democrats were busily engaged in ‘legislative brawling’ against the nationalist 
congressmen/women in order to paralyse the assembly. In the end, these three 
contentious bills were passed by the Chairman’s declaration at 12:33 PM on 30 
December 1993, and promulgated by the President that same afternoon.350 
 
Both the New Party and the democratic congressmen/women claimed that the 
Chairman’s conduct was unconstitutional, and they decided to bring this political 
conflict to the Judicial Yuan. Meanwhile, the nationalist congressmen/women also 
claimed that the conduct of the opposition party’s congressmen/women was 
unconstitutional, so they too decided to request a judicial decision from Judicial Yuan. 
Eventually, all the political parties involved appealed to Judicial Yuan. 
 
Instrument of Appeal – New Party’s Proposal351 
 
The instrument of appeal promoted by congresswoman Hsieh Chi-Ta was co-signed by 
                                                     
350 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.342 App’x [1994]. 
351 Id. 
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58 congressmen/women, including 8 nationalists, 39 democrats, 6 New Party members, 
1 social democrat and 4 independent congressmen. Although the instrument was de 
facto supported by multi-party advocates, it is normally considered as a New Party-
based appeal because its main promoter, congresswoman Hsieh Chi-Ta, was a member 
of the New Party caucus, and all the New Party congressmen/women co-signed the 
appeal. 
 
This instrument of appeal claimed that there had been no second and third readings of 
the bills in contention because the congressmen/women were busy with ‘legislative 
brawling’ in the Legislative Yuan. Therefore, the Chairman acted unconstitutionally by 
passing these contentious bills without proper legislative procedure. Moreover, this 
instrument of appeal also challenged the President, claiming that he had no power to 
promulgate either undetermined or disputed bills, and that those bills in question that 
the President already promulgated should be nullified immediately. 
 
Instrument of Appeal – Democratic Proposal352 
 
Unlike congresswoman Hsieh Chi-Ta’s instrument of appeal, which was co-signed by 
8 congressmen/women from the then ruling Nationalist Party, the instrument of appeal 
promoted by congressman Lin Cho-Shui was co-signed by 56 opposition-party 
congressmen/women, including 49 democrats, 5 New Party members, 1 social 
democrat and 1 independent congressman. Congressman Lin Cho-Shui was one of the 
leading members of the Democratic caucus, and his instrument of appeal is commonly 
held as the democratic proposal because 49 out of 51 democratic congressmen/women 
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supported it. 
 
This instrument of appeal confirmed that the Chairman of the Legislative Yuan had 
announced the commencement of both the second and the third readings; however, the 
appeal was on the grounds of the Self-Stipulated Rules of Assembly, and claimed that 
neither reading complied with the Rules because the congressmen/women were busy 
‘legislative brawling’ all the time. The appeal claimed that ‘legislative brawling’ was 
not a qualified procedure under which to review bills in accordance with the Rules of 
Assembly, and that the three bills should be prevented from being enacted. Based upon 
the above claim, the instrument of appeal further challenged the President, claiming 
that he would be unconstitutional in promulgating any undetermined bills of this act. 
 
Instrument of Appeal – Nationalist Proposal353 
 
The instrument of appeal promoted by congressman Liao Hwu-Peng was co-signed by 
60 congressmen/women, all of whom were nationalists. Even though it is self-evident 
that this instrument of appeal was a purely nationalist proposal, it should be specified 
that only 60 out of 97 congressmen/women from the Nationalist Party co-signed it. 
Moreover, 4 nationalist congressmen co-signing nationalist and New Party’s proposals, 
as well as another 4, who only gave their signatures to the New Party. 
 
The nationalist instrument of appeal blamed the democrats and the New Party 
congressmen/women for deliberate legislative omission through the use of ‘legislative 
brawling’, which the nationalists claimed to be unconstitutional. Article 9III of the 1991 
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amendments provided a deadline (31 December 1993) for the invalidation of the 
original laws; however, the congressmen/women were still busy ‘legislative brawling’ 
until 30 December 1993, instead of bringing in new laws. Based upon this, the 
nationalists claimed that either the bills in contention must be passed before the deadline 
(the nationalists had sufficient votes), or all congressmen/women were unconstitutional 
through deliberate omission. In other words, the nationalists claimed that it was better 
to violate the Self-Stipulated Rules of Assembly than to ignore the deadline given by 
the Constitution. Moreover, the nationalists further defended the President, claiming 
that the President had no obligation to confirm to bills of act passed by the Legislative 
Yuan. As long as he received it from the Legislative Yuan, he was entitled to promulgate 
it. 
 
Decision 
 
The Judicial Yuan backed parliamentary privilege and applied the principle of gravity 
defect control within this case, drawing up the court’s criterion of reviewing legislative 
procedure (Wu, 2004: 406-407). The court’s substantial decision was in favour of the 
nationalists, though its genuine purpose was to introduce the concept of parliamentary 
privilege into the Legislative Yuan. 
 
The court’s majority opinion held that the Legislative Yuan, based upon the separation 
of powers doctrine, should pass the bill according to its own self-stipulated rules within 
the scope of the Constitution, including ‘the rules of organization of the Legislative 
Yuan, the rules of assembly and the customs and practices of assembly’.354 This meant 
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that the court would not interfere with an act of congress because of any procedural 
imperfection, unless this imperfection fell within the scope of the Constitution: 
 
Whether the Legislative Yuan is in compliance with the procedure 
stipulated in its rules of assembly, its review of bills of act is an internal 
matter, unless it is in violation of the Constitution, and it shall fall into 
the scope of the parliamentary autonomy instead of being reviewed by 
the authority responsible for the constitutional interpretation […]355 
 
It is obvious that the court did not intend to create further rules of assembly for the 
Legislative Yuan, because it wanted to get rid of this political conflict. However, the 
court also knew that congressmen/women in the future, whenever there was political 
conflicts between each other within the Legislative Yuan, would keep requesting 
answers from the court if the court failed to lecture them the concept of parliamentary 
privilege. The court thus constituted a double safeguard against the politicians’ abuse 
of legislative power (by gravity defect control), as well as their manipulation of judicial 
power for political conflict (by parliamentary privilege). The Justices held: 
 
Where the procedures for enactment of the laws can be determined to be 
in contravention to the Constitution without investigation into the facts, 
i.e., where there are palpable material defects which are against the 
fundamental rules of enactment of laws, the authority responsible for 
constitutional interpretation may still declare it void. Where there is a 
dispute as to whether the defect is sufficient to affect the enactment of 
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the laws to a grave extent and investigation is required, i.e., where it is 
not evident and, according to the current regime, the investigation of the 
facts thereof by the authority responsible for constitutional interpretation 
is subject to constraints, then the dispute shall be resolved in accordance 
with the autonomy rule of the Legislative Yuan.356 
 
Finally, the court found in favour of the nationalists’ proposal in terms of the President’s 
power of promulgation, holding that the President was entitled to promulgate a bill of 
act he received from the Legislative Yuan with no responsibility to confirm whether it 
had been firmly passed or not. 
 
7.6 NON-PARTISAN CASES 
 
The best way of learning the merits of non-partisan cases in Taiwan is by examining 
the nature of the questions asked, as the result of these questions reflected the political 
weight of the Judicial Yuan from the questioners’ perspectives. From 1990 to 1999 there 
were only 10 non-partisan cases; however, the questioners consisted of the President (1 
case), all of the Pentapartite powers (1 case each except the Examination Yuan for 2 
cases), the City Councils of Taipei and Kaohsiung (1 case each) and the Provincial 
Assembly of Taiwan (1 case). 
 
Most non-partisan-question cases raised between 1990 and 1999 were impressive 
because the Judicial Yuan was being asked by the appellant organs to ‘amend’ the 
Constitution by judicial means. Hence, it is interesting in the realm of mega-politics 
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because these appellant organs found it easy to transfer power to the court. Why did 
these organs prefer to lean politically towards a judicial constitution instead of 
determining their own business arbitrarily? 
 
The President asked the Judicial Yuan with regard to his nomination power over the 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.470 [1998]. He did this 
by virtue of the failure of the Additional Articles of the Constitution 1997357 to specify 
the nominations between 1997 and 2003, asking the Justices to amend the Constitution 
via judicial power. The Legislative Yuan’s question was even more unbelievable – the 
legislators petitioned the Justices for guidance as to how to amend the Civil Code on 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.365 [1994], thus they received an impatient response 
from the court: 
 
Finally, as for the Legislative Yuan’s submission of an official letter 
titled Tai-Yuan-Yi No. 2162 to this Yuan on July 26th of this year (1994), 
in which the former Yuan sought to obtain this Yuan’s opinion on 
whether Members of that Yuan are qualified to propose future 
amendments to the unconstitutional Article 1089 of the Civil Code, the 
request made is not in conformation with Article 4, Paragraph 1, 
Subparagraph 1, of the Constitutional Interpretation Procedure Act.358 
 
Meanwhile the City Council of Taipei in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.259 [1990], 
as well as the Provincial Assembly of Taiwan in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.260 
[1990], demanded that the Judicial Yuan confirm their autonomous positions via 
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358 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.365 Reasoning [1994] (Official Translation). 
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judicial power, considering that there was no Local Government Act enacted according 
to the Constitution. The Judicial Yuan confirmed that all local governments were 
entitled to the right of autonomy. However, they imposed an obligation of enacting the 
relevant acts upon the Legislative Yuan. The Justices held: 
 
Article 118 of the Constitution expressly stipulates that the self-
governance of a special (Executive-Yuan-governed) municipality shall 
be prescribed by law. However, the abovementioned law has not yet 
been enacted, and the existing organization of special municipalities and 
the administration of local self-governance matters are governed by laws 
of the Central Government. To render the constitutional intent of local 
self-governance effective, there shall be enacted laws for the special 
municipalities’ self-governance, taking into consideration the practical 
circumstances. Until such laws are enacted, the existing laws of the 
Central Government shall remain in effect.359 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
Pursuant to Article 78 of the Constitution, the Judicial Yuan is vested 
with the power to interpret the Constitution, and to provide uniform 
interpretations with respect to statutes and ordinances. The intent is to 
have the Judicial Yuan assume the responsibility of clarifying and 
enunciating the correct meaning of the Constitution and statutes and 
ordinances. The interpretations thus rendered shall be binding upon 
                                                     
359 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.259 [1990] (Official Translation). 
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every institution and person in the country, and each institution shall 
abide by the meaning of these interpretations in handling relevant 
matters. Prior precedents which are contrary to these interpretations 
shall automatically be nullified.360 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 [1984] directly claimed that the power of the 
Judicial Yuan over judicial review was part of the Constitution, and that any decision 
made by the Judicial Yuan would be legally binding. When we see that the Judicial Yuan 
could interpret its judicial review power to the extent that the Constitution is almost 
‘what the judges say it is’ (Hughes, 1908: 139), we realise that judicial power expansion 
in Taiwan is not unrealistic as long as the Justices can find a proper way to exercise 
power in politics. The Constitution provides massive levels of power to the Judicial 
Yuan, and all the Justices have to do is to play a good role strategically in the field of 
mega-politics (Hirschl, 2004: 71-108), that is, by constructing a convention in Taiwan 
that state organs and individuals must rely on the Judicial Yuan’s judicial review for 
settling contentious political controversies. 
 
There are many reasons why such a constitutional convention exists. Despite the 
constitutional design, the Judicial Yuan’s political credibility is also relevant. Since 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], the court has established a positive image 
for itself in terms of justice amongst the public, so the potential for judicial arbitration 
over contentious political controversies has greatly increased. Moreover, the 
government’s authoritarian tradition of following superior authority is definitely crucial 
– the officials are used to complying with orders given by their superiors, thus providing 
                                                     
360 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.185 Reasoning [1984] (Official Translation). 
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a motion to petition the Judicial Yuan for judicial determinations instead of making their 
own decisions. In other words, ROC officials traditionally prefer to be subject to the 
law. They will administer the law, but they will not decide what the law is; therefore, if 
there is any doubt as to what comprises the genuine spirit of the law, or if there is no 
law, the officials would rather pursue an order authorised by their superiors, and as far 
as Taiwan is concerned there is no greater superiority than the Judicial Yuan. 
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8: JUDICIAL POWER EXPANSION: 
PUBLIC OPINION AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since Taiwan’s democratic transition, the protection of human rights has become an 
unchallengeable political value. However, much of the previous research fails to 
distinguish sincere human rights protection from strategic human rights protection. In 
other words, previous studies of Taiwan’s Judicial Yuan have made no conclusion as to 
whether the Justices safeguarded human rights for strategic or humanitarian reasons – 
or indeed for a combination of both. Some academics argue that the Judicial Yuan is 
and always has been ‘an institute for democracy and human rights’ (Ginsburg, 2003: 
106) whilst others hold that the Justices were not always liberal (Li, 2012: 340) in the 
1990s. 
 
How is it that the Judicial Yuan receives such polarised comments on human rights? 
Such a puzzle surely encourages us to question the Justices’ sincerity in terms of human 
rights protection, and reminds us of the third of four ‘but for’ causations embodied in 
the methodology chapter (Chapter 3.3) – If the Justices never considered public opinion 
as their political source for judicial power expansion, they would not have to educate 
the public on higher fundamental rights standards. 
 
Justice Mohammed Bedjaoui of the International Court of Justice argues that ‘there is 
an indissoluble link between underdevelopment and the violation of human rights, and 
at the same time there is a definite equation between development and the observance 
of human rights’ (Bedjaoui, 2000: 42). In Taiwan’s case, the country was 
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underdeveloped in the 1990s,361 so there was nothing wrong in the Justices introducing 
fresh standards of human rights. However, the introduction of human rights standards 
was not unconditional, as the Justices always shied away from introducing any standard 
that may arise public anger (see also Chapter 9). 
 
Taiwan’s policies on human rights protection in the 1990s can be classified into two 
categories: Rights that the Justices introduced to the public in order to shape public 
opinion), 362  and rights that Justices changed in law in accordance with public 
preferences. Both categorisations imply that the Justices’ strategies never went beyond 
public preferences. In other words, the Justices in the 1990s did protect human rights, 
but only after they had secured public support in order to maximise their political 
influence (judicial power expansion). 
 
In terms of special power relationships (Krüger and Ule, 1956: 109-226), it is obvious 
that the Justices were attempting to shape public opinion, and that such Prussian legal 
tradition ought to be abolished because of the sincerity of human rights protection. The 
Prussian legal tradition had been applied in the ROC’s own legal system since 1929, 
and comprised a sound logical construction that makes cultural sense in Taiwan. As 
such, it is hard to believe that the people of Taiwan – who had been politically liberated 
from an authoritarian regime in a period of less than 10 years – would have realised that 
the application of a special power relationship might constitute an infringement against 
human rights. It is more probable that the Justices’ attempted to introduce the public to 
                                                     
361 Taiwan was been broadly accepted as a developed economy from the year 2000; in the 1990s, Taiwan 
was in the first decade of democratisation. Hence, I find no reason not to address it as ‘underdeveloped’. 
362 This thesis has no intention of arguing whether the Judicial Yuan has ability to shape public opinion 
or not; however, according to Unger’s idea (Unger, 2007: 7-12), the Judicial Yuan attempted to shape 
public opinion in the same way that law school professors teach their students. So, the core of this thesis 
is essentially why the Judicial Yuan behaved like law school professors in some cases, and why did they 
attempt to shape public opinion? 
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the concept of human rights protection in order to win public support. 
 
In terms of prosecutors’ power of custody, the Justices deliberately changed the civil 
law tradition because of Taiwanese public preference, holding that it was a violation 
against human rights if the prosecutors had the power to detain. However, prosecutors’ 
power to detain is commonly exercised in many civil law countries even today. Hence, 
it is not a persuasive argument to say that the ROC abolished this legal tradition because 
of human rights concerns. It is more likely to be a strategic judicial decision. 
 
8.2 STATISTICS 
 
In the long run, the Judicial Yuan’s attention had shifted gradually according to the 
statistics, as can be seen by Figure 8.1: 
 
8.1 Classification of Cases Reviewed, 1948-2003 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The chart indicates that the audience of the Judicial Yuan before 1976 was made up 
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from governmental organs, but that from the fourth-term the Judicial Yuan became more 
accepting of appeals filed by individuals. Apart from proof of direct causation, this may 
reflect a crucial historical event that happened in Taiwan – President Chiang Kai-Shek’s 
death on 5 April 1975. 
 
8.2 Classification of Cases Reviewed (per Annum), 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
8.3 Classification of Cases Reviewed, 1990-1999 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
Statistics show that the Judicial Yuan reviewed 190 (out of a total of 249) cases that 
concerned individual rights between 1990 and 1999, accounting for 76.30% of the total. 
Of all these 190 cases, the Justices scored 91 wins and 99 losses (47.89% to 52.11%). 
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8.4 Judicial Reviews Filed by Individuals, 1990-1999 
Year Win Loss Odds (%) 
1990 6 8 42.86% 
1991 7 5 58.33% 
1992 4 12 25.00% 
1993 8 6 57.14% 
1994 12 19 38.71% 
1995 7 9 43.75% 
1996 12 12 50.00% 
1997 10 10 50.00% 
1998 14 6 70.00% 
1999 11 11 50.00% 
Total 91 99 47.89% 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The Justices’ preferences between 1990 and 1999 can also be seen from the statistics: 
 
8.5 Categories of Cases Filed by Individuals, 1990-1999 
Categorisation Sum Win/Loss Odds 
Property Rights 44 18:26 40.91% 
Tax Law 42 12:30 28.57% 
Right of Legal Actions 24 12:12 50.00% 
Right to Work 20 6:14 30.00% 
Gesetzesvorbehalt363 15 13:2 86.67% 
Special Power Relationship 10 10:0 100% 
Habeas Corpus 6 5:1 83.33% 
Urban Planning 5 3:2 60.00% 
Personal Law 4 2:2 50.00% 
                                                     
363 Gesetzesvorbehalt is a German legal concept which is the complete opposite of the British royal 
prerogative. There is no similar concept in English. It means the executive body is prohibited from 
making a decision unless there is an act of the legislature to support it. 
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Suffrage 3 1:2 33.33% 
Mainland Chinese Affairs 3 0:3 0% 
Assembly and Association 2 2:0 100% 
Personal Rights 2 2:0 100% 
Equality 2 2:0 100% 
Transitional Justice 2 1:1 50.00% 
Capital Punishment 2 0:2 0% 
Freedom of the Press 1 1:0 100% 
Proportionality 1 0:1 0% 
Religion against Nationalism 1 0:1 0% 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
There is no doubt that the Justices’ preference for democratic transition is conspicuous 
between 1990 and 1999, where the statistics shows that the odds on issues of special 
power relationship, assembly and association, freedom of the press, equality and 
personal rights are 100%, whilst the odds on the issue of habeas corpus and 
Gestzesvorbehalt are over 80%. Conversely, in cases regarding property rights, the right 
to work, tax laws and right of legal actions, the Justices were generally quite 
conservative. It is obvious that the Justices sought to reconstruct the relationship 
between the country and its people via democratic transition. However, they also placed 
a very strong priority on issues of national security – in terms of mainland Chinese 
affairs and religion opposing nationalism, the result was absolute. 
 
In comparison with the Justices’ strong preference for habeas corpus (odds: 83.33%), 
the Justices were mercilessness upon capital punishment (odds: 0%), which appears 
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paradoxical. How can a court with a strong preference for habeas corpus show no 
mercy on the capital punishment issue? The influence of public opinion is probably the 
only reasonable answer. 
 
8.3 PRINCIPLE OF ANTI-SPECIAL POWER RELATIONSHIP 
 
Before discussing the connotation of the principle of special power relationships and 
the reason why this principle was eventually derogated in Taiwan, a question of implied 
judicial behaviour should be answered first: 
 
What makes a judge consider overriding a legal convention which is culturally 
validated and has been in force for more than 60 years; especially if the judge 
has to reflect the public’s opinion that overriding this legal convention is wrong? 
 
The first possibility that a judge is willing to do this is undoubtedly based on a strategic 
decision for personal interest, that by overriding something archaic and/or unfair he or 
she may earn a good name (Garoupa and Ginsburg, 2009: 452-457). The second 
possibility is that judge simply holds that the old legal convention wrong and has a 
sincere reason for overriding it. In order to distinguish strategic decisions from sincere 
decisions, this thesis argues that the best approach is to observe how a judge makes a 
decision by examining the wording. If a judge strikes down a legal convention directly 
and completely, it probably reflects a sincere decision that judge really disagreed with 
the convention. However, if the judge only holds the convention wrong on a case-by-
case basis – even though there are no cases found in which the judge has approved the 
convention – it is likely that judge makes decisions carefully and strategically in this 
field, in the belief that the underlying convention may prove correct at times. 
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Did the Justices of the Judicial Yuan in the 1990s oppose the application of the special 
power relationship? The author of this thesis believes that they did, and this was also 
the common consensus of Taiwan’s Law Society. However, the Justices derogated the 
principle on a case-by-case basis, from public functionaries to students, soldiers and 
sailors, dispelling cultural prejudices that the application of the principle was neither 
proper nor just whilst inculcating the mass public strategically with the Justices’ 
idealism concerning human rights. This tells us that the Justices did not make decisions 
sincerely. In contrast, they were trying to lead public opinion in their own vision of 
Utopia. 
 
8.3.1 Public Functionaries: Pre-1990 Judicial Reviews 
 
Taiwan’s first constitutional judicial review referring to the application of the special 
power relationship principle is the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.187 [1984]. In this 
case the appellant, Lieutenant Zhang Long-Cheng, had his request for a certification of 
his working period rejected by the Ministry of National Defense. As a result, his right 
to a pension was revoked. However, the Administrative Court stood in favour of the 
principle of the special power relationship, holding that the appellant, as a lieutenant in 
the army, had no right to file an administrative lawsuit against the ministry under any 
circumstances. As such, the Administrative Court’s only option was to dismiss this 
appeal procedurally.364 
 
The Administrative Court’s decision in this case symbolises and reflects Taiwan’s 
                                                     
364 Administrative Court Decision, 71 Ruling No.271 [1982]. 
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nationalist Chinese legal tradition, as well as its deep-rooted German jurisprudential 
influence. However, the Justices of the Judicial Yuan attempted to reverse this German 
legal principle and held that: 
 
[C]ivil servants are under the obligation to abide by the law and orders 
of the authority that are within the scope of their duty, unless the said 
orders are obviously against the law or exceed the authority’s scope of 
supervision. Subordinate civil servants may only put forward their views 
in disagreement, but may not appeal under the Administrative Appeal 
Act. […] Other than the aforementioned exceptional circumstance, civil 
servants are not barred from seeking administrative or legal relief when 
their constitutionally- or legally-guaranteed rights are abridged due to 
the relevant authority’s illegal or improper administrative acts.365 
 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.187 [1984] clearly states that the Justices would no 
longer tolerate the unconditional application of the special power relationship in the 
first place, but then drew in their horns immediately, confirming a necessity for the 
application and providing a definition of the principle. It was 1984, and the Justices in 
that time period were still hesitant, wavering between conservatism and liberalism. 
 
8.3.2 Public Functionaries: Two Decisive Cases in 1989 and 1992 
 
An administrative decision made […] to remove a public functionary 
from his office […] has a direct impact on the constitutionally 
                                                     
365 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.187 Reasoning [1984] (Official Translation). 
309 
 
guaranteed right of such public functionary to hold public office. 
Therefore, such public functionary may, as a matter of course, exercise 
his right to file an administrative appeal or right to sue as provided for 
under Article 16 of the Constitution. Such public functionary has 
petitioned the competent authorities and the personnel authorities, 
respectively, for a review and a second review of the decision. […] If 
such public functionary is not satisfied with the decisions of the 
aforesaid authorities, he should be allowed to institute an administrative 
litigation so as to bring the matter in line with the legal principle that 
there is a remedy where there is a right.366 
 
According to Article 77 of the Constitution, the Judicial Yuan shall take 
charge of cases concerning disciplinary measures against public 
functionaries. Depending on the nature of the said disciplinary measures, 
laws may be made to allow top-ranking officials to take such measures, 
within reasonable scope. However, in cases concerning disciplinary 
measures with consequence sufficient to change the status of the public 
functionaries or with serious impact on such public functionaries, the 
person under order of disposition may file an objection with the judicial 
organ in charge of disciplinary measures; the said organ will then 
examine the original disciplinary measures to decide whether there is 
any contradiction with the law or any other inappropriateness, and 
whether legal relief shall be offered. Relevant laws shall be amended 
accordingly, and supplements to Interpretation No. 243 of the Judicial 
                                                     
366 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.243 [1989] (Official Translation). 
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Yuan shall be made.367 
 
A combined analysis of Judicial Yuan Interpretations No.243 [1989] and No.298 [1992] 
can easily conclude that what the Judicial Yuan had done was in effect like peeling an 
onion – the Judicial Yuan firstly informed the executive that of all public functionaries 
the executive had punished shall be entitled to bring an administrative lawsuit.368 
Following that, in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.298 [1992], the Judicial Yuan further 
declared that the power to discipline public functionaries belongs constitutionally to the 
Judicial Yuan, thus the executive bodies’ delegated power to discipline public 
functionaries is actually subject to the Judicial Yuan’s decision. 
 
8.3.3 Students: Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.382 [1995] 
 
The appellant of this case, Mr Wang Shi-Xian, a student of the National Taipei Junior 
College of Business, was accused of multiple instances of cheating in his final 
examinations, and was expelled from Junior College in 1991. He petitioned and re-
petitioned against the Junior College’s decision, but his petitions were all turned down 
in accordance with the special power relationship principle. Wang Shi-Xian thus 
appealed his case to the Administrative Court, which held that: 
 
Article 1 of the Administrative Appeal Act (1930/79) clearly stipulates 
that the rights to petition and re-petition shall be exercised by the people 
in circumstances in which either the central or the local administration 
has administered the law illegally or improperly. As to the decision made 
                                                     
367 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.298 [1992] (Official Translation). 
368 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.243 [1989]. 
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by a national college for students, it falls within the ambit of special 
power relationship, which is different from the decision made by either 
the central or local administration for the people. Students shall therefore 
have no right to petition and re-petition against a national college 
accordingly. […] Administrative lawsuits filed against the Junior 
College shall be [procedurally] dismissed by reason of illegality, [and 
the court holds that] there is no need to consider the appellant’s 
substantive claim [in this event].369 
 
It is obvious that the Administrative Court stood in favour of the special power 
relationship, deeming that Wang Shi-Xian, as a student, was both legally and morally 
ineligible to conduct an administrative lawsuit against his Junior College, thus the court 
not only stated that the appellant’s substantive claim was irrelevant but also lectured 
Mr Wang Shi-Xian stringently: 
 
[T]he appellant refused to accept the decision of relinquishing his claim, 
claiming that [the decision] was a violation of the dropping out terms of 
the Regulation Concerning the Enrolment of the Students of Junior 
Colleges. [He] should behave properly, pleading and petitioning [the 
College] for reconsideration according to Article 3 of the Regulation. 
However, the appellant did not do so but had the impudence to petition 
and re-petition according to the administrative legal proceedings […]370 
 
In contrast to the Administrative Court’s conservative view, the Judicial Yuan acted like 
                                                     
369 Administrative Court Decision, 81 Ruling No.923 [1992] (Author’s Translation). 
370 Id. (Author’s Translation). 
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the saviour of human rights, spreading a contemporary human rights gospel on this 
special and rare occasion. The Justices held that: 
 
An expulsion or similar action taken by a school of any level against one 
of its students in accordance with its student codes or disciplinary 
regulations will change that student’s status and hinder his/her 
opportunity to receive an education. In light of its significant impact on 
the people’s right to education guaranteed by the Constitution, such a 
disciplinary action shall be classified as an administrative act subject to 
administrative appeal and administrative litigation. The disciplined 
student is entitled to bring an administrative appeal and later an 
administrative litigation when he/she has exhausted all remedies 
available within his/her school. To the extent that it is contrary to this 
Interpretation, the ruling announced in Precedent P.T. No. 6 of the 
Administrative Court in 1952 should no longer be applied, so that the 
right to education and the right of instituting legal proceedings 
guaranteed by the Constitution can be secured.371 
 
8.3.4 Soldiers and Sailors: Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.430 [1997] 
 
Following the release of administrative legal burdens imposed by the conventional 
application of the special power relationship upon public functionaries and students, 
soldiers and sailors became the final freedom fighters, removing the shadow that hung 
over human rights. Major Lin Qing-Cai was forced by the Taiwan Military Reserve 
                                                     
371 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.382 [1995] (Official Translation). 
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District Command to demobilise in 1994, and his petition and re-petitions were all 
turned down; as a result, he filed an administrative lawsuit against the command, but 
the case was dismissed on procedural grounds: 
 
The right to petition and re-petition shall be exercised by the people 
whenever their rights or interests are infringed by an administrative 
organ because of any unlawful or disproportionate administration. In 
terms of the basis of special power relationship, there is no lawful right 
to petition and re-petition accordingly. The Administrative Court 
Adjudication, 48 Suit No.11 [1959] is on record […] [the decision of 
demobilisation] [and] was made under the special powers relationship, 
which is different from an actio popularis against an unlawful 
administrative decision. [This court] thus deems neither the appellant’s 
administrative lawsuit against the defendant legal, nor the procedural 
dismissal of the re-petition inappropriate […]372 
 
Of all the special power relationship cases mentioned in this chapter, it is not difficult 
to see that the Administrative Court had one simple syllogistic formula for this type of 
case: 
 
1. As long as the special power relationship principle applies, the appellant has 
no right to petition, re-petition or bring any form of administrative litigation. 
 
2. Unfortunately, the special power relationship principle is applicable because 
                                                     
372 Administrative Court Decision, 84 Ruling No.310 [1995] (Author’s Translation). 
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of the appellant’s profession. 
 
3. Game over, and the appellant’s substantive claim is no longer relevant. 
 
Moreover, the Administrative Court was actually displaying another pattern of logic: 
 
If the Judicial Yuan decides that A is no longer subject to the special power 
relationship, then A is beyond the reach; however, the application of special 
power relationship remains as a fundamental legal principle, unless the Judicial 
Yuan makes it clear that this principle shall be null and void. 
 
Once again, the Judicial Yuan became ‘an instrument for democracy and human rights’ 
(Ginsburg, 2003: 106) in Major Lin Qing-Cai’s case, holding that: 
 
Military officers are in a broad sense civil servants and have public law 
relationships with the State due to their official posts. Active service 
military officers who file petitions for remaining on active duty 
according to pertinent rules and whose petitions are rejected following 
orders of discharge, if they question the orders, may seek remedies by 
lodging administrative appeals and bringing administrative proceedings 
following the respective due procedures since the orders of discharge 
affect their military statuses and may result in violation of the 
constitutional guarantee of the right to perform public service. The part 
of Supreme Administrative Court Precedent No. 11 (Pan-tze No. 11),373 
                                                     
373 Administrative Court Adjudication, 48 Suit No.11 [1959]. 
315 
 
Supreme Administrative Court of 1959, which is in contravention to this 
Interpretation, shall no longer be applicable.374 
 
The Judicial Yuan’s behaviour over these special power relationship cases brings out 
one question: 
 
If the Judicial Yuan prefers to determine special power relationship cases on a 
case-by-case basis, instead of nullifying the principle at once – is it a strategy 
that is attempting to encourage the general public to bring any case relevant to 
human rights to the Judicial Yuan? 
 
8.3.5 Conclusion: Pro Bono Publico 
 
The application of the principle of the special power relationship in Taiwan reflects a 
legal convention with a cultural origin which was held legally binding (vinculum juris) 
in administrative law for decades. It was original a Paul Laband principle (Laband, 1876: 
383-488) introduced from Germany, although the principle was strongly compatible 
with the moral norms of traditional Chinese bureaucracy (Shen, 2004: 19-23) and 
thereby it had been broadly applied within the system of ROC administrative law since 
1929. Such a historical coincidence might reflect the Justices’ thoughts and 
considerations towards mass public support. 
 
If the Justices attempted to override a legal convention with a strongly cultural origin, 
there ought to be some persuasive and positive motive behind their actions, particularly 
                                                     
374 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.430 [1997] (Official Translation). 
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bearing in mind the political price the Justices had to pay for the changes (Ghosh, 1997: 
43-62). In the event of derogating the application of the special power relationship 
principle, the Judicial Yuan’s decisions were de facto a series of direct and deliberate 
political challenges against the executive under circumstances in which the executive 
was morally and historically entitled to have such prerogatives. The executive branch’s 
strong political reaction should therefore have been expected. When the Justices made 
their decisions to derogate the application of the special power relationship principle, 
they knew they would benefit from upgrading Taiwan’s human rights standards, and 
held that their decisions would not harm the Judicial Yuan. 
 
The author of this thesis does not consider that people who have political liberalised 
from an authoritarian regime for less than 10 years can appreciate the full connotations 
or the spirit of human rights. There must have been plenty of occasions when the people 
were unaware of their own rights (Bouvard, 1996: 8). The evolution of a public sense 
of human rights requires an epistemic process. If people were not aware of their own 
rights, how could they possibly fight for them? 
 
The principle of the special power relationship is definitely within this ambit, because 
it performs a perfect logic – If you are a public functionary, student, solider or sailor of 
this nation, you are subject to the principle of special power relationship. This means 
that you have no right to complain because you have chosen your own profession and 
you need to pay for your decision. 
 
There should be no doubt that the logic formula of the special power relationship 
principle is somehow too perfect, and that a normal person even with insufficient 
knowledge of human rights could easily perceive its defects; however, the infringement 
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of human rights whilst applying the principle is possible. If the defect is broadcast 
academically and authoritatively to the public, public opinion towards the principle of 
special power relationship will certainly change. 
 
This means that the Justices – as the best qualified fifteen people in Taiwan, and who 
were surely aware of the elaboration of human rights – as well as academics and 
authoritative jurists of this country, would have found it comparatively easy to influence 
their own nationals on advanced concepts of human rights via the exercise of the 
judicial power. The Justices were like professors in the realm of human rights protection, 
and they earned their name by passing their teachings to the people. 
 
8.4 JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
There are many ways to address Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995], a 
constitutional litigation referring to prosecutors’ arbitrary powers of custody. This case 
is commonly referred to as ‘the trial of the century’ in Taiwan. However, this thesis has 
no intention of discussing the case in detail. It will relate the story in a simple manner, 
avoiding any accusations of political bias. 
 
The story of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995] is not complicated: the ROC, 
as a civil law state, employed prosecutors who followed the civil law tradition, in the 
same way as Judges d’instruction in France and Luxembourg, with the power to detain 
accused criminals arbitrarily. In the 1990s, however, many political interest groups 
attempted to challenge this civil law tradition, including legislators, judges, lawyers and 
legal academics, claiming that the tradition was a violation of human rights and 
appealing against the procuratorate to the Judicial Yuan. These political interest groups 
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deliberately stirred up the prosecutors’ anger in the media, arguing for and against them 
publicly in order to gain public support before the Judicial Yuan’s hearings were held. 
 
8.4.1 The Trial of the Century: The Prosecutors’ Power to Custody 
 
[The reason why] the constitution represents the essential peace of the 
state is due to [its] deep-rooted nationalism in the realms of history, 
culture, politics and social background. A country’s constitutionalism 
cannot therefore completely reverse the foundations of its history, 
culture, politics and social system. This is the root cause of the diversity 
between nations in respect of the content and ambit of their judicial and 
executive powers, and explains why prosecutors in the Netherlands, 
Zürich, Basel, Aargau, Luzern and Graubünden of Switzerland do have 
the power of custody […] and why prosecutors in the United Kingdom 
and the United States […] can only play the role of public accuser.375 
 
The abovementioned partial dissenting opinion submitted by Justice Wang Ho-Hsiung 
in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995] illuminates both the historical and 
theoretical dilemma of this trial: 
 
The claim that the procuratorate should not possess the power of custody on the 
basis of the separation of powers doctrine may not be persuasive enough within 
a civil law state like the ROC. As a result, the essence of the claim is constructed 
under common law ideology. 
                                                     
375  Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995] (Wang Ho-Hsiung, partial dissenting) (Author’s 
Translation). 
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This thesis stresses the logic pattern of this because the opinion of this thesis on this 
case lies outside the mainstream of current legal academic opinion in Taiwan (Li, 
2008:97-112; Su, 1999: 179-200). It holds that the main bone of contention in the case 
was not about the distinction between the judiciary and procuratorate. If the definition 
of judiciary is different from one nation to another, such as Judges d’instruction in 
France, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg, which have a hybrid position as both a judge 
and investigator, then Taiwan’s debate as to whether the procuratorate should be a 
judicial organ or not in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995] is no longer relevant. 
In other words, this thesis argues that the genuine bone of contention in this case is 
public opinion – if Taiwan’s general public could no longer accept the procuratorate’s 
power of custody, the Justices would make a strategic decision in name of human rights. 
In contrast the Justices might follow Taiwan’s tradition of civil law, holding that the 
procuratorate is entitled to have such a power: 
 
[Justice Minister] Ma Ying-Jeou was very cautious and concise in public, 
but [he] immediately ordered his staff to issue [public] statements in 
order to secure the [procuratorate’s] power [of custody]. Prosecutor Liu 
Cheng-Wu of the Taipei Prosecutors Office came forward and 
challenged the leapfrog appellant, Judge Gao Shi-Da of the Taichung 
District Court publicly, but Gao Shi-Da declined to rise to the challenge. 
However, prosecutors and judges began a battle of words against each 
other through media, and [Taiwan’s] public opinion forums came under 
heavy fire. The Taipei Bar Association also joined the battle, supporting 
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publicly that the power of custody should return to the courts.376 (Chang, 
1997: 46) 
 
8.4.2 Instrument of Appeal – Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang’s Petition377 
 
The first instrument of appeal by Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang of the Democratic 
Progressive Party was submitted on 13 October 1989, following the procedural 
dismissed of his petition against the procuratorate’s criminal custody decision by the 
Taiwan High Court. Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang was arrested on 27 September 1989 on 
charges of unlawful entrance into homeland and treason. He was brought to the Taiwan 
High Prosecutor’s Office and was immediately taken into custody under the orders of 
the Prosecutors Office. Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang petitioned the Taiwan High Court for 
his release on 7 October 1989, but his petition was dismissed on the same day. 
 
A national requires permission to enter into homeland – this was how 
the nationalists ruled our country in the past […] absolutely 
ridiculous!378 (Private conversation between Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang 
and his old friends attended by the author of this thesis in 2013) 
 
His lawyer, Mr Chen Shui-Bian, who later became ROC President (2000-2008), 
petitioned the Judicial Yuan for his release, claiming that the prosecutors’ power of 
custody should be considered unconstitutional. He argued: 
 
                                                     
376 Author’s Translation. 
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Personal freedom is the people’s most fundamental freedom. […] When 
interpreting the content of Article 8II of the Constitution, referring to the 
certiorari system, the essence is concrete and clear that a person’s 
petition for certiorari shall be granted as long as [he or she] is arrested 
and detained on criminal suspicion, and there no further limitations are 
provided. However, Article 1 of the Habeas Corpus Act provides that 
‘when a person is arrested and detained unlawfully by any organ except 
the courts, he or she shall be entitled to petition either the district court 
or its superior high court where he or she was arrested and detained for 
certiorari’. [Thus I argue] that this additional term ‘unlawful arrest and 
detention’ is obviously unconstitutional […]379 
 
The so-called courts provided by Article 8 of the Constitution ought to 
be defined more narrowly as judicial organs that are empowered to try, 
thus excluding the procuratorate. This is not only a common consensus 
amongst academics but also something that was approved by your 
worships’ decision in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.13 [1953]. […] 
The procuratorate’s power, according to Articles 76 and 101 of the 
Criminal Procedure Law, is to detain people for long periods of time 
without reason or charge, which undoubtedly constitutes an 
unconstitutionality against the provisions provided by Articles 8II and 
8III of the Constitution, [thus] infringing upon people’s personal 
freedom [...]380 
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8.4.3 Instrument of Appeal – the Legislative Yuan’s Proposal381 
 
The second instrument of appeal was politically critical because it was submitted in the 
name of the Legislative Yuan on the basis of the Legislative Resolution of the 32nd 
Conference of the 89th Session. The resolution asked for a judicial decision as to 
whether or not the procuratorate should be deemed a judicial organ delineated by Article 
8I of the Constitution. This instrument of appeal embodied the legislature’s open 
political challenge against the executive. The instrument of appeal was originally 
promoted and co-signed by 17 congressmen/women, of which 16 (94.18%) came from 
the total of 21 democrats (76.19%) with the addition of 1 independent congressman 
(5.82%). It was therefore an undeniably democratic proposal, especially considering 
that the only independent signatory, congressman Cheng Ding-Nan, joined the 
Democratic Progressive Party the following year (1993). 
 
The instrument of appeal claimed that the procuratorate was not capable of existing as 
a constitutional judicial organ because of its institutional function. The powers of 
investigation, indictment and execution of punishment are all active and aggressive 
powers, meaning that the procuratorate could only be part of the executive. However, 
Article 8 of the Constitution is clearly a habeas corpus clause, protecting people from 
illegal arrest, custody and trial. It was therefore completely irrational to consider the 
procuratorate as a constitutional judicial organ, and it should therefore be 
unconstitutional to allow the procuratorate such arbitrary powers of custody. 
 
8.4.4 Instrument of Appeal – Enhanced Democratic Proposal382 
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The previous instrument of appeal, submitted in the name of the Legislative Yuan on 
17 June 1992, principally challenged the constitutional identity of the procuratorate, 
claiming that it was not a judicial organ and that the power of custody provided by 
Article 8 of the Constitution had been given illegally to prosecutors. However, the 
Justices made no decision on this appeal until 52 congressmen/women submitted an 
enhanced instrument of appeal on 18 July 1995, placing more arguments to back up 
their 1992 claim. 
 
This enhanced instrument of appeal was originally promoted by congressman Chang 
Chun-Hsiung, and co-signed by 52 congressmen/women, including 49 democrats 
(94.23%), 2 New Party members (3.85%) and 1 independent congressman (1.92%). 
Congressman Chang Chun-Hsiung was undoubtedly the force behind this proposal – 
he had been a cause lawyer in his early life, which rendered him more than capable of 
leading this constitutional litigation. He was also a law school classmate as well as a 
close friend of the then Chief Justice Weng Yueh-Sheng, and he was thus considered to 
be the right person to persuade the Chief Justice at the trial, even though none of the 
evidence he provided measured the emotional and subconscious influence of this 
friendship. Congressman Chang Chun-Hsiung wrote a memoir about the trial in 1997, 
placing detailed information of all the hearings of this litigation on record: 
 
[Congressman Chang Chun-Hsiung] considered this event as an 
opportunity to renovate our nation’s criminal procedure system, as well 
as the best chance of examining the newly commissioned sixth-term 
Justices of the Judicial Yuan in terms of their courage of guarding the 
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Constitution […]383 (Chang, 1997: 42) 
 
Congressman Chang Chun-Hsiung’s instrument of appeal accused the Criminal 
Procedure Law (1928/93) of unconstitutionality, claiming that Articles 71IV and 102III 
of the Law that empowered the procuratorate to detain criminal suspects without 
warrants of arrest was incompatible with the principle of habeas corpus provided by 
Article 8 of the Constitution. He emphasised particularly that the ROC’s principle of 
habeas corpus ought to be granted by the Constitution, and its judiciary should be the 
only state organ that empowered to detain criminal suspects, and that the judiciary 
should no longer tolerate the procuratorate’s abuse of power. In other words, this 
instrument of appeal written by congressman Chang Chun-Hsiung – who was also a 
well-experienced cause lawyer as well as a close friend of the then Chief Justice – was 
attempting to play the judiciary off against the procuratorate, stating: 
 
My Lords, the procuratorate is taking advantages of you, the judiciary. Are you 
sure that there is nothing you can do? 
 
8.4.5 Instrument of Appeal – Judge Gao Shi-Da’s Leapfrog Appeal384 
 
The final instrument of appeal was submitted by Judge Gao Shi-Da, a famed public 
figure in Taiwan after his direct participation in the judicial innovation movement, who 
decided to suspend the trial and granted the accused a writ of constitutional leapfrog 
appeal on 25 August 1995: 
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384 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 App’x [1995] (Instrument of Appeal) (Author’s Translation). 
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This court […] holds that the prosecutors’ power of detaining the 
accused during the period of investigation provided by […] the Criminal 
Procedural Law is unconstitutional, and considers that [this given power] 
should be incompatible with Article 8 of the Constitution and thereby 
constitutes ‘unlawful custody’ under Article 1 of the Habeas Corpus Act. 
[This court therefore] requests your worships’ decision […] upholding 
that the so-called courts provided by Article 8 of the Constitution ought 
to be defined more narrowly as judicial organs that are empowered to 
try, [and] the procuratorate should be excluded, thus nullifying Articles 
102III and 121I of the Criminal Procedure Law that empower the 
prosecutors to detain the accused.385 
 
Judge Gao Shi-Da’s position clearly stated that he could not tolerate the prosecutors’ 
abuse of power. He wrote: 
 
[T]he trial court [of our nation] is commissioned constitutionally to 
provide immediate protection of people’s personal freedom, based on 
the court’s function for independent trial, wherein [the court] is capable 
of restraining others, especially the executive organs, from committing 
violations of human rights. […] The prosecutors’ power to prosecute; 
[however], has revealed their [constitutional] identity, executive agents, 
[and thus identity] has never been changed […]386 
 
If a prosecutor is also an accuser, that the power to detain the accused 
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arbitrarily over a long period of time is [already] tantamount to the 
prosecutor’s absolute dominance over the accused during the period of 
investigation. That is to say, the accused, by virtue of his or her inferior 
position during the period of investigation, has lost his or her lawful 
human rights regarding personal freedom clearly provided under Article 
8 of the Constitution. [If] the so-called principle of equality of arms [Der 
Grundsatz der Waffengleichheit] has already been discarded during the 
period of investigation, the courts’ insistence upon the principle during 
the trial stage may only become formalistic, resulting in damage to the 
truth [caused by the prosecutors during the period of investigation] 
which may never be remedied.387 
 
8.4.6 Decision 
 
This thesis has no doubt that the Judicial Yuan made a strategic decision in Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995], pacifying the procuratorate with an admission of 
the prosecutors’ personal interests on one hand, and pleasing the mass public, courts 
and law society by abridging the procuratorate’s power of custody on the other. Through 
a strategic decision which meant that the procuratorate did not completely lose and the 
public, courts and law society did not completely win, the Justices once again secured 
their reputation among the public, and avoided political revenge at the same time. 
 
Judges shall hold office for life. No judge shall be removed from office 
unless he has been found guilty of a criminal offense or subjected to 
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disciplinary measure, or declared to be under interdiction. No judge shall, 
except in accordance with law, be suspended or transferred or have his 
salary reduced.388 
 
This was what the procuratorate had been fighting for, and the Judicial Yuan was surely 
well aware of that – it was virtually an open secret. The prosecutors claimed themselves 
as Taiwan’s Judges d’instruction according to the tradition of civil law, and if the 
procuratorate was no longer considered as a judicial organ, the prosecutors would lose 
their position to claim protection under Article 81 of the Constitution. The loss of 
custody powers was one thing, but the loss of judicial organ status was far more deadly 
to the procuratorate. Therefore, the Justices concluded that: 
 
[T]he prosecutor’s offices act on behalf of the state to investigate, indict, 
and punish. Since the duty and function of a prosecutor’s office is to 
carry out its role in criminal justice, its conduct within this sphere of 
state action shall be deemed “judiciary” in an expansive sense. Therefore, 
the term “judicial organ” used in Article 8, Paragraph 1, of the 
Constitution would not have the same meaning as the term “judicial 
organ” used in Article 77 of the Constitution. Instead, the term is applied 
as an expansive definition in order that the prosecutor’s offices may be 
included therein.389 
 
After the interests of the prosecutors had been secured, it was time to please the mass 
public, the courts and the law society by depriving the procuratorate’ power to custody: 
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The term “trial” defined in Article 8, Paragraphs 1 and 2, of the 
Constitution means trial by court. He who has no authority to try a case 
cannot conduct this proceeding. The “court” defined in Article 8, 
Paragraphs 1 and 2, means a tribunal composed of a judge or a panel of 
judges empowered to try cases. According to Article 8, Paragraph 2, of 
the Constitution, if any organ other than a court arrested or detained a 
person, such organ shall surrender the detainee to a competent court for 
trial within 24 hours of said action. Therefore, the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, Article 101, and Article 102, Paragraph 3, applies mutatis 
mutandis to Article 71, Paragraph 4, and Article 120, which empowers 
a prosecutor other than a judge to detain suspects; Article 105, Paragraph 
3, of the same Code which empowers a prosecutor to grant a request for 
detention submitted by the chief officer of the detention house; Article 
121, Paragraph 1, and Article 259, Paragraph 1, of the same Code which 
empowers a prosecutor to withdraw, suspend, resume, continue 
detention, or to take any other measures in conjunction with a 
detention.390 
 
These provisions are incongruous with the spirit of the aforementioned 
Article 8, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution. Article 8, Paragraph 2, of the 
Constitution merely provides: “When a person is arrested or detained on 
suspicion of having committed a crime, the organ making the arrest or 
detention shall in writing inform said person, and his designated relative 
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or friend, of the grounds for his arrest or detention, and shall, within 24 
hours, turn him over to a competent court for trial. Said person, or any 
other person, may petition the competent court that a writ be served 
within 24 hours on the organ making the arrest for the surrender of said 
person for trial.” It does not impose an “unlawful arrest or detention” 
condition for surrendering the detainee to court for trial. Whereas Article 
1 of the Habeas Corpus Act […] does add an extra term “unlawful arrest 
or detention” as a condition for petitioning the writ. Therefore, this 
provision violates the aforementioned Article 8, Paragraph 2, of the 
Constitution.391 
 
The decision of Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995] shows that the Justices did 
not consider the Judge d’instruction system inherently wrong – it wasn’t a case of being 
right or wrong, it was a civil law tradition. However, the Justices were aware of the 
social and political atmosphere that pertained at the time, so they deprived the 
procuratorate’ power in exchange for the prosecutors’ personal interests – it was a wise 
decision of unconstitutionality: 
 
It is hereby declared that the abovementioned unconstitutional 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Habeas Corpus 
Act shall lose effect within two years from the date of promulgation of 
this Interpretation [...]392 
 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
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Critics commented that the Achilles’ heel of the [Judicial Yuan’s] 
reviews over human rights in the post-martial law period is that the 
Justices only concern themselves about the mainstream human rights of 
the majority, and have a poor sense of human rights protection for the 
minority and the disadvantaged […]393 (Li, 2012: 346) 
 
The above comment, cited by Nigel N.T. Li, makes a perfect conclusion on the Justices’ 
judicial behaviour in terms of human rights cases. This thesis would therefore like to 
establish a logic model for the Justices’ behaviour, testifying to Li’s conclusion and 
disclosing the Justices’ interaction with the mass public by using a reverse approach: 
 
It is logical. The needs of the many outweigh the needs of the few or the 
one. (Star Trek: The Wrath of Khan, 1982) 
 
If this is the logic formula that the Justices adopted, then we can conclude that the 
Justices’ primary concern was not human rights, but the needs of the many. If this is 
true, the Justices may not make decisions in favour of human rights protection, and they 
would always please the majority even if a decision by the majority against human 
rights is made. If the Justices were to make a series of decisions that fell into this 
category, then their promotion of human rights was simply cynical and strategic: 
 
If the Justices’ primary concern was the needs of the many, the Justices would 
only promote human rights if thus right was compatible with the needs of the 
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many. 
 
This logic explains the Justices’ attitude towards the procuratorate’s power of custody 
in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.392 [1995]. The Justices overrode civil law tradition 
in the name of human rights; however, their overriding decision also met the needs of 
the many. Through the Justices’ admission of the procuratorate’s judicial organ status, 
it is more than clear that the Justices did not consider this civil law tradition wrong, but 
simply made a strategic decision for the needs of the many – and their own continuing 
support. This begs the following questions – What could the Justices get if they made 
decisions for the needs of the many? What political price would the Justice pay if they 
did not do so? 
 
The special power relationship cases might offer researchers the best answer as to why 
the Justices preferred to decide in favour of the needs of the many, and why they 
attempted to shape public opinion in terms of the genuine needs of the many. It should 
not be difficult to discover that the Justices could win support amongst the public, as 
long as they pleased the majority by providing decisions for the needs of the many. 
They were therefore willing to enlighten the mass public on specific categories of 
human rights, which is a sort of right that everyone may enjoy, if thus illumination 
cemented the Justices’ reputation and added to their popular support. 
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9: LIMITATIONS TO JUDICIAL POWER: 
SILENCE AND AVOIDANCE 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The king is like a boat and his subjects are the water. The water that 
bears the boat is the water that sinks the boat.394 – Xunzi (313-238BCE) 
 
Xunzi, one of the greatest Confucian legal philosophers, demonstrates the relationship 
between the ruler and the ruled in this metaphor, holding that a decision maker in China 
is considered legitimate only when his or her decision meets the public’s favour – 
otherwise the boat would be sunk. It is of course an ancient concept of democracy, but 
it is also a stark warning to those in charge: do not anger the public. 
 
If we read Xunzi in accordance with Baum’s audience theory (Baum, 2006: 25-32), we 
can see the public as the prime audience of the Chinese rulers. Unlike Machiavelli, the 
Chinese Il Principe (Confucianism) preferred to lecture the rulers on the essence of 
public opinion, convincing the rulers that there is no better way to rule permanently 
than to listen to public opinion (Li, 2012: 42-45). Hence, it would be wise not to anger 
the public in order to avoid disaster. This applies not only to government officials but 
also to judges in China, and it also brings out the final ‘but for’ causation embodied in 
the methodology chapter (Chapter 3.3) – If the Justices never considered public opinion 
as their primary judicial audience (Baum, 2006: 25-49), they would not have to avoid 
angering the public strategically. 
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In this chapter two typical cases from the 1990s will be examined in which the Judicial 
Yuan deferred to vigorous public preference (capital punishment cases) and divided 
public opinion (political question cases) in order to avoid angering the public directly. 
If the Justices did not take public preference or public opinion into consideration (Baum, 
2006: 60-72), they would be expected to behave more assertively – but in reality, they 
chose deference by submitting no dissenting opinions (silence) and making no concrete 
decisions on political questions: 
 
[T]he judge, unexpectedly, told me in the court: ‘My dear Barrister Lin, 
if I show mercy on him [the accused], the public will show no mercy on 
me!’ The judge’s consideration was not about the conformability of 
[criminal] custody on the legal basis, but public opinion.395 (Interview 
with Lin on 3-JUL-2013) 
 
Such a phenomenon is not because of political intervention towards the 
judiciary, but the magnificent pressure public opinion provided, which 
most of the judges could not defy.396 (ibid) 
 
9.2 WHILST PUBLIC OPINION BIASES 
 
If there is no applicable act for a civil case, the case shall be decided 
according to customs. If there is no such custom, the case shall be 
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decided according to the jurisprudence.397 
 
Only those customs which are not against public policy or morals shall 
be applied to a civil case.398 
 
Articles 1 and 2 of the ROC Civil Code are empirical doctrines embodied according to 
the Roman law principle of consuetudo pro lege servatur, by which morality is 
recognised as the source of law (La Torre, 2007: 12-15). In fact it is not only the ROC 
that recognises moral principles as its common law, it is an ancient legal custom dating 
back to the Roman era. In 1945 to 1946, moral principles were even used to rebut the 
Nuremberg defence of ‘I was just following orders’ (Citron, 2006: 139-150), thus 
founding Principle IV of the Nuremberg Principles: 
 
The fact that a person acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a 
superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international law, 
provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.399 
 
If moral principles can be applied to prevent war crimes, then it should come as no 
surprise that moral principles should also be applied to provide the legitimacy for 
capital punishment – as long as the execution is held justifiable within society. In other 
words, through the observation of a judge’s decision in which moral principles are a 
prominent concern, especially if this judge’s personal belief is against these moral 
principles, the influence of the public opinion towards the judge should be evaluated, 
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because public opinion would be extremely sensitive in terms of what the judge decides 
about moral and social justice. 
 
9.2.1 An Eye for an Eye Legal Tradition: Lex Talionis 
 
[I think that Minister of Justice] Wang Ching-Feng is noble-minded; 
however, a good judge is obliged to do the right thing and [he or she] 
will not go to hell for sentencing the accused to death.400 (Pai Ping-Ping: 
ETTV 12 March 2010) 
 
Pai said that the death penalty deters violent crime and is humane enough, 
unlike the way in which murderers take other people’s lives. She urged 
voters to boycott those in favor of abolishing capital punishment. 
(Brainstorm Digital Communications: Fun Day Trend 15 March 2010) 
 
Pai Ping-Ping, a famous television hostess in Taiwan and a grief-stricken mother whose 
17-year-old daughter was abducted, raped and murdered in 1997, believes that capital 
punishment is morally just in Taiwan, as a result of the lex talionis (an eye for an eye) 
tradition that is deeply rooted in the Chinese society. In Taiwan, Pai Ping-Ping even 
attempted to raise political pressure against legislators who supported Taiwan’s 
abolition of capital punishment, so there is no reason to conclude that the judiciary was 
not under pressure. 
 
It is commonly acknowledged in Taiwan that public opinion is in favour of capital 
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punishment. According to the BBC News, surveys show that more than 70% of 
Taiwan’s citizens want to keep the death penalty (Cindy Sui: BBC News 4 June 2012), 
and this preference has brought many political crises to the government’s door when 
executions were suspended between 2006 and 2009 (ibid). Joe Chien-Chao Hung wrote 
a newspaper article under the heading ‘Taiwan Needs More Time to Abolish the Death 
Penalty’ on 24 March 2010, commenting on the Justice Minister Wang Ching-Feng’s 
resignation after a historical analysis of Chinese moral justice over capital punishment, 
in which he said: 
 
All we need is time. […] If we want to change our people’s mind-set 
dictated by the founder of the Western Han Dynasty who ruled China 
from 206 to 194 B.C […] Liu Bang simplified […] to three basic laws 
when he […] found the Han Dynasty. One of the three laws was: Death 
to those who killed. The Chinese have since been convinced that a 
murderer has to pay for his crime with death. That is why seven out of 
every ten people in Taiwan continue to insist that murder be punishable 
by death. (Joe Chien-Chao Hung: China Post 24 March 2010) 
 
9.2.2 Statistics 
 
The Ministry of Justice promulgated a series of surveys about public opinion towards 
capital punishment between 1993 and 2008, and the Central News Agency reported on 
1 February 2010 that more than 70% of the population in Taiwan strongly favoured the 
death penalty, even though there were more and more supporters who accepted 
conditional abolishment year after year, replacing capital punishment with life 
imprisonment: 
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When asking about [the policy] of direct abolition of capital punishment 
in Taiwan, according to data [the Ministry has provided] in the past 15 
years, there has always been at least 70% [and sometimes more than 
80%] of respondents who opposed abolition. The highest opposition rate 
came from a 1993 survey in which 88.3% of interviewees opposed 
abolition, and even in 2008 the opposition rate was still 80.0%.401 (An 
Chih-Hsien: Central News Agency 01 February 2010) 
 
In a report published by the Liberty Times on 14 November 2012, the Ministry of 
Justice’s survey from 2012 reports the same demands by the public: 
 
The public opinion poll referring to the death penalty issue investigated 
by […] the Ministry of Justice […] [shows that] 76.7% of citizens in 
Taiwan disapprove of the abolition of capital punishment, whilst 85.2% 
[of the citizens] hold that the abolition of capital punishment would have 
a negative effect on public safety. [The poll] indicates that the majority 
of the population still affirm the necessity of capital punishment and do 
not want it to be completely abolished […]402 (Hsiang Cheng-Chen: 
Liberty Times 14 November 2012) 
 
On 08/09 April 2010, Taiwan’s privately owned TVBS Poll Centre conducted one of 
the most detailed public opinion surveys regarding the death penalty on record (TVBS 
Poll Center: 09 April 2010). It concludes that: 
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1. 85% of the population disapprove of abolishing capital punishment. Only 
9% approve whilst 6% have no preference. In terms of those who have been 
sentenced to death, 87% of the population uphold their execution, whilst 
only 3% disagree and 10% have no opinion. 
 
2. 58% of the population disapprove of life imprisonment as a substitute for 
capital punishment. Only 34% approve, and 8% stated no opinion. Even if 
the criminal has repented, 62% of the population still think that the 
execution should go ahead. 30% disagree and 8% stated no preference. 
 
3. 85% of the population consider that the threat of execution will reduce 
serious crime. 10% reject the idea, whilst 5% have no opinion. 
 
4. 84% of the population disagree that the execution constitutes a violation of 
human rights. Only 10% agree whilst 6% have no opinion. However, only 
30% of the population consider the abolition of the death penalty to be unjust. 
61% consider that abolishment is not unjust, whilst 8% have no preference. 
 
9.2.3 Capital Punishment: Constitutionality 
 
After the ROC ratified and implemented the ICESCR and ICCPR, 
[another] application of constitutional judicial review regarding the 
Article 271 of the Criminal Code – a constitutionality debate about the 
execution of murderers – was directly dismissed by the Justices of the 
Judicial Yuan under procedural rules. The reason given was ‘[this sort of 
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case] was already reviewed’, because the abolishment of capital 
punishment was completely politically incorrect. I believe that this 
reason is extremely ridiculous: Can the constitutionality of executing 
drug traffickers be held equivalent to the constitutionality of executing 
murderers? [...] The logic is ridiculous […] and only goes to show that 
the Justices of the Judicial Yuan did not want to touch this hot potato.403 
(Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
Li did not criticise the Judicial Yuan as severely as he might have done, because 
Taiwan’s case-coding shows that the court had become ‘impatient’ (Lo Bing-Cheng: 
WSHR 2010) with capital punishment cases. Since the fourth term (1976-1985), the 
Justices of each term had declared once that capital punishment would be held 
constitutional, and after the retirement of the sixth-term Justices in 2003, the succeeding 
Justices chose not to reply this sensitive subject positively through procedural 
dismissals in 2006404 and 2010.405 
 
The Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.194 [1985] was the first case referring to the 
constitutionality of capital punishment in Taiwan’s history, and its decision was 
promulgated on 22 March 1985 – 6 months and 10 days before the retirement of the 
fourth-term Justices (01 October 1985). Through this case, the fourth-term Justices 
affirmed that the death sentence for drug traffickers during the martial law period would 
be held constitutional by the Judicial Yuan, which also implies that the forth-term 
Justices would tolerate any form of death penalty. 
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The more open-minded fifth-term Justices then promulgated the Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.263 [1990] on 19 July 1990, affirming once again that, so far as the 
Justices were concerned, Taiwan’s mandatory death penalty would still be considered 
constitutional. This decision came only 28 days after the legendary case of congress 
dissolution406 – it is interesting to realise that the Judicial Yuan democratised Taiwan 
on one hand, but confirmed the constitutionality of capital punishment on the other. 
 
The final decision was made by the sixth-term Justices, in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.476 [1999] and the value of this case is that it was decided during the Judicial Yuan’s 
golden age. Only 13 months and 24 days later, the Judicial Yuan surprised the world by 
successfully striking down unconstitutional constitutional amendments in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.499 [1999]. 
 
Chong De-Shu, a prisoner awaiting execution on death row who appealed against his 
death sentence to the Judicial Yuan three times before his execution, with the assistance 
of the Taiwan Alliance to End the Death Penalty, was informed by the Justices that his 
application was procedurally dismissed according to the Judicial Yuan Dismissal 
Resolution No.1297 [2006] on 29 December 2006: 
 
Whilst reviewing the appellant’s request regarding the constitutionality 
of capital punishment as a statutory penalty, there is no necessity to make 
further decision, because the Judicial Yuan Interpretations No.194 
[1985], No.263 [1990] and No.476 [1999] have set the precedents [for 
                                                     
406 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
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future cases of a similar nature].407 
 
The last tries two applications (in 2010) were based upon the ROC’s ratification and 
implementation of the ICESCR and ICCPR in 2009, claiming that the execution of the 
treaties had become the ROC’s international legal duty. In accordance with these two 
treaties, capital punishment should be abolished. However, the Justices once again 
dismissed the two applications procedurally on the Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution 
No.1358 [2010] on 28 May 2010, holding that no obligation was found for abolishing 
capital punishment upon the ROC.408 
 
Attorney-at-law Lo Bing-Cheng, the Director-General of the Hsinchu Bar Association, 
made a speech entitled ‘Death’s Advocates: Taiwan’s Reticent Grand Justices’ at the 
2010 World Summit on Human Rights for World Citizens, claiming that the Justices’ 
reticence and conservatism were due to public opinion. Lo even placed a subtitle ‘The 
Unspoken Secret: Public Opinion Trumps All’ (Lo Bing-Cheng: WSHR 2010) 
describing the Justices’ judicial behaviour: 
 
Our society’s attitude toward abolishing the death penalty resembles this 
scenario, with Truth presumed to be on the side of the majority. The 
silent masses support the death penalty regime, so Truth stands with it. 
Confronted with the cries of the minority, the majority simply plays deaf, 
rarely offering even “the shadow of an argument.” This perspective may 
shed some light on the stance of the Council of Grand Justices, which 
has quietly and consistently sided with the death penalty. […] By the 
                                                     
407 Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution No.1297 [2006] (Author’s Translation). 
408 Judicial Yuan Dismissal Resolution No.1358 [2010]. 
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time of J.Y. Interpretation No.476 in 1999, the grand justices had begun 
to show impatience with petitions challenging the death penalty. […] It 
was the third strike for death penalty opponents, and in the long decade 
since, the grand justices have shut the door on this issue. They’ve said 
what needed to be said and will devote no more breath to the matter. 
(ibid) 
 
The “state of society” refers to public support for death penalty. 
Declaring it unconstitutional would “contradict the expectations of the 
country’s people” and would not be “consistent with the people’s faith 
in the law.” The subtext of what the grand justices are telling opponents 
of the death penalty is: Stop looking to us – what we think isn’t the issue. 
The issue is that the majority of people don’t want to get rid of the death 
penalty. If the majority changes its stance on day, we’ll go with the tide 
and declare it unconstitutional. (ibid.) 
 
9.2.4 Setting the Tune: Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] 
 
This court doubts whether such extreme legislation is beyond the 
arbitrary power [Gestaltungsfreiheit] of the legislature and constitutes a 
violation of the principle of the consistency between the crime and the 
punishment? If this court penalises by law, then the accused could only 
be sentenced either to death or life imprisonment, which [this court] 
holds to be over-punishing. Therefore, [this court deems that] the 
mentioned acts of congress that can be applied to [the accused] may be 
unconstitutional and [this court] conducts a leapfrog appeal by this 
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reason.409 
 
District Court Judge Chen Chih-Hsiang, S.J.D. is considered either famous or notorious 
for his leniency and humanity towards criminals in Taiwan, conducting a constitutional 
leapfrog appeal for the accused by using his ex officio authority. His appeal eventually 
resulted in the Justices’ ultimate resolution regarding the capital punishment debate in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]. Judge Chen Chih-Hsiang has played an 
active role in Taiwan’s constitutional judicial review because of his personal beliefs, 
and he is still the champion judge who has authorised and conducted the most 
constitutional leapfrog appeals in history. He even said: 
 
[A citizen] is a host of [this] nation, and we should cure him when he is 
ill; [however, we chose] not to cure him but sentence him to death, this 
is the most typically evil law of the Republic of China.410 (Chen Chih-
Hsiang: Business Weekly 10 December 2003) 
 
However, Judge Chen Chih-Hsiang, a fighter for human rights who obtained his 
doctoral degree (S.J.D.) in the realm of human rights law,411 did not persuade the 
Justices to abolish Taiwan’s capital punishment: 
 
[T]o execute criminal sanctions, some special criminal laws enacted for 
certain crimes do not violate the principle of proportionality if they have 
the due purposes, necessary means, and proper restrictions required by 
                                                     
409  Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 App’x [1999] (Judge Chen Chih-Hsiang’s Instrument of 
Leapfrog Appeal) (Author’s Translation). 
410 Author’s Translation. 
411 Cheng, Chih-Hsiang, A Study on the Principle of the Consistency between the Crime and Penalty 
under International Human Rights Law (S.J.D. Dissertation, National Taiwan Ocean University 2013). 
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Article 23 of the Constitution. They will not be deemed inconsistent with 
the regulations set forth in the general criminal laws and thus be held 
unconstitutional merely because they may infringe upon people’s lives 
and physical freedom.412 
 
Whilst interpreting the meaning of the Justices’ decision from its context, it is likely 
that the sixth-term Justices were running out of patience, lecturing Judge Chen Chih-
Hsiang about human rights, informing him that his appealing strategy of persuasion 
under the name of human rights was only based upon his personal beliefs about human 
rights. The Justices upheld capital punishment as being compatible with human rights 
as long as the principle of proportionality was always considered. The Justices did not 
consider the death penalty as an absolute breach of human rights, and held: 
 
In view of national history, culture, and current social conditions, these 
special criminal laws should not be deemed improper if their purposes 
aim to conform to the nationals’ expectations and the affection of the 
laws. In addition, these […] laws should be deemed consistent with the 
principle of proportionality (Verhältnismäßigkeitsprinzip) under Article 
23 of the Constitution if the methods used to achieve such purposes are 
necessary to correct and prevent mistakes and are also reasonable 
actions to take even though they restrict the people’s fundamental 
rights.413 
 
9.2.5 Where was Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung? 
                                                     
412 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] (Official Translation). 
413 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 Reasoning [1999] (Official Translation). 
345 
 
 
[T]he Justice who has written more than 20 pages in his [law] textbook, 
discussing the abolition of capital punishment, [eventually] submitted 
neither a dissenting nor a partially-concurring opinion [in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.476 [1999] – the court’s] conservatism over human 
rights [protection] was undeniable.414 (Li, 2012: 341) 
 
The Justice that Nigel N.T. Li refers to here is Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung, a well-known 
promoter of the abolition of capital punishment and a respectable proponent of human 
rights in Taiwan. It was surprising that Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung chose to keep silence on 
such an important case, submitting no opinion towards capital punishment; however, 
before his death, Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung left two profound and unusual clues behind: 
 
1. One year after the decision of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 
[1999], Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung published his new law textbook titled 
‘Introduction to Criminal Law III’ (2000), whereon he wrote 21 pages about 
the abolishment of capital punishment (Su, 2000: 178-198). 
 
2. Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung was interviewed by the Judicial Yuan in November 
2009, and mentioned many details about judicial decision-making progress 
within crucial political controversies; however, he maintained silence over 
the decision of the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] (Judicial 
Yuan, 2011: 97-202) – if he was willing to disclose so many details, why he 
said nothing about capital punishment? 
                                                     
414 Author’s Translation. 
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A reasonable speculation is that he was convinced by his colleagues that it was not the 
right time to abolish capital punishment because of public opinion; otherwise it was 
hard to believe that he would have kept his silence upon this case. Nigel Li also agrees 
with this speculation, saying: 
 
Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung’s usual opinion about the abolition of capital 
punishment was widely known in this country; however, there was a 
chance that he might change his academic opinion as he dealt with actual 
cases. Or there was another possibility, that Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung 
maintained his academic opinion but did not think our society was ready 
for an era without capital punishment. Of course, I agree that Justice Su 
should submit an opinion, making a description of his position clear 
within the Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]; unfortunately, he 
did not submit any opinion.415 (Interview with Li on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
If you try to conclude that in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999], 
public opinion [in Taiwan] showed full and clear preferences, then the 
Justices who always held a different academic opinion from their public 
opinion [had no option but] chose to keep silent; I would not oppose 
your conclusion [at all]. On the contrary, I would remind you in addition 
that Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] was definitely not the 
only case in our nation’s history – there are abundant examples referring 
to the Justices’ reticence because the case consisted of sensitive political 
                                                     
415 Author’s Translation. 
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issues on which public opinion had already stated a preference […]416 
(ibid) 
 
We probably will never know the genuine reason why Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung stayed 
silent in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999]; however, it is obvious that public 
opinion played a crucial role in this case, and it is also reasonable to conclude that the 
Justices would put themselves in political danger if they decided assertively – probably 
this is the reason why Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung submitted no dissenting opinion; it would 
change nothing but only to anger the public: 
 
I am aware that this question you have asked is [mainly] aimed at Justice 
Su Jyun-Hsiung. If you want to ask me as to whether Justice Su Jyun-
Hsiung disobeyed his academic conscience in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.476 [1999], I make no comment because Justice Su 
Jyun-Hsiung was my professor – unless there is evidence that ‘beyond 
the reasonable doubt’. As his junior generation we should be more 
conservative [and respectful whilst talking about him].417 (ibid) 
 
9.2.6 Conclusion: Public Opinion Obviously Prevails  
 
To be honest, I have never heard that ‘no money’ can constitute a reason 
of ‘debt repudiation’. Though the population of Taiwan only amounts to 
1% of the population of China, [the Republic of China] is obliged to 
discharge [its pre-1949 debt] according to [this] percentage, right? Even 
                                                     
416 Author’s Translation. 
417 Author’s Translation. 
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if [the Republic of China] enters a counterplea of destitution in 
accordance with Article 318 of the Civil Code (1929/1999), the debt still 
has to be paid off. However, the result of what we have seen in Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.475 [1999] is that no [dissenting] opinion was 
submitted – it was likely that all the Justices upheld that the debt 
repudiation claimed by the Government of the Republic of China was 
justifiable. The genuine reason [that caused the Justices to make such a 
decision] was that it would be seriously politically incorrect if [they] 
decided [that the Republic of China was obliged to] repudiate [its pre-
1949] debt and the Justices of the Judicial Yuan would definitely receive 
a huge amount of public censure from the public.418 (Interview with Li 
on 17-JUN-2013) 
 
Nigel N.T. Li produced another vivid instance in his interview, citing Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.475 [1999] in regard to the ROC’s national debt before China’s 
disunion in 1949, explaining the significant influence of public opinion over the Judicial 
Yuan and its clear bias. As in the capital punishment cases, judicial deference was a 
reasonable strategic decision here as well. 
 
Even though the precise connotations of public opinion are still unsolved, public 
opinion polls have demonstrated that it is already beyond reasonable doubt that the 
Justices would receive this abstract but direct public censure if they made ‘incorrect’ 
political decisions. Judicial deference in Taiwan has indicated that the Judicial Yuan 
aimed to avoid angering the public strategically, and this shows how vitally important 
                                                     
418 Author’s Translation. 
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public opinion had become in accordance with Baum’s judicial audience theory (Baum, 
2006: 25-49). 
 
9.3 WHILST PUBLIC OPINION DIVIDES 
 
[I]f public opinion is divided on a moral issue, courts should leave its 
resolution to the political process. (Posner, 1999: 142) 
 
Posner’s opinion in the event of public opinion being divided implies a strategy of 
judicial decision-making. If judges cannot earn their reputation from judicial 
assertiveness, but may be harmed by decision-making, why not make a decision of no 
decision, to apply political question doctrines and leave the resolution to politics? 
 
Here is a typical example provided in 1993: Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] 
– the territorial delimitation case over a divided China. 
 
9.3.1 Taiwan: the Chinese Alsace-Lorraine 
 
Though the Chinese people always claim that the island of Formosa ought to be 
considered as China’s ‘existing national boundary’ 419  or ‘part of the scared 
territory’,420 the historical fact is that the Chinese conquered the island by defeating the 
Dutch in 1662: 
 
Castle Zeelandia, with its outworks, artillery, remaining war material, 
                                                     
419 Constitution of R.O.C. § 4 (1947). 
420 Constitution of P.R.C. pmbl. (1982). 
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merchandise, money, and other properties belonging to the Honourable 
Company, to be surrendered to Lord Koxinga.421 
 
Lord Koxinga, Prince of Yanping of the Ming Chinese Empire (Han-Chinese), took 
over Taiwan because the Ming Empire (1368-1683) was collapsing upon the Chinese 
mainland as a result of the Manchurian invasion and the foundation of the Qing Empire 
(1616-1912). The Imperial Ming Army and Navy required Taiwan as a new base for the 
Empire’s restoration (Hong, 2009: 59-92), but neither the Dutch nor the Chinese were 
native the island – they were both its conquerors. 
 
The island fell to the Qing Empire in 1683 (Shepherd, 2007: 107-132) and the new 
conqueror, Admiral Shi Lang, reported officially to his emperor after the conquest of 
Taiwan, describing the island as a ‘barbarian region which had never been ruled by 
China’ but which was ‘being sincerely recommended to be reigned over for the good of 
China’.422 History tells us that China’s attitude towards Taiwan was unlike modern 
Chinese regimes – either the ROC or the PRC – always claimed, and history tells the 
inhabitants of Taiwan that China did not treat the island as part of its scared territory in 
1895, despite that many records that show that China was forced to make such a 
decision (Li and Li, 2008: 186-189): 
 
China cedes to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty the following 
territories, together with all fortifications, arsenals, and public property 
thereon […] (b) The island of Formosa, together with all islands 
appertaining or belonging to the said island of Formosa. (c) The 
                                                     
421 Treaty between Koxinga and the Dutch Government § 2 (1662). 
422 Author’s Translation. 
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Pescadores Group […]423 
 
When the ROC was founded in 1911, Taiwan was not included because the island was 
part of the Japanese Empire at the time. The restoration of Taiwan to the ROC was 
initially demanded by the Chinese nationalist politician Chiang Kai-Shek, a demand 
that was unilaterally accepted by the Allied Powers without consulting the inhabitants 
of Taiwan about their future: 
 
The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the 
aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no 
thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be 
stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied 
since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the 
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, 
Formosa, and The Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. 
Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken 
by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the 
enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course 
Korea shall become free and independent.424 
 
The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese 
sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, 
Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.425 
                                                     
423 Treaty of Shimonoseki § 2 (1895). 
424 Cairo Declaration (1943). 
425 Potsdam Declaration § 8 (1945). 
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On 25 October 1945, the island of Formosa was officially and legally delivered to the 
ROC (Chiu, 1979: 166). However, in 1949, only 4 years after the island’s restoration, 
Taiwan became the last outpost (99% of actual control territory) of the ROC at the end 
of the Chinese Civil War (Lynch, 2010: 7-92). Councillor Guo Guo-Ji once joked about 
the interrelationship between the ROC and Taiwan by saying: 
 
When the Japanese were defeated, Taiwan was returned to the arms of 
[our] fatherland; [however], when the Chinese mainland was taken over, 
[our] fatherland wanted to be held in the arms of Taiwan.426 (Chen, 
2005a: 190) 
 
9.3.2 Complicated Emotion towards China and Reunification 
 
In 1936, [Taiwanese squire] Lim Hian-Tong visited Shanghai and 
claimed [that he had] returned to the fatherland; after [he] went back to 
Taiwan, he was slapped in the face by a Japanese [named] Urima Zenbee 
at the Taichung Park’s garden party. This was the ‘Incident of the 
Fatherland’ that created quite a stir.427 (Lee, 2009a: 204) 
 
As a Japanese colony, it appears normal that the authorities would not treat Taiwan’s 
local inhabitants equally; hence, it is reasonable to assume that the Taiwanese would 
expect to be liberated from the Japanese Empire in 1945: 
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At this moment we deeply in great debt and our tears flow involuntarily, 
[because I] never anticipated during my lifetime that Taiwan could be 
restored [to China] and we can [once again] be Chinese. 428  (Chen, 
2005a: 41-42) 
 
Except for a few natives, the inhabitants of Taiwan are Han-Chinese. Hence, most of 
the people in Taiwan welcomed the restoration of Taiwan in 1945. However, the 
Taiwanese certainly underestimated the cultural gap caused by a 51-year division 
between the Han-Chinese in the mainland (Mainlanders) and those of Taiwan 
(Taiwanese): 
 
[I]t would not take long for the Taiwanese to discover that the Nationalist 
Party behaved no differently than the Communist Party at all, and it was 
nearly impossible to conclude which one was more evil than the other.429 
(Interview with Wu on 31-MAY-2013) 
 
President Wu Jan-Fu of the Asia Pacific Academic Exchange Foundation is one of the 
living eyewitnesses of the nationalist regime since Taiwan restoration. His grand-uncle 
was executed by the nationalists during the 2/28 Massacre in 1947; however, his uncle, 
Wu Po-Hsiung, served as Chairman of the Nationalist Party afterwards (2007-2009). 
He has devoted his whole life to Taiwan’s democratisation, and he was one of the 
original members who founded the Democratic Progressive Party (ibid). His comment 
about the reunification was: 
 
                                                     
428 Author’s Translation. 
429 Author’s Translation. 
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At the moment, being a senior Taiwan independentist, my greatest 
expectation is that the ideas of liberty and democracy could take root in 
the Chinese mainland. As long as they accept these [two] concepts, it is 
hard to tell whether the People’s Republic of China will be merged into 
the Republic of China, or whether the People’s Republic of China will 
unite the Republic of China.430 (ibid) 
 
Chairman Shih Ming-Te (Nori) of the Democratic Progressive Party is another famous 
anti-nationalist, and his interpretation of the relationship between the ROC and the PRC 
was: 
 
The Republic of China was founded on the Chinese mainland in 1912; 
[however, its rule on the mainland] was terminated due to the Chinese 
Civil War in 1949 and the Government of the Republic of China was 
withdrawn to Taiwan. The Government of the People’s Republic of 
China was formed in Beijing, China, at the same year, thus [the Republic 
of China] was formally divided into two nations. For the past 60 years, 
the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China co-existed 
[…] but [they] never belonged to each other any more.431 (Shih, 2011: 
16) 
 
Both President Wu Jan-Fu and Chairman Shih Ming-Te (Nori) belong to the ‘minor’ 
ROC (Klein-ROC, Taiwan only) upholders, namely that they deny any interrelationship 
between the ROC and the PRC and hold that Taiwan is an independent country named 
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431 Author’s Translation. 
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the Republic of China. The only difference is that Wu would conditionally accept a 
‘Great’ ROC (Groß-ROC, including Taiwan, mainland China and Mongolia) if such a 
thing were to happen (Interview with Wu on 31-MAY-2013), but Shih clearly stated 
that he only wanted a ‘Minor’ ROC because this is a matter of reality (Shih, 2011:109). 
Besides Wu (Klein-ROC in principle, accepts Groß-ROC conditionally) and Shih 
(Klein-ROC only), there are other opinions towards China and reunification: 
 
Taiwan is not a part of another country, it is not another country’s local 
government or province, Taiwan is not going to be the second Hong 
Kong or Macao, because Taiwan is a sovereign state. Briefly speaking, 
it shall be made clear that that Taiwan and China that from the other 
coast [of the Taiwan straits] are two countries.432 (President Chen Shui-
Bian’s Conference on 2 August 2002) 
 
[W]e have made [our political statement] very clear, insofar as we have 
interpreted the term ‘one China’ as the Republic of China. This position 
is non-negotiable, and we would negotiate [with Beijing] only under this 
position. If they cannot accept [our political position, then], very simply, 
we will not negotiate. In other words, if I became the President, or more 
precisely if I were the President of the Republic of China, [I] would 
make this position very straight, and would never ever disgrace our 
Republic of China. This is our Taiwan and we are the Taiwanese 
people.433 (President Ma Ying-Jeou’s Statement on 24 February 2008) 
 
                                                     
432 Author’s Translation. 
433 Author’s Translation. 
356 
 
President Chen Shui-Bian’s political position is unstable and confusing, because his 
opinion towards China and reunification is completely polarised. He is either an 
unconditional reunification upholder who can accept being absorbed into the PRC, or a 
fierce independent who upholds the ‘Republic of Taiwan’ at all costs (Chen, 2009: 220-
244). However, his polarised position reflects the fact that some Taiwanese support 
either China’s unconditional reunification or Taiwan’s absolute independence under the 
name of the Republic of Taiwan. He said: 
 
[M]y main point is to emphasise that if [the People’s Republic of] China 
wants unification, [China] should consider Taiwan’s independence first. 
If there is no division, there would be no unification; if there is no 
independence, how can the final unification happen?434 (ibid: 224) 
 
In contrast, President Ma Ying-Jeou’s political position is very clear, and represents the 
nationalist sense of conservatism that there is but only one China, the ROC – a ‘Great’ 
ROC (Groß-ROC) proposal. 
 
9.3.3 Statistical Insights 
 
How to delimit the national territory is a purely political question. It may 
also be called by some scholars an act of state. This question is not 
subject to judicial review according to the constitutional principle of 
separation of powers.435 
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357 
 
The reason why the Judicial Yuan refused to step in a territorial question is due to the 
diverse and incompatible perspectives of national identity in Taiwan. The Taiwanese 
national identity can be read very differently in light of various political tendencies, and 
each idea of identity has respectively defined an interrelationship between the ROC and 
the PRC (Fell, 2012: 133-150). This means that a territorial question equals a national 
identity question, and the Judicial Yuan would anger atleast some of the public who 
stood for an opposite national identity as long as the answer was concrete. 
 
9.1 Public Opinion on Unification vs. Independence, 1992-1996 
 
(Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University) 
 
Figure 9.1 shows changes in Taiwan’s public opinion on the issue of unification versus 
independence from 1992 to 1996. The independent Taiwan supports were 7.8% of total 
population in 1992, 13.2% in 1993, 11.1% in 1994, 11.6% in 1995, and 13.6% in 1996. 
In the meantime, the Chinese unification supporters were 39.5% of the total population 
in 1992, 39.3% in 1993; and then the figures dropped dramatically (1994: 20%; 1995: 
21.7%; 1996: 22%). This survey shows that public opinion was turning against the idea 
of Chinese reunification: they would rather choose to maintain the status quo (1992: 
17.5%; 1993: 10.8%; 1994: 48.3%; 1995: 40.4%; 1996: 45.8%) instead of unifying. On 
358 
 
average, 11.46% of Taiwan’s total population supported Taiwan’s independence from 
1992 to 1996, 28.56% supported Chinese unification, and 32.56% chose to maintain 
the status quo. The 2012 survey further demonstrates that the status quo option is 
favoured by the majority population in Taiwan: 
 
9.2 Public Opinion on Unification vs. Independence, June 2012 
 
(Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University) 
 
The Taiwanese public opinion survey on the issue of unification versus independence 
from 1992 to 1996 was not very helpful in terms of judicial decision-making in Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] because there is no ‘but for’ causation (cause-in-fact) 
between national identity options and territorial delimitation options. For example, 
supporters who stand for the status quo consist of those nationals who prefer a ‘Great’ 
ROC (Groß-ROC, including Taiwan, mainland China, and Mongolia), as well as those 
who simply wants a ‘Minor’ ROC (Klein-ROC, Taiwan only). In other words, the 
Justices must need to examine public opinion through a more detailed unification versus 
independence survey, such as Figure 9.3 below: 
 
9.3 Public Opinion on Unification vs. Independence, 1994 
Preference Ratio 
Unconditional Unification 4.4% 
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Preferred Unification 15.6% 
Status Quo, Decide Later 38.5% 
Patriots – Unconditionally the Republic of China 9.8% 
Preferred Independence 8% 
Unconditional Independence 3.1% 
(Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University) 
 
Of those who championed Chinese unification in 1994, their championship can be 
categorised into two types. Unconditional unification champions refer to those who care 
only about Chinese unification – even the unification leads into the destruction of the 
ROC. Conversely, preferred unification champions support Chinese unification 
conditionally – although they prefer the Chinese unification, the unification process 
must be carried out in the name of ROC. Hence, both types of unification champions 
would favour the Great ROC proposal on territorial controversies. 
 
Those who adhered to Taiwan’s independence in 1994 can also be categorised into two 
types. The adherents of unconditional independence were those who wanted to establish 
the Republic of Taiwan – they disliked both the Great-ROC or the Minor-ROC 
proposals on territorial controversies simply because of their hostility to the PRC. 
Meanwhile, adherents who preferred independence supported only the ‘Minor’ ROC 
proposal – for them, the ROC is Taiwan and they would not accept any further territories. 
 
For those who wished to maintain the status quo in 1994, their political opinion 
regarding the limits of the ROC national territory was actually unknown. The 
unconditional ROC supporters claimed only that they were fervent patriots of the ROC 
– without expressing a preference for a ‘Great’ or a ‘Minor’ ROC. Moreover, the 
political opinion of upholders who preferred the temporary status quo and wished to 
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make a decision at a later time is definitely unknown, because they have not made any 
decision yet. 
 
If the Justices decided in favour of a ‘Great’ ROC in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.328 [1993], their political position would definitely anger unconditional 
independent supporters, which accounted for 3.1% of total population, as well as those 
who preferred independence (8%). Only supporters who preferred unification (15.6%) 
and unconditional unification (4.4%) would appreciate the Justices’ political position. 
However, it was not clear whether supporters who preferred temporary status quo and 
wished to make their decisions in a later time (38.5%) would favour the Justices’ 
political position or not, whilst even those who supported the ROC unconditionally 
(9.8%) could be either Great-ROC or Minor-ROC supporters. In other words, according 
to the 1994 public opinion survey, if the Justices chose the ‘Great’ ROC plan, it would 
definitely please only 20% of total population. 11.1% would be angered, and the 
opinion of 48.3% was unknown (see Figure 9.4). 
 
9.4 Public Opinion on Great-ROC Proposal, 1994 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
If the Justices went for the ‘Minor’ ROC proposal in Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
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No.328 [1993], their political position would anger unconditional unification supporters 
(4.4%) and preferred unification supporters (15.6%). The unconditional independent 
supporters (3.1%) would dislike the Justices’ Minor-ROC decision as well. In the 
meantime, supporters who preferred independence (8%) would appreciate the Justices’ 
position. However, the temporary status quo supporters (38.5%) and the unconditional 
ROC supporters (9.8%) could still not be categorised into either the pro or the anti group 
because the temporary status quo supporters had made no decision yet, and the 
unconditional ROC supporters might support either the ‘Great’ ROC or ‘Minor’ ROC 
proposal. In other words, if the Justices chose the ‘Minor’ ROC plan, this judicial 
decision only covered a definite 8% of total population, while 23.1% would not approve 
of the decision and the opinion of 48.3% was unknown (see Figure 9.5). 
 
9.5 Public Opinion on Minor-ROC Proposal, 1994 
 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
The above analyses indicate that the Justices would anger at least 20% to 23.1% of 
Taiwan’s population if they were to make a concrete decision in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.328 [1993]. Conversely, they could only be confident that between 
8% to 11% of the total population would definitely welcome the adjudication. Moreover, 
48% of Taiwan’s population had not shown a preference for either the Great-ROC or 
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the Minor-ROC – they could approve or disapprove of the Justices’ decision. 
 
Whilst maintaining a sense of political realism, there was no good direction for the 
Justices to take in such a sharp political controversy, and it seemed reasonable for them 
to choose judicial self-restraint (McWhinney, 1986: 99-109) according to the Brandeis 
formulae. 436  The Justices would become forever unpopular and anger a large 
proportion of the population if a concrete answer was given – no matter what that 
answer was. More importantly, the Justices would be tabbed by the public as the 
unification or independent supporters, which was a situation the Justices strove to avoid. 
 
9.6 Public Opinion on Self-identification in Taiwan, 1994 
 
(Source: Election Study Centre, National Chengchi University) 
 
The 1994 public opinion survey on self-identification also demonstrates that it would 
not be wise for the Judicial Yuan to make a concrete decision. According to this survey, 
26.2% of Taiwan’s total population considered themselves as Chinese only, whilst 
Taiwanese identity accounted for 20.2%. In other words, the ROC was a country in 
which more than a quarter of its nationals considered themselves to have a national 
identity that was incompatible with another fifth of the country’s view. Under such 
                                                     
436 See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, (1936) 297 U.S. 288. 
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circumstances, was it wise for the Judicial Yuan to step into a political controversy on 
national identification, including national identity and delimitation issues? The answer 
is obviously no. 
 
9.3.4 Conclusion 
 
As everyone knows, this case was appealed due to the political debate 
on the reunification/independence issue in the Legislative Yuan; 
therefore, the consequences would be more serious or deadly if the 
Judicial Yuan made a concrete answer in this case.437 (Wu, 2004: 584) 
 
Justice Wu Geng recalled Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993], stating that it 
was the case in which the Judicial Yuan would confront serious (or deadly) political 
consequences if a concrete decision was made. As such, the application of the political 
question doctrine was strategically reasonable. Through this case we can not only learn 
how the Justices made strategic decisions; more importantly, we learn that they have 
made strategic decisions simply in order to avoid angering the public. In other words, 
we find clear evidence that the Justices not only read public opinion but also came to 
judicial decisions based upon it. 
 
9.4 CONCLUSION 
 
There is no doubt that power must be restricted by its source of power and its allies. We 
can therefore conclude that a power would avoid angering its source of power or its 
                                                     
437 Author’s Translation. 
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allies in practice. In the realm of judicial power studies, Baum constructed a theory 
based on this idea, indicating that judicial decision-makers may ‘present themselves in 
certain ways in order to gain something concrete from an audience’ (Baum, 2006: 28). 
In other words, judges would not only please the audiences but also avoid angering 
them ‘in order to gain something concrete from an audience’ (ibid). 
 
In Taiwan, we can see that Taiwan’s public opinion was the most crucial audience for 
the Judicial Yuan in the 1990s, because the Justices obtained great political power from 
the alliance between the judiciary and public opinion. The Justices would therefore 
choose silence in response to an event in which public opinion had strong bias, and they 
would refuse to become involved in an event in which public opinion was radically 
divided. In such cases, the Justices either lacked the courage of their convictions or 
simply tried hard to avoid involving themselves in a political morass. Such judicial 
deference shows how influential public opinion was. 
 
In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999], Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung left a puzzle 
behind. He was one of the most vocal critics of capital punishment in Taiwan, but he 
wrote no dissenting opinion against the ultimate decision on capital punishment, 
remaining completely silent. However, he continued to publish academic books 
regarding anti-capital punishment after this case was decided. 
 
In Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993], the Justices chose to apply the political 
question doctrine for the first time in history, holding that the delimitation of ROC 
territory is beyond the remit of the judicial power. However, the Judicial Yuan was 
constantly involved in political controversies in the 1990s, providing final resolutions 
all the time, so it is unusual for the Justices to claim that they were unable to decide a 
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case due to its inherent political controversies. The Justices chose to avoid making a 
concrete decision in Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.328 [1993] for strategic reasons – 
they knew it would be unwise to make any decision on issues in which the state was so 
divided between reunification and independence. 
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10: CONCLUSION 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Woe to him that claims obedience when it is not due; woe to him that 
refuses it when it is. – Thomas Carlyle (1840) 
 
This thesis footnotes the expansion of judicial power in Taiwan in the 1990s through 
Carlyle’s aphorism, and responds to the question Ginsburg asked: 
 
How can a constitutional court that served an authoritarian regime 
become an instrument for democracy and human rights? (Ginsburg, 
2003: 106) 
 
It is easy to see that the ROC constitutionalism follows the spirit of judicial supremacy. 
The constitutional text, structure and context, as well as the country’s legal culture in 
general, provide the Judicial Yuan with massive constitutional powers with no attempt 
to install formal-legal restrictions. This means in theory that the Justices will always 
have sufficient power to check-and-balance other branches of government, and have 
done since the implementation of the ROC Constitution. However, the Judicial Yuan 
was a much weaker state organ before the Justices found a way to turn public opinion 
into a key political ally. In other words, public opinion in Taiwan in the 1990s was the 
real springboard for judicial power expansion, as the other branches as institutional 
safeguards against judicial supremacy proved ineffective in political terms. 
 
Taiwan’s judicial power expansion, in terms of the tools at the Justices’ disposal, was 
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also deeply rooted in traditional Chinese culture. The need for judicial decision makers 
within Chinese society offered more space for the exercise of judicial power and fewer 
bounds to this power because of the strong Chinese tendency towards substantive 
justice. As long as a judicial decision maker could pursue ‘substantive justice in 
accordance with public opinion’, he or she would not risk facing questions about 
procedural imperfections or judicial overreach. Likewise, the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty (Bickel, 1962: 9-22) – or rather the counter-majoritarian myth – fades into the 
background as soon as we learn to appreciate constitutional courts as majoritarian 
institutions. This thesis has illustrated via various case studies that the majority of 
Taiwanese society supports the Judicial Yuan not merely as an institution but also in 
terms of the specific political choices the court makes, giving the Judicial Yuan indirect 
democratic legitimacy. The social context of public opinion and public support 
stimulate Taiwan’s Justices into strategic decision-making in alignment with public 
opinion. In other words, Taiwan’s Justices need to be skilled readers of public opinion 
before making decisions, because they were well aware that it represents not only their 
safeguard against political intervention but also the best method of judicial power 
expansion. 
 
This concluding chapter revisits the role of constitutional design and traditional culture 
to illustrate how fertile and welcoming the environment was for judicial power 
expansion. The two crucial variables developed by this thesis will be re-examined to 
form a conclusion that Taiwan’s judicial power expansion in the 1990s was an upshot 
of the link between the ROC’s constitutional design and its traditional culture. It is 
therefore probable that the Justices would stand in line with public opinion by using 
their powers of judicial review actively and strategically as guardians of the constitution, 
whilst remedying Taiwan’s occasional defects in representative democracy as an 
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alternative lawmaking body. 
 
Res dura, et regni novitas, me talia cogunt. Moliri, et late fines custode 
tueri. – Publius Vergilius Maro (70-19BCE) 
 
10.2 VARIABLE ONE: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
 
[T]he jurisdiction of the [Republic of China’s] judiciary not only refers 
to adjudications between civilians and civilians, or between civilians and 
officials, but further includes constitutional judicial review power 
against both congressional legislations and the President’s 
administrative discretion. [Our] rule of law shall not be considered 
successful, ultimate or prefect until such a power is exercised, the power 
of judicial supremacy.438 – Carsun Chang (1946) 
 
Carsun Chang’s opinion on the fundamentals of the ROC constitutional design in 1947 
illustrates that the ROC Constitution of 1947 was deliberately designed to pursue 
judicial supremacy – which is what Carsun Chang wanted. As long as the Constitution 
was being implemented, it is reasonable to predict that judicial power expansion within 
the ROC would be a strong probablility, because the fundamental constitutional design 
provides an excellent breeding ground for such an expansion. 
 
It is also reasonable to conclude that the ROC Constitution embodies the spirit of 
judicial supremacy. The Constitution on one hand provides a series of safeguards 
                                                     
438 Author’s Translation. 
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against political intervention towards the judiciary.439 On the other, it also deliberately 
authorises a huge amount of power to the judiciary440 without providing any specific 
strategies or limitations to that power. Judicial activism was thus designed to play an 
important part in ROC constitutionalism – subject to a condition whereby the Justices 
can find the way (through judiciary-public opinion alliance) of using it in politics. In 
other words, Carsun Chang chose the Justices as the ‘guardians of the constitution’ 
intentionally, but gave no political resolution of how this judicial activism could be 
achieved. The Justices waited for Taiwan’s political fragmentation through 
democratisation in 1990, when the diffusion of political power in other branches of 
government took place (Ginsburg, 2003: 106-157). They then opened up a political 
space for judicial power expansion by putting institutional roles into play, in which 
Carsun Chang expected the Justices to have the last word. 
 
By elucidating the concept of the guardian of the constitution, Chief Justice Weng Yueh-
Sheng tells us that the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 foresaw the 
Judicial Yuan becoming involved in political controversies: 
 
The Constitution expects much from the Justices of the Judicial Yuan; 
[as a result], many constitutional articles [deliberately] express that laws 
that are in conflict with the Constitution, orders that are in conflict with 
the Constitution or with laws, and local autonomous regulations and 
rules that are conflict with the Constitution shall all be rendered null and 
void. In addition, [the Constitution] repeatedly emphasises that when 
                                                     
439 Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 81 (1947) (Gesetzesvorbehalt), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 80 
(1947) (Verfassungsvorbehalt). 
440 Compare Constitution of R.O.C. § 77 (1947), with Constitution of R.O.C. § 78 (1947), Constitution 
of R.O.C. § 114 (1947), and Constitution of R.O.C. § 115 (1947). 
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doubt arises as to whether or not [a law, order or local autonomous 
regulation and rule] is in conflict with the Constitution, ‘interpretation 
thereon shall be made by the Judicial Yuan’, and that ‘an 
unconstitutional article shall be null and void’ if it is held to be 
unconstitutional by the Judicial Yuan. [What is more], the Constitution 
ignores the judicial power’s passive nature, authorising the Judicial Yuan 
to use a semi-active judicial review power over the [ROC] Provincial 
Self-Government Regulations – ‘the Regulations of Provincial Self-
Government shall, after enactment, be forthwith submitted to the 
Judicial Yuan’ [for active judicial review] […]441 (Weng, 1976: 475-476) 
 
Even pre-democratisation, the authoritarian government would not be able to directly 
and openly override a Judicial Yuan decision. For instance, in 1960, the Judicial Yuan 
decided via Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.86 [1960] that both the district courts and 
high courts should be subordinated to the Judicial Yuan, and the Executive Yuan seemed 
to accept this judicial decision. However, retaliation could take place by stealth: under 
the name procedural hand-over, the Executive Yuan took 19 years to carry out the 
court’s order (Tung, 2005: 442). However, we can conclude from this event that the 
court’s order could not be openly disregarded even in the pre-democracy era, or the 
Executive Yuan would stand accused of attempting to disregard the Constitution 
altogether. 
 
When we look back at China in 1946, we find a surprising constitutional meme of 
judicial activism which ROC nationalists embraced, but which was also driven forward 
                                                     
441 Author’s Translation. 
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by another actor – the Communist Party. According to Carsun Chang’s recollection, the 
Communist Party – albeit somewhat unbelievably – played a massively important role 
in the construction of the Judicial Yuan’s role (Yang, 1993: 130-131). They were 
China’s first political interest group to favour judicial activism by virtue of their 
political need to check and balance the ruling Nationalist Party (ibid). In other words, 
the Judicial Yuan’s political role was planned deliberately by important actors within 
the constitution-making process, giving birth to the notion that the Justices could be 
vital political mediators within the ROC political system. Ironically, it was originally 
promoted by the Chinese communists (ibid), even though judicial activism was no 
longer welcomed after they took power on the Chinese mainland. However, since the 
communists attempted to check and balance the ruling Nationalist Party through the 
constitutional use of judicial power, the 1947 Constitution was given an institutional 
power challenging authority in the form of the Judicial Yuan. The democrats later took 
advantage of this power in a political game in which the judiciary was used as a 
mediator (Brams, 2004: 199-242) – a role which had already been deliberately provided 
for that purpose. 
 
As a matter of fact, the most common political theme behind political demonstrations 
against the Nationalist Party during Taiwan’s dictatorship period was accusing the 
nationalists of unconstitutionality. The regime was referred to as unlawful unless and 
until Taiwan’s full democratisation according to the ideals of the Constitution (Lee, 
2009: 282-283): 
 
[T]here are still many political realities that are not truly compatible with 
the ideal of the Constitution. [Thus], we eagerly expect the [Nationalist] 
Government to serve this Constitution loyally without any far-fetched 
372 
 
excuses of unconstitutionality.442 (Taiwan Times Editorial, 1987: 44) 
 
Carsun Chang’s Constitution offered a unique political path towards democracy, and 
over the following decades the Justices followed that path well. In the 1950s, the ROC 
aimed to retake the Chinese mainland, an operation which required the country to live 
under a state-of-emergency political system. The Justices supported the system via 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.31 [1954] and judicial review power was restricted 
accordingly. But public opinion in the ROC shifted towards the acceptance of the status 
quo in the late 1980s, and the necessity of state-of-emergency was called into 
questioned constitutionally. The Judicial Yuan therefore chose political assertion in 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] on the basis of public opinion, and the 
political space for the expansion of judicial power opened up accordingly: 
 
1. Taiwan’s political demonstrators stood against their authoritarian 
government in the name of unconstitutionality, and the government faced 
losing legitimacy because it could not accuse the demonstrators of illegality. 
In comparison with other autocracies, Taiwan’s model of democratic 
transition was easier because of state theory and political ideologies the 
constitutional design embodied. 
 
2. If the ROC Constitution was being implemented fully, the judiciary would 
become the ultimate winner of this political game because of the 
constitutional design. This was sufficient cause for the Judicial Yuan to lead 
the people of Taiwan towards democracy. 
                                                     
442 Author’s Translation. 
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3. Here is a chicken or egg problem. It is reasonable to conclude that the 
Judicial Yuan encouraged the people of Taiwan towards democracy by using 
its constitutional judicial review power at critical moments. It is also 
reasonable to claim that the Justices dared to challenge the authoritarian 
government because it had the support of the people of Taiwan and their 
desire for democratic constitutionalism. However, it is irrelevant to argue 
which came first or whether judicial review power or public opinion is more 
important. What matters is that the Judicial Yuan achieved judicial power 
expansion by standing side by side with the public, sincerely committed to 
the interests and welfare of the people of Taiwan. 
 
In a nutshell, the Judicial Yuan made a shrewd political move with Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.261 [1990], giving them massive amounts of political credibility as 
the best political mediator within the political system in Taiwan (Interview with Li on 
17-JUN-2013). This historical event, what Ackerman calls ‘a constitutional moment’ 
(Ackerman, 1991: 1-324), no doubt strengthened the Judicial Yuan’s political role as 
the ultimate political mediator with the power of the last word, expanding the Justices’ 
political influence and, in consequence, materialising the Constitution’s original design 
for the ROC judiciary. 
 
10.3 VARIABLE TWO: LAW AND SOCIETY 
 
The pursuit of substantive justice was the original value orientation of 
China’s legal system, and the emphasis on substantive justice and the 
neglect of procedural justice became barriers to the rule of law. The 
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system paid no regard to whether or not law enforcement or court rulings 
were carried out in accordance with the law; as long as the result was 
favourable, there was no need to care about procedural details. (Wang, 
2010a: 38) 
 
For the Chinese, substantive law always represents the ultimate sense of 
fairness and social justice, which for the most part is reflected by the 
customs, practices and usages of Chinese society. The written law is only 
a form through which to realise justice. As long as justice is done, people 
are not bothered too much about the statutory basis of the judgement. To 
most Chinese, ‘due process’ is an unknown quantity. To the legal 
profession, it is something desirable, rather than something 
indispensable. (Gao, 1989: 89-116) 
 
The Chinese cultural preference for substantive justice implies that Chinese society 
provides more space and less constraint for the exercise of judicial power, because due 
process is only ‘desirable’ rather than ‘indispensable’ (ibid). For example, Judge Chou 
Yu-Lan says: 
 
If there is a conflict between substantive justice and procedural justice, 
unless it is a serious infringement of the defendant’s personal rights, I 
will prioritise substantive justice.443 (Interview with Chou on 24-JUN-
2013) 
 
                                                     
443 Author’s Translation. 
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Although it is debatable whether or not public opinion is equal to substantive justice in 
theory, and where to draw the line between populist justice and substantive justice, there 
is no doubt that substantive justice is broadly supported as the view held by the Chinese 
majority. In other words, as long as the Justices pursue substantive justice in broad 
alignment with public opinion, their political influence will immediately grow, 
unobstructed by formalism or procedural details. To benefit as much as possible from 
indirect democratic legitimacy, it becomes important for the Justices to learn to read 
public opinion and make strategic decisions accordingly: 
 
In terms of whether the Justice of the Republic of China take public 
opinion seriously or not, [and] the question of whether [they] read public 
opinion or not, I think, speaking overall, it is nearly impossible for a 
jurist in the Republic of China, including Justices and judges, to 
completely ignore social reactions […]444 (Interview with Ma on 19-
JUL-2013) 
 
Generally speaking, whilst the atmosphere is that public opinion 
obviously supports the Justices of the Judicial Yuan, the Legislative 
Yuan would never act rashly and blindly!445 (Interview with Li on 17-
JUN-2013) 
 
In summary, this thesis highlighted the fact that Taiwan’s 1947 constitutional design 
embraced judicial activism with no strict formal legal limitations; Meanwhile, we can 
learn from Taiwan’s judiciary-public opinion alliance that judicial activism in Taiwan 
                                                     
444 Author’s Translation. 
445 Author’s Translation. 
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is both politically supported and limited by public opinion. The interdisciplinary 
analysis this thesis adopted has verified the influence of public opinion upon Taiwan’s 
judicial decision-making using an ex adverso legal-political validation, by which we 
have learned that since public opinion became a crucial variable over judicial decision-
making because the court could not achieve judicial activism without public support, 
there is no longer much space for sincere judicial decisions. 
 
Looking at political question doctrine cases has helped us assess the extent to which 
there was theoretically ‘no limit to’ (Stennis, 1958: 1179-1181) but only ‘self-imposed 
limits on’ (Neubaver and Meinhold, 2010: 441-472) judicial power in Taiwan. The 
constitutional restrictions against judicial power expansion in Taiwan in accordance 
with related constitutional interpretative theories did not create a legally binding force 
over time. However, we have discovered that strong public opinion and preferences are 
a clear boundary the court will not cross, and this in reality constitutes a limitation on 
judicial power expansion – a limitation which clearly emerged when considering the 
death penalty in Taiwan. 
 
If we choose to see public opinion in a positive light, we learn from Taiwan that a 
judiciary can be powerful as an alternative lawmaker at moments when representative 
democracy fails. In Germany, on the 24th of March 1933 when the Enabling Act was 
passed, no guardian of the Weimar Constitution chose to stand against the Nazis on 
behalf of the German people; however, on the 3rd of September 1999, when the Fifth 
Additional Article of the ROC Constitution was passed, the Judicial Yuan struck it down 
with clear public support through Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000]. If 
Taiwan’s mechanism of accountability – whether the lawmaker is elected or unelected 
– is relevant to political legitimacy, the 3rd of September 1999 could be seen as 
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Taiwan’s 24th of March 1933. If Taiwanese society had paid less attention to the 
political values that embrace legitimacy deriving simply from power used justly, there 
would have been no legendary dissolution of congress case446 either, and Taiwan’s 
political miracle of peaceful democratisation would not have come to pass. 
 
When we look at public opinion in a negative light, and bear in mind the dangers of 
populism, we learn from Taiwan that not all public preferences play constructive roles 
for deliberative democracy, and at some point the courts will encounter a case in which 
they cannot defer to strong public opinion without being politically harmed in the 
process. The courts must be strategic, but wise strategists think long term too. In the 
repetitive game of judicial review, exclusive judicial attention to ‘the mainstream 
human rights of the majority, and have a poor sense of human rights protection for the 
minority and the disadvantaged’ 447  (Li, 2012: 346) might build only short-term 
institutional legitimacy. If the courts seek never to anger the vast majority of their 
audience today, their judicial choices to not support the struggle of society’s weakest 
sectors can lead to de-limitising legacies in the long run. In Taiwan, the notorious 
Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.618 [2006] that openly discriminates against new 
mainland Chinese immigrants448 to Taiwan is the best example. Although this case is 
beyond the remit of this thesis, it hints at the possibility of changing meanings of the 
judiciary-public opinion alliance in the new millennium. 
 
10.4 STATISTICAL INSIGHTS 
 
                                                     
446 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990]. 
447 Author’s Translation. 
448 Like China’s legal tradition of lex talionis in Taiwan’s death penalty cases, this case touches the core 
of Chinese morality: do enemies deserve equal fundamental rights? Here we see that the Justices deferred 
to public opinion. 
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As shown in previous chapters, this thesis is committed to a data-heavy approach for 
the study of judicial decision-making of the Judicial Yuan. This is particularly true of 
Chapter 5, in which a series of background studies of media, the judiciary, the Judicial 
Yuan and the Justices were statistically reviewed. In addition, case law analyses (see 
also Chapters 6 to 9) were influenced by existing models of statistical analysis within 
the field of judicial behaviourism. In contrast to the existing Taiwanese legal 
scholarship, which focuses exclusively on doctrinal analysis, this thesis offered unique 
insights by examining the history of the Judicial Yuan through statistical insights – 
which of course represents a new and entirely different scientific approach which in the 
case of Taiwan has not been used or tested before. However, the main difficulty in 
applying this new approach to a country like Taiwan, which has never used statistics to 
study judicial decision-making, was where to find the data? 
 
All data-sets used in this thesis were compiled from massive official data collections. 
Although the data were not collected for the purpose of understanding judicial decision-
making in Taiwan, this thesis sieved out relevant information from apparently unrelated 
documents and linked them together for theoretical analysis. This is a new and original 
approach. All data-sets labelled as ‘compiled by the author’ are original, and nothing 
similar has been displayed before despite the fact that they originate from official 
statistics collected by the ROC Government. The compilation required Chinese 
linguistic skills as well as knowledge of Taiwanese jurisprudence. 
 
If we take the Justices’ signatures as an example, they are used only for formalities and 
few researchers pay attention to them. Even on the Judicial Yuan’s online database, the 
Justices’ signatures are not regularly listed. However, the research behind this thesis led 
to the discovery of a document that lists the Justices’ signatures in each case, namely 
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the Judicial Yuan Gazette, which is issued on a monthly basis. With the knowledge of 
relevant jurisprudence, these signatures were counted case by case, revealing the actual 
size of each bench in each case for the first time, along with an unequivocal bill of 
absence for the Justices. By looking this bill of absence, this thesis was able to discover 
that all the crucial cases in the 1990s were decided en banc, and the order of the Justices’ 
signatures was also checked (see also Chapter 5). 
 
For Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990], the data-sets compiled by this thesis 
from the instrument of appeal also profile the political weight of this legendary case. 
The 26 legislators who signed this instrument included1 President, 2 premiers, 1 vice 
premier, 5 ministers and 1 vice minister, 2 county mayors and 1 vice mayor. How can 
we thus hold that the Judicial Yuan has obtained no political rewards afterwards by 
linking themselves with such a legendary decision (see also Chapter 6)? In Taiwan, 
legal professionals commonly agree that the political role of the Judicial Yuan has 
become more and more important since Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] 
(Weng, 1998: 310-311). The concrete evidence presented by this thesis via case-coding 
takes the argument to a new empirical level. Similarly, the coding and data shows how 
power is balanced, continuously shifting back and forth between the various branches 
of Taiwan’s government. This can be properly explained by the classifications of the 
judicial reviews requested by state organs (see also Chapter 7). However, no Taiwanese 
academics has previously undertaken any case-coding, and no such a trend has been 
used to study the exercise of judicial power in the field of judicial politics. Whilst jurists 
have read and analysed these cases as much as the author of this thesis, the only thing 
they did not do is categorise the cases according to type, nature and names of appellant 
and defendant. The search for patterns through case-coding is difficult for Taiwanese 
legal academics because most of them are not trained that way and would not intuitively 
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embrace such a method to study judicial behaviourism. At the same time, case-coding 
would be an impossible task for foreign legal academics because of their difficulty to 
acquiring linguistic skills in classical Chinese. 
 
The Taiwanese unawareness of judicial behaviourism in the legal academic field 
constituted a ‘virgin territory’ for this thesis to explore. We already know whether a 
judicial decision is logical and compatible to the Taiwanese jurisprudence because of 
its repetitive examination via doctrinal analysis. But why a judicial decision is made in 
a particular way remains surprisingly unaddressed. Lawyers and jurists in Taiwan have 
wondered, but none have attempted to analyse this aspect of the judicial approach 
scientifically. Aa another example, this thesis discovered through case-coding that as 
far as the 1990s were concerned, no claim pertinent to the special power relationship 
was ever lost (100% odds) and no claim related to mainland Chinese affairs was ever 
won (0% odds) (see also Chapter 8). Furthermore, no Taiwanese legal study before this 
thesis has attempted to explain why the odds in the aforementioned cases were so 
extreme. All the data-sets compiled by this thesis reflect Taiwanese public opinion, but 
no one has ever analysed this scientifically before, thus opening up the possibility of an 
entirely different type of discourse and putting the Judicial Yuan back on the map of 
comparative analysis too. 
 
Fresh theoretical approaches lead to different ways of looking at a case. There is no 
doubt that capital punishment is still supported by a strong and absolute majority of the 
Taiwanese public. For this thesis, then, what stands out is not jurisprudential coherence 
or precedent – but the unusual decision made by Justice Su Jyun-Hsiung in Judicial 
Yuan Interpretation No.476 [1999] (see also Chapter 9). The silence of Justice Su leads 
this thesis to suspect that he decided strategically because of public opinion, and this 
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decision is supported by statistics in relation to Taiwan’s public opinion on capital 
punishment. 
 
10.5 INTERVIEWS AND ARCHIVAL STUDIES 
 
Fieldwork for the interview project began in May 2013 and was expected to last at least 
until September 2013; however, the original plan for the second round of fieldwork was 
suspended because of the discovery of the Judicial Yuan’s oral historical project that 
consists of the retired Justices’ official interviews. The Justices interviewed drew the 
researcher’s attention to these official interviews. The author searched out the entire 
collection at the Taipei National Central Library. The aforementioned statistical analysis 
conducted for this thesis was mainly carried out in May 2013, and all the data-sets 
compiled by this thesis point overwhelmingly to a single conclusion – that public 
opinion was the most important variable influencing the decision making of the Judicial 
Yuan during the 1990s. The qualitative engagement with the interview project was 
conducted in accordance with the data-sets compiled, aiming to back up and explain 
the statistical analysis by talking to the Justices and other people involved. 
 
This thesis is at times based upon the common-sense expectations of Taiwanese citizens 
in relation to public opinion. For example, in the legendary Judicial Yuan Interpretation 
No.261 [1990], none of the Justices interviewed doubted whether Taiwan’s public 
opinion in 1990 preferred democracy – this fundamental question was not tested 
through a Judicial Yuan initiated opinion poll, but was a common-sense expectation. 
Chairman Hsu Hsin-Liang, who led the democrats, chose the word ‘self-evident’ 
(Interview with Hsu on 10-MAY-2013) accordingly. Hence, when the Justices went 
directly to discussing Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.261 [1990] when interviewed, 
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saying: 
 
We the Justices had already noticed the changing political atmosphere 
in which [our] nationals wanted a constitutional reform, whereas our 
people’s desire was just. Therefore, the fifth-term Justices had a 
common consensus that we should push the country’s constitutional and 
political system towards this necessary reform.449 (Interview with Ma 
on 13-JUL-2013) 
 
No criticism is needed because this is already the Chinese way the Justices said they 
had been influenced by public opinion.450 
 
Cultural characteristics that govern conversations, the professional codes of judges and 
in particular their codes of honour also encouraged increased attention to archival 
studies. When the oral history project conducted by the Judicial Yuan was introduced 
by the Justices to the author of this thesis, it implied that official interview is the criteria 
for citation directly used by the Justices interviewed according to Chinese culture. 
Anything beyond the official interview requires additional permission. At first sight, 
this may seem to be bad news for this researcher, but in reality it was not. The Chinese 
elites have a long history of writing, and they prefer to write down their stories and 
ideas in their own words (in books, memoirs and articles) or through official records – 
Chinese elites have even self-published their writings (e.g., Justices Wang Tze-Chien 
and Wu Geng) because of their desire to tell the story in their own way. In other words, 
                                                     
449 Author’s Translation. 
450 A confirmation such as ‘Yes, I was definitely influenced’ is almost impossible to elicit in Chinese 
culture. 
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the Justices tell the stories they want to tell in exactly the way they want to tell. This 
can be mistaken for formalism – because of the written format – but the result is 
enormously information-rich. Hence, many Justices interviewed suggested that their 
books and official interview should suffice in terms of the qualitative ambitions of this 
thesis, and additional interviews would only be conducted when the author of this thesis 
had specific additional questions. 
 
Reading the official interviews conducted by the Judicial Yuan through its oral history 
project is a transformative experience for any researcher. Whilst the quality of these 
archives is outstanding by any standards, the value of the official interviews has not yet 
been broadly appreciated in Taiwan because almost no Taiwanese legal academic before 
this thesis had gone beyond the classical doctrinal analysis and expanded the Taiwanese 
jurisprudence into the realm of judicial behaviourism. Taiwan’s political scientists pay 
little enough attention to the Judicial Yuan in the first place. Whilst the entire collection 
of the oral history project conducted by the Judicial Yuan has been accessible in the 
National Central Library for a decade, almost no citations of or references to it can be 
found. The author of this thesis especially recalls the reaction of Justice Herbert H.P. 
Ma when he found out about this thesis: he sighed and said that almost no one in the 
researcher’s generation has the patience to listen to his stories anymore, and worried 
that the wisdom of his generation is vanishing. 
 
10.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Taiwan’s judiciary-public opinion alliance in the 1990s could be read in two ways. 
Firstly, it was the Justices’ strategy against political intervention as they aimed to 
become Taiwan’s guardians of the constitution. Their decisions were strategic responses 
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to the political atmosphere of the day. Secondly, the Chinese cultural tradition provides 
a fertile ground for judicial power as long as the Justices pay careful attention to public 
opinion as a primary judicial audience. The formula behind the success of Taiwan’s 
judicial power expansion in the 1990s therefore consisted of strategic decision-making 
in accordance with the public opinion of the time, eventually resulting in the 
institutional judicial supremacy stipulated by the ROC Constitution. 
 
Ginsburg’s insurance model (Ginsburg, 2003: 25) studied the Judicial Yuan’s power 
expansion through separation of powers games between various branches of Taiwan’s 
government (see also Chapter 7), in which weakened political actors insure themselves 
for the future by committing to judicial review. However, the explanation for the 
opportunity of judicial power expansion, is different from the reasons why the Justices 
chose to take on this role in general, and the insurance model also fails to explain 
periods of judicial deference. 
 
To set a background, this thesis also acknowledges the work of Pritchett, Murphy, 
Schubert, Baum, Epstein, Knight, Staton, and Vanberg, reconstructing a strategic model 
that isolates public opinion as Taiwan’s most important judicial audience in the 1990s, 
a period during which the Judicial Yuan knew it had little to fear in terms of retaliation 
by the executive and the legislature because of the judiciary-public opinion alliance. 
Justices could choose to impose their will on other branches of government without fear 
of retribution, and when the court deferred to strong public opinion, our model 
continues to deliver insights through the identification of the political limitations of 
judicial power expansion. 
 
In a nutshell, this thesis began by illustrating the enormous expansion of judicial power 
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in Taiwan since the 1990s. Such expansion was partly due to the ROC’s specific 
constitutional design and Chinese legal culture. The Justices of the Judicial Yuan were 
deliberately designated as guardians of the ROC Constitution by Carsun Chang, and 
correspond to strong cultural expectations of an alignment between judicial decision-
making and public opinion. These variables provide not only a path for judicial power 
expansion, but also a strong moral and cultural sense of responsibility that underlies 
judicial decision-making (Anson et al., 2009: 211) and feeds the judiciary-public 
opinion alliance (Baum, 1997: 89-124; Shapiro, 1981: 157-193). It seems fitting to end 
this thesis with an aphorism by Zhang Zai, a Chinese Neo-Confucian philosopher, with 
regard to the expected moral and cultural behaviour of Chinese intelligentsia: 
 
[A Chinese intellectual shall] maintain the Confucian merciful morality 
in the Universe, providing knowledge for the masses, inheriting the 
ancient wisdoms from and for [our] sages, as well as creating an epoch 
of peace and prosperity for [our] descendants.451 – Zhang Zai (1020-
1077) 
 
The Justices are willing, expected and empowered to expand judicial power culturally 
and constitutionally as long as they attempt to safeguard the imagined will of the people 
from perceived defects of the political system. The Justices of the Judicial Yuan are 
encouraged to be activists, to imposing their will – the people’s will – upon the other 
branches of government, overriding executive actions and acts of the legislature as an 
alternative lawmaker in the name of indirect democracy. 
 
                                                     
451 Author’s Translation. 
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APPENDIX (A): PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF THE FIFTH-TERM JUSTICES 
JUSTICE ORIGIN BIRTHPLACE 
WENG Yueh-Sheng 
(1932 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
CHAI Shau-Hsien 
(1924 – ) 
Jilin 
(Mainlander) 
Fengtian Province, 
Republic of China 
YANG Yu-Ling 
(1925 – ) 
Sichuan 
(Mainlander) 
Sichuan Province, 
Republic of China 
LEE Chung-Sheng 
(1923 – ) 
Unknown 
(Mainlander) 
Henan Province, 
Republic of China 
YANG Chien-Hua 
(1927 – 1998) 
Jiangsu 
(Mainlander) 
Jiangsu Province, 
Republic of China 
YANG Zu-Zan 
(1933 – 1994) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
Herbert Han-Pao Ma 
(1926 – ) 
Anhui 
(Mainlander) 
Hubei Province, 
Republic of China 
LIU Tieh-Cheng 
(1938 – ) 
Hebei 
(Mainlander) 
Hebei Province, 
Republic of China 
CHENG Chien-Tsai 
(1925 – ) 
Fujian 
(Mainlander) 
Fujian Province, 
Republic of China 
WU Geng 
(1940 – ) 
Hainan 
(Mainlander) 
Canton Province, 
Republic of China 
SHIH Shen-An Shandong Shandong Province, 
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(1923 – ) (Mainlander) Republic of China 
CHEN Rui-Tang 
(1928-2010) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
CHANG Cheng-Tao 
(1922 – ) 
Liaoning 
(Mainlander) 
Fengtian Province, 
Republic of China 
CHANG Teh-Sheng 
(1923 – ) 
Jiangxi 
(Mainlander) 
Jiangxi Province, 
Republic of China 
LEE Chih-Peng 
(1932-2004) 
Guizhou 
(Mainlander) 
Guizhou Province, 
Republic of China 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (B): PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF THE SIXTH-TERM JUSTICES 
JUSTICE ORIGIN BIRTHPLACE 
WENG Yueh-Sheng 
(1932 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
LIU Tieh-Cheng 
(1938 – ) 
Hebei 
(Mainlander) 
Hebei Province, 
Republic of China 
WU Geng 
(1940 – ) 
Hainan 
(Mainlander) 
Canton Province, 
Republic of China 
WANG Ho-Hsiung 
(1941 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
WANG Tze-Chien 
(1938 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
LIN Young-Mou 
(1938 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
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LIN Kuo-Hsien 
(1936 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
Vincent SZE 
(1933 – ) 
Zhejiang 
(Mainlander) 
Zhejiang Province, 
Republic of China 
CHENG Chung-Mo 
(1938 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
SUN Sen-Yen 
(1933 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
CHEN Chi-Nan 
(1937 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
TSENG Hua-Sun 
(1936 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
TUNG Hsiang-Fei 
(1933 – ) 
Jiangsu 
(Mainlander) 
Jiangsu Province, 
Republic of China 
YANG Huey-Ing 
(1934 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
TAI Tong-Schung 
(1937 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
SU Jyun-Hsiung 
(1935 – 2011) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
HWANG Yueh-Chin 
(1941 – 2009) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Colony, 
Imperial Japan 
LAI In-Jaw 
(1946 – ) 
Taiwan 
(Taiwanese) 
Taiwan Province, 
Republic of China 
HSIEH Tsay-Chuan Taiwan Taiwan Colony, 
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(1944 – ) (Taiwanese) Imperial Japan 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (C): EDUCATION BACKGROUND OF THE FIFTH-TERM JUSTICES 
JUSTICE EDUCATION BACKGROUND 
WENG Yueh-Sheng (Constitutional and Administrative Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Heidelberg 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
A.A. – Tainan Normal School 
CHAI Shau-Hsien (Constitutional Law and Criminal Law) 
LL.M. – Yale University 
LL.B. – Northeastern University 
YANG Yu-Ling (Civil Law and Civil Procedure) 
Dip. – Institute for Defense Studies 
Dip. – Institute of Policy Development 
LL.B. – Chengchi University 
LEE Chung-Sheng (Legal Philosophy and Legal History) 
LL.B. – Anhui University 
YANG Chien-Hua (Civil Procedure) 
N/A – (But he was a legendary master) 
YANG Zu-Zan (Legal Philosophy) 
S.J.D. – Tokyo University 
LL.M. – Tokyo University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
A.A. – Tainan Normal School 
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Herbert Han-Pao Ma (Legal Philosophy) 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
LIU Tieh-Cheng (Private International Law) 
S.J.D. – University of Utah 
LL.M. – Southern Methodist University 
LL.B. – Chengchi University 
CHENG Chien-Tsai (Civil Law and Civil Procedure) 
Dip. – Institute for Defense Studies 
WU Geng (Constitutional and Administrative Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Wien 
M.A. (Politics) – Taiwan University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
SHIH Shen-An (N/A) 
LL.B. – Central University 
CHEN Rui-Tang (N/A) 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
CHANG Cheng-Tao (N/A) 
LL.B. – Changchun University 
CHANG Teh-Sheng (Civil Law and Commercial Law) 
M.A. (Politics) – Harvard University 
LL.B. – Chengchi University 
LEE Chih-Peng (Civil Law and Legal Philosophy) 
S.J.D. – California Institute of Law 
LL.M. – Southern Methodist University 
LL.B. – Taipei University 
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(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (D): EDUCATION BACKGROUND OF THE SIXTH-TERM JUSTICES 
JUSTICE EDUCATION BACKGROUND 
WENG Yueh-Sheng (Constitutional and Administrative Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Heidelberg 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
A.A. – Tainan Normal School 
LIU Tieh-Cheng (Private International Law) 
S.J.D. – University of Utah 
LL.M. – Southern Methodist University 
LL.B. – Chengchi University 
WU Geng (Constitutional and Administrative Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Wien 
M.A. (Politics) – Taiwan University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
WANG Ho-Hsiung (Administrative Law) 
S.J.D. – Chengchi University 
LL.M. – Chengchi University 
LL.B. – Chengchi University 
A.A. – Tainan Normal School 
WANG Tze-Chien (Civil Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität München 
LL.M. – Taiwan University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
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LIN Young-Mou (Criminal Procedure) 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
LIN Kuo-Hsien (Constitutional Politics) 
R.P.D. – Chinese Culture University 
Master Degree – Unknown 
Bachelor Degree – Unknown 
Vincent SZE (Commercial Law) 
J.D. – Willamette University 
M.A. (Journalism) – Oregon University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
CHENG Chung-Mo (Administrative Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Wien 
LL.M. – Waseda University 
LL.B. – Soochow University 
SUN Sen-Yen (Civil Law) 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
CHEN Chi-Nan (Civil Law and Civil Procedure) 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
TSENG Hua-Sun (Administrative Law) 
LL.B. – Taipei University 
TUNG Hsiang-Fei (Constitutional Law and Governance) 
M.A. (Politics) – Chengchi University 
B.A. (Politics) – Taipei University 
YANG Huey-Ing (N/A) 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
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TAI Tong-Schung (Civil Law and Legal History) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Mainz 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
SU Jyun-Hsiung (Criminal Law and Legal Philosophy) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Freiburg 
LL.M. – Taiwan University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
HWANG Yueh-Chin (Labour Law) 
Dr.Iur. – Universität Wien 
LL.M. – Taiwan University 
LL.B. – Chengchi University 
LAI In-Jaw (Commercial Law) 
S.J.D. – Harvard University 
LL.M. – Harvard University 
LL.M. – Taiwan University 
LL.B. – Taipei University 
A.S. – Ilan School of Agriculture 
HSIEH Tsay-Chuan (Civil Law) 
LL.M. – Southern Methodist University 
LL.B. – Taiwan University 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (E): QUALIFICATIONS OF THE FIFTH-TERM JUSTICES 
JUSTICE Acad. Judg. Barr. Pros. Admi. 
WENG Yueh-Sheng ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
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CHAI Shau-Hsien ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
YANG Yu-Ling ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
LEE Chung-Sheng ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
YANG Chien-Hua ○ ○ ● ● ╳ 
YANG Zu-Zan ○ ● ● ● ○ 
Herbert Han-Pao Ma ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
LIU Tieh-Cheng ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
CHENG Chien-Tsai ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
WU Geng ○ ● ╳ ○ ╳ 
SHIH Shen-An ╳ ○ ○ ○ ╳ 
CHEN Rui-Tang ╳ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
CHANG Cheng-Tao ╳ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
CHANG Teh-Sheng ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
LEE Chih-Peng ○ ╳ ○ ╳ ╳ 
Acad. = Academic; Judg. = Judge; Barr. = Lawyer; Pros. = Prosecutor; Admi. = Administrator 
○ = One who is qualified for the profession. 
● = One who is qualified for the profession but has never occupied the position. 
╳ = One who is not qualified for the profession. 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (F): QUALIFICATIONS OF THE SIXTH-TERM JUSTICES 
JUSTICE Acad. Judg. Barr. Pros. Admi. 
WENG Yueh-Sheng ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
LIU Tieh-Cheng ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
WU Geng ○ ● ╳ ○ ╳ 
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WANG Ho-Hsiung ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
WANG Tze-Chien ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
LIN Young-Mou ○ ○ ● ○ ╳ 
LIN Kuo-Hsien ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
Vincent SZE ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
CHENG Chung-Mo ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
SUN Sen-Yen ○ ○ ╳ ○ ╳ 
CHEN Chi-Nan ○ ○ ● ○ ╳ 
TSENG Hua-Sun ○ ○ ○ ○ ╳ 
TUNG Hsiang-Fei ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
YANG Huey-Ing ╳ ○ ● ○ ╳ 
TAI Tong-Schung ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
SU Jyun-Hsiung ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
HWANG Yueh-Chin ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ╳ 
LAI In-Jaw ○ ╳ ╳ ╳ ○ 
HSIEH Tsay-Chuan ○ ○ ╳ ● ╳ 
Acad. = Academic; Judg. = Judge; Barr. = Lawyer; Pros. = Prosecutor; Admi. = Administrator 
○ = One who is qualified for the profession. 
● = One who is qualified for the profession but has never occupied the position. 
╳ = One who is not qualified for the profession. 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (G): CAREER AND PREVIOUS PROFESSION OF THE FIFTH-TERM JUSTICE 
JUSTICE MAIN CAREER PREVIOUS PROFESSION 
WENG Yueh-Sheng Academic Professor 
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Taiwan University 
CHAI Shau-Hsien Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
YANG Yu-Ling Judge Director-General 
Ministry of Justice 
LEE Chung-Sheng Judge PFDS Committee 
Judicial Yuan 
YANG Chien-Hua Judge Vice Secretary-General 
Judicial Yuan 
YANG Zu-Zan Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
Herbert Han-Pao Ma Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
LIU Tieh-Cheng Academic Professor 
Chengchi University 
CHENG Chien-Tsai Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
WU Geng Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
SHIH Shen-An Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
CHEN Rui-Tang Judge Judge 
Administrative Court 
CHANG Cheng-Tao Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
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CHANG Teh-Sheng Judge Judge 
Administrative Court 
LEE Chih-Peng Legislator Legislator 
Legislative Yuan 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
 
APPENDIX (H): CAREER AND PREVIOUS PROFESSION OF THE SIXTH-TERM JUSTICE 
JUSTICE MAIN CAREER PREVIOUS PROFESSION 
WENG Yueh-Sheng Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
LIU Tieh-Cheng Academic Professor 
Chengchi University 
WU Geng Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
WANG Ho-Hsiung Prosecutor Prosecutor 
Supreme Procuratorate 
WANG Tze-Chien Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
LIN Young-Mou Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
LIN Kuo-Hsien Judge Chief Judge 
Shilin District Court 
Vincent SZE Academic Professor 
Chengchi University 
CHENG Chung-Mo Administrator Minister 
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Examination Yuan 
SUN Sen-Yen Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
CHEN Chi-Nan Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
TSENG Hua-Sun Judge Judge 
Administrative Court 
TUNG Hsiang-Fei Academic Representative 
National Assembly 
YANG Huey-Ing Judge Judge 
Supreme Court 
TAI Tong-Schung Academic Professor 
Taiwan University 
SU Jyun-Hsiung Academic Representative 
National Assembly 
HWANG Yueh-Chin Academic Minister 
Control Yuan 
LAI In-Jaw Administrator Vice Governor 
Taiwan Province 
HSIEH Tsay-Chuan Judge President 
Judicial Academy 
(Source: Compiled by the author) 
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GLOSSARY 
 
CONSTITUTION OF 1947. This refers to the fundamental and supreme law of the Republic 
of China. It was passed by the Constituent National Assembly on 25 December 1946, 
promulgated by the Nationalist Government on 1 January 1947 and implemented since 
25 December 1947. It was originally designed as the Constitution of the whole of China, 
and was implemented within the 38 member states of the Republic of China, but now 
it is only implemented in two member states, Taiwan (entire) and Fujian (part), as a 
result of the Chinese Civil War. Following the Weimar-Nazi example of the Enabling 
Act,452 a temporary state-of-emergency453 was passed by the National Assembly on 10 
May 1948, thus the Constitution reflected the Weimar Constitution – partially 
suspended because of the Chinese communist rebellion against the Republic until 30 
April 1991 (democratisation). However, the separation of powers system was partially 
and temporarily reorganised after democratisation because the Republic of China no 
longer consisted of 38 member-states (Additional Articles of the Constitution 1991,454 
1992,455 1994,456 1997,457 1999,458 2000459 and 2004460). These Additional Articles 
would be immediately invalidated if the reunification of the Republic of China ever 
occurs. 
 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. The National Assembly was designed as the specific and exclusive 
                                                     
452 Ermächtigungsgesetz (1933). 
453 Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of Communist Rebellion (1948). 
454 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1991). 
455 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1992). 
456 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1994). 
457 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1997). 
458 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (1999) (declared unconstitutional by the Justices in Judicial Yuan 
Interpretation No.499 [2000]). 
459 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (2000). 
460 Constitution of R.O.C. amend. (2005). 
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state organ with the power to amend the Constitution, and to elect and impeach the 
President and Vice President. However, the power of electing and impeaching the 
President and Vice President was removed in 1994 because of the direct election 
referendum. The National Assembly finally ceased to exist in 2004, as a result of its 
task of amending the Constitution being once again taken over by referendum. 
 
PRESIDENT. The president is the Head of the Republic of China and the de facto head of 
its executive political body. The President served a six-year term in accordance with the 
Constitution, but the term of office was shortened into four in 1996. Apart from 
President Chiang Kai-Shek – who served five terms as President (20 May1948 to 5 
April 1975) because of the Temporary Provisions – all Presidents served no more than 
two terms. Under normal circumstances, the President is also the chairman of the ruling 
political party unless he or she resigns from taking the political responsibility for losing 
an election. 
 
EXECUTIVE YUAN. The Executive Yuan is de jure the supreme administrative body of the 
Republic of China in accordance with the Constitution; however, it is de facto a state 
organ which is politically subject to the President. Since 1997, the Additional Articles 
of the Constitution have empowered the President to appoint the Head of the Executive 
Yuan exclusively, and the Republic of China has shifted towards the presidential system 
in reality. 
 
LEGISLATIVE YUAN. The Legislative Yuan is designed to be the house of commons of the 
Republic of China. It is de facto the only house of the Republic of China’s congress 
because the Republic of China no longer consists of 38 member-states, so the senate is 
meaningless at the moment. 
423 
 
 
JUDICIAL YUAN. The Judicial Yuan is the supreme judicial organ of the Republic of China 
and is much more than a constitutional court. It is actually the only state organ that can 
decide what the Constitution is, meaning that it has massive constitutional power not 
only to nullify laws and executive actions but also to modify them. The Judicial Yuan 
is empowered as the supreme organ in terms of punishing public functionaries. It is also 
the exclusive organ for dismissing political parties and the ultimate safeguard of local 
autonomy. In 2000, the Judicial Yuan successfully struck down an unconstitutional 
constitutional amendment.461 
 
EXAMINATION YUAN. The Examination Yuan is designed to be an independent branch of 
government which awards licenses, qualification and certification to candidates who 
pass national exams. It also controls the civil service system of the Republic of China. 
Though it is a silent power in politics, it is very influential to individuals because it is 
the only state organ that can award licenses (including licences to practise law), 
qualifications (including judge qualifications) and certifications (such as civil service 
certification) in Taiwan. In other words, it checks-and-balances the other branches of 
government by awarding licenses, qualifications and certifications under which the 
other four branches of government recruit new members. 
 
CONTROL YUAN. The control Yuan was originally the senate of the Republic of China, set 
up in accordance with the Constitution. It mainly exercises the power of impeachment 
and audit independently. The Members of the Control Yuan were originally 
commissioned by the legislatures of the 38 member-states; however, they are now 
                                                     
461 Judicial Yuan Interpretation No.499 [2000]. 
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appointed by the President since 1992 because the Republic of China no longer consists 
of 38 member-states. 
 
CONGRESS. This refers to the legislature of the Republic of China at the national level 
in this thesis, although some Taiwanese academics prefer to use the term ‘parliament’. 
Its Chinese terminology is Guo Hui. In Taiwan, congress in its narrowest sense may 
also refer only to the Legislative Yuan, and its broad sense changes from time to time – 
it was once a collective of the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control 
Yuan in pre-democracy days (although sometimes the Control Yuan was excluded 
because of its lesser importance). It consisted of the National Assembly and the 
Legislative Yuan between 1990 and 2005. Congress has become an accepted synonym 
for the Legislative Yuan since 2005. Because of Taiwan’s linguistic customs, it is 
difficult to avoid using the words ‘congress’ or ‘parliament’ in Taiwanese legal studies. 
This thesis prefers ‘congress’ to ‘parliament’ because Taiwan has turned into a de facto 
presidential system since the 1997 constitutional amendments. Hence, this thesis adopts 
‘congress’ for translation but respects other translators who prefer ‘parliament’ 
